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I. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The most significant development in the field of appellate practice in
Florida during the 1992-93 year was the revision of the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
As is the case with each set of Florida court rules, such revisions occur
every four years pursuant to the cycle established by Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.130(c). Proposals are submitted by the Florida Appellate
Court Rules Committee ("the Committee") to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which adopts such portions of the proposals as it deems appropriate. The
numerous changes that resulted from this process were adopted by the
supreme court on October 22, 1992,' and took effect on January 1, 1993.2
A. Gender-Neutral Language and Compliance With Supreme
Court Style Guidelines
The rules were rewritten in gender-neutral language and in confor-
mance with the standard style guidelines promulgated by the supreme court
for court rules. Whenever possible, the rules employed the use of plural
instead of' singular pronouns to avoid both gender-specific language and
awkwardness. This is the approach that was suggested by the supreme
court3 and by the report of the court's Gender Study Bias Commission.4
I. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 609 So. 2d 516, 516
(Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Appellate Amendments].
2. Id. at 518.
3. See In re Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.133(b)(6) (Pretrial
Release), 573 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 1991).
4. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF THE FLA.
SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMM'N 239 (March 1990) (on file at Nova
1993]
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Changes for these purposes were made throughout the rules and will not be
detailed in this article. No substantive effect was intended by these changes.
B. Rule 9.010. Effective Date and Scope
This rule was amended to eliminate the statement that the appellate
rules supersede all conflicting rules. The Committee noted that other sets
of Florida court rules contain provisions applicable to certain appellate
proceedings.5 The Committee felt that, in the absence of a clear mandate
from the supreme court that only the appellate rules are to address appellate
concerns, the appellate rules should not automatically control in the event
of a conflict.6 The portion of the rule indicating that the appellate rules
supersede all conflicting statutes was unchanged.7
C. Rule 9.020. Definitions
A change of terminology in subdivision (a) of this rule reflects the fact
that workers' compensation matters are now heard by judges of compensa-
tion claims, rather than deputy commissioners.' Similar references are
changed in other rules, but will not be specifically noted in this article.
The court also adopted an extensive rewrite of subdivision (g) of the
rule, relating to rendition of orders.9  The provision was expanded to
include motions for clarification among those motions that delay rendition °
when they are timely and authorized. The provision was also rewritten to
make clear that when a rule of procedure specifically provides that a
particular motion does not delay rendition, that rule prevails and even a
timely and authorized motion that would otherwise delay rendition will not
have that effect." This change recognizes the fact that in such instances
University Law Library).
5. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.132(c)(4); FLA. W.C.R.P. 4.160.
6. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendments; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 521.
7. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 520.
8. FLA. R. ApP. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 521.
9. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
10. Rendition of an order can be postponed only when a motion, whether it be for
clarification or for some other form of relief specified by the rule, is timely and authorized
by the rules of procedure governing the proceeding in which the final order is entered. See
Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 1986).
I1. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
[Vol. 18
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the supreme court has indicated that the rule dealing with the specific
motion in question prevails over the general appellate rule.' 2
Subdivisions (g)(1), (g)(2) and (g)(3) replace previous language that
simply stated that when an appropriate motion was filed, an order would not
be deemed rendered until the disposition of the motion.' 3
Subdivision (g)(l) reflects that in multiple party cases, the rendition of
an order is delayed only with respect to any claim between a movant and
the party or parties against whom relief is sought by motion. 4 This
change incorporates existing case law.'5 It does not affect cases with just
one plaintiff and one defendant, as the filing of an appropriate motion in
such cases postpones rendition of the entire final order as to all claims
between the parties.' 6
Subdivision (g)(2) was added to make clear that an order granting a
new trial shall be deemed rendered when filed with the clerk even if other
motions remain pending at the time.' 7 This change also incorporates
existing case law'" and is intended to insure that subdivision (g)(1) is not
read as a modification of this principle.'9
Subdivision (g)(3) provides that if a notice of appeal is filed before the
filing of a signed, written order disposing of all motions, all motions filed
by the appealing party that are pending at the time shall be deemed
abandoned and the final order shall be deemed rendered upon the filing of
the notice of appeal as to all claims between parties who then have no
motion pending between them. ° This provision was added to clarify
confusion generated by dicta in Williams v. State,2' which appeared
contrary to the settled principle that the rule incorporates.22 Even when
one party files a notice of appeal, however, the order appealed from is still
12. In re E.P., 544 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 1989).
13. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2M at 521-22.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Phillips v. Ostrer, 442 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
16. FLA. R. App. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment; Appellate Amendments,
609 So. 2d at 523.
17. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 522.
18. Frazier v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 508 So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1987).
19. FLA. RULE R. App. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
20. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 522.
21. 324 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1975).
22. See, e.g., In re Forfeiture of $104,591 in U.S. Currency, 578 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1993]
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not deemed rendered with regard to any other party whose post-judgment
motions are still pending.23
D. Rule 9.030. Jurisdiction of Courts
Subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this rule was amended to correctly indicate
that the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts extends to all non-final orders
listed in Rule 9.130,4 not just those set forth in subdivision (a)(3) of that
rule, as the rule had previously stated.
Subdivision (c)(I)(C) was amended to include thejurisdiction conferred
on circuit courts by article V, section 5 of the Florida Constitution,2 5 which
provides for "the power of direct review of administrative action prescribed
by general law."
E. Rule 9.040. General Provisions
Subdivision (h) was amended to provide that the failure to file
conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal, as required by
Rules 9.110(d), 9.130(c) and 9.160(c), is not a jurisdictional defect, but that
such failure may be the subject of appropriate sanctions.2 6
F. Rule 9.100. Original Proceedings
There were two additions to subdivision (b) of this rule. One change
is to prohibit the practice of bringing original proceedings to enforce a
private right on the relation of the state." Thus, such actions must now
be brought in the name of the parties. 8 The other change requires that if
a petition seeks review of an order entered by a lower tribunal, all parties
to the proceeding in the lower tribunal who are not named as petitioners
shall be named as respondents.29 This change complies with the definitions
set forth in Rule 9.020 (f)(3) and (4), which defines "[p]etitioner" as "[a]
party who seeks an order under Rule 9. 100 or Rule 9.120," and "[r]espon-
dent" as "[e]very other party in a proceeding brought by a petitioner."3
23. FLA. R. APp. P. 9.020 Committee Note-1992 Amendments.
24. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 525.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 529.
27. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 521.
[Vol. 18
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Subdivision (c) was substantially rewritten. Although it retains the
substance of its previous text, two significant changes were incorporated.
It now states in subdivision (c)(2) that petitions for review of final quasi-
judicial actions of agencies, boards and commissions of local government
must be filed within thirty days of the rendition of the order to be reviewed,
the same time limit that is set forth in subdivisions (c)(1) and (3) for tile
filing of petitions for common law certiorari and petitions for review of non-
final administrative actions.3 It also prohibits the practice of naming as
separate respondents to petitions filed under the rule lower court judges,
individual members of agencies, boards and commissions of local govern-
ments, and hearing officers. 32 It continues the practice of requiring copies
of petitions to be served on such individuals, however.33 The purpose of
tile change is to eliminate any suggestion that these individuals are parties
or that they are adverse to the petitioner.34
Subdivision (e) was amended to require that the caption of a petition
designate all parties on each side,35 rather than at least one party on each
side, as had previously been tile case. In addition, a requirement was added
for petitions seeking orders directed to lower tribunals to contain references
to the appropriate pages of the supporting appendix required by Rule
9.220.36 This requirement was intended to mirror the requirement of Rule
9.210(b)(3), which calls for page references to records or transcripts in
briefs. 7
Subdivision (f) was amended to reflect the existing requirement in the
law 38 that a petition for certiorari under this rule must demonstrate not only
that there has been a departure from the essential requirements of law, but
also that the departure will cause material injury for which there is no
adequate remedy by appeal.39 Previously tile rule referred only to the need
31. Id. at 531.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. FLA. R. App. P1. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
35. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 534.
36. Id.
37. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
38. All 'Weather Control, Inc. v. Wawerczyk, 600 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 590 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Young,
Stem & Tannenbaum. P.A. v. Smith, 416 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); In re
J.S., 404 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), dismissed, 412 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1982);
Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 397 So. 2d
779 (Fla. 1981), review denied, 454 U.S. 815 (1981).
39. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 531.
19931
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.,to show a departure from the essential requirements of law and the
Committee felt that it therefore established a standard other than that
established by decisional law."
Subdivision (h) was amended to extend to responses the requirement
adopted for petitions 4' that appropriate page references to appendices be
included. 2
G. Rule 9.110. Appeal Proceedings to Review Final Orders of
Lower Tribunals and Orders Granting New Trial in Jury and
Non-Jury Cases
Subdivision (d) was amended to impose a requirement that, except in
criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal
be attached to such notices.43 Copies of orders entered on timely motions
postponing rendition of orders from which appeals are taken must also be
attached.44 These requirements are for the purpose of assisting the clerk
in determining the nature and type of orders being appealed and the
timeliness of appeals, 45 and are not jurisdictional in nature. 46
Subdivision (m) was created to deal with situations in which notices of
appeal are filed before the rendition of final orders. The subdivision
provides that in such situations, appeals shall be subject to dismissal as
premature,47 but that if a final order is rendered before dismissal of the
premature appeal, the premature notice of appeal will be considered
effective to vest jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the final
order.48 It goes on to provide that before dismissal, the court, in its
discretion, may permit the lower tribunal to render a final order. 49 This
rule would not apply to situations in which the only reason a final order has
not been rendered is the pendency of a motion delaying rendition that was
filed by the same party that filed the notice of appeal. In such a situation,
the pending motion would be deemed abandoned.5
40. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
41. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.100(e).
42. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 532.
43. Id. at 535.
44. Id.
45. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
46. See supra part I.E.
47. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 535.
48. Id. at 535-36.
49. Id. at 536.
50. See supra part I.B.
[Vol. 1 8
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H. Rule 9.120. Discretionary Proceedings to Review Decisions of
District Courts of Appeal
An amendment to subdivision (d) makes clear that the formal
requirements for briefs specified in Rule 9.210 also apply to briefs on
jurisdiction.5
I. Rule 9.130. Proceedings to ReviewWon-Final Orders
This rule was amended to expand the list of non-final orders that may
be reviewed. Specifically, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vii) adds orders that
determine that a class should be certified,52 subdivision (a)(6) adds orders
that deny a motion to certify a class and subdivision (a)(3)(D) adds orders
that grant or deny the appointment of a receiver,53 and terminate or refuse
to terminate a receivership.54
The provisions allowing review from orders relating to the grant or
denial of class certification arose from the Committee's belief that such
orders determine the nature of an action and the extent of the parties and are
analogous to other orders reviewable under the rule.55 These provisions
have been held to apply to orders entered after January 1, 1993, and are
therefore not limited just to orders in cases instituted after that date.56
The provision relating to receivers and receiverships was added in
response to the decision in Twinjay Chambers Partnership v. Suarez,57 in
which the court found that an order denying a request to appoint a receiver
was not appealable under subdivision (a)(3)(C)(ii), which allows appeals
from orders that determine the right to immediate possession of property.5"
The court suggested that the Committee consider whether subdivision
(a)(3)(C)(ii) should be amended to set out whether and to what extent orders
granting or denying such requests should be appealable. 59 The Committee
was of the opinion that orders terminating or refusing to terminate
receiverships are of the same quality as those that grant or deny the
51. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 538.
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. FLA. R. App. P. 9.130 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
56. See Backus v. Broward County, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1993).
57. 556 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
58. Id. at 782.
59. Id.
19931
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appointment of receivers and that, rather than amending subdivision
(a)(3)(C)(ii), it was preferable to create a new provision that specifically
identifies those orders with respect to a receivership that are subject to
review under this rule.6"
In this regard, it should be noted that in a case wholly independent of
the four-year cycle revisions, the supreme court adopted an amendment that
also added a category of orders that may be reviewed. In Mandico v. Taos
Construction, Inc.,61 the court adopted subdivision (a)(3)(C)(vi), which
allows for review of orders determining that a party is not entitled to
workers' compensation immunity as a matter of law.62 That amendment
became effective upon release of the court's opinion63 on July 9, 1992.64
Subdivision (c) was also amended to impose a requirement that, except
in criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices of appeal
of non-final orders shall be attached to the notice.65 This requirement is
consistent with the identical requirement added to Rule 9.1 10(d), dealing
with notices of appeal to review final orders, and is clearly for the same
purpose.66 The requirement is not jurisdictional in nature.67
J. Rule 9.140. Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases
Subdivision (b)(3)(A)(v) was added to provide that when an appeal is
taken in a criminal proceeding, the attorneys of record shall not be relieved
of any professional duties until substitute counsel has been obtained or
appointed, or a statement has been filed with the appellate court that the
appellant has exercised the right to self-representation. 6' The provision
also states that in public-funded cases, the public defender for the local
circuit shall initially be appointed until the record is transmitted to the appel-
late court.69
Subdivision (g) was amended to apply the procedure in effect for
appeals from summary denials of motions for post-conviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, to appeals from summary denials
60. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
61. 605 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1992).
62. Id. at 855.
63. Id
64. Id. at 850.
65. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 542.
66. See supra part I.G.
67. See supra part I.E.
68. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 545.
69. Id.
[Vol. 18
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of motions for correction of sentences under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a).7" The provision was also changed to require the clerk
of the lower tribunal to include in the record, on an appeal from the
summary denial of a Rule 3.800(a) motion, any attachments to the motion,
order, motion for rehearing and order thereon.7 This requirement was
added because a motion under Rule 3.800(a) does not have the same
detailed requirements as one under Rule 3.850.72 A proposal by the
Committee that would have eliminated briefs, except by court permission,
in appeals from motions under both of the criminal rules, was rejected by
the court. 7"
K. Rule 9.160. Discretionary Proceedings to Review Decisions of
County Courts
Subdivision (c) was amended to impose a requirement that, except in
criminal cases, conformed copies of orders designated in notices invoking
the discretionary jurisdiction of district courts of appeal to review county
court orders be attached to such notices.74 Copies of orders entered on
timely motions postponing rendition of orders from which review is sought
must also be attached.75 These requirements are consistent with the
identical requirements added to Rule 9.110(d), dealing with notices of
appeal from final orders, and are clearly for the same purpose.76 The
requirements are not jurisdictional in nature.77
L. Rule 9.200. The Record
Subdivision (b)(2) was amended to require the court reporter to bind
the transcript of proceedings in consecutively numbered volumes and to
number each page consecutively.78
70. Id. at 546.
71. Id.
72. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
73. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 517.
74. Id. at 550.
75. Id.
76. See supra part I.G.
77. See supra part I.E.
78. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 552.
1993]
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Subdivision (d)(1)(A) was amended to require the clerk to incorporate
the trial transcript at the end of the record and to prohibit the clerk from
renumbering that transcript. 79
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) was amended to include any transcripts other
than the trial transcript as part of the remainder of the record that is to be
consecutively numbered."0
These changes were made to standardize the lower court clerk's
procedure with respect to the placement and pagination of the transcript in
the record on appeal.8"
M. Rule 9.210. Briefs
Significant additions were made to subdivision (a)(2) with regard to the
type, size and spacing required for briefs. The provision requires that the
text be printed in type of no more than ten characters per inch and that text
should be double spaced with no more than twenty-seven lines per page.1
2
It further states that, although footnotes may be single spaced, they shall be
in the same type size, with the same spacing between the characters, as the
text. 3
These requirements were imposed to bring about uniformity, to
preclude efforts to circumvent the length requirements for briefs established
by subdivision (a)(5) by the use of smaller type and to eliminate the filing
of briefs that are difficult to read because of small type and spacing.84 It
appears that modern technology brought about these changes, as the
Committee took into account the fact that "[t]hrough the utilization of
various word processing systems, lawyers, if they choose, can reduce the
size of print and spacing in footnotes and significantly extend the allowable
length of their briefs, while at the same time making the ultimate product
more difficult to read. 85
Subdivision (g) was amended to allow for the filing of notices of
supplemental authority that call the court's attention not just to decisions,
rules or statutes, but also to other authorities."s A provision was also
added allowing the notice to identify briefly the points argued on appeal to
79. Id. at 553.
80. Id.
81. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.200 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
82. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 556.
83. Id.
84. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.210 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
85. REPORT OF THE FLA. BAR APPELLATE COURT RULES COMM. 6 (1992).
86. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 556.
[Vol. 18
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which the supplemental authorities are pertinent, but stating that the notice
shall not contain argument.8 7
N. Rule 9.220. Appendix
This rule was amended to provide that if an appendix includes
documents filed before January 1991, on paper measuring 8 1/2 by 14
inches, the documents should be reduced in copying to 8 1/2 by 11 inches,
if practicable.88 If impracticable, the appendix may measure 8 1/2 by 14
inches, but it should be bound separately from the document it accompa-
nies. 9
These additions to the rule were necessitated by the adoption of Florida
Rule of Judicial Administration 2,055, which requires the use of 8 1/2 by
11 inch paper for all documents filed in any court and which became
mandatory on January 1, 1991.90 Problems arose when documents filed
prior to that date on the longer paper needed to be included in an appendix
filed after that date and the new rules address those problems.9'
0. Rule 9.300. Motions
Subdivision (b) was clarified to reflect that an order granting an
extension of time for preparation of the record or the index of the record or
for filing of the transcript of proceedings automatically extends, for a like
period, the time for service of the appellant's initial brief.92 Although the
subdivision already provided, and continues to provide, that an order
extending time for any act automatically extends the time for all other acts
that bear a relation to it, the briefing schedule is related by time only to the
filing of the notice of appeal. 93 Thus, it was felt that the existing rule did
not act to automatically extend the time for filing the appellant's brief when
there was a delay in preparing or filing the record, index of record or
transcript. Accordingly, the specific language was added.94 The subdivi-
sion was also modified to eliminate the reference to an order extending time
87. Id. at 556-57.
88. Id. at 558-59.
89. Id. at 559.
90. In re Amendment to the Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., Rule 2.055 (Paper Size), 550
So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1989).
91. FLA. R. App. P. 9.220 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
92. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 559.
93. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(0.
94. FLA. R. App. P. 9.300 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
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entered by the lower tribunal.9" This action was taken to correlate the rule
with Rule 9.600(a), which provides that only an appellate court can grant an
extension of time for any act under the appellate rules.96
P. Rule 9.310. Stay Pending Review
Subdivision (c)(1) was modified to eliminate the ability of parties
posting a bond through the use of two personal sureties, but to allow parties,
as an alternative, the use of a surety company, to deposit cash in the circuit
court clerk's office. 97 The Committee was of the opinion that a meaning-
ful supersedeas could be obtained only through the use of one of those two
methods. 9' Specific language was also added to note that the lower
tribunal retains continuing jurisdiction to determine the actual sufficiency of
any such bond. 99
Q. Rule 9.800. Uniform Citation System
The uniform citation system set forth in this rule underwent significant
revision.'00 In citing to the Southern Reporter, Second Series, a space
between "So." and "2d" is required.' Similarly, spaces are inserted
between "S." and "Ct." in citing to the Supreme Court Reporter' and
between "L." and "Ed." and "2d" in citing to Lawyer's Edition, Second
Series.0 3 There is no space, however, between "U." and "S." in citing to
United States Reports. 10
4
When citing to a United States Supreme Court decision, the first
citation should include all three of the above reports, while subsequent
citations, as well as pinpoint citations, should be to the United States
Reports only.'05
95. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 558.
96. FLA. R. App. P. 9.300 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
97. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 561.
98. FLA. R. App. P. 9.310 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
99. Appellate Amendments, 609 So. 2d at 563.
100. The changes are too numerous for each one to be discussed in this article. Some
of the more significant changes will be noted.
101. FLA. R. App. P. 9.800(a)(2), (3).
102. Id. 9.800(k).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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The citation for Florida Law Weekly has been changed to "Fla. L.
Weekly" from "F.L.W."' 6 Other provisions state that the rule applies to
all legal documents, including court opinions,' that citations not covered
by the rule or by The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, shall be in
the form prescribed by the Florida Style Manual published by Florida State
University, 1 8 and that case names should be underscored or italicized in
both text arid footnotes. 10 9
R. Rule 9.900. Forms
Forms 9.900(a), (c) and (e) were revised to remind the practitioner that
conformed copies of the order or orders designated in a notice of appeal or
a notice to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of district courts of appeal
to review county court orders should be attached to the notice of appeal as
provided in Rules 9.110(d), 9.130(c) and 9.160(c)."0
II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Some of the changes to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration
that were made during the same four-year cycle that brought about the
revisions to the appellate rules will also impact on appellate practice. The
changes to the Rules of Judicial Administration were adopted by the
supreme court on October 8, 1992,' and took effect on January 1,
1993. 112
A. Rule 2.040. District Courts of Appeal
Changes in terminology were adopted to reflect changes in the appellate
rules and in the Florida Constitution. In subdivision (b)(5), the term
"petition for rehearing" was changed to "motion pursuant to Florida Rule of
106. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(a)(4), (b)(2), (c)(3).
107. Id. 9.800.
108. Id. 9.800(n); see Florida State University Law Review, Florida Style Manual, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 525 (1991).
109. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.800(o).
I10. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.900 Committee Note-1992 Amendment.
11I. The Fla. Bar re: Amendment to Fla. Rules of Judicial Admin., 609 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
1992) [hereinafter Judicial Administration].
112. Id. at 466.
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Appellate Procedure 9.330." ''t 3 This action was taken in recognition of the
fact that the appellate rule cited now calls for rehearing by motion, rather
than by petition, and the fact that the rule allows a party to seek not just
rehearing, but also clarification and certification."' In the same subdivi-
sion, the references to a "petition for certiorari" being "filed" in the supreme
court were changed to "discretionary review proceedings" being "timely
commenced" in the supreme court." 5  This substitution was made in
recognition of the changes in article V, section 3(b) of the Florida Constitu-
tion that gave the supreme court the authority to consider cases on
discretionary review rather than by certiorari." 6 The amendments are not
intended to impact on the rule in a substantive manner." 7
B. Rule 2.055. Paper
The most obvious impact of the changes to the Rules of Judicial
Administration will come from the amendments to Rule 2.055, which
require the use of recycled paper for all documents filed in any court." '
The rule defines "recycled paper" as paper containing a minimum content
of fifty percent waste paper. "' The definition was taken from the United
States Environmental Protection Agency Recommended Minimum Content
Standards of Selected Papers and Paper Products. 2 1 In an effort to ensure
the easy availability of paper that meets the definition, no requirement was
included that any of the paper's content be post-consumer waste materi-
als.'12  This amendment provides the one exception to the effective date
of the four-year cycle revisions. Although it took effect on January 1, 1993,
like the other rule changes, it does not become mandatory until January 1,
1994. 122
113. Id. at 472.
114. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 2 (1992).
115. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 472.
116. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 2 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 476.
119. Id.
120. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,546 (1988) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (proposed
June 22, 1988).
121. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. COMM. 9 (1992).
122. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 476.
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C. Rule 2.060. Attorneys
Changes to subdivision (b) of this rule require foreign attorneys who
seek to appear in particular cases in Florida courts to be active members of
the bar of another state. 3 These foreign attorneys are also required to
submit verified motions for permission to appear with or before their initial
personal appearance, paper, motion or pleading." 4 Moreover, they must
also state in the motion all jurisdictions in which they are active members
in good standing of the Bar and the number of cases in which they have
filed a motion for permission to appear in Florida in the preceding three
years. 25
D. Rule 2.160. Disqualification of Trial Judges
This is a new rule that deals with the disqualification of trial judges.
It embodies the dictates of Brown v. St. George Island, Ltd.,'26 which
interpreted sections 38.02 and 38.10 of the Florida Statutes, dealing with
disqualification. The rule states in subdivision (a) that it applies only to
circuit and county court judges.2 7  That is because it was held in In re
Carlton121 that sections 38.02 and 38.10 do not apply to appellate judg-
es.29 In adopting this rule, the supreme court stated that it declined "to
adopt a review authority"1 3' as part of the rule, indicating that authority
for review must be in the appellate rules.' 3' Accordingly, the court asked
that the Appellate Court Rules Committee consider the appropriate authority
for reviewing orders of disqualification and whether an amendment to the
123. Id. at 477.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 561 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1990).
127. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 490.
128. 378 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980).
129. Because subdivision (a) indicates that the rule applies "to county and circuit judges
in all matters in all divisions of court", the question may well arise as to whether the rule
applies to circuit judges sitting in their appellate capacity. It appears that the rule was not
intended to apply in such a manner. The committee report proposing the change indicates
that "[s]ubdivision (a) of the proposed rule limits the scope of the rule to trial judges," and
states that the limitation is in recognition of the fact that in Carlton, the supreme court found
that the statutory provisions that were later interpreted in Brown, the case that formed the
basis for the rule, do not apply to appellate judges. REPORT OF THE FLA. RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMIN. COMM. :28 (1992). Moreover, the title of the rule specifically refers to trial judges.
130. Judicial Administration, 609 So. 2d at 466.
131. Id.
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appellate rules is necessary.32 Thus, it is presently unclear what form of
review is appropriate for orders dealing with disqualification. Presumably,
this question will be answered by revision of the appellate rules or by case
law in the near future.
III. CASES
In a broad sense, every appellate decision falls within the scope of
appellate practice. Decisions relating to substantive areas of the law,
however, are more properly dealt with in articles relating to those substan-
tive areas and therefore will not be discussed here. Rather, this article will
focus on matters relating to practice in the appellate courts and will deal
with substantive areas only with regard to appellate considerations unique
to those areas. The article will be limited to appellate practice in the
supreme court and the district courts of appeal and will not deal with issues
relating to circuit courts sitting in their appellate capacities, except insofar
as such issues relate or compare to the district courts or the supreme court.
Additionally, this article will not discuss cases relating to the preservation
of issues or the question of whether particular errors were harmless.
A. The Appellate Process
1. Notice of Appeal
In Alfonso v. Department of Environmental Regulation,'33 the su-
preme court dealt with a situation in which an appellant filed a notice of
appeal in the district court of appeal, rather than in the circuit court, as
required by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.1 10(b). Receding from
its prior decision in Lampkin-Asam v. District Court of Appeal,'34 the
court in Alfonso held "that an appellate court's jurisdiction is invoked by a
timely filing of a notice of appeal or a petition for certiorari in either the
lower court that issued the order to be reviewed or the appellate court which
would have jurisdiction to review the order."' 35 It is thus likely that the
appellate rules will need to be amended to incorporate this holding.
132. Id.
133. 616 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1993).
134. 364 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1978).
135. Alfonso, 616 So. 2d at 47.
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In In re E.H.,36 the court found that in a case involving the termina-
tion of parental rights, parents are entitled to belated appeals based on
ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys fail to timely file the
notices of appeal. 37  The court stated, "[w]e do not believe that the
attorney's mistake should be imputed to the mother when the consequence
of the mistake is the mother's permanent loss of custody of her chil-
dren."' 38  While such reasoning is routinely employed to grant belated
appeals in criminal cases, its application in the civil context is quite unusual.
As the court noted, "[w]e did not grant the belated appeal in this case based
on precedent, but on the significant policy interest in ensuring that a parent
and child are not separated without a thorough review of the merits of the
case."' 39 The court also found a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
trial court to be the appropriate remedy for obtaining a belated appeal in this
context. 
40
2. Captions of Cases and Parties
In Fink v. Holt,141 the Fourth District Court of Appeal disapproved
of the widespread practice of identifying appeals in forfeiture cases by
reference to the property involved. The notice of appeal and the briefs in
the case bore a caption identical to that used in the circuit court proceeding,
which read, "In Re: Forfeiture of One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, Florida Tag
No. ACL959, VIN 161YY0785F5100137, Together With All Tangible and
Intangible Personal Property Found Therein."', 42 Noting that the rules of
appellate procedure 43 require that the caption of cases contain the name
and designation of at least one party on each side, the court, on its own
motion, amended the caption of the appeal to identify the parties in-
volved. 14
4
The Fourth District also questioned the wisdom in the naming of the
trial court judge as the only proper respondent in a petition for a writ of
136. 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
137. Id. at 1290.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1291.
140. Id.
141. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
142. Id. at 1335.
143. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(d), 9.900(a).
144. Fink, 609 So. 2d at 1336.
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prohibition. In Fabber v. Wessel,'45 the court stated that the response filed
in the case on behalf of the named respondent judge,'46 which took
exception with the accuracy of the petitioner's factual account, created "an
intolerable adversary atmosphere between the trial judge and the liti-
gant."' 47 Although the court declined to hold that any response filed by
a judge in a prohibition-disqualification proceeding is per se disqualifying,
the court stated that it is "decidedly dangerous" for the judge to respond and
suggested that it is "much the better practice" for the judge to remain silent
and let the adversarial party supply the response. 4 '
3. Record on Appeal
a. Contents of Record
Several cases addressed issues relating to the record on appeal. In
Citizens of the State of Florida v. Beard,49 the supreme court was called
upon to decide whether memoranda of staff and transcripts of agenda
conferences are properly included in records of appeals from decisions of
the Public Service Commission. The court concluded that such memoranda
are properly considered part of the record if they are memoranda of staff
who testify or otherwise become involved in the hearing with which the
appeal is concerned. 5 ' On the other hand, when the advisory staff neither
testifies nor actively participates in the hearing, such memoranda are not to
be considered part of the record.'' The court recognized that an agenda
conference is somewhat akin to the discussion of appellate judges in
conference, but concluded that the transcripts of such conferences may be
made part of an appellate record because the conferences are public
meetings and the transcripts are public records.'52
An effort to supplement the record with an affidavit of the trial judge,
setting forth the judge's recollection of a hearing, was rejected by the First
145. 604 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 617 So. 2d 322 (Fla.
1993).
146. The court indicated that the fact that the response was prepared and signed by a
member of the attorney general's staff did not make it any less a response by the judge, for
it was submitted expressly in his name. Id. at 534 n. I.
147. Id. at 534 (quoting Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1978)).
148. Id.
149. 613 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1992).
150. Id. at 404.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 405.
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District in Hadden v. State. " The court noted that such an affidavit is
not part of the record as defined by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.200 and that the affidavit in the case was not the product of the procedure
set forth by Rule 9.200(b)(4) for offering a statement of the evidence for use
when a transcript is unavailable.' 54
b. Filing of Record and Transcripts
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(e) states that "Itlhe burden
to ensure that the record is prepared and transmitted in accordance with
these rules shall be on the petitioner or appellant."' 55 In Kobel v. Schlos-
ser, 156 the Fourth District indicated that it was placing "everyone" on
notice that it was interpreting this provision "to require an appellant to seek
an enlargement of time to prepare the record and serve the index, or other
appropriate relief where such is necessary, before the expiration of the
period prescribed by the rules."' 57 The court allotted the responsibility in
this manner, rather than requiring the circuit court appeals clerk to seek
enlargements of time when necessary, a process that had apparently been
followed at some point in the past.
In Freeman v. State, 58 the Fourth District also indicated that it was
"not sympathetic to requests for extraordinary extensions of time because the
court reporter has too many cases,"' 59 particularly in criminal cases. The
court went on to state, "[t]his court will not tolerate court reporters delaying
criminal appeals, while defendants are incarcerated, because the reporters
knowingly take on more work than they can timely perform.""" In light
of these principles, the court imposed a fine on a court reporter who
received a sixty day extension to prepare a transcript of a five day trial, who
unsuccessfully sought a second, fifty day extension and who filed the
transcript over a month after the date set by the court in denying her second
motion. "'
153. 616 So. 2d 153 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
154. Id. at 154.
155. FLA. R. App. P. 9.200(e).
156. 601 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Id. at 602-03.
158. 621 So, 2d 472 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
159. Id. at 473.
160. Id. 1
161. Id.
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4. Motions
In City of Miami Beach v. Korostishevski,62 the First District com-
mented that it is an improper procedure for a party wanting some relief from
the court to send a letter to the court or to make a phone call to the
clerk.'63 Rather, the court indicated that such parties should file an
appropriate motion.'64
The Fourth District, in Kobel, noted that motions for additional time to
do something required or permitted by the rules, filed after the expiration
of the original period, are required to show some good reason why timely
application was not sought.
165
In Lurie v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 166 the First District pointed
out that the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure do not authorize a reply
to a response to a motion and that such unauthorized pleadings are
ordinarily ignored or sua sponte stricken by the court.
1 67
In In re C.G.,68 the Second District published an order granting a
short extension of time "as notice that parental termination appeals should
be expedited by all persons involved in the process."'' 69 The court noted
that in the future it will grant extensions in such cases only for extraordinary
reasons and will impose sanctions, if necessary, to assure that the cases are
expedited.'70
5. Briefs
In F.M W. Properties, Inc. v. Peoples First Financial Savings & Loan
Ass'n,'' the First District pointed out that "proper organization of briefs
pursuant to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is not only desirable
and convenient, it has become an absolute necessity."'7I The court
refrained from striking the appellant's brief in the case despite the fact that
the argument section of the brief did not track the issues the appellants
162. 619 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
163. Id. at 495.
164. Id.
165. Kobel, 601 So. 2d at 603.
166. 605 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
167. Id. at 1025.
168. 609 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id. at 632.
170. Id.
171. 606 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 377.
[Vol. 1 8
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
1993]
purported to raise.'73  The court noted, however, "that the failure to
organize arguments under cogent and distinct issues on appeal presents
sufficient reason for an appellate court to decline consideration of a
matter."' 
74
The First District also provided guidance as to the appropriate
procedure to correct typographical errors in briefs. In North Florida
Regional Medical Center v. Witt,'17 the court disapproved of the practice
of providing the court with pages upon which corrections have been made
to be substituted for the original pages. The court stated, "[w]e do not have
the staff resources to perform such tasks nor are we willing to accept the
responsibility for error that might occur in the process."' 76  Rather, the
court indicated that parties moving to amend briefs must accompany their
motions with an original and three copies of an amended brief.' 77 The
same process is to be followed, the court noted, by any party required to
serve an amended brief due to the striking of a brief.7 8
In Beatty v. State,'79 the Second District denied a motion to file an
enlarged brief of sixty-five pages 80 when forty pages were used for the
statement of facts.' The court noted that the statement started at the
beginning of the trial and summarized the testimony of every witness who
testified, without regard to the issues on appeal.'82 The court stated that
this approach made it "virtually impossible to obtain an overview of the
factual situation," which the court indicated should be the purpose of the
statement of facts.'83 Moreover, the court noted that it could "only
assume this method is used because it is easier than setting forth the facts
in a logical, more readable fashion."' 84 Although recognizing that it had
little control in most cases as to the method used by appellate counsel to
173. Id.
174. Id. at 377-78.
175. 616 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
176. Id. at 614-15.
177. Id. at 615.
178. Id.
179. 621 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
180. Absent court permission, initial briefs of appellants and answer briefs of appellees
are limited to 50 pages by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(5).
181. Beatty, 621 So. 2d at 678.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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state the facts, the court commented that it had "no intention of encouraging
the practice used here." '185
6. Appendices
The First District, in Korostishevski, dealt with the question of how
appellees in appeals from non-final orders in workers' compensation cases
should cite to items not included in appellants' appendices which appellees
feel are necessary to the court's decision.' 86 The court interpreted Florida
Rule of Workers' Compensation 4.180(b)(3) as calling for such appellees to
file their own appendix and for citations in their briefs to be made to
appellant's appendix, appellee's appendix, or both, as may be appropri-
ate. 187
In a case involving review of non-final administrative orders, Agency
for Health Care Administration v. Orlando Regional Healthcare System,
Inc., '8 the First District rejected an attempt to file as an appendix evi-
dence which had not been submitted to the hearing officer for consideration.
It was unsuccessfully argued that the 1977 Committee Note to Florida Rule
of Appellate Procedure 9.100(e) authorized the inclusion of such materi-
al. 89 That note refers to an appendix "containing conformed copies of the
order to be reviewed and other relevant material, including portions of the
record, if a record exists."' 9° The court noted the basic rule that an appeal
asserting error on the part of a lower tribunal' 9' can only be based on
evidence presented to that tribunal and stated that any exception to the
general rule which may be implied from the committee note was not present
in the case.' 92
7. Relinquishment of Jurisdiction
In Lurie v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.,' 93 the First District discussed
the procedures and standards involved when a party seeks relinquishment of
jurisdiction. The court stated that the burden is on the moving party to
185. Id.
186. Korostishevski, 619 So. 2d at 494.
187. Id. at 495.
188. 617 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
189. Id.
190. FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(e) Committee Note-1977 Amendment.
191. Agencyfor Health Care Admin., 617 So. 2d at 389.
192. Id.
193. 605 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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show entitlement to relief' 94 and that the presumption is that judicial
economy would be best served by leaving jurisdiction in the appellate court
until issuance of mandate'95 and that, a party wishing to overcome that
presumption must show entitlement to relief by informing the court of the
specific nature of the proceedings it seeks to have conducted in the trial
court. 196
8. Notices of Supplemental Authority
In Ogden Allied Services v. Panesso,'97 the First District struck
notices of supplemental authority and published its order doing so "to place
the bar on notice" that abuses involved with such notices will be treated
similarly. The appellee in the case, on the afternoon before oral argument,
filed and served a notice of supplemental authority which had attached to
it copies of twenty-two cases, totalling 125 pages, all of which had been
decided before the appellee's answer brief was filed. 9 The notice
prompted the appellants to respond with their own notices on the morning
of oral argument.'99
The court found such filings to be a misuse of Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.2 10(g) and Florida Rule of Workers' Compensation
Procedure 4.225, which "are intended to permit a litigant to bring to the
court's attention cases of real significance to the issues raised which were
not cited in the briefs, either because they were not decided until after the
briefs had been filed; or because, through inadvertence, they were not
discovered earlier. 22 These rules, the court went on to state, "are not
intended to permit a litigant to submit what amounts to an additional brief,
under the guise of 'supplemental authorities'; or to ambush an opponent by
deliberately withholding significant case citations until just before oral
argument. 20'
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1025.
196. Id.
197, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
198. Id. at 1023.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1024.
201. Id.
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9. Proceedings After Appellate Determination is Final
In Green v. Rety, 2 the supreme court considered the certified question
of whether Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.340(c), which states that
if a judgment of reversal is entered that requires the entry of a money
judgment on a verdict, the mandate shall be deemed to require such money
judgment to be entered as of the date of the verdict, applies when an
appellate court-ordered remittitur requires entry of ajudgment in an amount
less than the full amount of the jury's verdict.2 °3 The court concluded that
the district court's finding that the trial court's remittitur had been excessive
constituted a "reversal" under the rule. 204 Accordingly, the court answered
the question in the affirmative, found that the date of the verdict controlled,
and determined that all interest would be computed from that date.20 5
In City of Miami v. Arostegui, °6 the First District issued its mandate
after the appellant filed a notice invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of
the supreme court. The appellant moved to recall the mandate. The motion
was treated as a motion to stay the effect of the mandate and was denied by
the court.
The court found that the filing of a notice invoking discretionary
jurisdiction does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to issue a
mandate.20 7 The court rejected a claim that the automatic stay provision
of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), which states that the
timely filing of a notice of appeal by a public body or a public officer shall
automatically operate as a stay, applies when discretionary review is
sought °.2 8 The court also rejected an additional argument that the mere
fact that a case was pending review in the supreme court compels a district
court to recall its mandate. 20 9 The court therefore concluded that when a
public body desires to stay the decision of a district court while discre-
tionary review is pending, it should file a motion to stay the mandate before
the mandate is issued by the district court.210 Once the mandate is issued,
202. 616 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 435.
205. Id.
206. 616 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
207. Id. at 1119.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1121.
210. Id.
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the court stated, a motion to stay its effect should be filed in the supreme
court.21
In Wilcox v. Hotelerama Associates, Ltd,2 12 the Third District dealt
with the question of whether, after mandate issued in a case that was
reversed and remanded for a new trial, the trial court could stay the retrial
until the losing parties on appeal paid an award of appellate costs or posted
a cost bond. The court found such a stay to be improper, noting that "a trial
court's role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes
purely ministerial, and its function is limited to obeying the appellate court's
order or decree." '2 3 Despite recognizing the broad discretion a trial court
has in ordering stays in proceedings before it,214 the court concluded that
in light of its specific mandate, which was not conditioned upon payment
of the appellate costs, "the trial court was without discretion in its obligation
to proceed with the disposition of the case without entering a stay pending
the payment of the costs of the appeal." '215
In In re B.C.,216 the First District held that the county, rather than the
state, has the burden of paying for appointed counsel and for costs in
proceedings for the termination of parental rights.2" 7 The court relied on
section 43.28 of the Florida Statutes, which requires counties to provide,
among other things, the "personnel necessary to operate the circuit and
county courts."2 ' The court rejected the county's contention that a
different result was compelled by article VII, section 18 of the Florida
Constitution, which limits the circumstances under which a county can be
required by a general law to spend funds. The court concluded that the
constitutional provision, which was ratified by the electorate in the
November, 1990 election, was prospective in operation and thus targeted at
211. Arostegui, 616 So. 2d at 1121.
212. 619 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
213. Id. at 445-46 (citing Milton v. Keith, 503 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987); O.P. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 302 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1974); Berger v.
Leposky, 103 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1958)).
214. Id. at 446 (citing Regan, Inc. v. Val-Ro, Ltd., 396 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Neale v. Aycock, 340 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied,
351 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1977); Price v. Hernando Beach, Inc., 286 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973)).
215. Id.
216. 610 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), reviewgranted., 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1992).
217. Id
218. Id. at n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (Supp. 1992)).
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laws passed after its effective date,219 laws which do not include section
43.28 of the Florida Statutes.
Several other cases also dealt with issues relating to appellate attorney's
fees. In Hernstadt v. Brickell Bay Club Condominium Ass 'n,22° the Third
District found that when an appellate court awards appellate attorney's fees
and remands for a determination of the amount, it is improper for the party
against whom the fees are to be assessed to argue in the trial court or on a
subsequent appeal the issue of entitlement to the fees.221 In Duffy v.
Brooker,222 the First District rejected a claim that sections 59.46 and
766.206(3) of the Florida Statutes mandate an award of appellate attorney's
fees to prevailing parties in medical malpractice cases on the issue of
compliance with the reasonable investigation requirements of chapter 766,
Florida Statutes.223  In Langel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. ,224 the
Fourth District found attorney's fees appropriate when the appellants
impermissibly sought to reargue issues they had already raised and argued,
and which were rejected, in a previous appeal.225
B. Appeals in Workers' Compensation Cases
In Hines Electric v. McClure,226 the First District interpreted Florida
Rule of Workers' Compensation Procedure 4.160(b), a recently adopted
rule 227 that deals with appellate review of non-final orders. The rule states
that the district court "may" review certain listed non-final orders.
The court stated that it was "candidly perplexed' 228 by the new rule.
The court pointed out that the rule was derived from Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.130, but that the appellate rule provides for review
as a matter of right from the non-final orders listed therein. 229 The court
further noted that neither the text of the rule nor the commentary accompa-
219. Id. at 628.
220. 602 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. Id. at 968.
222. 614 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
223. Id. at 547.
224. 614 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
225. Id. at 1218.
226. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
227. Amendments to Fla. Rules of Workers' Compensation Procedure, 603 So. 2d 425
(Fla. 1992).
228. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 134.
229. Id.
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nying its adoption provided guidance as to the correct legal standard to be
utilized in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.23
The court also pointed out that the rule provides for discretionary
review of some orders that were reviewable by common law certiorari, and
some that were not reviewable by certiorari or otherwise until a final order
was entered by a judge of compensation claims.23' This fact caused the
court to comment that there was no indication of whether the adoption of
the rule was intended to provide for review of a greater number of orders
prior to the ultimate disposition by the judge of compensation claims, or to
ease the appellate court's overburdened docket by granting greater flexibility
to refuse certain types of cases.232
The court went on to indicate that the rule did not set forth a procedur-
al mechanism for the parties to address the jurisdictional issue233 nor did
the rule set forth a standard of review to be used after jurisdiction is
accepted.234 Summing up its frustration with the rule, the court opined
that it "creates a whole new type of review which did not previously exist
under Florida law" '235 and that the court was "faced with the unenviable
task of determining the procedural and substantive effect of a rule that is
unclear, ambiguous and which could have a significant impact ' on the
court's workload.237
The court therefore adopted a procedure calling for a party seeking
review pursuant to Rule 4.160(b) to file a brief and an appendix along with
the notice of appeal. 23' The brief is to address whether the court should
exercise its jurisdiction and the merits of the issue being appealed.239
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 134.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 134-35.
237. The court noted that it appeared that the rule was adopted without any meaningful
input from the judges of the court, which has statewide primary jurisdiction over workers'
compensation appeals. The court took issue with the opinion adopting the rules by the
supreme court, which stated that the proposed new rules had been published in the Florida
Bar News. Amendments to Fla. Rules of Workers'Compensation Procedure, 603 So. 2d at
425. The court stated that all that was actually published was a summary of the rules and
that the summary, in the court's opinion, was not accurate. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 135
n.5.
238. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 136.
239. Id.
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The court will then review the brief and appendix to determine whether
the appellant has demonstrated a prima facie case for entitlement to
interlocutory relief.24° For appeals from all orders listed in the rule other
than discovery matters under subdivision (b)(5), the court will exercise its
discretion to review the order if the order is one that would be reviewable
as a matter of right under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130.241
If the order is not one reviewable as a matter of right under the appellate
rule, the court will exercise its discretion only if: (1) the order constitutes
a departure from the essential requirements of law; (2) would cause material
harm; and (3) could not be adequately remedied by appeal.242 Appeals
relating to discovery matters under subdivision (b)(5) will be judged by the
standard set forth by that provision, which requires the party seeking review
to demonstrate irreparable harm and that there is no adequate remedy at law
to rectify such harm.243
If the court determines that a prima facie basis for relief exists, it will
issue an order accepting jurisdiction and briefing will continue in accordance
with the appellate rules.244 The answer and reply briefs will also need to
address the jurisdictional issue. 45
The court recognized that as it gained more experience with this type
of case, it may have to revisit the adopted procedure.246 The court also
urged the Workers' Compensation Rules Committee to revisit the rules in
an effort to alleviate the problems discussed in the opinion.247
C. Appeals in Criminal Cases
1. Appointed Counsel
In Green v. State,248 the supreme court dealt with a situation in which
a court-appointed attorney for a defendant, whose conviction and death
sentence had been upheld, requested the trial court to appoint him at the
county's expense for the purpose of petitioning the United States Supreme
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Hines Elec., 616 So. 2d at 136.
244. Id. at 136-37.
245. Id. at 137.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 620 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1993).
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Court for certiorari.249 The supreme court reversed the denial of this
motion, finding that the ruling denied the defendant equal protection under
article 1, section 2 of the Florida Constitution.25°
The defendant had initially been represented on appeal by the public
defender, who withdrew due to an excessive caseload. 25' A private
attorney was then appointed to handle the unsuccessful appeal.252 At a
hearing on the motion to appoint counsel for the United States Supreme
Court proceeding, testimony was presented that the public defender seeks
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court in every case in which
the defendant is sentenced to death.253
The supreme court concluded that when a defendant is represented by
court-appointed counsel and is sentenced to death, "the court-appointed
counsel must have the same professional independence to seek federal relief
on an individual basis as the public defender whom court-appointed counsel
replaces and must be compensated accordingly. 254
In Turner v. State, 25 5 the Fourth District also addressed an issue
dealing with appointed counsel. In that case, the attorney that had been
appointed to represent the defendant at trial, due to the public defender's
conflict of interest, was later appointed for the purpose of appeal.2"6 On
motion for reconsideration by the County Commission of Palm Beach
County, which was concerned with the expense of appointed counsel, the
trial court determined that the conflict of interest did not carry through to
the appellate stage and that it was obligated to appoint the public defend-
er.21 Noting first that Palm Beach County had no standing to intervene
in the proceedings, 258 the appellate court found that because the public
defender asserted that the conflict still existed, the issue of conflict was not
extinguished, as an appeal is merely a continuation of the original proceed-
249. Id. at 188.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 188-89.
252. Id. at 189.
253. Green. 620 So. 2d at 189.
254. Id. at 190.
255. 611 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
256. Id. at 12.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial
Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1990); Escambia County v. Behr, 384 So. 2d
147 (Fla. 1980)).
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ings. 9  The court therefore reversed the order appointing the public
defender and directed the trial court to appoint a special counsel to represent
the defendant on appeal.
2 60
2. Appellate Proceedings Instituted by the State
In State v. Zenobia,26 1 the Fourth District discussed the manner in
which it reviews petitions for writs of common law certiorari in which the
state seeks review of a pre-trial ruling on a motion in limine denying the
state's request to admit certain evidence. The court noted that it viewed
such rulings as "entirely tentative, 2 62 because a judge "may suffer a
change of mind,263 after the evidence is actually adduced at the trial.
Accordingly, the court stated that it begins its "analysis of a petition for
certiorari seeking reversal of a pre-trial exclusion of evidence with an
inclination to forego extraordinary review., 264  The court went on to
indicate that when the pre-trial exclusion is attended also by factual rulings
by the trial judge, such as a finding that the evidence's unfair prejudicial
aspects outweigh its probative value, the court is "doubly reluctant" to
reverse the exclusion.265
An unusual situation presented itself in State v. Lozano,266 when the
state petitioned the First District for a writ of certiorari purportedly to
protect a defendant's constitutional rights. The case dealt with a situation
in which the trial court granted a defense motion for a change of venue and
moved the trial from Miami to Orlando.267 Subsequently, the court on its
own motion, moved the trial to Tallahassee. 268 The defendant then moved
for another change of venue. 69
After the trial court took evidence and heard argument on the motion
for change of venue, the state joined in the motion insofar as the defendant
claimed that his rights were violated by the small Hispanic population in
259. Id. at 13 (citing Aranda v. State, 205 So. 2d 667, 670 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. dismissed, 218 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1968).
260. Turner, 611 So. 2d at 13.
261. 614 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
262. Id. at 1139.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1140.
265. Id.
266. 616 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
267. Id. at 74.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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Tallahassee's county and because the site was chosen solely upon racially-
based reasons.
2 70
The appellate court initially noted its concern with the question of
whether its jurisdiction was timely invoked because the state was in effect
challenging the order moving the case to Tallahassee, which had been
entered some ten months before the petition was filed.2 7' The court
pointed out that the State's challenge to the order was not presented to the
trial court until the day the petition was filed.272 It then stated that
although it could be argued that the State's challenge was untimely, the
court would decline "to adopt a rule which would preclude the State from
asserting at any time that continued prosecution under the circumstances
would constitute a violation of the constitutional rights of a criminal defen-
dant. 2 73 The court therefore concluded that the state's petition was timely
and proceeded to consider the case on the merits.274
In State v. Ashley,275 the Second District denied the state's petition
for certiorari without opinion. A specially concurring opinion by Judge
Parker, however, reveals the existence of an interesting issue. The judge
noted that he concurred because of the supreme court's decision in State v.
MacLeod,276 which concluded that the state has no statutory right to appeal
a trial counr's order which denies restitution in a criminal case "provided the
reasons for the denial are set forth. 277 The concurring opinion stated that
because no right of appeal exists, no right of review by certiorari exists.2 7
Judge Parker therefore opined that, a victim of a crime is denied the
right of appellate review of a trial court's denial of restitution from a
criminal defendant if the trial judge lists any reasons, right or wrong, for the
denial.2 79 Thus, notwithstanding his belief that the right of restitution in
this case was denied for reasons contrary to Florida law, Judge Parker felt
270. Id.
271. Lozano, 616 So. 2d at 75.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. In doing so, the court noted that the state, in an appeal from a Tallahassee
conviction, would be bound by its position that the motion for change of venue should have
been granted. Id. at n.4.
275. 621 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
276. 600 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1992).
277. Id. at 1098.
278. Ashley, 621 So. 2d at 743 (Parker, J., specially concurring) (citing Jones v. State,
477 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1985)).
279. Id
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compelled to concur with the appellate court's decision.28 ° Judge Parker
went on to note that as long as MacLeod remains the law, establishing a
right to appellate review for victims who are wrongly denied restitution will
apparently require legislative action.28'
3. Cross Appeals by Defendants
In State v. Waterman,282 the state appealed a trial court's pre-trial
order partially suppressing seized evidence.283  The defendant cross
appealed that aspect of the order denying his motion to suppress all of the
evidence.284  The state moved to dismiss the cross appeal on the ground
that it was not authorized under the appellate rules.285 Aligning itself with
the decision of the Fifth District in State v. McAdams,286 the Second
District found that a cross appeal was not foreclosed.287
In doing so, the court noted that several districts have held that there
is no jurisdiction to entertain a cross appeal when the order in question is
one which could not have been independently appealed by the defendant,
such as a ruling or motion to suppress.288 It thus appears that the issue
involved in this case is one that will have to eventually be resolved by the
supreme court.289
4. Application of Florida Supreme Court
Precedent to Pending Cases
In Smith v. State,29° the supreme court, relying on article I, sections
9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution, established a clear standard regarding
280. Id. at 744.
281. Id.
282. 613 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
283. Id. at 565-66.
284. Id. at 566.
285. Id.
286. 559 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
287. Waterman, 613 So. 2d at 566.
288. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 444 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State
v. Willits, 413 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Clark, 384 So. 2d 687 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1980)).
289. In State v. Lopez, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1914 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. .App. Aug. 31,
1993), the Third District adhered to its view that a cross appeal is inappropriate and, pursuant
to article V, section (3)(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, certified to the supreme court that
the decision was in conflict with Waterman and McAdams.
290. 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992).
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the retrospective application of its decisions in criminal cases. Noting that
it was troubled by the inconsistency or lack of clarity in its various decisions
on the subject, 9' the court held "that any decision of this Court announc-
ing a new rule of law, or merely applying an established rule of law to a
new or different situation, must be given retrospective application by the
courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet
final." '292 The court went on to note that in order to benefit from the
change in law, defendants must have timely objected at trial if an objection
was required to preserve the issue for appellate review."'
5. Appellate Jurisdiction After Change of Venue
In Vasilinda v. Lozano,294 a member of the media challenged an order
restricting certain aspects of television coverage of a criminal trial.295 The
challenge was brought in the Third District, the court that hears appeals
from cases in the Eleventh Circuit, where the charges had originally been
filed. Because a change of venue had been granted,2 96 moving the case
to the Ninth Circuit, and because the trial judge had been assigned by the
supreme court to serve as judge of that circuit for purposes of the case, the
district court transferred the appellate proceeding to the Fifth District, which
has appellate jurisdiction over Ninth Circuit cases.297
In an opinion filed the following day, the Fifth District indicated that
it was unclear as to whether the factors relied upon by the Third District
gave the court jurisdiction over the appeal. 29' Because the trial was set to
start one business day later, the court did address the issues presented by the
case; 299 it also certified to the supreme court as a matter of great public
importance, the question of when jurisdiction vests and in which appellate
court jurisdiction lies when a change of venue is granted to a circuit in
291. Id. at 1064.
292. Id. at 1066.
293. Id.
294. 622 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
295. Id. at 5.
296. The defendant was the same defendant involved in the case of State v. Lozano, 616
So. 2d 73 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993). See also supra text accompanying notes 264-72.
297. Vasilinda, 622 So. 2d at 5.
298. Vasilinda v. Lozano, 618 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.); reviewgranted,
__ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
299. Id. at 759-60.
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another district and the circuit judge is appointed as a judge of the circuit
to which the case is transferred.3"'
A similar issue was dealt with by the Fourth District in Kohut v.
Evans. T'M In that case, a change of venue had been granted, moving the
matter from the Thirteenth Circuit, within the Second District, to the
Fifteenth Circuit, within the Fourth District and in which an order had been
entered temporarily assigning the trial judge of the Thirteenth Circuit to the
Fifteenth Circuit to hear the case.30 2 On his own motion, the trial judge
re-examined the venue question and determined that a jury would be
selected in the Fifteenth Circuit and that the case would then be returned to
the Thirteenth Circuit for the remainder of the trial, with the jurors
sequestered within that circuit.30 3
One of the defendants challenged the procedure in a petition for writ
of prohibition filed in the Second District. That court determined that the
petition was directed to the trial judge in his capacity as a judge of the
Fifteenth Circuit and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to address the
merits of the petition. Accordingly, it transferred the case to the Fourth
District.304 The Fourth District stated that it was unsure whether the trial
judge thought he was acting as a Fifteenth Circuit judge when he issued the
order in question, but accepted that it was the appropriate court to take
jurisdiction of the case because the judge was to be acting as a judge of the
Fifteenth Circuit in conducting the jury selection and ordering the jury to
return to the Thirteenth Circuit for the remainder of the trial.305
D. Certification of Questions
In Bradley v. State,30 6 the First District discussed the circumstances
under which the court will exercise its discretionary review authority and
consider certified questions from county courts pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(4). The opinion dealt with two appeals in
which county courts had certified essentially the same question as one of
great public importance.
300. Id. at 759.
301. 623 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
302. Id. at 569.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. 615 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The court noted there existed little discussion in case law to guide it in
exercising its discretion, but determined that it should accept jurisdiction in
at least one of the appeals because the issue was one of constitutional
magnitude that was frequently raised in the lower tribunals.3"7 Pointing
to its "highly taxing" caseload, the court concluded that there was no useful
purpose to be served by accepting more than one appeal presenting the
issue.3 °8 Doing so, the court stated, would only delay resolution of other
matters before the court.3 °9 The court therefore accepted jurisdiction in
the appeal that involved factors which made the preparation of the record
and briefing easier and declined to accept jurisdiction in the other.31°
The First District also declined to accept an appeal involving a certified
question from a county court in State v. Boyd,31' noting that such appeals
are appropriate from non-final orders under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.030(b)(4)(B) only when the orders are otherwise appealable to
the circuit court." 2 Since the order in the case was not appealable in that
manner, the court concluded that it was without jurisdiction.3"3
The First District also found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the
certified questions in Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services v. State."4 In that case, the questions were certified by a circuit
court and the appellate court determined that only county courts have the
authority to certify questions.35
In several cases, such as State v. Burgos,3 16 the Fourth District
employed a method of double certification that resulted in a county court
case being reviewed by the supreme court. Pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.160, the court accepted jurisdiction from an order
certified by a county court to be of great public importance. In turn, the
court certified to the supreme court, pursuant to Rule 9.125, not only that
the issues were of great public importance, but also that they had an effect
307. Id. at 855.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 610 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
312. Id. at 65.
313. Id.
314. 616 So. 2d 66 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
315. Id. at 68.
316. 614 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 618 So. 2d 1369 (Fla
1993).
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on the administration of justice throughout the state and that the case
required immediate resolution by the supreme court.317
E. Effect of Prior Prohibition Proceedings on Appeals
In Thomason v. State,3 t8 the Fourth District considered a direct appeal
from an order withholding adjudication and placing a defendant on
probation in a criminal case. The defendant raised a double jeopardy claim
that he had previously asserted in a petition for writ of prohibition that had
been denied without opinion by the same court.319 The court affirmed
without opinion, but Judge Farmer, in a dissenting opinion, addressed the
question of whether consideration of the double jeopardy claim was proper
in light of the prior proceeding.32 °
Judge Farmer noted that such consideration was appropriate because
prohibition is an "extraordinarily prerogative writ"32' that is sometimes
denied for good reasons having nothing to do with the underlying merits of
a petitioner's position.322 The judge noted that his view323 was contrary
to that taken by the Third District in Obanion v. State,"' in which the
court considered a claim previously raised in a prohibition proceeding, but
stated that in future cases, summary denials of petitions for writs of
prohibition would be deemed to be denials on the merits unless the denial
says otherwise.325 Judge Farmer stated that the Fourth District had never
adopted such a rule and that he hopes it never does, "at least as long as
prohibition is deemed a matter of mere grace.5
326
317. Id. at 694.
318. 594 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed on other grounds, 620 So.
2d 1234 (Fla. 1993).
319. Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234, 1236.
320. Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 310. (Farmer, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 312 n.2 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
322. Id.
323. The other members of the panel apparently shared Judge Farmer's belief that
review of the merits was appropriate because the case was affirmed, rather than dismissed.
324. 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), reviewdenied, 504 So. 2d 768 (Fla.
1987).
325. Thomason, 594 So. 2d at 312 n.2 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
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This conflict between the districts... was not resolved by the supreme
court's review of Thomason, as the court's opinion, despite setting forth the
procedural history of the case,32 dealt only with the merits of the double
jeopardy claim.329
F. Cross Appeals When Appeals are Untimely
In Peltz v. District Court of Appeal, Third District,33 the supreme
court dealt with the question of whether a district court has jurisdiction to
consider a cross appeal when the original notice of appeal is untimely. The
case involved a situation in which one party filed an untimely notice of
appeal from an order of a trial court."' Ten days later, the opposing party
filed a notice of cross appeal.332 Subsequently, a notice of voluntary
dismissal of the original appeal was filed and the district court entered an
order accepting the voluntary dismissal but stating that the cross appeal
would remain pending.33
3
Acting on a petition for prohibition, the supreme court found that the
notice of cross appeal could not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction
and that because the original notice of appeal did not vest the district court
with jurisdiction to proceed, there was no jurisdictional basis upon which the
notice of cross appeal could be based. 34  Accordingly, prohibition was
granted.335
327. The approach taken by the Third District in Obanion also conflicts with that taken
by the First District in State v. Falls Chase Special Taxing District, 424 So. 2d 787, 790 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 436 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1983), and the Second District
in Thomas v. State, 422 So. 2d 93, 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
328. Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1236.
329. The case was reviewed pursuant to a certified question relating to the merits. Id.
at 1235. The issue relating to the prior prohibition proceeding was not presented to the court.
330. 605 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1992).
331. Id.
332. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.1 10(g) provides that an appellee may cross
appeal by serving a notice within 10 days of service of the appellant's notice or within the
time allowed for the filing of a notice of appeal directed to the order to be reviewed,
whichever is. later. FLA. R. APP. PROC. 9.110(g).
333. Peltz, 605 So. 2d at 865.
334. Id. at 866.
335. Id
1993]
43
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
G. Nature of Review
Many cases dealt with the question of whether orders were reviewable,
either by appeal or by certiorari. The sheer volume of cases involving such
issues precludes discussion of the reasoning relied on each case. Nonethe-
less, this article will set forth some of the cases, and indicate the type of
order involved, and the conclusion reached.
1. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was
Found to be Appropriate
Among the orders that were reviewed by appeal were: (1) an order
dismissing a civil action without prejudice because of a plaintiff's failure to
serve the complaint within 120 days after it was filed;336 (2) an order in
a prosecution for driving under the influence suppressing breath test results
because the breath testing device was not maintained in compliance with the
appropriate regulations;337 (3) an order dismissing a petition for a writ of
mandamus;33 (4) an adjudicatory order which reaffirmed a dependency
finding and which terminated the parental rights of the natural father;339
(5) an order granting a motion for summary final judgment on a permanent
injunction; 34° (6) a non-final order denying immunity under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act;34' (7) an order denying a motion
to set aside a clerk's default; 342 and (8) an order compelling compliance
with an investigative subpoena served by the Attorney General of Flori-
da.343
2. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was
Found to be Inappropriate
Orders which were found not to be reviewable by appeal included: (1)
336. Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
337. Blore v. Fierro, 618 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (conflict certified
with State v. Gemignani, 545 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Townsend,
479 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
338. Tunstall v. Folsom, 616 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
339. In re T.M., 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
340. Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass'n, 614 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993).
341. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988); International Ship Repair & Marine Servs., Inc. v.
Emig, 611 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
342. Richardson v. Watson, 611 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
343. Transcall Am., Inc. v. Butterworth, 604 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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non-final orders in child dependency proceedings; 44 (2) a partial summary
judgment establishing the existence of insurance coverage; 34 5 (3) an order
vacating an arbitration award and ordering a new hearing before a new
arbitrator; 346 (4) an order granting a motion for final summary judgment
on attorney's fees; 347 (5) an order granting a defendant's cross-motion for
partial summary judgment, denying a plaintiff's motion for partial summary
judgment and reserving jurisdiction for any and all other matters applicable
to the case;34 and (6) orders impleading a third party prior to the entry of
a final order against the impleaded third party.349
3. Cases in Which Review by Appeal was Found to be
Inappropriate but in Which Review by
Certiorari was Found to be Appropriate
In some cases, the courts found that orders were not appealable, but
that certiorari review was proper. The orders involved in these cases
included: (1) an order denying a motion to mitigate a sentence in a situation
in which the trial court erroneously believed that it was without jurisdiction
to consider the motion;350 (2) a writ of prohibition by a circuit court to a
county court ordering a defendant in a criminal case discharged on speedy
trial grounds;35' (3) an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and certifying
a juvenile for trial as an adult; 352 (4) an order suppressing identification
testimony in a criminal prosecution; 353 (5) a final judgment of foreclosure
in a case in which the appellant's counterclaim asserting fraud had been
severed and was still pending in the trial court;354 (6) an order to show
cause why a writ of prohibition should not be granted in a situation in
which, absent immediate review a party might have suffered irreparable
344. In re MA., 609 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1992).
345. Interamerican Car Rental, Inc. v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
346. Central Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
347. Korandovitch v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass'n, 614 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 199:3).
348. Dixon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 609 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
349. Turnpike Dev., Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 606 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
350. Arnold v. State, 621 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
351. State v. Frazee, 617 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
352. In re D.W., 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
353. State v. Houston, 616 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
354. Norris v. Paps, 615 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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harm for which remedy on plenary appeal was inadequate;355 (7) an order
abating an action for exhaustion of administrative remedies; a56 (8) an order
granting a psychiatric examination of children entered after final judgment
but as part of a supplementary proceeding on a petition for change of
custody;357 and (9) an order withholding adjudication of guilt and impos-
ing court costs that did not place the defendant on probation.358
4. Cases in Which Certiorari Review was
Found to be Appropriate
In addition to those noted in the preceding section of this article,
certiorari was deemed the proper method to review numerous other orders,
such as: (1) an order requiring production and in camera inspection of
certain investigative reports of Florida's Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services;359 (2) an order entered on a master's report prior
to the expiration of the ten day period under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.490(h) for serving exceptions to the report;36 ° (3) a protective order
allowing a plaintiff, but not a defendant, to communicate exparte with the
defendant's former employees;36' (4) an order compelling disclosure of the
petitioner's workers' compensation file on the respondent;362 (5) an order
imposing sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and costs for failure to
negotiate in good faith during court ordered mediation; 363 (6) an order
compelling the victim of a criminal offense to appear at a live lineup and
identify the person who committed the offense upon her;364 (7) an order
reducing a sentence upon a defendant's motion to mitigate sentence entered
after the trial court lost jurisdiction to reduce or modify the sentence;365
355. Broward County v. Florida Nat'l Properties, 613 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
356. Hedin v. Indian River County, 610 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
357. Pariser v. Pariser, 601 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
354. Martin v. State, 600 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
359. Cebrian By and Through Cebrian v. Klein, 614 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
360. Barnett Bank of Martin County v. RGA Dev. Co., 606 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
361. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
362. Adjustco, Inc. v. Sibley, 611 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
363. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
364. State v. Ray, 604 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d
8 (Fla. 1992).
365. State v. Blue, 603 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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and (8) an order denying a motion to amend and/or supplement a motion for
post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850.366
IV. CERTIFICATION
A major development in the field of appellate practice in Florida was
the approval by the supreme court of board certification for appellate
lawyers.367 The rule adopted by the court368 on the subject defines
''appellate practice" as "the practice of law dealing with the recognition and
preservation of error committed by lower tribunals, and the presentation of
argument concerning the presence or absence of such error to state or
federal appellate courts through brief writing, writ and motion practice, and
oral argument. 3 69  They go on to state that appellate practice "includes
evaluation and consultation regarding potential appellate issues or remedies
in connection with proceedings in the lower tribunal prior to the initiation
of the appellate process."37
To become certified as an appellate lawyer, an applicant must
demonstrate substantial involvement in appellate practice,37" ' a showing
which requires meeting several criteria,"' including five years of the
actual practice of law, at least thirty percent of which has involved appellate
practice; 37 3 having sole or primary responsibility in at least twenty-five
appellate actions for the filing of principal briefs in appeals or petitions or
responses in extraordinary writ cases; 374 having sole or primary responsi-
bility for at least five oral arguments;375 and a demonstration of special
competence as an appellate lawyer within the three years immediately
preceding application.376
366. Rozier v. State, 603 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
367. The Fla. Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar, 621 So. 2d 1032
(Fla. 1993) [hereinafter Florida Bar Amendments].
368. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 6-13.2 (1987).
369. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1059-60.
370. Id. at 1060.
371. Id.
372. While this article will summarize the criteria, it does not purport to set forth the
criteria in detail. Attorneys interested in applying for certification should review the rule
itself and not rely on this summary as a complete statement of the criteria.
373. Id.
374. Id
375. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1060.
376. Id.
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In addition, applicants must submit the names of at least four lawyers
and three judges to attest to their substantial involvement in appellate
practice,377 demonstrate that within the three years immediately preceding
application, they have accumulated approved continuing legal education
credits in the field of appellate practice in amounts varying from thirty to
forty-five hours depending upon when application is made,378 and pass an
examination.379
The rule also establishes the requirements for recertification, which,
with the exception of the examination, are concerned with the same factors
as the requirements for initial certification.38 °
It is hoped that the certification process will "identify those lawyers
who engage in appellate practice and have the special knowledge, skills, and
proficiency to be properly identified to the public as certified appellate
lawyers." ''
V. CONCLUSION
The changes that have occurred in Florida over the past year in the
field of appellate practice have been widespread and significant. They
include not only the large number of court decisions that are expected each
year, but also important changes to the rules and the birth of certification.
These events will undoubtedly shape the future of appellate practice in this
state. The recent creation by The Florida Bar of its Appellate Practice and
Advocacy Section will also impact on that future. The net result of these
developments should be a better appellate process.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Florida Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1061.
381. Id. at 1059.
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I. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Securities regulation in Florida is governed by chapter 517 of the
Florida Statutes and the Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder by
the Florida Department of Banking and Finance Division of Securities.' In
1992-93, three bills were adopted which amended or added to chapter 517.
These are chapters 92-9, 92-45 and 92-198.2
* © 1993 Jeffrey Winikoff and Maxine Bradford. The authors wish to express their
gratitude to Craig D. Stein for his assistance and research in the preparation of this paper.
** Mr. Winikoff, a member of the Florida Bar, is a shareholder in the firm of Stein,
Rosenberg & Winikoff, P.A. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In addition, Mr. Winikoff served
as Staff Attorney and Senior Counsel for the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Division of Enforcement, in Washington, D.C. from 1978-1983. He practices
primarily in the area of securities litigation.
*** Ms. Bradford, a member of the Florida Bar, is an associate with the firm of Stein,
Rosenberg & Winikoff, P.A. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She practices principally in the
area of securities litigation.
1. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 517 (1991) and FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-300 to
r. 3E-900.001 (1993).
2. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 156, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT. §
517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at
159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015 (Supp. 1992)); id. § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws at 162
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.201 (Supp. 1992)); ch. 92-45, § I, 1992 Fla. Laws 413,
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (Supp. 1992)); id. § 2 1992 Fla. Laws at 415 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 517. 061(6), (7) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws at 416 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 517. 111(1) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 517.12( 1I) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
517.131(3) (Supp. 1992)); id § 6, Fla. Laws at 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517. 141
(Supp. 1992)); id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(c), (d),
(g), (j), (m) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
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Chapter 92-9 entitled, "Banking and Finance Department-Investiga-
tions-Confidentiality of Information," amends chapter 517 to provide
exceptions to the state disclosure laws3 for certain information provided to
the Department of Banking and Finance ("Department"), and a privilege
against civil liability for persons who provide information to the Department
for the furnishing of such information.4
This relatively small amendment may have significant impact. First,
it enacts an investigative privilege from state disclosure laws similar to that
long enjoyed by federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA").5 Second, it exceeds the privilege granted federal investigative
agencies by making consumer complaints or other information relevant to
investigations by the Department, confidential even after the close of an
investigation where the disclosure of such information might reveal
identifying information of any complainant, customer or account holder.6
517.301(1)(a) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 9, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421; ch. 92-198, § I, 1992 Fla. Laws
1837 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp. 1992)). Incidental to the changes to chapter
517 promulgated by the Legislature, the rules of the Florida Administrative Code were
revised for the purpose of implementing the amendments of chapter 517. The following
regulations were adopted in 1993: FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-200.001, r. 3E-301.002,
r. 3E-400.003, r. 3E-600.001, r. 3E-600.002, r. 3E-600.004, r. 3E-600.005, r. 3E-600.007,
r. 3E-600.008, r. 3E-600.0012-.014, and r. 3E-600.019.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.16 (1991). These sections state that, generally, information
obtained by state officials must be made available to the public and contains exemptions
thereto, for various circumstances. See generally id. § 119.07.
4. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 156, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT.
§ 517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)); id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws
at 159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015 (Supp. 1992)).
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). The new section appears to be modeled upon FOIA, but
contains some important differences as discussed infra.
6. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(I)(b)2 (Supp. 1992); cf 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) which
only allows protection of information gathered for law enforcement purposes and only to the
extent that such information:
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B)
would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or
any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and,
in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting
a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a
confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably
[Vol. 18
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Winikoff / Bradford
This section also makes provision for non-disclosure of information relating
to department personnel and their families.7 It also makes provisions for
the continuing confidentiality of the information even if it is offered in
evidence in an administrative, civil or criminal proceeding at the discretion
of the presiding officer.8 Furthermore, the Department is permitted to share
information with any law enforcement, administrative agency, or regulatory
organization, provided such agency or organization maintains the confidenti-
ality of the information, so long as it would otherwise be confidential.9
This section also extends exemption from disclosure laws to informa-
tion made available to the Department on a "confidential or similarly
restricted basis;"' however, the subparagraph contains limiting language
specifying that the exemptions are not to be construed to prohibit disclosure
of information required by law to be filed with the Department or otherwise
subject to disclosure laws." Presumably, this is intended to be a coordi-
nate provision to the one allowing the Department to give information to
other law enforcement agencies so that it could receive confidential
information from those agencies without the necessity of making such
information subject to disclosure laws.
Undoubtedly, securities counsel will attempt to use this provision to
exempt from disclosure laws any information provided to the Department
by securities broker/dealers during the course of an investigation or
examination, which include, for example, witness statements and the like.
How much the Department will cooperate with these efforts, and how much
the protections offered by this section will be challenged, remains an open
question at this juncture. Likewise, the question of who has standing to
claim or defend the exemption offered by this section, and whether it will
be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1988) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the new section also allows the
Department to keep information confidential and exempt from disclosure under the disclosure
laws in four situations also covered by the FOIA exemptions: I) where disclosure would
jeopardize the integrity of another active investigation or examination; 2) where disclosure
would reveal the identity of a confidential source; 3) where disclosure would reveal investiga-
tive techniques or procedures; and 4) where disclosure would reveal a trade secret. FLA.
STAT. § 517.2015(l)(b)1, 3-5 (Supp. 1992). The FOIA does provide a privilege similar to
that granted in section 517.2015 of the Florida Statutes for information gathered in
examination of financial institutions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8)(1988).
7. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(l)(c) (Supp. 1992).
8. Id. § 517.2015(2).
9. Id. § 517.2015(l)(d).
I0. Id. § 517.2015(I)(e).
11. Id.
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give rise to a flurry of litigation similar to that found under FOIA remains
uncertain. 2
Chapter 92-9, section 4, grants a privilege against civil liability to
persons who furnish information or evidence to the Department. 3 This
subsection may have the greatest impact in the area of securities bro-
ker/dealer employment cases. There has been a significant amount of
litigation concerning questions of defamation over statements made on Form
U-5, regarding terminations of registered persons from broker/dealers.
14
Presumably, although it was clearly not the intended purpose of the section,
brokerage firms will attempt to use the privilege against civil liability,
provided by section 517.2015(3), to defend actions for defamation brought
by terminated employees.' 5
The new section may, however, be a double edged sword in that it
provides an exemption or an exception to the privilege if the person
furnishing information to the Department, acted either in bad faith or with
malice in providing such information or evidence.' 6 This appears to be a
more difficult standard for the employer to meet than was previously
12. See, e.g., George K. Chamberlin, Use of Freedom of Information Act (5 USCS §
552) as Substitute for, or as Means of Supplementing Discovery Procedures Available to
Litigants in Federal Civil, Criminal, or Administrative Proceedings, 57 A.L.R. FED. 903
(1982). Use of Freedom of Information Act as substitute for, or as means of, supplementing
discovery procedures available to litigants in federal, civil or administrative proceedings. Id.;
see also Daniel Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuits, 55
TEX. L. REV. 587 (1977); Michael Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative
Procedure Act: .The Freedom of Information Act; The Privacy Act; and the Government in
the Sunshine Act, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1977); Donald Scriven, Administrative Law-
Freedom of Information Act-Investigatory File as Exemption Remains Operative after Investi-
gation and Law Enforcement Proceedings Concluded, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1136 (1973).
13. Ch. 92-9, § 4, Fla. Laws 156, 159 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp.
1992)).
14. A broker/dealer is required to file Form U-4 with the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., as well as with the State of Florida, upon the hiring of a person to
be employed as a registered person, and upon the registered person's termination, a Form U-5
must be filed. Broker/dealers are also required to submit additional information to the
Department on Disclosure Reporting Pages ("DRP") concerning the background of the
registered person. This includes any complaints filed by customers, any administrative or
civil actions brought by a regulatory authority, and of course, any criminal actions brought
against the registered person. In addition, Form U-5 requires the broker/dealer to state the
basis for the termination of employment. See FLA. STAT. § 517.12 (Supp. 1992); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-600.002, r. 3E-600.008 (1992).
15. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp. 1992).
16. Id.
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available at common law where a terminated employee would have to prove
both bad faith and malice, not either.' 7 Thus, while the section codifies the
common law privilege for communications required to be made by law, it
broadens the exemption to that privilege by allowing one who maintains an
action in defamation to prove either bad faith or malice to avoid the statu-
tory privilege. 8 What the effect of this provision will be in defamation
cases is, of course, an open question as is the interpretation of this section
by Florida courts. It is possible that the courts may rule that the privilege,
being part of a section relating to investigations or examinations by the
Department of Banking and Finance, extends only to information transmitted
in that context and not in the context of regular Form U-5 disclosures made
by a brokerage firm. In that case, brokerage firms would be left to rely on
common law privileges and exceptions to the laws of defamation.
It is equally conceivable that the courts would construe the disjunctive
"or" to be read conjunctively as "and" and thus, to bring in line the
exemption to the privilege with the exception currently available at common
law.' 9 This would have the effect of making a person who attempts to rely
on the exception to the privilege, prove that a brokerage firm acted not only
in bad faith, but also with malice in providing information or evidence to
the Department before the exemption to the privilege granted by this section
is overcome.2"
Finally chapter 92-9, section 3 amends Florida Statutes section 517.12
to make exempt from disclosure currency reports. 2' According to this
section, registered persons are required to file currency reports with the
Department.22
The second major piece of legislation amending chapter 517 is chapter
92-45, sections 1-9, which made far more changes to the law than chapter
17. See 19 FLA. JUR. 2D Defamation and Privacy § 112 (1980).
18. FLA. STAT. § 517.2015(3) (Supp. 1992).
19. See id.
20. Cf Form U-4 contains language granting a similar privilege from employee to
employer which authorizes the employer to release information to the Department and
releases the employer from any liability whatsoever for doing so. This authorization and
release is, of course, contractual and not statutory. The provision states: "I release each
employer, former employer and each other person from any and all liability, of whatever na-
ture. by reason of furnishing any of the above information, including that information
reported on the Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry Registration (Form U-5)
.... " Rev. Form U-4 (11/91) 2, at 8.
21. Ch. 92-9, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 158, 159 (reenacting and amending FLA. STAT. §
517.12(14), codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(14) (Supp. 1992)).
22. Id.
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92-9, but whose impact may, except in one or two areas, be less significant.
This act makes several technical and clarifying amendments,23 including
amendments to section 517.051 (relating to securities exempt from
registration under the blue sky laws) specifying that the exemptions granted
by that section are self-executing, and that the person claiming any
entitlement to the exemption bears the burden of proving such entitle-
ment.24 This amendment to the introductory paragraph of Florida Statutes
section 517.051 does nothing more than codify the existing status of the
law.2 ' This section is also amended to provide an exemption for securities
issued or guaranteed by the National Credit Union Association where
formerly, the law provided the same exemption for the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation.26 The amendment also added credit unions
to the list of institutions specifically named as exempt under that section. 7
Chapter 92-45, section 2 also amended Florida Statutes section 517.061
(relating to exempt transactions in securities) to codify existing law that the
exemptions, provided by the section are self-executing, and that the burden
of proving such exemption is on the persons claiming same.28 The chapter
make certain amendments to existing subsections (6) and (7) of Florida
Statutes section 517.061, which are designated clarifying amendments by the
preamble to the session law.29 Subsection (6) of Florida Statutes section
517.061, which previously granted an exemption for transactions involving
the distribution of securities of an issuer exclusively among its own securi-
ties, in a circumstance where no commission or other remuneration is paid
in connection with the distribution was, in fact, clarified to specify securities
holders as any person holding convertible securities, non-transferable
warrants, or warrants exercisable within not more than ninety days of issu-
ance.
30
Subsection (7) of Florida Statutes section 517.061 is amended to
include transactions with qualified institutional buyers, essentially as that
term is defined by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
23. Ch. 92-45, 1992 Fla. Laws 413 (codified at FLA STAT. §§ 517.051-517.301 (Supp.
1992)).
24. Id. § 1, Fla. Laws at 413 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.051 (Supp. 1992)).
25. See id.
26. FLA. STAT. § 517.051(5) (Supp. 1992).
27. Id. § 517.051(5)(t).
28. Ch. 92-45, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 415 (codified at Fla. Stat. § 517.061 (Supp.
1992)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(6) (Supp. 1992)).
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("SEC").3 It also deletes the requirement that transactions with pension
or profit sharing plans are exempt where such plans have assets not less than
$500,000 and instead refers the exemption to rules also promulgated by the
Department in accordance with SEC Rules." Potentially the most inter-
esting amendment to the section is the deletion of the word "regulated"
before the words "investment company," and the insertion thereafter of the
words "as defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940." 33 Thus, the
exemption, previously only for regulated investment companies is now
extended to any investment company, as that term is defined under the
federal law.34
Chapter 92-45, section 3 amended Florida Statutes section 517.111
(relating to revocation or denial of registration of securities) by extending
the grounds for revocation or denial of registration of securities.35
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) have been clarified by the addi-
tion of the: terms "officer" and "director."'36 Previously, the paragraphs
stated that acts by the issuer or its controlling person were grounds for
denial or revocation of registration.37 Thus, the subsection specifically
includes acts of officers and directors as a basis for denial or revocation,
even if an argument could be made that they are not control persons.38 In
3 1. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(7) (Supp. 1992)).
32. Id.
33. Ch. 92-45, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 415 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.061(7)
(Supp. 1992)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) defines "investment company" to be any issuer which:
(I) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2)
is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has
such certificate outstanding; or (3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the busi-
ness of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns
or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per
centum of the value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government
securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1988). For further discussion on companies covered by the Investment
Company Act see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 17.3 (2d ed. 1990).
35. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (Supp.
1992)).
36. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 l(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1992)). These amendments
are primarily clarifying since officers and directors are generally defined as control persons
of the issuer.
37. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111(I)(g) (Supp. 1992)).
38. The practical effect of this amendment is questionable. It is rare that circumstances
could exist where an officer or director could sustain the argument that he or she was not a
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addition to (1)(b) and (1)(c), this chapter similarly adds the terms "officer"
and "director" to subparagraph (1)(g) (formerly (d)) as persons whose
dishonesty can lead to suspension, revocation or denial of the issuer's
registration."
Chapter 92-45 adds new subparagraphs (d), (e), (f), (h) and (j) to
subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.111 which provide additional
grounds for the revocation or denial of registration of securities. °
Subparagraph (1)(d) extends the revocation, suspension or denial powers to
a case where an issuer, officer, director or control person has been found
guilty of a fraudulent act in connection with the sale of securities, or is
engaged or is about to engage in making a fictitious sale or purchase of
securities, or in any practice or sale of any security which is fraudulent or
in violation of any law.4' Subparagraph (e) extends the revocation,
suspension or denial powers to cases where the issuer, officer, director or
control person of the issuer had a final judgment entered against him in a
civil action on grounds of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresentation or
deceit.42 Subparagraph (f) extends the power to instances in which the
issuer, officers, directors, or control persons of the issuer have "demonstrat-
ed any evidence of unworthiness. 43 Subparagraph (h) extends the power
to circumstances where the security in question is the subject of an
injunction or an administrative stop order or similar order prohibiting the
offer or sale of a security.44 Subparagraph (j) extends the power to
circumstances where the issuer or any person acting on its behalf has failed
control person of an issuer. See, e.g., In re Thortec Sec. Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,330, at 92,156 (Jan. 25, 1989); Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,779, at 90,814 (Oct. 22, 1976), affd,
710 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1983); Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l, Inc., [1982-1983
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,222, at 95,899 (Aug. 24 1982) (all holding
officers and directors to be control persons). But cf Holloway v. Howerdd, 377 F. Supp. 754
(M.D. Tenn. 1973), afftd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litigation,
747 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that officers and directors, under the circumstanc-
es presented in these cases, were not control persons).
39. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 l(1)(g)
(Supp. 1992)).
40. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(d)-Oj) (Supp. 1992)).
41. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)(d) (Supp. 1992)).
42. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(l)(e) (Supp. 1992)).
43. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(0 (Supp. 1992)).
44. Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)(h)
(Supp. 1992)).
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timely to complete any application for registration filed with the Depart-
ment. 4
These provisions significantly broaden the Department's ability to deny,
suspend or revoke securities registrations.46 Their scope, and no doubt,
their intended scope, is extremely broad. For example, subparagraph (d) of
subsection (1) allows the Department to revoke or suspend registration
where a determination is made that an issuer or a related party is about to
engage in any securities transaction which is fictitious or fraudulent or in
violation of any law.47 Under subsection (1)(e), the Department has the
right to suspend, revoke or cancel any registration if any officer, director or
control person of the issuer or the issuer itself has a judgment entered
against it in a civil action on grounds of fraud, embezzlement, misrepresen-
tation or deceit.48  The section is not in any way limited by time, and
presumably, the Legislature determined that rather than impose a limitation
similar to the ten year limitation of disclosure of such items on Form U-4,
it would leave it to the discretion of the Department to utilize its authority
under this section regardless of the timing of the civil determination. Sub-
paragraph (f) is by far the broadest grant of powers to the Department which
allows it to suspend, revoke or cancel the registration of any security where
the issuer or any officer, director or control person of the issuer has demon-
strated "any evidence of unworthiness."49  This section neither defines
"evidence of unworthiness," nor explains what demonstration of such
unworthiness need be made. This subparagraph has no coordinate provision
in the federal law and may well be challenged on constitutional vagueness
standards. It is clearly a reaffirmation of the qualitative review standard
found in the blue sky laws of Florida and other states, and is a coordinate
provision of new subparagraph (i), formerly subsection (e), which denies
registration or grants authority to the Department to suspend or revoke regis-
tration of securities where the offer or sale of such securities would not be
"fair, just or equitable."5
45. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.11 1(1)j) (Supp. 1992)).
46. See FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (Supp. 1992).
47. Id. § 517.11 (1)(d). This authority is akin to that granted to the SEC under Section
8(e) of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(e) (1991). However, the power of the
SEC, absent a stop order proceeding to suspend or delay a registration, has been rarely used.
But cf Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. I (1936); Las Vegas Hawaiian Dev. Co. v. SEC, 466 F. Supp.
928, 932 (D. Hawaii 1979).
48, FLA. STAT. § 517.11 (1)(e) (Supp. 1992).
49. Id. § 517.111(1)(f).
50, Ch. 92-45, § 3, 1992 Fla, Laws 413, 416 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.111 (1)(i)
(Supp. 1992)).
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Section 517.12(1 1) is amended to change the dates for re-registration
of branch offices.' Presumably, this administrative change will help in the
processing of paperwork. This section is also amended to require the
payment of any amounts lawfully due and owing to the Department as a
precondition of re-registration. 2  Presumably, this would require the
payment of any fines levied by the Department as a precondition of re-
registration for any dealer, associated person, investment advisor or branch
office of a broker/dealer."
Section 517.131(3), relating to persons eligible to seek recovery from
the Securities Guaranty Fund, has also been amended. 4 That section, and
the ensuing sections, provide for a fund against which persons damaged by
entities regulated by the Department can seek reimbursement up to a
statutory limit of $10,000 if that person has been unsuccessful in collecting
a judgment against the judgment debtor." Subsection (3)(b), which had
previously required the issuance of a writ of execution and a return showing
that no personal or real property of the debtor was available to be levied
upon in satisfaction of the judgment or that such property was insufficient
to satisfy the judgment, has now been deleted.56 Instead, the new law
makes such a showing to be a condition within the Department's discre-
tion.5" This amendment is an addition to the old subsection (3)(c) now
denominated (3)(b)." The new law also adds subsection (3)(e), which
allows the Department to waive compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b),
which require the person to receive a final judgment and make reasonable
inquiries to ascertain whether there are sufficient assets to satisfy it if the
regulated person against whom the claim is filed is the subject of a pro-
ceeding in which a receiver has been appointed.59 While subsection (3)(e)
grants the Department the authority to make such a waiver in the event of
the appointment of a "receiver," the next sentence makes clear that the term
receiver is meant to encompass the "court appointed trustee or examiner" as
well as a receiver.6° Therefore, upon petition by the debtor or the court
51. Id. § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.12(l 1) (Supp. 1992)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws at 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3) (Supp. 1992)).
55. FLA. STAT. § 517.131 (Supp. 1992).
56. Ch. 92-45, § 5, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 417 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3)(b)
(Supp. 1992)).
57. Id.
58. FLA. STAT. § 517.131(3)(b) (Supp. 1992).
59. Id. §§ 517.131(3)(c), 517.131(3)(a), (b).
60. Id. § 517.131(3)(e).
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appointed trustee, examiner or receiver, any waiver granted by the Depart-
ment will be considered a judgment for purposes of satisfying the require-
ments of Florida Statutes sections 517.131 and 517.141." This relaxation
of the requirements is welcome and long overdue for individuals defrauded
of their funds by members of the brokerage industry.
What the government giveth, the government taketh away. The
amendments to subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.141 exclude
from payment to a claimant any award for costs and attorney fees. 62 In
addition, if the Department honors a claim by a trustee or a receiver, the
claimant must assign all his rights against the debtor to the Department.63
The 1992 amendments to Florida Statutes section 517.141 (4), clarify that
a claimant is entitled to no more than ten thousand ($10,000) dollars from
the fund, regardless of how many accounts the claimant may have had with
a regulated entity or how many judgments the claimant attains against
same.64 Subsections (5), (6) and (7) of Florida Statutes section 517.141
clarify the obligation of a claimant to reimburse all amounts received in
excess of what is permitted by law, or if the judgment is overturned on
appeal or in a collateral proceeding, also authorizes the Department to
enforce compliance with this section by instituting legal actions to recover
such monies.65 Curiously, the amendments entitle the Department to obtain
interest, costs and attorney fees if the Department is the prevailing party in
an action to recover same, despite the fact that a claimant may not recover
for same, either in an action brought against him or her by the State to
recover excess funds paid, or as part of the judgment upon which the
original claim is based.66
Perhaps the most significant changes made by the 1992 amendments
are to be found in Florida Statutes sections 517.16167 and 517.301,6 the
former regarding revocation, denial or suspension of registration of a dealer,
investment advisor, associated person or branch office, and the latter
61. Id. §§ 517.131(3)(e), 517.141.
62. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141 (Supp.
1992)).
63. FLA. STAT. § 517.141(9) (Supp. 1992).
64. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413. 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141(4)
(Supp. 1992)).
65. FLA. STAT. § 517.141(5)-(7) (Supp. 1992).
66. Ch. 92-45, § 6, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 418 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.141(5)-(7)
(Supp. 1992)).
67. Id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp. 1992)).
68. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
1993]
59
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
involving fraudulent transactions, falsification or concealments of facts.69
Both sections have been amended to specifically include for the first time
the power to regulate the rendering of investment advice.7" Subparagraphs
(c), (d), (g) and (j) of subsection (1) of Florida Statutes section 517.161
have been amended to add, specifically, fraudulent conduct in connection
with rendering investment advice as well as in the sale or purchase of any
securities as a ground for revocation, suspension or denial of registration."
In addition, misrepresentations, concealing material facts or false statements
made in connection with the rendering of investment advice is similarly
made a grounds for administrative action.72 Finally, rendering investment
advice through any associated person not registered in compliance with the
provisions of chapter 517 is also made a ground for revocation, denial or
suspension of registration.73
Similarly, Florida Statutes section 517.301 has been broadened to make
unlawful, not only fraud in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any investment or security, but also in connection with the rendering of any
investment advice.74
These changes clearly reflect the national concern for the growing
number of people defrauded by individuals or entities labeling themselves
"investment advisors." The federal government has focused on strengthen-
ing federal regulation of investment advisors.75 The Florida amendments
69. Id. §§ 7-8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420-21 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 517.161-517.301
(Supp. 1992)).
70. Id. § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws at 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp. 1992)).
71. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)
(Supp. 1992)).
72. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(d) (Supp. 1992).
73. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp.
1992)).
74. Id. § 8, 1992 Fla. Laws at 421 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
75. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21 (1988). Addition-
ally there is currently pending before Congress a bill entitled the "Investment Adviser
Regulatory Enhancement and Disclosure Act of 1993." H.R. 578, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1992). The bill would amend the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 and would provide the
SEC with additional resources for its regulatory activities, and enhance investor protection
by strengthening the duties upon investment advisors as to disclosure, suitability and
confidentiality. The bill would establish a fee structure for registered investment advisors.
Such fees generated would be used to offset the cost of an increase in the SEC's investment
advisor inspection staff, and to conduct surveys of unregistered advisors. The bill would
also: 1) increase the frequency of examinations of high-risk advisors; 2) establish a
mechanism for identification of unregistered advisors; 3) establish express suitability
standards; 4) improve disclosure of conflicts of interest and other pertinent information; 5)
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seem an aggressive and positive step in closing the loopholes concerning the
regulation of those who offer financial services to the public.76 Definitio-
nal uniformity and vigorous enforcement of the new federal and state
provisions are enthusiastically anticipated.
The change in the Florida law may present certain regulatory problems.
Previously, fraud was only actionable in the offer, purchase or sale of
securities.7 7 That is, an offer, or the purchasing or selling of securities,
was required before at unlawful act could be deemed to have occurred. By
making unlawful the fraudulent rendering of investment advice absent the
offer, purchase or sale of securities, an argument could be raised that the
unlawful act is totally inchoate until acted upon by the potential victim. In
response, no doubt, the Department and plaintiffs counsel will argue that
the rendering of fraudulent investment advice is akin to the offer of a
security, the alleged perpetrator having committed all the acts necessary for
a violation of the law. In private actions, presumably, absent a showing of
detrimental reliance, damages, if available, would be nominal. The
Department on the other hand, would presumably not need a showing of
damages to institute injunctive proceedings against an investment advisor for
rendering fraudulent investment advice."
Moreover, the 1992 amendments add new subparagraph (m) to Florida
Statutes section 517.161(1) which enables the Department to suspend,
revoke, restrict or deny the registration of any investment advisor or other
regulated person having been civilly adjudicated to have committed fraud
in connection with the rendering of investment advice or any violation of
federal or state securities or commodities laws or any rule or regulation
promulgated thereunder or any injunction or adverse administrative order by
require fidelity bonds of certain advisors; 6) provide for the establishment of a toll-free tele-
phone listing to receive inquiries regarding disciplinary history of investment advisors; and
7) provide for confidentiality of client financial information. Id.
The proposed legislation would require investment advisors, under certain circum-
stances, to pay, upon registration, and annually thereafter, a fee based on assets under
management. One of the most important provisions of this proposed legislation is that it
would add to the Investment Advisor's Act a section specifically prohibiting advisors from
making unsuitable recommendations and require that the advisor make a reasonable inquiry
into the client's financial circumstances.
76. See Ch. 92-45, §§ 7-8, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420-21 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 517.161-517.301 (Supp. 1992)).
77. FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (1988) (amended 1992).
78. Id. § 517.19 1. The Department is granted the right to seek injunctive relief for any
violation of chapter 517. Id. This section makes clear that no damage need already to have
occurred, granting the Department authority to seek injunction against one who "is about to
engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of this chapter." Id.
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a state or federal agency regulating banking, insurance, finance or small loan
companies, real estate, mortgage brokerage or other related or similar
industries.79 The subparagraph does limit the right and power of the
Department to bring such a proceeding if the registered entity has been
continuously registered with the Department for five years after the entry of
the decision, provided of course, that the decision has been timely reported
to the Department pursuant to its rules. 80 Presumably, the threat of a
coattail action by the Department to revoke or suspend the registration of a
regulated entity because of the entry of a civil or regulatory judgment of
fraud will encourage additional lawsuits against regulated persons as well as
settlements prior to determination of those actions. More liberal settlement
policies on the part of regulated entities can be expected to generate even
further litigation.
The language of subsection (1)(m) of Florida Statutes section 517.161
is exceedingly broad. This is no doubt intentional. It allows the Depart-
ment to deny, revoke or suspend registration when any regulated person
"[h]as been the subject of any decision, finding, injunction, suspension,
prohibition, revocation, denial, judgment, or administrative order by any
court of competent jurisdiction, administrative law judge, or by any state or
federal agency, national securities, commodities, or option exchange, or
national securities, commodities, or option association . ". ..,, It is an
open question whether this includes a decision by an arbitrator or arbitration
panel of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., or arguably, even of the American Arbitration
Association. While the language, though broad, does not include the terms
arbitrators or arbitration panel, it is conceivable that the Department could
deem an arbitrator's decision to be a "decision" or "finding" of a national
securities, commodities, or option exchange or national securities or option
association.82 Further credence to this argument is lent by the fact that the
subparagraph refers to reported or reportable determinations, 3 and arbitra-
tion decisions have been deemed to be such according to the rules goveming
reports on Forms U-4 and U-5. 4 If this was in fact the intention of the
legislature, arbitral decisions should be one of the specified grounds for
79. Ch. 92-45, § 7, 1992 Fla. Laws 413, 420 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.161 (Supp.
1992)).
80. FLA. STAT. § 517.161(1)(m) (Supp. 1992).
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Rev. Form U-4 (11/91) and Rev. Form U-5 (11/91).
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revocation or suspension spelled out in the statute and further legislation is
needed for its inclusion. In the absence of such legislation and the
otherwise expansive of reach of subparagraph (m), a compelling argument
can be made that it was not the intent of the legislature to include such
decisions. The final legislative amendment to chapter 517, made in the
1992-1993 legislative sessions, was added by chapter 92-198."5 This
amendment added Florida Statutes section 517.075 to the securities laws
requiring disclosure in any prospectus for the issuance of securities in this
state, if the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer does business with the
government of Cuba or with any person o affiliate located in Cuba. 6 The
section further provides that after a registration is in effect, if a company
later engages in business with the government or any person or affiliate
located in Cuba, the issuer must file with the Department a statement to that
effect within 90 days.87 Additionally, the section provides penalties for
non-compliance, including a civil remedy to any purchaser of securities sold
in violation of the section. 88 This section also provides for public disclo-
sure, upon request, of any statements or forms filed with the Department by
an issuer doing business with the government of Cuba or its citizens or
affiliates. 9 The authors believe this provision to be unique to the laws of
the State of Florida.
In addition to the enacted legislation, five bills affecting or seeking to
regulate or amend the securities laws were introduced in the last two
legislative sessions. Senate Bill 105890 and its coordinate House Bill
02419' sought to reduce statutory interest rates from twelve to nine percent
in the absence of a written contract.92 The bills died in the Senate and
House. 93 House bill 1893 also introduced in the 1993 session, had as its
primary purpose to clarify the provisions related to selling and registering
85. Ch. 92-198, § 1, 1992 Fla. Laws 1837 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp.
1992)).
86. FLA. STAT. § 517.075 (Supp. 1992).
87. Id. § 517.075(3).
88. Id. § 517.075(6).
89. id. § 517.075(2)(c).
90. S. 1058, FLA. S. JOUR 117 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Senate Commerce Committee
3/24/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 109, S. 1058.
91. H. 0241, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 18 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Judiciary
4/04/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 26, H. 0241.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 90-91.
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small corporate securities offerings and to simplify registration for such
offerings, i.e. offerings under one million dollars.94 This bill also died in
committee. 95 Senate Bill 354 would have provided a rate of interest for
certain judgments equal to the prime rate plus two percent and would also
have provided for the imposition of prejudgment interest.96 It too died in
committee.97 Finally, Senate Bill 1252 sought to incorporate some of the
amendments of the prior unsuccessful bills and would have included a
prohibition on the sale of securities into, from or within the state without
registration.9" It also would have deleted an exception to the definition of
"associated person" for the registration of small corporate offerings and
would have authorized the Department to adopt rules to facilitate these
registrations.99 This bill also died in committee'0° and no securities
legislation was enacted in the 1993 session.'
In 1992, the Legislature amended one section of the Florida Statutes,
which though not specifically relating to securities regulation, may have a
significant impact in the area. 0 2  Chapter 768.73, regarding punitive
damages, previously provided that sixty percent of all judgments awarding
punitive damages in the areas of "negligence, strict liability, products
liability, misconduct in commercial transactions, professional liability or
breach of warranty that involves willful, wanton or gross misconduct"'0 3
94. H. 1893, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 160 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Commerce
4/4/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 210, H. 1893.
95. See supra note 94.
96. S. 354, FLA. S. JOUR 73 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Committee on Commerce
4/4/93); see FLA. LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR
SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 40, S. 354.
97. See supra note 96.
98. S. 1252, FLA. S. JOUR. 134 (Reg. Sess. 1993) (died in Messages 4/4/93); see FLA.
LEGIS., PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF SENATE BILLS at 129, S. 1252.
99. See supra note 98.
100. See supra note 98.
101. During 1992-93, the SEC enacted several new rules and regulations affecting, inter
alia, proxy solicitations, small business capital formation and reporting requirements, and,
most notably, penny stock regulation. The details of these initiatives are beyond the scope
of this paper, but should be of interest to Florida Securities practioners, the SEC's activities
are the subject of a well written article entitled "Significant 1992 Regulatory Developments,"
48/3 The Business Lawyer 977 (May 1993).
102. Ch. 92-85, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 821 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
103. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(1)(a) (1988).
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was payable either to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund in the case
of personal injury or wrongful death, °4 or to the General Revenue Fund
in the case of other punitive damages awards."0 5 Chapter 92-85, effective
April 8, 1992, reduced the percentage of punitive damages awards payable
to the state from sixty to thirty-five percent. 0 6 Thus, a successful plaintiff
in an action covered by Florida Statutes section 758.73 will now recover
sixty-five percent rather than forty percent of any punitive damage
award. " 7  The provision of subsection ](a) of Florida Statutes section
768.73relating to "misconduct in commercial transactions" certainly appears
broad enough to cover securities cases.' Moreover, since securities
related causes of action are often founded in fraud, which has traditionally
been a subject of punitive damage awards, it appears likely that courts
confronting the issue will apply Florida Statutes section 768.73 to securities
cases. '9 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified
to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether Florida Statutes
section 768.73 applied to arbitration awards in a securities case.'" This
issue was previously raised in the case of Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc.,"
where the court refused to apply section 768.73 to an award of punitive
damages made by an arbitration panel because the cause of action arose
prior to the then operative date of the statute even though the award was
made after that date." 2 Section 4 of chapter 92-85 amends Florida Statute
section 763.73 to clarify that subsections (2) and (3) of Florida Statutes
section 768.73 shall apply to pending cases and causes of action in which
a judgment has not yet been entered," 3 in effect putting to rest the issue
104. Id. § 768.73(2)(b).
105. Id.
106. Ch. 92-85, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 821 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
107. FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
108. See id. § 768.73(I)(a). But see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
109. But cf Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 599 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the intentional tort of malicious
prosecution was not intended to be included among those civil actions for which punitive
damages are limited by section 768.73(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes. Id.; see also infra notes
378-386 and accompanying text for a discussion of Florida's economic loss rule limiting
securities actions to breach of contract causes. Presumably, this would also limit the
application of puntive damages in securities cases.
110. Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 986 F.2d 459 (11 th Cir. 1993).
III. 677 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987)
112. Id. at 1139.
113. Ch. 92-85, § 4, 1992 Fla. Laws 821, 822 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp.
1992)).
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raised in Peabody.
II. LITIGATION
A review of securities litigation requires inquiry on both the state and
federal level since regulation of securities is concurrent." 4  Moreover,
since the United States Supreme Court decisions in Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd,"5 and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
1 16
endorsing arbitration as a means for resolution of disputes between
broker/dealers and their customers and employees, the great majority of
these disputes have been brought either in the first instance or ultimately in
arbitration." 7  Finally, a substantial portion of the judicially created law
regarding securities regulation in Florida is made on the circuit court level
which is reported, unfortunately, sporadically, if at all. Any review
therefore, of securities litigation in Florida, cannot purport to be complete
and the practitioner is cautioned to recognize the externally imposed
limitations of any such undertaking." 8
114. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(zzz) (1988); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) (1988); FLA. STAT. §§ 517.011-517.32
(1991).
115. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
116. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
117. The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., reports that the Fort
Lauderdale office handled 657 cases in 1992 and another 701 have been filed to date in 1993.
Additionally, cases are arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association, the New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., and other arbitral fora in Florida.
Arbitrators are not required by arbitration rules to write opinions but merely state the
ultimate resolution of the arbitration matter. See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURI-
TIES DEALERS, INC. ("NASD") CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 41 (1992). These
decisions are not widely reported, and as stated, only infrequently contain any rationale.
Section 41(f of the NASD Code has been amended to make arbitration awards, their
contents, and the names of the arbitrators publicly available. "The NASD will implement this
rule change October 1, 1993. For public customer cases, the rule change will apply to
awards rendered on or after May 10, 1989. For industry cases, including employment
disputes, the rule change will apply to awards rendered on or after October 1, 1993." Self-
Regulatory Organization; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Public Availability of Arbitration Awards, SEC Release
No. 34-32740 (August 12, 1993). Any interested practitioner should also consult the
Securities Arbitration Commentator, an invaluable source ofinformation concerning securities
arbitration. The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") makes all of its awards publicly
available, and the AAA is reportedly considering doing the same in securities cases.
118. This paper also is intended as a survey only and not as an in depth analysis or
discussion of each and every decision reported in the field during the period.
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A review of federal and state court cases for the period 1992-1993" 9
reveals that the court decisions have been concentrated primarily in
arbitration related cases. Most of these cases can be loosely divided into
two areas relating to arbitration disputes: The first, involves the extent of
judicial intervention in determining under what circumstances and in what
manner aggrieved parties must submit their disputes to arbitration. These
cases generally arise on motions or petitions either to compel or stay
arbitration. The second, involves the extent, manner and grounds for
judicial review of arbitration decisions.
On the federal level, judicial inquiry into compelling or staying
arbitration has been delimited by the mandates of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA").' 20  Under the FAA, the court's authority is confined to
determining whether there is an agreement to arbitrate. 12 1 If the parties
have validly agreed to arbitrate their dispute, under the FAA, the district
court must compel arbitration.
1 22
The federal courts have made clear, however, that while the scope of
their inquiry may be limited, they must and will inquire into the issue of the
making of an agreement to arbitrate where the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate is in issue. In such circumstances, a district court will decide if the
arbitration agreement is enforceable against the parties and will not allow
the question to be addressed by the arbitrators. 23 In Chastain v. Robin-
son-Humphrey,124 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of a motion to
compel arbitration where the customer denied signing the arbitration
agreement.125 Stating the general rule that a mere denial without more is
119. The authors have attempted to review the decisions published between January 1,
1992 and August 31, 1993.
120. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
121. Id. § 4. This section further provides that the court make this determination in a
summary proceeding. Id.
122. Id. §§ 2, 3. Section two of the FAA mandates that a written agreement to arbitrate
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable .... " Id. § 2, and section three of the FAA
requires courts to stay trial of any action in which it finds any issue contained therein to be
referable to arbitration pursuant to an agreement of the parties. Id. § 3. See, e.g., Chastain
v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 851 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
123. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854; see also Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). In Volt, the Supreme Court
instructed: "Iwle have recognized that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when
they have not agreed to do so ... nor does it prevent parties who do agree to arbitrate from
excluding certain claims from the scope of their arbitration agreement . Id. at 478
(citations omitted).
124. 957 F.2d at 851.
125. Id. at 854.
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normally insufficient to deny compelling arbitration,'26 the Chastain court
nevertheless affirmed the lower court ruling.'27 The court recognized that
in the rare instance, where, as here, a customer makes a substantial showing
that she had not, in fact, signed the arbitration agreement, the court, not the
arbitrators, must determine the validity of the agreement. 2 The Chastain
court expressed the general rule as follows: "the first task of a court asked
to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed
to arbitrate that dispute.' 2 9
In Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc. v. Lifshutz, 3 ° the Fourth District
Court of Appeal construed the state court's duty under the Florida Arbitra-
tion Code ("FAC")'3' to be identical, that is, the court must make the
determination whether an enforceable written agreement to arbitrate exists
between the parties. 32 Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the state
court construed the burden to be on the party seeking arbitration to establish
the existence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.'33 Finding that
despite submitting the arbitration agreements, appellant Shearson Lehman
had failed to produce handwriting experts or make any other attempt to
authenticate the signature on the brokerage agreement.'34 The appellate
court affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion to compel, holding that
"[t]he record does not show any evidence that the appellees signed or
126. See id
127. Id. at 855.
128. Id. at 854.
129. Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854 (citation omitted). Where, however, it is undisputed that
the party seeking to avoid arbitration has not signed any contract requiring same, as the court
stated, "the calculus changes." Id. "Under these circumstances, there is no presumptively
valid general contract which would trigger the district court's duty to compel arbitration
pursuant to the Act." Id. "Therefore, before sending any such grievances to arbitration, the
district court itse/f must first decide whether or not the non-signing party can nonetheless be
bound by the contractual language." Id.; see also Cancanon v. Smith Barney Upham & Co.,
805 F.2d 998, 1000 (11 th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Stating that in such circumstances "[t]o
make a genuine issue entitling the [party seeking to avoid arbitration] to a trial by jury [on
the arbitrability question], an unequivocal denial that the agreement has been made [is]
needed, and some evidence should [be] produced to substantiate the denial." Chastain, 957
F.2d at 854. In the instant matter, the court agreed that appellant Chastain had, in fact, made
such showing and was therefore entitled to a trial on the issue of the validity of the arbi-
tration agreement. Id.
130. 595 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
131. FLA. STAT. §§ 682.01-682.22 (1991).
132. Lifshutz, 595 So. 2d at 997.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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assented to the brokerage agreement submitted by the appellants.' ' 5
One year later, in Wheat, First Securities, Inc. v. Green,'36 the
Eleventh Circuit reiterated the proposition that it is the task of the court
asked to compel arbitration to determine whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate that dispute.'37 In Wheat, while recognizing that Congress in
enacting the Federal Arbitration Act declared a national policy favoring
arbitration, 3 1 the court reiterated its position in Chastain stating that
"[s]imply put, parties cannot be forced to submit to arbitration if they have
not agreed to do so. '
The Wheat court was asked to review a judgment of the district court
that a securities broker/dealer had no obligation to arbitrate claims by
investors arising from transactions with the broker/dealer's predecessor in
interest. 40  Appellants, customers of another brokerage firm, signed
arbitration agreements with that broker.'4 ' Thereafter, Wheat purchased
the assets of the original broker, and in its agreement expressly denied
assuming any liabilities of its predecessor.'42 Notwithstanding, appellants,
whose accounts were transferred to Wheat after the asset purchase, sought
to hold Wheat liable on the questioned transactions conducted by the
predecessor. "' The Eleventh Circuit, echoing its prior ruling in Chastain,
held that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate the matters before it.'44
In affirming the lower court's determination that Wheat was not bound
by the arbitration agreement of its predecessor, the Eleventh Circuit also
stated that since contract interpretation is generally a question of law,
135. Id. In his dissent, Judge Anstead noted that appellants had in fact successfully
introduced the arbitration agreements into evidence and that since no other evidence to the
contrary existed in the record, a motion to compel arbitration should have been granted. Id.
at 998. Presumably, Judge Anstead was recognizing that the burden of disputing the making
of the arbitration agreement shifted to the appellee after the agreement itself was submitted
in evidence. It is arguable that the dissent's position in Lifshutz is closer to that espoused by
the Eleventh Circuit in Chastain, since the Chastain court, at least impliedly recognized that
the party seeking to compel arbitration is required to make a prima facie showing of the
existence of an arbitration agreement, the burden then shifts to the party challenging that
agreement to present evidence rebutting same. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854.
136. 993 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1993).
137. Id. at 817.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854).
140. Id. at 815.
141. Wheat, 993 F.2d at 816.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 818.
19931
69
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
"'[d]eterminations of arbitrability, like the interpretation of any contractual
provision, are subject to de novo review."' 145  Thus, while the de novo
review standard announced in Wheat was applied therein to facts that were
not in dispute,146 the court's previous review in Chastain involved a case
where the facts were very much in question: whether or not appellant
Chastain was bound by an arbitration agreement, despite her vehement
assertion that she had never signed same.'47 In Chastain, however, the
Eleventh Circuit was careful to note that "the district court did not decide
that Chastain could not in fact be bound by the arbitration clauses of the
customer agreements. The district court only determined that Chastain's
duty to arbitrate would be decided by the district court, rather than being
decided by an arbitration panel."' 48  The court carefully noted that this
was the only determination that it reviewed upon appeal.'49 Left open by
its two rulings, Chastain and Wheat, is the question of what standard the
court would apply to any subsequent determination of the district court in
Chastain. In other words, whether the appellate court would review the
district court's determination on the issue of arbitrability de novo, or under
the more common abuse of discretion standard normally applied in cases
where a district court makes factual determinations.5
The Eleventh Circuit may have indicated its view on this question
earlier in the year in its decision in Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.'51 In Kelly, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging two causes
of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.152
After two years, the plaintiffs dismissed one of their claims and the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the remaining
claim.' 53 Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced arbitration of four state
common law claims alleging essentially the same conduct as the earlier
litigation, based on a clause in the arbitration agreement which required
arbitration of all claims with the exception of federal securities laws
claims.' 54 On motion of the defendant, the district court enjoined the
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Wheat, 993 F.2d at 815.
147. Chastain, 957 F.2d at 854.
148. Id. at 853.
149. Id.
150. PHILIP J. PADAVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE § 5.5 (1988).
151. 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 1068; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983).
153. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1068.
154. Id.
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arbitration proceeding and Kelly appealed.' 55 In affirming the lower
court's order, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "[w]e review the district court's
injunction for abuse of discretion."' 56  Thus, it appears that despite its
enunciation in Wheat of the de novo review standard in questions of
arbitrability, whereas in Kelly, the district court has been required to review
evidence in making its determination on whether or not to compel arbitra-
tion, the court will apply an abuse of discretion standard not de novo review
of the lower court's determination. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in
Kelly, "the district court . . . [is] in the best position to decide whether.
* an injunction was necessary. '
In Kelly, appellants sought to enjoin the subsequent arbitration
proceeding on grounds of resjudicata."5 ' In upholding the district court's
power to grant an injunction to protect its own rulings,'59 the court reject-
ed an argument that the issue of resjudicata should be left to the arbitrators
"because it is an affirmative defense that goes to the merits of . . . [the]
claims."' 6 ° The court stated "[w]e think the better rule is that courts can
decide res judicata."''
The Eleventh Circuit's willingness to have courts, rather than the
arbitrators, consider the issue of resjudicata is interesting in that it appears
to be contrary to and a departure from the general rule that courts faced
with a request to compel arbitration will limit their review to the issue of the
making of the agreement to arbitrate and the failure or refusal of one of the
parties to agree to arbitration.'62 The Kelly court's departure from the
general rule resurrects questions that had previously been thought, at least
on the federal level, to have been settled. By deciding the resjudicata
issue, the court clearly did not limit the scope of its inquiry to the valid
making of an agreement to arbitrate. Whether and under what circumstanc-
es federal courts will expand their scope of inquiry when asked to compel
or stay arbitration are again open questions. As we shall see, on the state
level, the question of the scope of judicial review of motions to compel or
stay arbitration is not at all well settled and is, in fact, the subject of a rather
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1070.
157. Id.
158. Kelly, 985 F.2d at 1069.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Chastain, 957 F.2d at 817; see also Wheat, 993 F.2d at 817.
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furious debate.' 63
During the period 1992-93, the Eleventh Circuit, following the dictates
of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,'6 4 joined the Fifth, 65 Sixth, 66 and Ninth 67 Circuits in deter-
mining that claims of sex discrimination under Title VII, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,161 were subject to arbitration. In
Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court held that a former stockbroker,
dismissed from his employment, who sought recovery under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,169 was required, by having
signed a U-4 registration form which provided for arbitration of all disputes
between him and his employer, to arbitrate his age discrimination
claims.170  The Supreme Court rejected the employee's contentions that
Congress had intended to exclude age discrimination claims from the
purview of the FAA' In Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,'72 the
plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court alleging sexual harassment and
seeking relief under Title VII and pendent state law claims.7 3  The
defendants sought a stay of the Title VII claims pending arbitration under
the FAA. 174  The Eleventh Circuit, noting that in her application for
registration as a stockbroker plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate all her disputes
with her employer, compelled arbitration of all claims including the Title
VII claims. 1
75
The expansion of the scope of causes of action which have been held
to be arbitrable in cases like Bender undoubtedly come as a result of what
the courts see as a clear mandate from the Supreme Court: They are to
effectuate the intention of parties signing arbitration agreements and order
163. See infra notes 211-46 and accompanying text.
164. III S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
165. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), appeal after
remand, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). Originally, the Fifth Circuit had determined Title
VII cases were not subject to arbitration, but its decision was vacated by the United States
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Gilmer. Id.;
see also Gilmer, I I I S. Ct. at 1647.
166. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
167. Mago v. Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1989).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1990).
170. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
171. Id. at 1657.
172. 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 699.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 700.
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all claims not specifically required to be determined by a court to arbitra-
tion. '76 Perhaps the attitude was best described by the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Pierce v. J W. Charles-Bush Securities, Inc.'77  The Pierce
court in determining that parties could agree to grant arbitrators authority to
award attorneys' fees, reviewed the various decisions of the United States
Supreme Court expanding the scope of arbitration in Moses H. Cone,1
78
Southland Corp. v. Keating,179 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.,8' Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 8' and
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 82. The Pierce court then stated:
"[i]f civil rights, antitrust and securities fraud claims are not inappropriate
for arbitration, it is very difficult to imagine a civil claim in which an
agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced."'83  In general, this is
probably a fair statement of the law."S4
Perhaps the most highly debated issue regarding judicial intervention
to compel or stay arbitrations before Florida courts during 1992-1993,
involves what has come to be known as the "AMEX Window." 185 The
matter was ultimately resolved, at least in part, by the Eleventh Circuit's
recent opinion in Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co.' 6 The
176. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983) (the FAA is a "congressional declaration of the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration ... [requiring that] as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope
of arbitrable issues, should be resolved in favor of arbitration.
177. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
178. 460 U.S. 1 (1983); see also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
179. 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act prohibited the states
from requiring a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties had
agreed to resolve by arbitration).
180. 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that certain antitrust and RICO claims were
arbitrable).
181. 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (reversing the Court's previous holding that securities fraud
claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could be determined in arbitration).
182. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (holding civil rights claims under the Age Discrimination
and Employment Act arbitrable).
183. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 628.
184. But cf Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614. The Mitsubishi court specifically limited its
holding to international antitrust cases. Id. at 629; cf Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1988) (upholding a state court determination
to stay arbitration while proceeding with a related trial).
185. See, e.g., Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 999 F.2d 509 (11 th Cir.
1993). In essence, the AMEX Window cases do not involve the courts in making a
determination of whether or not parties agreed to arbitrate, but rather whether specific fora
for those arbitrations are permitted or specified in the contracts. Id.
186. Id.
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controversy surrounding the AMEX Window involves whether or not an
involved customer of a broker/dealer may seek resolution of disputes by
arbitration before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). In
Luckie, the Eleventh Circuit decided that, where there was a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties which contained a provision denominating
fora for arbitration (a "forum selection provision") which did not include
AAA, the answer was no.'87 In Luckie, the plaintiffs, who were customers
of the broker/dealer and its registered representatives, alleged that the
defendant mismanaged and misused their investment accounts."' In April
1989, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the AAA to resolve the dis-
pute.' 89 The case was filed pursuant to article VIII, sections 1 and 2(c)
of the AMEX Constitution which allow a customer of any member organiza-
tion to demand arbitration before the AAA.'90  Thereafter, plaintiffs
commenced suit in the Sixth Circuit Court of Florida seeking a declaratory
judgment, affirming AAA jurisdiction and compelling arbitration before the
AAA.'9' The case was subsequently removed to the federal district court
on diversity jurisdiction. 92 The day before removal, however, the defen-
dant filed suit in New York City attacking the jurisdiction of the AAA and
seeking to compel arbitration before the New York Stock Exchange,
("NYSE"), National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., ("NASD"), or
AMEX.' 93 The New York court then enjoined the plaintiffs from proceed-
187. Id. at 514. ("[T]he New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE"), the American
Stock Exchange, Inc. ("AMEX"), and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") are all self-regulatory organizations, overseen and regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The AAA is an independent arbitral forum.") Id. at 511.
188. Luckie, 999 F.2d at 510.
189. Id.
190. Id. Section 1 of article VIII of the AMEX Constitution provides that members of
the exchange "shall arbitrate all controversies arising in connection with their business...
between them and their customers as required by any customer's agreement or, in the absence
of a written agreement, if the customer chooses to arbitrate." Id. Section 2(c), the so-called
"AMEX Window" provision, states that "[airbitration shall be conducted under the arbitration
procedures of this Exchange, except as follows: . . . (c) if any of the parties to the
controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate before the American
Arbitration Association in the City of New York, unless the customer has expressly agreed,
in writing, to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the Exchange." Id.
191. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1116, 1117
(M.D. Fla. 1991).
192. Id.
193. Id. The defendants actions were based upon a "choice of law" provision of the
arbitration agreement which specified that New York law was to apply to any disputes
between the parties.
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ing in any manner with their claim before the AAA and the plaintiffs filed
a motion challenging the jurisdiction of that court to hear the case. 194 The
federal district court in Florida then stayed further action in the Florida
matter pending the New York court's resolution of the jurisdictional is-
sue.' 95 The New York court then issued an internal order affirming its
jurisdiction to which plaintiffs filed objection on September 18, 1989.96
The Florida federal court continued its stay pending a final decision of the
jurisdictional question in New York until that court had failed to act for
almost two years.' 97  In June 1991, the district court lifted its stay.'98
The court then ruled on the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration and
determined that the customer's agreement in the instant case, which
provided in relevant part for "arbitration in accordance with the rules,
regulations and procedures then in effect of the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., the AMEX or the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc...
,"'99 barred arbitration before the AAA.2"' The district court, adopting
the defendant's position that the AMEX window operates only as a default
provision in the absence of a specific agreement between the parties, refused
to compel AAA arbitration.2"' The case made its tortuous way to the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Luckie, 766 F. Supp. at 1117.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1119.
200. Id. at 1120.
201. Luckie, 766 F. Supp. at 1120. Ultimately, the New York court decided to rule on
the matter before it. In Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Charles Luckie, Index
No.: 9909/89 (Supreme Court, New York October 14, 1992), the New York court, noting
the actions of the Middle District of Florida, finally determined the only issue remaining be-
fore it, Smith Barney's motion to dismiss one of the plaintiff's claims as time-barred under
the Supreme Court decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson, 11 I
S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (adopting the one/three year statute of limitations applicable to other
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to actions under section 10(b) thereof). The
New York court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the claims as time-barred on the
grounds that the claim was not time-barred under New York or federal statutes of limitation.
Id. at 5. The court based its reasoning on the fact that Congress had amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by enacting Section 27A "to modify the retroactive effect of the
Lampf ruling." Id. at 4. "Section 27A provides for re-instatement of certain actions time-
barred and dismissed under Lanmpf if timely commenced prior to June 19, 1991, [date of the
Lampfdecision], under applicable federal or state limitations as herein." Id. Accordingly,
the court found that respondent's claim was not time-barred under the New York (CPLR
213 [91) or federal law. Id.
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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2"' On August 26, 1993, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding closing the AMEX Window in
cases where the contract between the parties specifically designates other
fora for arbitration.2 3  Relying on Second Circuit decisions in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis,2 4 and PaineWebber,
Inc. v. Rutherford,0 5 as well as the Sixth Circuit decision in Roney & Co.
v. Goren,0b the court held that a forum selection provision of a customer
arbitration agreement can supersede the arbitration provisions of the AMEX
Constitution, namely the AMEX Window.20 7
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement in Luckie, the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida was again required to consider the
viability of the AMEX Window. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. King,"'8 Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich was confronted with an
arbitration agreement containing a forum selection clause providing for
specific fora which, while specifically including the AMEX, did not provide
for arbitration before the AAA.2"9 Relying on her previous ruling in
Luckie, the Judge preliminarily enjoined an AAA arbitration based on the
fact that the AMEX Window was superseded or closed by the specific
provisions in the arbitration agreement. °
On the state level, a rather heated debate is raging about the proper
scope of inquiry for a court when faced with a motion to compel or stay
arbitration. In 1989, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Anstis Ornstein
202. Luckie v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 999 F.2d 509 (11 th Cir. 1993).
203. Id. at 514.
204. 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990).
205. 903 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1990).
206. 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
207. Luckie, 999 F.2d at 514.
208. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc. v. King, 804 F. Supp. 1512 (M.D. Fla.
1992).
209. Id. at 1513.
210. Id. at 1514, 1516. Some months earlier, in Orlowe v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1991-1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,952, at 94,057 (Fla. 10th
Cir. Ct. 1991), a state court, also finding that the specific forum selection provision of an
arbitration agreement did not include AAA, held that the AMEX Window was closed and the
AMEX constitutional provision was superseded by the specific arbitration agreement. But
see Ray v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Case No. 92-845-CAOI (Fla. 5th Cir. Ct. 1992)
where a court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings and directed the parties to
proceed immediately with the arbitration then pending before the AAA pursuant to the
AMEX Window. The court specifically referred site selection and all other issues to the
arbitrators for resolution. Id.
[Vol. 18
76
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Winikoff / Bradford
Associates v. Palm Beach County,21 1 a non-securities case, held that issues
of statutes of limitation when raised as objections to submitting matters to
arbitration, are to be determined by the courts and not by arbitrators.
2
,
2
Two years later, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, relying on its previous
holding in Anstis Ornstein, refused to allow an arbitration panel to determine
whether or not a claim under the Florida probate code was time-barred. 13
The court, in a rather pugnacious opinion in Estate of Vernon v. Shearson,
Lehman Bros., Inc.,2 ' stated:
We hold that just because parties agree to the arbitration of disputes in
the execution of a contract, this does not mean that statutes of limitation
are without effect. It certainly does not mean that the arbitrators should
interpret the applicable statute of limitation to decide whether it applies
or not.2 s
In 1992, in a per curiam decision in Lange v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,216 the Fourth District Court of Appeal again refused to allow arbitra-
tors to consider the issue of statutes of limitation, relying on its opinions in
Anstis Ornstein and Vernon.1 7
In Anstis Ornstein, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was not
required to consider the applicability and effect of the FAA because it was
a non-securities case. Nor was it required to consider that most federal
courts, in construing their role under the FAA, have usually refused to
determine issues of statutes of limitation, and referred such issues to arbitra-
tion. '
211. 554 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
212. Id. at 19.
213. Id.
214. 587 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
215. Id. at 1170.
216. 601 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir.
1991); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Titan Group, Inc. v. Anne
Arundel County, 588 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1984), afd, 749 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1984). The
Eleventh Circuit has adopted the rationale of the Second Circuit's Wagoner opinion. See
Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (1lth Cir. 1982).
Generally, the rationale is that statutes of limitation are affirmative defenses and do not go
to the issue of whether or not the parties agreed to arbitrate. See generally Wagoner, 944
F.2d at 121 (where the rule is that "it is up to the arbitrators, not the court, to decide the
validity of time-bar defenses."). But cf Lawler v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Case No.:
91-136-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D. Fla. 1992):
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In Vernon (and presumably Lange), however, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal directly confronted the dictates of the FAA, as well as the
decisions of the federal courts construing same. Not only did the Vernon
court find exception to the general application of the FAA in cases of
statutes of limitation arising under state probate law, its strong dicta
indicated a disinclination to apply the majority approach to statutes of
limitation issues in general.2" 9 The Vernon court, referring to its opinion
in Anstis Ornstein, stated: "this court [has previously] held that it is the
court's responsibility, and not that of the arbitrators, to decide whether
arbitration has been time barred by statute."22  The court's 1992 per
curiam decision in Lange, derived from a circuit court injunction of an AAA
arbitration concerning "standard" securities law claims of fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence and breach of contract. 2 In Lange, the Fourth
District affirmed the circuit court ruling without deeming the subject worthy
of comment.222
The position of the Fourth District has, however, by September 1993,
become a rather solitary one. The Fifth District in Victor v. Dean Witter
In an action to compel arbitration under [sic] Federal Arbitration Act, [a court]
generally considers no issues other than the making of the agreement to arbitrate
and the failure or refusal of the other party to arbitrate, and apart from equity
doctrines such as laches, which on a motion to compel arbitration the court
sitting as a court of equity must take into account, all other issues of law and
fact are for determination by the arbitrators.
Opinion at 3 (emphasis added) (citing In re Ropner Shipping Co., 118 F. Supp 919
(D.C.N.Y. 1954). In Lawler, in an arbitration that was heard before the American Arbitration
Association, the AAA was advised that one of the respondents filed a petition in bankruptcy
two years earlier. In light of the bankruptcy proceedings, the AAA sua sponte temporarily
suspended the arbitration. Id. at 2. Lawler thereafter filed a petition with the court seeking
an order overruling the decision of the AAA. Id. The court deemed itself bound by the
general rule that it could inquire only into issues of the making of the agreement to arbitrate
and the failure of one party to arbitrate. The court, therefore, refused to reverse the arbitr-
ators' decision, and found that "[rleversal of the arbitrators' decision would be contrary to
our national policy favoring arbitration and would undermine the authority of the arbitrators
to make procedural decisions." Id. at 3.
219. Vernon, 587 So. 2d at 1170.
220. Id.
221. Lange v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 601 So. 2d 1347, 1347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); see also Lange v. Dean Witter Reynold's, Inc., No. 91-0770-CA-03 (Fla. 19th
Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 1992) (order granting temporary injunction).
222. Lange, 601 So. 2d at 1347. But cf Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hall, [Current] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,697, at 97,237 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 28, 1993), discussed infra.
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Reynolds, .nc.,223 considered and expressly rejected the Fourth District's
approach to the extent that it extended past the probate code.224 In the
securities context, the Victor court refused to follow Vernon, noting that
cases construing the court's powers of review under the FAA require it to
leave issues of statutes of limitation to the arbitrators.2 5 The Victor court
also rejected an argument based on Volt, 2 26 that since the arbitration
agreement contained a choice of law provision specifying the application of
New York law, the FAA was inapplicable.227 The Victor court reasoned
that the application of New York law was precluded on preemption grounds
since the application of New York law would have resulted in barring
arbitration.228  Finally, while feeling constrained by the FAA and the
federal cases construing it, the Victor court curiously-and in the authors'
view, correctly-expressed sympathy with Dean Witter's argument that since
"arbitrators are not frequently steeped in the law and cannot always be ex-
pected to follow its precepts. . . . [They] are wont to ignore valid statute
of limitations defenses. 229
The rationale of the Fifth District was quickly followed by the District
Court of Appeal for the Second District in Marschel v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.23 °  The Marschel court refused to allow the courts to
consider the issue of statutes of limitation, stating:
[T]he Fifth District recently decided the exact issue presented in this
case regarding whether the arbitrators or the court should decide time
bar defenses . . . .The Fifth District concluded that the arbitrators
should decide the statute of limitations issue .... We agree with the
conclusion reached in Victor ....23
223. 606 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, 614 So. 2d 502 (Fla.
1993).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 683.
226. Volt Info. Servs., Inc., 489 U.S. at 468.
227. Victor, 606 So. 2d at 685.
228. Id
229. Id.
230. 609 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla.
1993).
231. Id. at 720; see also Daugherty v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 618 So. 2d 802 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Second District Court of Appeal, relying on its holding in Marschel,
summarily reversed a circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration on statute of limitations
grounds).
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In April of this year, the Third District Court of Appeal joined the
debate,232 siding with the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in
a succinct opinion in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Clarke.233 The Clarke
court stated: "The decision below that the dispute must be arbitrated is
affirmed on the authority of... [Victor and Marschel], with which we are
in complete agreement. 234
Despite the Third District's agreement with the Victor and Marschel
decisions, one important issue raised in both cases was resolved in opposite
manners by those two courts. Both cases construed the same arbitration
clause, containing a New York choice of law provision.2" The Victor
court found that the choice of law provision was preempted by the
FAA,236 while the Marschel court found the contract did not show an
intent to apply state law and, therefore, decided that it need not determine
whether New York law would conflict with the goals and policies of the
FAA and, therefore, be preempted.237
Most recently, in a rather unusual written (and reported) opinion of a
circuit court in Paine Webber, Inc. v. Hall,238 Judge Leroy H. Moe, of the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, a court within the
jurisdiction of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, openly rejected the
holdings of the Fourth District in Anstis Ornstein, Vernon and Lange and
sided with the Second, Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal holding
that the question of statutes of limitation are for the arbitrators and not for
the court under the Federal Arbitration Act.239 This case has apparently
been appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. 24' Thus, the issue
232. The Third District's position was predictable. In Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Cowan,
601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). the Third District disposed of an argument in
a federal labor law case seeking to preclude arbitration as time barred by the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. The Cowan court stated: "[tihat contention is a matter to
be presented to the arbitrators and is not for us to determine." Id. at 302 n.2. See also infra
note 255 and accompanying text.
233. 617 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
234. Id. But see Seaboard Surety Co. v. Cates, 604 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Anstis Omstein Assoc. v. Palm Beach County, 554 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct.
App. 1989) for the proposition that timeliness of a claim for arbitration is for the courts not
the arbitrators). It is important to note, however, that this is a non-securities case to which
the FAC, and not the FAA, probably applied.
235. Victor, 606 So. 2d at 682.
236. Id. at 683.
237. Marschel, 609 So. 2d at 721.
238. [1993] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,697, at 97,237 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Apr. 28,
1993).
239. Id. at 97,239.
240. 5 Securities Arbitration Commentator 9, at II (August 1993).
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has been squarely joined; the ball so to speak is in the court of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal. Should the Fourth District continue in its position
taken in Anstis Ornstein, Vernon and Lange, 4' the issue, no doubt, will
ultimately be decided in the Florida Supreme Court.
Ironically, the issue of court inquiry into statutes of limitation which
the Second, Third and Fifth District courts determined to be resolved by the
dictates of the federal courts in construing the FAA, may not be so clear-cut
on the federal level. In Lawler v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 42 the court
specifically included among the duties of a court faced with a motion to stay
or compel arbitration, determination of issues of equitable defenses.243
Presumably, this would include laches. If courts have jurisdiction to
construe laches, why not statutes of limitation? Similarly, the Eleventh
Circuit has, at least nominally, widened the scope of inquiry in its recent
decision in Kelly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,144 in
holding that issues of resjudicata are properly for the court and not the
arbitrators.24 Other federal courts have, at least in part, left the door open
to judicial review of statute of limitation issues and it is difficult to say that
the issue is fully resolved at either level.246
241. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has had ample opportunity to reverse its
position. To date it has chosen not to do so. See, e.g., Investment Management & Research,
Inc. v. Wylie, Appeal No.: 92-3256, pending since November 6, 1992, before the Fourth
District. In Wylie, Judge Edward Fine of the Fifteen Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach
County, Florida enjoined an arbitration proceeding on statute of limitations grounds.
Investment Management & Research, Inc. v. Wylie, No. CL-92-6169-AN (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.
Oct. 20, 1992) (order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). In at least two other cases, circuit
courts in the Fourth District have enjoined arbitrations based on Vernon, see Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Banks, Case No.: 92-8685 AC (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1992); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. DeGroff, Case No.: 92-00638 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1992).
242. Case No.: 91-136-CIV-FTM-17D (M.D. Fla. 1992).
243. Id. at 3.
244. 985 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1993).
245. Id. at 1069; see also supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Escobar, CaseNo.: 91-1078-CIV-
T-15A (M.D. Fla. 1991). In Escobar, the district court found certain claims to be time
barred and enjoined defendants therein from prosecuting those claims in a pending NASD
arbitration. Id.; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Gimenez (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.) N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1992. In Gimenez, a New York court was asked to consider, inter
alia, whether or not arbitration between a broker and its disgruntled customer was barred by
the statute of limitations. The New York court, finding that the matter was governed by the
FAA, specifically referred the issue of statutes of limitation to the arbitrators. Interestingly,
the New York court refused to decide that the FAA and federal law applied since securities
transactions, including the mailing of monthly account statements and confirmations, involve
interstate commerce. Rather, the court found federal law applicable on the grounds of
1993]
81
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
Another major issue confronting state courts in considering motions to
compel or stay arbitration during 1992-1993, is the issue of waiver. The
courts have ruled that, while parties may agree to arbitrate, a party seeking
to compel arbitration may waive the right by taking actions inconsistent with
the right to arbitrate.2 4 7  The general rule was clearly enunciated in Mike
Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co.: "[where] a party to a contract,
containing a provision for arbitration ...commences suit, or takes other
inconsistent action therewith, he will be held to have waived his rights to
arbitration.,, 24 ' This rule has been consistently followed by the Florida
courtS24 9 and has been specifically adopted by the Florida Supreme
diversity. The court found that the broker/dealer was a Delaware corporation and Gimenez,
the customer, a Florida resident. The court also rejected the customer's challenge to its
jurisdiction, noting that in its forum selection clause, the customer agreed to arbitration and
later chose the NASD for resolution of the dispute. Reasoning that the NASD had its
principal place of business in New York, and the customer chose a New York based entity
for his forum, the court found sufficient basis for obtaining jurisdiction over him.
The importance of Gimenezto Florida practitioners, even though the case was decided
by a New York court, is the fact that it applied federal law in refusing to determine statute
of limitations issues despite the fact that the contract contained a choice of law provision
stating that New York law would apply. Under New York law the court could dismiss
arbitration claims as time-barred. It is also important for Florida practitioners to note that
at least one court has construed a common forum selection provision to confer jurisdiction
on the courts of the state where the fora are located or have their principal place of business
to determine motions to stay or compel arbitration. The authors would note that many, if not
most, arbitration disputes arising in Florida contain similar choice of law and forum selection
provisions. In this regard, the authors direct practitioners' attention to the special concurrence
of Judge Anstead in Terminal Construction Co. v. DeSantis, 614 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). In DeSantis, Judge Anstead questioned the continuing viability of the Florida
Supreme Court decision in Damora v. Stresscon International, Inc., 324 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 19-
75), which held that an agreement to arbitrate in another state will not be enforced in Florida
upon the authority of section 682.02 of the Florida Statutes. In DeSantis, Judge Anstead
stated:
I do not believe the policy reasons underlying the Damora decision remain valid,
and hope both the legislature and the Florida Supreme Court would revisit the
issue. When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, even in another state, there
is no valid reason why Florida courts, if properly called upon to to do so, should
not enforce the parties' agreement to the extent that the courts have jurisdiction
over the parties.
DeSantis, 614 So.2d at 8.
247. See, e.g., Mike Bradford & Co. v. Gulf States Steel Co., 184 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
248. Id. at 913.
249. See, e.g., Finn v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 523 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. 1988); R.W. Roberts Constr. Co. v. Masters
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Court.25° In Bradford, and its progeny, the courts have made clear that a
party claiming waiver of arbitration must demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an
existing right to arbitrate; and (2) commencement of suit or other acts
inconsistent with the right.2"' In Finn v. Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.,252 the Fourth District Court rejected a claim that in order to find a
waiver of arbitration, a court must not only find knowledge and inconsistent
acts, but also prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.253 The Finn
court stated: "prejudice must be shown only where there is a finding of
waiver based upon delay in assertion of one's right. A showing of prejudice
is not required if waiver is based on inconsistent acts. ' 254 The Finn rule
seems to be one of lack of ambiguity; that is, the actions of one claimed to
have waived arbitration are not ambiguous but are clearly inconsistent with
that right and clearly reflect knowing waiver.5
& Co., 403 So. 2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); King v. Thompson &
McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
Seville Condo. No. 1, Inc. v. Clearwater Dev. Co., 340 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Gettles v. Commercial Bank, 276 So. 2d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
Qjus Indus.. Inc. v. Mann, 221 So. 2d 780, 782 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
250. Klosters Rederi A/S v. Arison Shipping Co., 280 So. 2d 678, 681 (Fla. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974).
251. Bradford, 184 So. 2d at 915; Kosters, 280 So. 2d at 681.
252. 523 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
253. Id. at 619.
254. Id. at 619-20.
255. See, e.g., Rosen v. Shearson, Lehman Bros., Inc., 534 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), reviewdenied, 514 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1989) (affirmative selection of a
course of action-litigation in the court-runs counter to the very purpose of arbitration);
Lapidus v. Arlen Beach Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (manifest acceptance of the judicial forum). Several cases have held that
commencing suit or answering a complaint is sufficient to waive arbitration. Ojus Indus.,
221 So. 2d at 782; Gettles, 276 So. 2d at 840; King, 352 So. 2d at 1235; Hardin Int'l, Inc.
v. Firepak, Inc., 567 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also Handmacher v.
Campagna, 621 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed per curiam an order from the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit denying appellant's
motion to stay the lower court proceedings and compel the matter to arbitration. In
Handniacher, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging wrongdoing against her former
investment adviser, its two principals and the broker dealer through whom her trades were
placed by the advisory company. The plaintiff and three of the defendants agreed to
arbitration of their dispute. The fourth defendant objected claiming that by filing her
complaint in circuit court, the plaintiff had waived her right to arbitrate. The circuit court
agreed, and the Fourth District affirmed this ruling on appeal. Handmacher, 621 So. 2d at
445.
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The issue of the necessity of showing prejudice, where waiver of
arbitration is based merely on delay in asserting the right to arbitrate,
apparently left open in Finn, has been the subject of debate among the
district courts of appeal during the period 1992-1993. In a case involving
federal labor law, Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Cowan,5 6 the Third District
held that in cases of delay, a party opposing arbitration must additionally
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the inconsistent acts (delay).5 7
The Cowan court, recognizing that the case involved federal labor law,
applied federal substantive law to the issue of waiver of arbitration. Relying
on decisions of various federal circuit courts,258 and the now familiar
litany that doubts concerning arbitration are to be resolved in favor of
arbitrability, 259 the court, found no showing of prejudice caused by the
delay in asserting a right to arbitration, and referred the matter to arbitra-
210tion.
In 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal apparently threw down
the gauntlet, challenging the Third District's Cowan decision. In Donald &
Co. Securities, Inc. v. Mid-Florida Community Services, Inc.,261 the
Second District refused to require a showing of prejudice in order to
conclude that arbitration had been waived by inconsistent acts. 62 The
Donald & Co., court recognized the applicability of the FAA.263 Never-
theless, the court reasoned that since the United States Supreme Court had
not ruled on the necessity of showing prejudice, and since Florida courts are
bound only by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting acts of Con-
gress, it was free to ignore lower federal court precedent and apply the law
of Florida.16 ' The Second District then ruled that following Florida law:
"a party may waive arbitration by actively participating in a law suit or by
taking action inconsistent with that right .... [I]t is not necessary to show
prejudice to establish waiver ....
256. 601 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 302.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (citing Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 709 P.2d 826 (1985)).
261. 620 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
262. Id. at 194.
263. Id. at 193.
264. id. The Second District did note that at least one federal court had held that waiver
may be found absent a showing of prejudice. See National Found. for Cancer Research v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 821 F.2d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
265. Donald & Co., 620 So. 2d at 194.
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In so holding, the court specifically noted that the Third District had
ruled to the contrary in Cowan.266 The court did conclude, however, that
while the facts in Cowan demonstrated no prejudice, the court could infer
prejudice from the facts of Donald & Co. subjudice.267 It was careful to
point out, however, that it was following the rule that a showing of
prejudice was not necessary. 68 Curiously, the Second District's decision
in Donald & Co. makes almost no reference to its decision of the prior year
in Bared & Co. v. Specialty Maintenance & Construction, Inc.,269 a non-
securities case that apparently did not involve construction of the FAA or
a review of the federal law on waiver of arbitration. In Bared, the Second
District succinctly found waiver of arbitration by the filing of an an-
swer.27° The Bared court held that the fact that appellees had both raised
the arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense in their answer and
specifically, claimed the right to arbitrate in their amended answer did not
negate their initial waiver of arbitration.2"'
The Florida courts in 1992-1993 have considered several other issues
in the context of motions to compel or stay arbitration. These include
determinations of what issues are properly the subject of arbitration, who
may demand arbitration, and whether disputes arising prior to the making
of the arbitration agreement or subsequent to the conclusion of that
agreement are properly arbitrable. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Gold-
stein,272 the court confronted the issue of whether an introducing broker
may validly enforce an arbitration agreement entered into between a
customer and a clearing broker.273 In Stratton, the customer had entered
into a customer account agreement with the clearing broker, Bear Stearns &
Co., which provided that disputes between them were to be resolved in
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 610 So. 2d I (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id.
272. 615 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
273. Id. The court explained: "The 'introducing broker' deals directly with the
customer and relays orders to the 'clearing broker,' who has access to the relevant stock ex-
changes." Id. Introducing brokers use the services of clearing brokers in order to gain access
to exchanges in which they may not be members. Frequently, in such arrangements, the
customers are required to contract directly with and be financially responsible to the clearing
broker. Typically, introducing brokers guarantee the accounts of their customers to the
clearing broker.
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arbitration. 74 Another part of the agreement provided that "[y]ou agree
that your broker (including Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.) is a third party
beneficiary of this agreement, and that the terms and conditions hereof,
including the arbitration provision, shall be applicable to all matters between
or among any of you . . ,*""' Finding that the introducing broker,
Stratton, was a third party beneficiary of the contract, and that the contract
clearly covered the controversy between the parties, the Third District
reversed the trial court decision refusing to compel arbitration and remanded
with directions to refer the matter to arbitration.276
Florida courts were also asked to construe what claims were properly
determined in arbitration. In Pierce v. J. W. Charles-Bush Securities,
Inc., 77 the court readily determined that parties could agree to grant
arbitrators authority to award attorney fees stating: "If civil rights, antitrust
and securities fraud claims are not inappropriate for arbitration, it is very
difficult to imagine a civil claim in which an agreement to arbitrate would
not be enforced. 278 Perhaps mindful of the Fourth District's admonitions
in Pierce, the circuit court for Indian River County, in an action brought
before it, issued an order compelling arbitration.279 In Noe v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,28° the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's order compelling arbitration. The court stated in a succinct per
curiam opinion: "We reject appellees' argument that subsequent federal
cases require us to depart from the holding expressed in Montgomery Dis-
tributors.,,28  In Montgomery Distributors, Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing
Co., Inc.,282 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that: (1) antitrust
claims were not a proper subject for arbitration; and (2) the doctrine of
permeation did not require a stay of arbitration of breach of contract claims
pending a trial on antitrust issues. 23  The doctrine of permeation has
subsequently been rejected on the federal level. 284 To the extent that the
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Stratton, 615 So. 2d at 184.
277. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
278. Id. at 628; see supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
279. SeeNoe v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 599 So. 2d 786 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
280. 599 So. 2d 786 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
281. Id. (citing Montgomery Distrib., Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 505 So.
2d 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
282. 505 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
283. Id. at 445.
284. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). If arbitrable
claims were so intertwined with nonarbitrable claims that the arbitrators could not reasonably
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Fourth District's decision in Noe reflects a conflict with its own decision in
Pierce, it is an anomaly. 85
In Bachus & Stratton, Inc. v. Mann,"6 the Fourth District compelled
arbitration of Title VII sex discrimination and various common law claims
against a broker/dealer and its registered representatives." 7 The court also
compelled arbitration of the claims against the broker/dealer's parent
company, holding that the issue of whether it was vicariously liable for the
acts of its agents is properly referable to arbitration.28
In Bachus & Stratton, the Fourth District was also required to consider
the issue of the arbitrability of claims which arose after the termination of
appellee's employment by the appellants, and thus, arguably after the
extinction of the agreement between them to arbitrate.289 The Fourth
District upheld the trial court's ruling that the arbitration agreement did not
apply to claims which arose after the termination of appellee's employ-
ment.29 °
The Fourth District, without reference to same, apparently followed its
holding in Bachus & Stratton in its decision in Chelsea Street Securities,
Inc. v. Cawthon,"' issued on the same day. In Chelsea, the Fourth
District in a per curiam opinion affirmed, without opinion, a lower court's
refusal to compel arbitration of a suit by a former employee of a securities
brokerage firm alleging slander and infliction of emotional distress.292
The alleged conduct giving rise to the suit apparently occurred some ten
days after the employee resigned.293
resolve the former without consideration of the latter, courts would require a stay of
arbitration pending resolution of the non-arbitrable matters at trial.
285. Since the circuit court ruling in Noe is unreported, and the Fourth District opinion
sheds no light on the issues considered by the circuit court, it is arguable that the decision
is unique to its facts and does not reflect a retreat from the court's position in Pierce. It is
important to note, however, that the court's broad statement in Pierce may not have been
entirely accurate. In its decision in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), the Supreme Court
noted that its ruling that antitrust claims were arbitrable was limited to cases involving
international arbitrations. See supra note 184.
286. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1275 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
287. Id.
288. Id.; see also Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11 th Cir. 1992)
(compelling arbitration of Title VII claims); supra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
289. Bachus, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1275.
290. Id.
291. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1272 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
292. Id.
293. Id
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Notwithstanding his concurrence in Bachus & Stratton, which held that
claims arising after termination of employment were not subject to
arbitration, Judge Farmer of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, inexplica-
bly wrote a scathing dissent in Chelsea. Judge Farmer reasoned that the
arbitration clause at issue in Chelsea, even though it was identical to the
arbitration clause in Bachus,"' was in fact broad enough to encompass
post employment disputes, so long as they arose "out of, or in connection
with, the business of the firm."29 Judge Farmer noted the liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration set forth in the FAA and the case law requiring
that all doubts be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it.296
Relying on the court's previous holding in Pierce, Judge Farmer stated:
"Manifestly, there is nothing inherent in slander or infliction of emotional
distress claims that precludes arbitration. Or, to put it another way, there
is nothing about such claims that requires a court in preference to an
arbitration forum. 297
In summary, Judge Farmer stated:
I do note that the employee's causes of action all arose after his
employment relationship with the firm had already terminated. I do not
understand why the date of the employee's termination of employment
might be thought to determine whether the claims are arbitrable.9
In light of his same day concurrence in the Bachus decision, which held
directly to the contrary, Judge Farmer's Chelsea dissent is an apparent
anomaly.
In Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Segal,299 the Fourth District
was confronted with a similar issue to that raised in Bachus & Stratton and
Chelsea."' In Segal, the brokerage firm sought retroactive application of
an agreement to arbitrate.3"' The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
294. Both cases construed the NASD Form U-4 agreement to "arbitrate any dispute,
claim, or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . .. that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules ... of the organizations with which I register." Bachus, 18 Fla.
L. Weekly at D1275; Chelsea, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1272.
295. Chelsa, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1272.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 603 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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the lower court ruling refusing to apply the subsequent arbitration agreement
to pre-employment disputes." 2
The second major focus of judicial review of arbitration decisions in
the period 1992-1993 in Florida, has been the extent, manner and grounds
for judicial review of arbitration decisions. This category can be loosely
termed post-arbitration review. In this context, Florida courts on both the
state and federal level have considered issues relating to the vacatur of
arbitration awards as well as the grounds and standards of review to be
applied in doing so. Three principal cases concerning this issue reached the
Eleventh Circuit in 1992-1993. The first two were Ainsworth v: Skur-
nick,30 3 ("Ainsworth IX') a case having its genesis in the Southern District
of Florida,3"4 and Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc.3"5 Brown in-
volved a review of a decision of the District Court for the Middle District
of Florida." 6 Curiously, both Ainsworth and Brown involved the construc-
tion of Florida Statutes section 517.12 relating to the unregistered sale of
securities in Florida.30 7 The third case, Robbins v. Day,38 arose out of
the vacatur of an arbitration award by the United District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama in a case primarily concerning Alabama blue
sky violations.
3 9
The FAA makes specific provision for vacatur of arbitration awards by
302. Id. The court held that the broker's subsequent agreement to arbitrate, which was
executed incident to the broker's registration afterhis employment dispute with the brokerage
firm, does not constitute an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising prior to registration. Id.
The court found that "[t]he rules of the NASD and NYSE do not provide that a registrant's
agreement to arbitrate disputes applies retroactively." Segal, 603 So. 2d at 689.
303. 960 F.2d 939 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993).
304. Id.
305. 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C508 (I Ith Cir. July 2, 1993).
306. ld; see Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., [19921 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,935, at 93,956 (M.D. Fla. 1992), wherein Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich of the Middle
District issued a typically well reasoned and well written opinion which thoroughly
summarizes the law to that time of judicial review of arbitration decisions in the Eleventh
Circuit.
307. Brown, 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. at C508; Ainsworth, 960 F.2d at 939.
308. 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
309. Id. The district court vacated an arbitration award in the amount of $325,000 since
the arbitrators' decision did not explain their rationale for determining liability or their
methodology for imposing damages. Id. at 681. Claimants originally sought 4.2 million
dollars in actual damages, 12 million in punitive damages and 12.6 million dollars in RICO
damages, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses totalling over 26.8 million dollars in damages.
Id. at 681 n.I.
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the district courts in section 10 thereof.310 However, the grounds provided
by section 10 are extremely limited.31' Specifically, section 10 enumerates
four grounds for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing . . . or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (4)
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.3 2
Given the limited grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards specified
in United States Code Title 9, section 10, it is perhaps not surprising that
several federal courts have fashioned other grounds to vacate awards. The
first of these judicially crafted means allows vacatur if the arbitrators' award
is "arbitrary or capricious."' 1 3  Another ground is when a court finds an
award "violates public policy., 3 4  Another ground cited by the courts is
that the award is "irrational." '3 15 The final method crafted by the courts
to vacate arbitration awards is upon a finding that the award was rendered
in "manifest disregard of the law. 316
The Eleventh Circuit has been considering the manifest disregard
standard without specifically adopting same since its decision in O.R.
Securities, Inc. v. Professional Planning Associates,3 7 in 1988.38 Given
the Eleventh Circuit's relatively long term flirtation with the manifest
disregard standard, it was inevitable that a district court below would vacate
an arbitration award on the grounds of manifest disregard of the law, and
310. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1993).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1412, (11th Cir. 1990).
314. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665 (11 th Cir.
1988).
315. See lema v. Arthur Murray, Int'l, Inc., 833 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1987).
316. O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs. Inc., 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir.
1988). In O.R. Sec., the Eleventh Circuit discussed the manifest disregard standard noting
that it had never adopted same. Id. at 747.
317. 857 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1988).
318. Id.; see Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412-16.
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that the decision would be appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. In Ainsworth
v. Skurnick ("Ainsworth 1"), the District Court for the Southern District of
Florida did just that and the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.319
In Ainsworth I, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an order of the Southern
District vacating an arbitration award in which a customer sued a broker
alleging inter alia that the broker was not registered to sell securities in
Florida, and that, despite the fact that his office was in New York, his
effectuation of the Florida customer's orders constituted the sale of securities
in Florida by an unregistered person, in violation of Florida Statutes section
517.12.320 The arbitration panel refused to award damages. On appeal, the
district court specified the elements of a section 5 17.12 violation, including
an instruction that a finding of scienter was unnecessary and remanded to
the arbitrators for a clarification of their decision.32' The panel responded
that although the broker had acted negligently, the claimant had suffered no
damages, and no violation of section 517.12 had been proven.322 The
district court, reviewing the transcript of the arbitration proceeding de novo,
determined that there had clearly been a violation of Florida Statutes section
517.12, and vacated the arbitration award as being in manifest disregard of
the law.323 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, was unable to ascertain the
status of the law concerning this statute from Florida court decisions, and
therefore certified, in Ainsworth 1, the question of whether the broker's
conduct constituted a violation of section 517.12 to the Florida Supreme
Court.3 24 The Florida Supreme Court held that the District Court had been
correct.3 25 The case again went to the Eleventh Circuit.3 26
In Ainsworth II, the Eleventh Circuit, armed with the opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court, affirmed the district court's vacatur, 27 but rejected
the court's use of the manifest disregard standard, again noting that it had
never adopted that standard as a ground for vacating arbitration awards.328
The Ainsworth H court did adopt the arbitrary or capricious standard as a
non-statutory ground upon which courts could, under proper circumstances,
319. 909 F. 2d 456 (1 th Cir. 1990).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 457.
323. Id.
324. Ainsworth I, 909 F.2d at 456.
325. Skumick v. Ainsworth, 591 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1991).
326. Ainsworth 11, 960 F.2d at 939.
327. Id. at 941.
328. Id.
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vacate an arbitration award.329  Defining the arbitrary or capricious
standard as one in which "'a ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be
inferred from the facts of the case,""'33 the court explained that, since the
district court correctly instructed the arbitrators on the law, and they
nevertheless refused to apply it properly, the refusal to grant damages was
arbitrary and capricious.33" ' The Ainsworth II court stated: "In this case,
it is not a question of deciding the law and getting it wrong or for some
reason disregarding the law. The decision was simply an apparent arbitrary
and capricious denial of relief with no factual or legal basis." '332
Prior to Ainsworth II, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's
decision in Robbins, which held the actions of an arbitration panel to be in
manifest disregard of the law since a review of the record supported a
finding of fraud, and yet the arbitrators refused to apply a mandatory
damages provisions of the Alabama Securities Act.333 The Eleventh
Circuit, however, reversed.334  The court stated: "[f]ollowing Eleventh
Circuit precedent, we decline to adopt the manifest disregard of the law
standard." '335 The Robbins court did not completely reject the idea of
judicial grounds for vacatur; instead, it declared that the court could look
beyond the statutory grounds of the FAA "[o]nly after it is determined that
there could be no proper basis for the award .... ""'
Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncement in Robbins, the
district court in Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc.,337 found that the
arbitrators below had a "proper basis" for their award since the issue of
what constituted a violation of Florida Statutes section 517.12 was not clear
at the time of the Brown arbitration, and the arbitrators' interpretation of the
law was reasonable.33 Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court finding, it noted that by inquiring into whether the arbitrators had a
329. Id.
330. Id. at 941 (quoting Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1413).
331. Ainsworth IA 960 F.2d at 941.
332. Id.
333. Robbins v. Paine Webber, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 773, 777 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
334. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
335. Id. at 684. As discussed above, it is not at all clear to the authors and, presumably
to the district court in Robbins, that this was the case. See O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 42;
Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1410.
336. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684.
337. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,935, at 93,956 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
338. Id. at 93,962.
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proper basis, the district court abused its discretion!339  The Eleventh
Circuit instructed that, since the arbitrators stated the rationale for their
decision, the district court should have confined its consideration to
appellant's contentions that the award was arbitrary, capricious and contrary
to public policy. 4°
If any bright line can be determined from these cases, it is that the
Eleventh Circuit has nominally rejected the manifest disregard standard for
judicial review of arbitrations and directed the district courts to be extremely
circumspect in vacating arbitration awards' To this end, the court in
Robbins directed the district courts to review arbitration decisions under the
abuse of discretion standard; that is, to uphold arbitration decisions if any
basis can be inferred for the arbitrators' decision, while warning that it
would review any vacatur of an arbitration award de novo.a4' While the
dictates of the Eleventh Circuit are far from clear, by its failure to reject all
judicially crafted grounds for review of arbitration decisions, and to allow
vacatur solely on the grounds provided in 9 U.S.C., section 10, the court
arguably encouraged the district courts to continue vacating arbitration
awards under proper circumstances.
One other decision of the federal courts concerning post-arbitration
review is of note. Again, the opinion was written by Judge Elizabeth A.
Kovachevich of the Middle District of Florida. In In re Arbitration between
Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. & Depew, 342 the court vacated an
arbitration award of attorney fees awarded by an AAA panel.343 In
Depew, claimants alleged their investment accounts had been mishandled in
violation of various statutes, including section 517.211(6) of the Florida
Statutes and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5,344 and
alleged various common law causes of action.345 In their statement of
claim, the Depews requested attorneys fees for the lob-5 allegations and for
violation of chapter 517, but did not request attorney fees for the common
law causes.3 46  Notwithstanding, the arbitrators awarded damages and
attorney fees despite finding the broker had committed no statutory viola-
339. Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 7 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C508, 509 (11 th
Cir. July 2, 1993).
340. Id.
341. Robbins, 954 F.2d at 681.
342. 814 F. Supp. 1081 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
343. Id
344. 17 C.F.R. §240.10(b)(5) (1992).
345. Depew, 814 F. Supp. at 1082.
346. Id.
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tions.3" The court, noting that under the American Rule, attorneys fees
awards are improper unless provided by statute or contract, also recognized
that even if an arbitration clause in a contract is ambiguous, but can be read
to include an award of attorney fees, the court will not vacate an arbitration
award of attorney fees made under the contract) 48 The court determined
that the Depew panel found no statutory violations and, therefore, it could
not have awarded attorney fees pursuant to the statute.349 It also found
that the contract did not provide for attorneys fees and held that even though
the contract incorporated AAA rules, and that Rule 43 of the AAA arguably
provides for the award of attorneys fees, the Rule failed to grant the
arbitrators the power to award attorneys' fees. 50 Presumably the court
found that such a tortured construction of the contract failed to demonstrate
a clear intent of the parties to empower the arbitrators to award attorneys
fees.
The state courts have also reviewed arbitration decisions and awards
during the period 1992-1993 and have focused on many of the same issues
as the federal courts. For example, several cases have addressed the issue
of the propriety of arbitrators awarding attorneys fees. In Pierce v. J. W.
Charles-Bush Securities, Inc.,5 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
concluded that there was no reason not to allow parties to submit attorneys'
fees claims to arbitration if they so desired since applicable statutes do not
evidence a legislative intent to require that all attorneys fees be determined
by a judge.352 In a well reasoned opinion, Judge Farmer explained that
the court's decision in Pierce, allowing for an award of attorneys fees, was
a retreat from the court's prior opinion in Loxahatchee River Environmental
Control District v. Guy Villa & Sons, Inc..5 In Loxahatchee River, the
court construed the plain language of section 682.02 of the Florida
Statutes,35 4 and deemed that arbitrators could not award attorneys fees.355
In Pierce, Judge Farmer noted the change at both the federal and state level
in the judicial view of arbitration since the time of the Loxahatchee decision
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Depew, 814 F. Supp. at 1083-84 (stating, "Rule 43 does not grant unlimited power
to the arbitrators. The rule allows arbitrators to grant only those awards which are 'within
the scope of the agreement between the parties."').
351. 603 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
352. Id. at 630-31.
353. 371 So. 2d 111 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
354. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1975).
355. Loxahatchee River Envtl. Control Dist., 371 So. 2d at 1113.
[Vol. 18
94
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Win ikoff / Bradford
and determined that if ambiguous, statutes should be construed to favor
arbitration.356 The court instructed, "[a]ny legislative mandate to force
contracting parties to a courtroom for legal fees should thus be stated in
language far more clearly requiring that result than the current text of FAC
Section 682.18(1).""' 7 Based on this reasoning, the Pierce court conclud-
ed that appropriately read, the Florida Arbitration Code ("FAC") precludes
the arbitrators from awarding attorney fees "but not when the parties have
specifically agreed to submit the fee issue to arbitration.358  The court
questioned whether, in light of the clear federal mandate favoring arbitra-
tion, any civil claim could not be subject to arbitration upon the agreement
of the parties." 9 It is significant to note that despite the fact that Pierce
involved a typical securities related arbitration between a customer and a
broker, neither party argued the applicability of the FAA. Because the
record was silent, the court, although itself remarking upon the likely
applicability of the FAA, considered the question solely under Florida
law.36° Florida courts, during 1992-93 entertained several issues concern-
356. Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 629.
357. Id. at 630.
358. Id. at 631.
359. Id. at 628. See also supra text accompanying notes 177-83.
360. Id. It appears that appellants got lucky. While the Pierce court recognized that
"[u]nder the previously cited Supreme Court decisions, we have little doubt that Congress has
barred the states from refusing to enforce arbitration awards under ... [the FAA] which
determine entitlement to attorney's fees." Pierce, 603 So. 2d at 628. Appellants apparently
chose not to seek confirmation of the award under the FAA and, thus, were required to hope
that the Fourth District would reverse its prior Loxahatchee decision. Fortunately for them,
that is precisely what the court did. Id. Three months later, in Paston & Coffman, M.D.S.,
P.A., v. Katzen, 610 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the Fourth District, in a non-
securities case, followed its judgment in Pierce,by upholding an arbitration award of attorney
fees based upon the arbitrators' determination that the parties stipulated during the hearing
that the arbitrators could determine the issue of attorneys' fees. The Second District Court
of Appeal, on the other hand, in Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1128, 1129
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), determined that under the FAC, arbitrators were not
empowered to award attorney fees. On motion for rehearing, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal reviewed its decision in Paston & Coffman, M.D.S., and amended its determination
to certify that its decision was in conflict with Fridman, apparently setting the stage for a
determination by the Florida Supreme Court of the issue. Paston & Coffman M.D.S., P.A.,
610 So. 2d at :513. Finally, in Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Associates,
Inc., 619 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Second District again, in a non-
securities case, confronted the issue of how attorneys fees should be awarded by the trial
court. Noting that in the case before it one party prevailed on six of seven claims, the court
instructed that the attorneys fees should be considered for each claim including an allocation
or time spent on all claims and that the trial court erred in attempting to net out fees. Id. at
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ing vacatur and the standards to be applied. In Lee v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,36 1 the Second District Court of Appeal refused to conclude
that an AAA arbitration panel's denial of a continuance constituted arbitrator
misconduct such that under section 10(c) of the FAA, its decision should be
reversed by the court.362 The first question confronted by the Lee court
was whether on issues of vacatur, the FAA preempted or superseded the
FAC.363 The court quickly resolved this issue stating, "[a]s this court has
previously determined, the Federal Arbitration Act supersedes the Florida
Arbitration Code when interstate commerce is involved." '36 4 The Lee court
then determined that the trial court exceeded its authority, in taking evidence
which went beyond that presented to the arbitrators, in its inquiry into the
reasons for a requested continuance.365 The court stated: "[t]he trial court
was not authorized to delve beyond [the] ... record and second guess the
AAA on evidence which the AAA did not have the benefit of when it made
its ruling. 36 6  Instead, the Second District Court of Appeal determined
that the AAA's refusal to grant a continuance was not, based on the limited
information presented to it, an "abuse of discretion, i.e. 'misconduct,' on the
part of the AAA. ' 3 67 Thus, the Second District made clear that the trial
court's proper role in reviewing arbitrations is not de novo review but rather
a summary review of the record to determine whether or not there had been
an abuse of discretion.368
1028. The court instructed that the trial court must consider each claim separately and ac-
count for time spent by the opposing party on the claim on which it prevailed as well. Id. at
1028-29.
361. 594 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
362. Id. at 784-85.
363. Id. at 785.
364. Id.; see also supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text; Marschel v. Dean Wiiter
Reynolds, Inc., 17 Fla. L. Weekly D2722; Daugherty v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1992); 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1385 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. June 4,
1993). Thus, it appears that in the Second District Court of Appeal, at least, securities cases
will be solely governed by the FAA. See id. The court's summary determination of this
issue perhaps ignores the instruction of the United States Supreme Court in Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1988), to the effect
that the FAA is only intended to preempt state law when that state law offends the
congressional purposes behind the FAA. Id. at 477.
365. Lee, 594 So. 2d at 785.
366. Id. The state court's decision clearly reflects the limited scope of review available
to trial courts on issues of vacatur. See id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
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The scope of review of arbitration decisions by the circuit courts was
also the subject of the Third District Court's opinion in Okun v. Litwin
Securities, Inc.3 6 9  In Okun, the court enunciated perhaps the most strin-
gent standard found in any of the decisions on the state or federal level
construing the scope of review of arbitration awards.37 Recognizing that
the FAC provided five grounds for vacating an arbitration award,37 ' the
court pronounced: "[i]n the absence of one of those five grounds, the trial
court does not have the authority to vacate the arbitration award." '372
Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal appears to have eliminated
judicially crafted grounds for vacatur entirely.37 3 While the authors are
unaware of any other court applying quite such a stringent standard, and it
is important to note that the Okun court was not faced with a judicially
created basis for vacatur, the concept of narrow review of arbitration awards
prevails both on the federal and state level.374
369. 619 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. Ct. 1993).
370. Id.
371. Section 682.13(1) of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(1) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award when: (a) The
award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. (b) There was
evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of
the arbitrators or umpire or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party. (c)
The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction exceeded their
powers. (d) The arbitrators or the umpire in the course of his jurisdiction
refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or
refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted
the hearing, contrary to the provisions of s.682.06, as to prejudice substantially
the rights of a party. (e) There was no agreement or provision for arbitration
subject to this law, unless the matter was determined in proceedings under
s.682.03 and unless the party participated in the arbitration hearing without
raising the objection.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.13(1) (1991). The grounds for vacatur under scction 682.13 Florida
Statutes are similar to those under 9 U.S.C. § 10 of the FAA. The most notable difference
is subsection (e) of section 682.13(1) allowing the court on motion to vacate to again
determine the validity of the making of an agreement to arbitrate.
372. Okun, 619 So. 2d at 995.
373. Id. But compare the trial court's determination in Raymond James & Assoc., Inc.
v. Deutsch, Case No. 92-08793 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. April 28, 1993), in which the court
conducted a full evidentiary hearing (and allowed depositions) in vacating an arbitral decision
on grounds of arbitral bias or "evident partiality." It is logical that a more in depth court
inquiry is appropriate where the issue is bias.
374. See, e.g., Applewhite v. Sheen Fin. Resources, Inc., 608 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992). In Applewhite, the circuit court upheld an injunction granted by an
arbitration panel enforcing a non-competition agreement and employment contract between
a broker and its registered representatives. Id. While the trial court did modify the
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Finally, state courts have been asked during 1992-1993 to consider and
determine the timing of review of an order vacating arbitration. In
Raymond James & Associates, Inc. v. Deutsch,75 the Fourth District dis-
missed the appeal of a lower court's vacatur of an arbitration award, on
grounds of evident partiality or bias of the arbitrator, holding that the
vacatur order was non-final and therefore not appealable on an interlocutory
basis.376 The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in a non-securities case, also
considered the issue of whether a trial court order vacating an arbitration
award and ordering a re-hearing is a final appealable order.377 In Central
Florida Police Benevolent Ass 'n, Inc. v. City of Orlando,378 the court,
following the Fourth District Court of Appeal, ruled that it was not a final
appealable order.379
An emerging area of judicial concern in Florida involves what has
come to be known as the "economic loss rule." The economic loss rule had
its genesis in Florida in a case certified to the Supreme Court by the
Eleventh Circuit entitled AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co.38° and the Supreme Court's previous decision in Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.3"' In those cases, the
Florida Supreme Court enunciated the rule that parties could not recover in
tort for damages arising solely out of a contractual relationship between the
injunction, which was again modified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, nevertheless
the Fourth District instructed, "[w]e note first that the standard ofjudicial review applicable
to challenges of an arbitration award is very limited .... Id. at 83; see also Goldman v.
Chang, 622 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In Goldman, the Third District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial court's attempt to award damages in a case in which the
arbitrators had determined the percentage interest of a minority shareholder in a close
corporation. Id. at 31. The trial court had requested the arbitrators to clarify whether they
intended to enter a damage award and if so, against which parties. The arbitrators responded
that they had not intended to enter a damage award, they had only computed the value of
shareholders' interest. Nevertheless the trial court entered judgment awarding the plaintiff
damages. Id. at 30-31. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court noting
that "the trial court was without power, authority, or jurisdiction to enter an award of
damages" in light of the ruling of the arbitration panel. Id. at 31.
375. Unpublished order, Case No.: 92-01953 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993).
376. Id.; accordCity of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582
So. 2d 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
377. Central Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'nv. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1204.
380. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
381. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
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parties.382 Thus, the rule has developed that where a plaintiff fails to
allege and prove the existence of a tort independent of the contractual
breach, it cannot recover economic damages under a tort theory.383 The
economic loss rule was soon applied in the securities context. The courts,
recognizing that the essential relationship between customer and broker is
contractual, have continued to limit non-contractual grounds for suits
between broker/dealers and their customers.384
During 1992-1993 at least two federal courts have considered the
application of the economic loss rule in the context of securities claims and
curiously, at least one state court which might have, has not been required
to do so. In City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers 'Retirement Trust
v. Invesco MIM, Inc.,385 the trial court was requested to consider the
application on a motion to dismiss of plaintiffs claim of tort damages
resulting from defendants alleged wanton, willful and reckless conduct in
speculative investments in plaintiffs account.386  The Southern District
court, reviewing the case law concerning the economic loss rule, construed
the law, stating:
no independent tort can exist solely for contractually based economic
damages, absent personal injury or damage to property other than that
which was subject to the contract .... If a claimant, however, does not
have a contractual remedy because no contract exists, then this lack of
alternate means of recovery provides claimant with an exception to the
economic loss rule. 81
382. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
383. See. e.g., Interstate Sec. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 774 (11 th Cir. 1991).
384. See, e.g., id (refusing to allow claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligence
in light of the contractual relationship between the parties); seealsoZitrin v. Raymond James
& Assocs., Inc., CaseNo.: CL-91-13284-AF (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 1992) (unpublished
order striking civil theft, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims); Tietig v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., Case No.: 89-1572-CIV-MARCUS (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 1991) (barring negli-
gence, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims); Dziabis v. Gandolfo, Case No.: 90-402-
CIV-T-10 (C) (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1991) (holding that allegations in complaint that defendant
was a paid professional investment advisor created a contractual relationship as a matter of
law and then applying the economic loss rule to bar claims of common law fraud, negligence,
and breach of fiduciary duty).
385. 789 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
386. Id. at 393.
387. Id. at 393-94 (citation omitted). Butsee Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley
Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248 (Fla. 1993) (overturning Latite Roofing Co.
v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) wherein the exception to the
economic loss rule relied upon by the Southern District of Florida in Invesco was enunciated).
In Casa Clara, the Florida Supreme Court denied a tort remedy to a homeowner against a
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Relying on the economic loss rule the Southern District court dismissed the
trust's tort allegations stating that the plaintiffs could seek recovery through
a claim for breach of contract.388
In BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc.,389 the Elev-
enth Circuit had occasion to consider the scope of the Florida economic loss
rule. In BankAtlantic, the bank sued Paine Webber who had served as its
investment advisor and had also served as a broker for BankAtlantic in
certain securities transactions. 39" BankAtlantic sued Paine Webber over
the securities transactions alleging breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and
fraud.3 9' A jury returned a verdict in favor of the broker and an appeal
was taken.392 The broker claimed that the bank's appeal was moot since
the underlying claims were barred by Florida's economic loss rule. 393 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, in dicta noting that the broker had argued until
its brief on appeal that the brokerage transactions were outside of the
contract for investment advisory services. 9 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit decided the claims were not barred by the economic loss rule. 395
The final case regarding economic loss is interesting primarily for the
fact that the defense was apparently not raised. In Csordas v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., Inc.,396 the customer sued a brokerage firm and its
account executive trainee for losses suffered on a bond purchase recom-
supplier of concrete used by the developer to build the homeowner's residence. Id. at 1246-
67. The court did so even though by limiting the action to contract, the homeowner arguably
was denied relief since he was not in privity with the supplier and even though, as the dissent
correctly points out, in supplying defective concrete the supplier could reasonably have
foreseen that the homebuyer would have been the party likely to have been injured. Id. at
1249 (Shaw, J., concurring and dissenting).
388. Invesco MIM, Inc., 789 F. Supp. at 394.
389. 955 F.2d 1467 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 966 (1993).
390. Id. at 1469-70.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1470.
393. Id. at 1476.
394. BankAtlantic, 955 F.2d at 1476.
395. Id. It is interesting to note that the court apparently did not consider whether the
brokerage relationship between Paine Webber and BankAtlantic, which resulted in the
disputed securities transactions, was itself contractual in nature albeit under a separate
contract from the investment advisory contract. See id Arguably, the brokerage contract
would have served to deny BankAtlantic its tort claims against Paine Webber. It is unclear
from the opinion whether or not Paine Webber raised this argument.
396. [1992-93] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,230, at 94,999 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. July 16,
1992).
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mended to the customer by the trainee.397 The customer sued the bro-
ker/dealer and the trainee alleging violation of chapter 517, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and common law fraud.3 98
The trial court sitting without a jury, found for the plaintiff on breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence and for the defendants on the other
counts.399 The opinion contains no reference whatsoever to the economic
loss doctrine and one can only conjecture whether it was raised in prelimi-
nary matters or at the trial by either the defendants or the court. It is
possible that in finding for the defendants on breach of contract, the court
determined that there was no contract between the parties which would
preclude the tort claims. However, such a ruling would ignore written docu-
ments and the essential nature of the relationship between broker and
customer recognized by so many of the Florida courts.4"0 The case does
contain a good explanation of the nature and scope of the fiduciary duty
owed by broker to customer as that law has developed in Florida and
elsewhere.40' This case demonstrates the continuing, if improper, viability
of actions based on such duties.40 2 Notwithstanding the Csordas decision,
the practitioner should not underestimate the effect of the economic loss rule
on securities litigation in Florida.0 3
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. See Central Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 614 So. 2d
1203 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also Okun v. Litwin Sec. Inc., 619 So. 2d 995 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
401. Csordas, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,230, at 94,999.
402. Id. The case indicates that the trainee had not studied the bonds he recommended
and only knew what his computer displayed. He did not obtain a pricing history, which was
available in the computer. Apparently, he did not consult Moody's Bonds Ratings, which
indicated that the bonds had speculative elements. The court also faulted the trainee for not
consulting Standard and Poor's Corporation Records available in his office, which would
have indicated that the corporation, whose bonds were recommended by him, had substantial
holdings in real-estate and savings and loan institutions which the court found were in
financial trouble at the time. Id. at 95,000. The opinion is silent on whether the trainee
found the bonds on the employer's recommended list or whether simply recommending a
security found on such a list would have satisfied his duty to the customer. It is interesting
to note that the broker, itself was only found vicariously liable for the negligence and breach
of fiduciary duty of its trainee. From this, one can infer that the security was not on its
recommended list and that the court did not have before it or consider the issue of negligent
supervision. Id. at 94,999-95,000.
403. Inter alia, by limiting securities controversies to actions in contract, litigation will
be streamlined. Presumably, such a limitation will also eliminate or virtually eliminate
awards of punitive damages in securities cases. It is even questionable whether parties could
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The third major focus of Florida courts in securities cases decided in
1992-1993 may generally be classified as non-arbitration cases. They cover
numerous subjects under the state and federal securities laws. In 1992, the
Eleventh Circuit joined the growing number of courts which have upheld the
constitutionality of Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,404
in its decision in Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.4"5 In Lampf Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson,"6 the Supreme Court rejected
the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitation for private causes of
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.40 7 Instead the Court held that
the one year/three year statute of limitations applicable to express private
rights of action under other sections of the 1934 Act governed 10(b) actions
and that the Lampf rule should be retroactively applied in that case.40 8 In
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,40 9 announced the same day as
Lampf the Supreme Court held that when the Court applies a new rule to
litigants in a particular case, that rule must be retroactively applied to all
other similarly situated litigants. 410 In 1992, in Lujkin v. McCallum,41'
the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Beam required retroactive application of the
new statute of limitations rule announced in Lampf 4 2 Thereafter, Con-
gress amended the 1934 Act by specifically providing in Section 27A that
private civil actions implied under Section 10(b) begun before June 19, 1991
were to be governed by the limitations period provided by the laws
applicable to the jurisdiction as such laws existed on June 19, 1991. 4 11
Section 27A also provided that cases dismissed as time-barred subsequent
to June 19, 1991, which would have been timely filed under the limitation
provision provided by laws applicable in the jurisdiction as such laws
contract for the award of punitive damages. See also supra notes 102-13 and accompanying
text.
404. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-I (West 1993).
405. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
406. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (superseded by statute as recognized in, National Union Fire
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Califinvest, No. CIV 2476, 1992 WL (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
1992)).
407. Id. at 2781-82.
408. Id
409. 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991) (superseded by statute as recognized in, Ahmed v. Trupin,
781 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
410. Id at 2441.
411. 956 F.2d 1104 (11 th Cir. 1992) (superseded by statute as recognized in, Henderson
v. Scientific-Atlanta, 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993)).
412. Id. at 1108.
413. Securities Exchange Act 1934, § 27A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-I (West 1993).
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existed on that date, must be reinstated on motion.414 Thus Section 27A
amounted to a Congressional reversal of the retroactivity rulings of the
Supreme Court in Lampf and Beam, at least as to 10(b) actions.
In Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta,1 5 the Eleventh Circuit considered
a case in which the plaintiff had filed a class action securities claim against
the defendant in September, 1988 alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act."16 After the action was filed, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Lampf and Scientific-Atlanta moved for summary judgment on
time-bar grounds.' 7  The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendant on the federal securities laws claims and dismissed the
pendent state law claims without prejudice.4 8 The plaintiffs then appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit.4" 9 While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Section 27A.420  Scientific-Atlanta argued that Section 27A
violated the separation of powers doctrine because Congress sought to
render Lampf a nullity.42' Appellee also contended that Section 27A was
unconstitutional because it operated to deny it due process since Congress
intended in enacting Section 27A to direct the outcome of pending
litigation. The court rejected both constitutional challenges, finding first
that Congress has the right under our federal system to amend a statute as
it sees fit if it disagrees with a court's interpretation of that statute,423 and
second that the fact that the statute had an effect upon pending litigation
does not constitute a due process violation.42 4 Appellees made two other
attacks upon the constitutionality of the statute, the first, also on due process
grounds, alleging that the statute made no attempt to define what would be
an appropriate limitations period.425  The court summarily disagreed,
stating that under the statute, the limitations period is clear.426 The court,
in similar summary fashion, disposed of an argument claiming the statute
414. Id. § 78aa-1 (not later than 60daysafter the date of enactment of§ 78aa-1 [enacted
Dec. 19, 1991]).
415. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 95 (1993).
416. Id. at 1568.
417. Id. at 1569.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1570.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1573.
424. Id. at 1574.
425. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574.
426. Id.
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violated appellee's right to equal protection noting that the statute must be
upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest.427 The court found protecting litigants from an unexpected
change in the law to be a legitimate governmental interest and that Section
27A is rationally related to that end.4 28  The court also found that the
equal protection clause was not offended by the fact that plaintiffs in
different areas would, under Section 27A, have different statutes of
limitation. The court concluded that there is nothing irrational about
borrowing statutes of limitation in cases where Congress has failed to
provide one.4 29 The court also found it rational for Congress to conclude
that litigants not already in court on June 19, 1991 were not in need of the
protection offered by the statute.430 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit became the
first court of appeal to address the constitutionality of Section 27A.
Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta arose in the context of a securities
class-action suit. During the period 1992-1993, the Eleventh Circuit had
occasion to consider one other securities class-action suit of note and one
district court has written two cogent opinions in the area. In In re US. Oil
& Gas Litigation v. Wolfson,43 1 the court upheld a determination by Judge
William H. Hoeveler of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida enforcing a bar order against a settling defendant on a
cross-claim.432  In In re US. Oil & Gas Litigation, the lower court was
faced with an incredibly complex case.433 One defendant settled, carefully
preserving its rights to cross-claim against another of the defendants.434
Notwithstanding, when the second defendant settled it asked the court to bar
the cross-claim. 435 The district court granted the settlement bar and the
first defendant appealed but did not withdraw its settlement offer despite
being offered the opportunity to do so by the court.4 36 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court's right to enforce the settlement bar holding
that a court is so empowered where it makes a reasonable determination that
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574.
431. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
432. Id. at 491.
433. Id. The case included 96 defendants, requiring 50 hearings between the period
1984-1990 and 260 depositions. Id. at 491. On the eve of trial, plaintiffs stipulated that
more than 700 issues of fact remained unresolved in the matter. Id.
434. U.S. Oil & Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d at 491-92.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 492.
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to do so is fair and equitable. 437  The Eleventh Circuit, noting that the
appellants' cross-claims were not independent claims but rather claims for
indemnity, found that the lower court could appropriately bar the same as
part of its settlement approval duties in class-action cases.438
The decision in In re US. Oil & Gas Litigation assumes, but does not
discuss, the obligation courts have under the federal rules of civil procedure
to approve proposed class action settlements. In Ressler v. Jacobson,439
the Middle District of Florida was requested to consider the propriety of a
proposed settlement in a securities class-action. Concluding that the
settlement was fair, reasonable and adeqdate, the court explicated the
elements a court must consider in making such a determination, setting forth
a six-factor test.440 The court then applied those factors to the proposed
settlement at bar and approved it.44" ' The practitioner considering a
securities class action matter is recommended to the court's well written
opinion. In a second reported opinion in Ressler v. Jacobson, the same
court was asked to award attorneys fees.442 Again, the court set forth the
factors involved in granting such an award.443
Applying the standard to the facts, the court, in another opinion
recommended to the practitioner, approved the award of attorneys fees.444
437. Id.
438. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(3) (requiring that courts approve class action
settlements). Curiously, the court noted that indemnification claims are not cognizable under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts and concluded that they would have been unlikely to survive a
cursory adjudication on the merits in any event. U.S. Oil & Gas Litgation, 967 F.2d at 495.
The Supreme Court, however, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employee's Ins. of Wausau,
113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993), held that parties have a right to seek contribution as a matter of
federal law and courts have a right to imply such a private right of action under Section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. Id. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit's assertion in In re U.S. Oil & Gas
may not be a fair statement of the law.
439. 822 F. Supp. 1551 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
440. The court's six factors were:
(1) The existence of fraud or collusion behind the settlement; (2) the complexity,
expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the stage of the proceedings and
the amount of discovery completed; (4) the probability of plaintiff's success on
the merits; (5) the range of possible recovery; and (6) the opinions of class
counsel and absent class members.
Id. at 1553.
441. Id. at 1555.
442. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,224, at 94,966 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 1992).
443. Id. These factors included, inter alia, benefits conferred upon the class as a result
of counsel's work, the complex nature of the litigation, the risks faced, the quality of the
work performed, and the promptness and efficiency in which the litigation was resolved.
444. Id.
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In Budget Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Hirsch, 45 the Southern District of
Florida confronted the issue of whether section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
applies to secondary market transactions.446 Section 12(2) provides an
express remedy for material omissions or misrepresentations made in
connection with the offer or sale of a security.447 As noted by the district
court, the majority of courts considering the issue have held that "[s]ection
12(2) applies only to initial offerings [of securities and] not to secondary
market transactions.1 44' The court recognized that the majority of courts
based their decision on three factors. 449  First, the legislative history
supports the conclusion that the 1933 Act was enacted in order to regulate
initial offerings of securities and the 1934 Act was enacted in order to
regulate secondary transactions.45 ° Second, the section makes reference
to statements made in a prospectus, and prospectuses normally accompany
only initial offerings not secondary market transactions. 451' Finally, the
United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Naftalin,452
making section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to secondary transactions,
distinguishes that section from "much of the rest of the [1933] Act, '4 3 in
that regard.454
The Budget Rent A Car Systems court also noted that one federal court
had carved an exception to the majority rule and extended coverage of
445. 810 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
446. Id. at 1255.
447. 15 U.S.C.S. § 771(2) (1991). In relevant part, section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
provides:
[a]ny person who . . . (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such truth or
omission shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him ....
Id.
448. Budget Rent A Car Sys., 810 F. Supp. at 1256.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
453. Id. at 777-78.
454. Budget RentA CarSys., 810 F. Supp. at 1256 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979)).
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section 12(2) to a sale of stock that, while not an actual initial offering, is
similar to an initial offering because it is the sale of a large block of stock
by a corporate insider. 55 Therefore, an exception was made "where 'a
corporate insider sells his own stock in such a manner that it takes on the
characteristics of a new offering."' 456  The district court explicated the
requirements of the exception: that is, all the outstanding stock of the
corporation, is distributed through a controlling distributor, and the stock
must be offered to the public.457 Without deciding the validity of the
exception, however, the district court held that the criteria were not present
in the case subjudice.458 Accordingly, the court adopted the majority rule
finding that section 12(2) did not apply to secondary offerings and refused
to find an exception to that rule for the transaction at issue. 59
One year later, the issue of the applicability of section 12(2) was
presented to the Eleventh Circuit in the case of First Union Discount
Brokerage Services, Inc. v. Milos.46° In First Union Discount Brokerage
Services, a customer of a discount broker/dealer46' had maintained large
positions at the broker on margin.462 With the stock market crash of
October 1987, the customer lost not only the equity in his account but also
owed the broker substantial funds for the margined positions.4 63  The
broker sued the customer for the margin debits. The customer filed counter-
claims on various state law grounds. Additionally, the customer alleged that
the broker violated section 12(2) by making materially false representations
in connection with the sale of securities. 64 These alleged false representa-
tions consisted of oral representations that the broker would forebear
enforcement of margin calls 465 on the customer's account.466  The trial
455. Id. at 1257.
456. Id. (citing Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Cal 1992)).
457. Id.
458. Id. at 1258.
459. Budget Rent A Car Systems, 810 F. Supp. at 1256.
460. 99"7 F.2d 835 (I1th Cir. 1993).
461. A discount broker, unlike its full service counterparts, does not provide research
and investment advice. It handles all transactions on a non-discretionary basis. That is, it
acts primarily as an order taker and not as a provider of securities trading advice. See, e.g.,
id.
462. Id. at 837.
463. A margin account is one in which the broker extends credit to the customer which
credit extension is normally secured by the securities portfolio of the customer and cash
deposits in to his account. See, e.g., id.
464. Id. at 840.
465. Margin calls are demands for the deposit of additional securities or cash to
collateralize the credit extensions made by the brokerage firm and normally occur when the
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court determined that the customer was liable for the debt and granted
summary judgment to the broker on its complaint for account stated.467
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the holding, recognizing that the broker had
established the account stated and that the customer had failed to object to
the statements presented to him in the manner provided on the state-
ments."' 8 The court then considered the section 12(2) issue, that is
whether section 12(2) applies to aftermarket or secondary market transac-
tions."' Relying on the opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,470 the court held that Section
12(2) does not apply to aftermarket transactions. 471' The Third Circuit first
noted in Ballay that the section's language itself limited the section's scope
to initial distributions. 472 Second, the court observed that section 12(2) is
structurally positioned after sections 11 and 12(1) of the 1933 Act, which
govern the registration of securities and liability for the sale of unregistered
securities, and before section 13, which establishes limitation periods for
sections 11 and 12. Noting that this position "sandwiched" section 12(2)
between sections that dealt exclusively with initial distributions, the court
reasoned that section 12(2) also must be so limited. 473  Finally, the court
rejected the suggestion that since section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies to
secondary market transactions, section 12(2) must, by analogy, as well.474
Noting the materially distinct language between sections 12(2) and 17(a), the
former being restrictive while the latter is expansive, the court concluded
that the broad reading appropriate for section 17(a) was not applicable to
section 12(2). 47' Noting finally that the Third Circuit had concluded that:
the language and legislative history of section 12(2), as well as its
relationships to sections 17(a) and 10(b) within the scheme of the 1933
value of the securities or cash in the account diminishes. See First Union Discount
Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 837-38.
466. Id at 840.
467, Id.
468. Id. at 841.
469. Id. at 842-43.
470. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 79 (1991).
471. First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 843 (citing Ballay, 925 F.2d at
682).
472. Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688.
473. Id. at 691.
474. Id. at 691-92.
475. Id at 693.
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and 1934 Acts, compel our conclusion that section 12(2) applies only
to initial offerings and not to aftermarket trading. 76
The Eleventh Circuit also refused to extend the reach of section 12(2) to
secondary transactions.477
The First Union Discount Brokerage Services case is notable not only
for its determination of the applicability of section 12(2), but also for the
court's interesting discussion on the element of causation in securities fraud
allegations. First the court noted that in connection with a securities fraud
claim under state law, a customer had to prove that its injuries were proxi-
mately caused by any alleged false representation or omission. 4"h The
court went on to note that the Milos' injury did not result from their reliance
on the broker's representations, but rather on the market crash.479 Thus,
the court clearly reinforced the focus on an element of a securities fraud
claim not infrequently overlooked by arbitrators and courts, to wit: the
necessity of a direct causal relationship between the allegedly unlawful con-
duct and the injury to the claimants.
The duties of a broker/dealer to its clients were also considered during
1992-1993 on the state court level by the First District Court of Appeal in
Palmer v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.48° In Palmer, the plaintiffs
claimed that they were injured by the actions of a registered representative
who had formerly worked for the defendant, Shearson, not while he was
employed by Shearson, but several years after the representative left
Shearson and had gained employment elsewhere.48' Since Shearson had
not appropriately indicated on the representative's termination documents the
real reasons for his termination, the plaintiffs claimed the broker was liable
to them for the injuries subsequently caused by their former employee.8 2
Noting that while the complaint was legally insufficient to show that the
broker owed a common law duty to appellants, the district court found that
476. Id
477. See First Union Discount Brokerage Serv., 997 F.2d at 844 (11 th Cir. 1993).
478. Id at 843-44.
479. Id. at 844-45.
480. 622 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
481. Id
482. Id. at 1086-88. Plaintiffs alleged that had Shearson disclosed his prior bad conduct,
plaintiffs never would have done business with him since he would not have been allowed
to re-register with the Department. Id. Whether this actually amounts to proximate causation
is at least questionable since it assumes an intervening act by the Department. The opinion
is silent about any allegation that the plaintiffs had obtained the representative's employment
history before doing business with him.
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a broker can be held accountable in negligence for damages to a customer
for breach of its statutory duty to report accurately the terms of an
employee's termination.483 The court stated that by falsely reporting in his
termination documents that the broker had "no reason to believe that...
[the registered representative] had violated any state or federal law or
regulation or . . . had engaged in any conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade" '484 when in fact the broker had knowledge to
the contrary, the broker was in violation of section 517.12 of the Florida
Statutes requiring that accurate termination reports be filed with the
Department of Banking.4"5 Further, the court determined that the statute
"creates a duty of care upon one whose behavior is the subject of the statute
to a person who is in the class designed to be protected" by same.486
Thus a finding of liability for negligence will be supported "when the injury
suffered by a person in the protected class is that which the statute was
designed to prevent., 487 The court continued its analysis stating that:
[a]lthough the violation of a statute establishing a duty to take precau-
tions to protect a particular class of persons from a particular injury or
type of injury constitutes negligence per se, the fact of negligence per
se resulting from a statutory violation does not necessarily mean that
there is actionable negligence. It must also be shown that the plaintiff
falls within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, that
the plaintiff suffered an injury of the type the statute was designed to
prevent, and that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of
this injury.488
The court then concluded that the facts presented to it, if true, were legally
sufficient to satisfy these elements. 489  The court distinguished the pro-
nouncements of the Florida Supreme Court in EF. Hutton & Co. v. Rous-
seff490 requiring privity to recover damages for violations of chapter
483. Id. at 1087.
484. Palmer, 622 So. 2d at 1088.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1090 (citing deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Ry., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
487. Id.
488. Palmer, 622 So. 2d at 1090 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
489. Id. The case was before the First District on an appeal of a summary judgment.
Id. at 1086. It is important to note that this required the court to view the record before it
in the context of determining whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. That is, as the court carefully noted in its conclusion, it was required to presume facts
which may not be later proven. Id. at 1093; see also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540.
490. 537 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1989).
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517.491 Noting that in Rousseff, a case involving securities transactions
between buyers and sellers, the plaintiffs relied on section 517.301(1)
relating to wrongs committed "in connection with the offer, sale or purchase
of any security,, 492 the court distinguished the claims in the matter before
it, finding that they were governed by subsection 517.301(3). That
subsection makes it unlawful and a violation of chapter 517 for any person
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Department to knowingly make
false and misleading statements or omissions. 4 93  The Palmer court
concluded that this section does not require privity like the section in issue
in Rousseff494
The duty of brokers to subsequent customers of a former employee to
report accurately the circumstances surrounding the termination of that
employee, will undoubtedly be a fertile area for securities litigation in the
future. Given the already thorny issue of defamation claims against brokers
for reports of termination and the unsettled law in that area, these subjects
will clearly occupy the securities bar in Florida in the future.
495
Another area in which the Florida courts in 1992-1993 have addressed
duties of persons involved in securities transactions is in the area of the
duties of corporate insiders. In Tapken v. Brown,496 the court found that
allegations in a complaint concerning misrepresentations in a company's
reports and SEC filings were sufficient to state a fraud claim against
individual directors even if their specific roles in the alleged fraud were not
detailed in the complaint. 497 The court also found that allegations that
outside directors, because of their positions with the company, had
knowledge of and assisted in the dissemination of false information stated
an aider and abettor claim against the outside directors.498 The court also
held that the accounting firm that audited the company's allegedly false and
misleading financial statements could be liable for aiding and abetting in the
company's claimed violation of section 10(b). 49 9  The Tapken case is
noted principally for its discussion of the pleading requirements for primary
and secondary liability under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, liability under
491. Id. at 979.
492. Id.
493. Palmer, 622 So. 2d 1092. See FLA. STAT. § 517.301(3) (1983).'
494. Id.
495. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
496. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,805, at 93,154 (S.D. Fla. March 13, 1992).
497. Id. at 93,169.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 93,170.
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section 20 of the 1934 Act, liability for common law fraud, especially as
compared to the federal fraud action and liability for negligent misrepresen-
tation. It also discusses the elements necessary for class certification in a
securities fraud class action.50°
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Tuchinsky,01 the court con-
strued the elements of liability under section 5 of the 1933 Act and the
exemptions thereto. The court first explained that to make a prima facie
case for violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act, which makes unlawful the
offer or sale of unregistered securities, the plaintiff must prove three
elements:
First, it must show that no registration statement was in effect as to the
securities. Second, it must establish that [the parties sought to be
charged] sold or offered to sell ... securities. Third, it must prove that
... [the person sought to be charged] used interstate transportation or
communication or the mails in connection with the sale, offer to sell, or
delivery [of the securities].,0 2
The court then noted that section 5 imposes strict liability in the civil
context on offerors or sellers of unregistered securities. As the court noted,
once the plaintiff has established a primafacie case of the sale of unregis-
tered securities, the burden falls on the party to be charged to demonstrate
that either the securities or transactions involved were exempt from the
registration requirements.0 3 In Tuchinsky, the court noted that the SEC
had demonstrated these elements. 4 Despite recognizing that the defen-
dant had failed to raise any exemption as a defense, the court refused to
grant summary judgment sua sponte, noting that an issue of fact existed as
to whether or not the defendant fell within the scope of certain of the
exemptions provided by the 1934 Act. 5
The Tuchinsky ruling is troubling since the court went beyond the
record on a motion for summary judgment to consider defenses thereto not
raised by the parties. The authors question the propriety of such a course
of conduct. As the court itself noted, the burden of claiming and proving
the exemption once the SEC had established its prima facie case falls on the
500. See id.
501. [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,917, at 93,801 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 1992).
502. Id. at 93,803.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 93,804-05.
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defendant." 6 Having found that the defendant failed to do so in this case,
it appears that the court abused its discretion in refusing to uphold the grant
of summary judgment.
In Marcus v. Shapiro, Abramson & Schwimmer, P.A.,5°7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal was confronted with an allegation of violation of
section 517.301 of the Florida Statutes" 8 by the failure to disclose
material facts. The case involved an allegation that a passive investor was
defrauded in connection with his investment in the stock of a proposed
savings and loan association. The venture was unsuccessful." 9 The
investor sued the promoters of the venture alleging violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of chapter 517."' The trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the promoters on the basis that the investor was committed
to the purchase of the stock prior to any alleged misconduct; therefore, the
misconduct was not "in connection with" his purchase transaction. 5 ' The
Fourth District Court, for the purposes of summary judgment, disagreed with
this pronouncement and reversed." 2  The issue upon which the matter
turned was the timing of the purchase by the investor. The trial court, in
fixing the (late of the sale, relied on what is known as the "commitment
test." 3 Under this test, the date of the sale is fixed at the date that the
investor enters into a binding commitment to undertake a securities transac-
tion.5"4 The trial court, noting that the investor had signed a stock
purchase agreement, fixed the sale date as the date of signing.5 The
investor argued instead that the agreement was not a binding commitment
because it was revocable within six months.5"6 The promoters argued that
even assuming arguendo that the stock purchase became revocable, the
purchase date was fixed by the time the investor made his down payment
and submitted his application for a loan for the balance due.5 17 The
Fourth District, noting that the appellees might well be correct, concluded
506. Tuchinsky, [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,917, at 93,803.
507. 620 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
508. See FLA. STAT. § 517.301(10)(a)(2) (1991).
509. Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1285.
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1286.
512. Id. at 1288.
513. Id. at 1286. (the "commitment test" was set out in Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v.
Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972)).
514. Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1286.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
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that the date when the sale occurred was, in any event, a disputed issue of
material fact which precluded summary judgment.5 8  Thus, while the
Fourth District discussed the issue of the date upon which a purchase of
securities is deemed to have occurred, it refused to supply a definitive
answer to the question in light of the procedural context in which this matter
was before the court." 9 The court specifically noted that its opinion was
"in no way intended as a definitive exposition of the law in this area. It is
but a reversal of summary judgment with perceived reasons why such was
inappropriate." 2 '
One cannot adequately review or understand securities regulation in
Florida without reference to the activities of the federal and state agencies
charged with the responsibility of regulating the entire scope of securities
transactions, that is, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities
and Investor Protection. Unfortunately, the activities of these agencies often
go under-reported or unreported entirely.52" ' Certain cases reflecting the
action of the administrative agencies during the period 1992-1993 have been
reported and may be notable more for an analysis of the areas of activity of
518. Id. at 1287.
519. See Marcus, 620 So. 2d at 1285-88.
520. Id. at 1288.
521. A full cognizance of the regulation of securities in Florida also is impossible
without reviewing the activities of the self-regulatory organizations, most notably the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. They
regularly inquire into the conduct of stockbrokers and other regulated persons in Florida and
throughout the country, make rules of conduct for regulated persons, and in fact, provide two
of the primary arbitration fora for resolution of brokerage disputes. In fact, the United States
Supreme Court in its decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) specifically recognized the integrity and abilities of these organizations as one of
the grounds for reversing its long standing policy against the arbitration of securities disputes
and indeed as a basis for mandating a change in the long standing judicial antipathy for
alternative dispute resolution. Id. at 225-26. The third major arbitration forum, the
American Arbitration Association, is, as noted above, specifically set forth as an arbitral
forum in the constitution of the American Stock Exchange, Inc., the so-called AMEX
Window (Article VIII of the American Stock Exchange Constitution Section 2(c)). Its attrac-
tiveness as a "non-industry" forum should not be underestimated. See id. at 226-27.
Unfortunately, arbitration decisions too, are unreported and frequently contain no opinions
or rationale upon which an interested practitioner can rely. Also it is important to recognize
that arbitration decisions have no stare decisis effect. Whether such opinions have res
judicata effect is an interesting and open question. Compare, Marilyn Blumberg Cane &
Patricia A. Shub, SECURITIES ARBITRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, 340-51 (1991) with
Phillip J. Hoblin, Jr., SECURITIES ARBITRATION: PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES, §§ 13-2
to 13-5 (1988).
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these agencies than necessarily for the opinions or rationale of the courts.
For example, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elliott, 22 the court
considered various objections to a proposed plan of distribution of assets
made by an SEC recommended and court appointed receiver. This matter
arose out of an SEC investigation of a massive Ponzi-type scheme in which
investors were paid paper profits from funds invested by subsequent
investors. 23 As the court points out, this massive scheme left the receiver
and the court the mammoth task of sorting out the equities. 4 The
opinion is important for the court's discussion of the receiver's role, the
legal and equitable basis for a receiver's powers and the limits on same.
Thus, it emphasizes the SEC's essential role in uncovering and halting such
illegal enterprises and its predilection for appointing a receiver to unwind
the result of the fraud.
The SEC was involved in several other cases of note during the period
which bear mention. These cases demonstrate areas of concern of the SEC
in Florida as well as the remedies sought and obtained by it. In Securities
& Exchange Commission v. Walloga,525 the court permanently enjoined
Walloga, a principal of a broker/dealer, from violating the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the anti-fraud and recordkeeping provisions
of the 1934 Act. Additionally, it ordered Walloga to disgorge all ill-gotten
gains. The SEC alleged that Walloga failed to disclose to investors pur-
chasing securities in the secondary market that the broker/dealer was acting
as a market maker with respect to those securities. It further alleged that
Wal loga charged customers excessive undisclosed mark-ups and inaccurately
maintained his books in order to conceal his undercapitalization. In Securi-
ties & Exchange Commission v. Rosemary Grady,526 the SEC charged and
the court found that Grady, the president and controlling stockholder of a
broker/dealer, violated the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws and aided and abetted violations of the anti-fraud and
recordkeeping provisions of the securities laws. The court found that Grady
manipulated prices of securities of at least two issuers by fraudulent sales
practices. The court ordered her to disgorge one million five hundred
seventy thousand ($1,570,000) dollars of ill-gotten gain and to pay pre-
judgment interest of eight hundred thirty three thousand nine hundred
522. 953 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1992), rev d in part, 998 F.2d 922 (11th Cir. 1993).
523. Id. at 1565.
524. Id.
525. Litigation Release No.: 13404 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 1992).
526. Litigation Release No.: 13435 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 1992).
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seventy-six ($833,976) dollars.527 In Securities & Exchange Commission
v. First Fidelity Financial Corp.,528 the SEC sought and the court granted
an injunction against the defendants from further violations of the bro-
ker/dealer registration provisions and violations of the anti-fraud provisions
of the federal securities laws.. The defendants were ordered to disgorge five
hundred sixty thousand ($560,000) dollars and pay civil penalties upon a
determination by the court that they operated a boiler-room selling
speculative over-the-counter securities to the public through high pressure
sales tactics and misrepresentations.529 In Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Omni Capital Group, Ltd.,53° the court permanently enjoined
Thomas R. Mullens, the president and sole shareholder of defendant Omni
Capital Group, Ltd. from future violations of the registration and anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 Act and the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
The court ordered disgorgement, civil penalties and other relief against
Mullens.53" The court found that Mullens had engaged in unregistered non-
exempt offerings of securities and that through Omni had made material
misrepresentations and omissions of material facts to investors and
prospective investors concerning, among other things, Mullens' personal
criminal history, the use of the proceeds from the offerings, the risks
associated with the investment and the existence of a guaranteed rate of
return on the investments. 32 The court appointed a receiver to unravel an
approximately 25 million dollar Ponzi scheme in which, despite making
various representations of the profits being made, Mullens, in fact, never
made any investments on behalf of his clients.533 Mullens was recently
sentenced to more than thirty years in prison on various criminal charges
arising from his Omni activities. On June 14, 1993 the court entered a final
judgment of permanent injunction against the defendants in Securities
527. Id.
528. Litigation Release No.: 13467 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1992).
529. Id.
530. Litigation Release Nos.: 13295 and 13296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 1992).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. The SEC has and continues to bring numerous actions to terminate fraudulent
investment schemes. See, e.g., In re: Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., [1992] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,867, at 93,531 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 1992) (growing out of the SEC's action to
enjoin an apparent massive fraud in connection with a public company's false statements
regarding the nature and extent of its business and assets, and granting a preliminary
injunction freezing the assets of one of the outside directors of Cascade in order to avoid his
secreting such assets to avoid judgment).
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Exchange & Commission v. Premium Sales Corp.,"' enjoining the
defendants from further violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. The SEC alleged that the defendants falsely represented to
investors that they had an extremely profitable grocery diversion business
which could yield upwards of 60% return on investment. In fact, the SEC
alleged, defendants had not made the represented returns and a material
number of the diversion transactions reported were overstated or sham
transactions. As a result of their activities, the defendants raised approxi-
mately five hundred fifteen million ($515,000,000)dollars from investors.
At the time of the filing of the action, only eighty nine million ($89,000,-
000) dollars was accounted for, according to'the SEC complaint. The SEC,
in addition to the injunctions, sought and obtained the appointment of a
receiver, and an order freezing assets of the defendants and prohibiting the
destruction of records. The SEC is seeking disgorgement and civil penalties
against the defendants, 5.
Finally,, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Premier Benefit
Capital Trust,536 the court preliminarily enjoined the defendants from
further violations of the registration and anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. It also entered orders freezing assets, prohibiting the
destruction of records, expediting discovery and appointing a receiver. The
SEC's complaint alleged that the defendants had raised at least six million
six hundred thousand ($6,600,000) dollars through the unlawful sale of
unregistered securities to 180 investors. The SEC further alleged that these
sales had been accomplished through materially false representations and
omissions in offering documents, radio and newspaper advertisements and
by oral communications which employed "boiler-room" techniques.
The SEC's litigation release cited the substantial assistance of the
Florida Department of Banking and Finance in its investigation. Such
cooperative efforts among the regulatory agencies, appears to be an increas-
ing trend in securities regulation in Florida.
Unfortunately, the activities of the Florida Office of the Comptroller,
Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor
Protection are even less well reported than those of the SEC. Two reported
decisions concerning that agency demonstrate some of the matters within the
purview and concern of the Department. In Giordano v. Department of
534. Civil Action No.: 93-1092-CIV-MORENO, Litigation Release No. 13668 (S.D.
Fla. June 9, 1993).
535. Id.
536. Civil Action No.: 93-1079-CIV-T-15C, Litigation Release Nos. 13731 & 13755
(M.D. Fla. July 2 & July 30, 1993).
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Banking & Finance,537 appellant sought review of an administrative order
of the Department of Banking and Finance requiring him to cease and desist
from the unauthorized sale of securities. The district court affirmed the
administrative order in an opinion that gave some insight into the workings
of the Department and its powers. 38  The district court held that the
Department did not have to hold an evidentiary hearing or to consider
reasons why appellant had failed to respond to an administrative complaint
prior to entry of a default order.53 9 The decision outlines the practice of
the Department to conduct administrative hearings on complaints of
securities laws violations and examines some of the procedures involved
therewith. It also demonstrates the broad latitude given the Department by
the state courts. In Santacroce v. Department of Banking & Finance,
Division of Securities & Investor Protection,54° the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that the Department had properly found that a broker had
violated a statute concerning receiving commissions on securities transac-
tions before the broker was properly registered with the state, but suggested
that the sanction imposed may have been excessive.5 4' Again, the Depart-
ment was concerned with the sale of securities by unregistered persons in
the state and the case gives additional insights into the Department's
workings and processes. As in Giordano, it demonstrates the latitude
granted the Department by the courts. The court in Santacroce affirmed the
right of the Director of the Department to act as a hearing officer in a
revocation (of license) hearing against the securities broker. 42 The court
also held the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel not to be applicable
to revocation hearings. It also upheld the hearing officer's determination
that the appellant had violated section 517.12, requiring registration of
brokers before they may sell securities, regardless of the fact that the
violation may have been inadvertent and that appellant had asserted a good
faith belief that he was registered. 43 The court held, "appellant's argu-
ment regarding his good faith belief that he was registered at the time he
537. 596 So. 2d 712 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
538. Id. at 715.
539. Id. at 713-15.
540. 608 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
541. Id. at 136-37.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 136; cf supra notes 319-39 and accompanying text.
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conducted the subject transactions did not provide him with a defense to
section 517.12." 544
One other decision of interest which was reported during the period
involves the effect of SEC Rule 2(e)(1)l of the SEC Rules of Practice . 45
Under Rule 2(e), the SEC is empowered to discipline lawyers who practice
before it, including the power to revoke that lawyer's right to practice
before the SEC. In The Florida Bar v. Tepps,546 the Supreme Court held
that The Florida Bar could not consider the entry of an SEC 2(e) revocation
as "conclusive proof of misconduct" under the Bar's rules allowing the Bar
to revoke the license of a lawyer solely on the basis of the entry of an order
of another jurisdiction terminating the lawyer's right to practice there. 47
The court concluded that "the SEC is not a 'court or other authorized
disciplinary agency of another jurisdiction"' and refused to recognize its
order as a basis for disciplinary action without a full evidentiary hear-
ing. 48
544. Id. Apparently, the Department takes a much dimmer view of alleged inadvertent
violations of broker registration provisions than do arbitration panels. See, e.g., Ainsworth
v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1269 (1993); Brown v.
Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 994 F.2d 775 (11 th
Cir. 1993).
545. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(1991).
546. 601 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1992).
547. Id.
548. Id at 1175.
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I. DETERMINATION OF GUILT
For practical purposes, Florida applies the death penalty only to first
degree murder cases. The State recognizes two forms of this offense:
unlawful killing from a premeditated design to kill,' and unlawful killing
during the attempt to commit, the commission of, or the flight from the
commission of an enumerated felony.2 Although the Florida Supreme
Court did nothing significant during the reporting period respecting felony
murders, it issued two interesting opinions regarding murder by premeditated
design. It also issued opinions regarding the State's failure to abide by plea
bargains in capital cases.
I. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)1 (1991).
2. Id. § 782.04(I)(a)2.
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A. The Element of Premeditated Design
In Hoefert v. State,3 the court found that the evidence did not support
a finding of a premeditated design to kill. The evidence showed that a
strangled woman was found in Robert Earl Hoefert's apartment, and the
State presented ample collateral crime evidence that he had also choked
other women while assaulting or raping them.' Thus, it appeared that he
had strangled the woman while committing a sexual assault on her.
Nevertheless, the supreme court found that the evidence did not support his
conviction for first degree murder, notwithstanding previous cases stating
that strangulation is sufficient to establish premeditation.' Hoefert is
especially interesting because the court left open the question of whether
Florida's standard jury instruction on premeditation correctly defines the
statutory element of premeditated design.
In contrast to Hoefert is Trepal v. State.6 George J. Trepal, in an
elaborate attempt to force a neighboring family to move away, put poison
in Coca-Cola bottles in the family's home, and as a result, one person died
and the others fell quite ill.7 With two justices dissenting, the supreme
court held the evidence supported a finding of a premeditated design to
kill.8 In his dissent, Justice McDonald argued that the evidence did not
show that Mr. Trepal intended to kill any of the family members, so that the
evidence supported only a finding of second degree murder.9
In another case involving the premeditation element, the court found
no error in excluding mental health expert testimony showing that the
defendant did not premeditate the murder.' °
B. Violation of Plea Agreements
In Hunt v. State," Deidre Hunt pleaded guilty to two first degree
murders once the State agreed her penalty proceeding would take place after
that of her co-defendant, Konstantino Fotopoulos. She thereafter indicated
her refusal to testify against Mr. Fotopoulos. Deeming this refusal a
3. 617 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1993).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1049.
6. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1367.
9. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting).
10. Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
11. 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992).
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violation of the plea agreement, the State sought, and the trial court granted,
an order to reschedule her sentencing so that it would occur before the
Fotopoulos trial. Ms. Hunt was sentenced to death. On appeal, she argued
the plea should be set aside because the State had violated the plea
agreement. Determining that "the State's agreement that Hunt's sentencing
would be postponed until after Fotopoulos' trial was not contingent upon
Hunt's cooperation and testimony in that case,"' 2 the supreme court found
that the State had violated the plea agreement. 13 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that "specific performance is an adequate remedy," refused to
grant Ms. Hunt her requested relief and, instead, ordered new sentencing
proceedings.14
In Long v. State, 5 the supreme court found that the State had also
failed to abide with a plea agreement in its tangled dealings with Robert Joe
Long.' 6 In 1985, Mr. Long was found guilty of first degree murder and
other offenses in Pasco County. Later that year, he pleaded guilty to eight
murders and several other felonies in Hillsborough County after the State
agreed not to use those crimes against him in any subsequent penalty
proceeding. He was sentenced to death for one of the Hillsborough County
convictions, and to life imprisonment for the others. In separate appeals, his
Pasco County conviction and death sentence, and the Hillsborough death
sentence were vacated." On remand, Mr. Long was again found guilty of
the Pasco murder and sentenced to death. In a separate proceeding he was
sentenced to death for the Hillsborough murders. In the Pasco County
sentencing proceedings, the State used evidence of the Hillsborough County
offenses. On appeal, the supreme court again reversed the Pasco conviction
for various reasons, and ruled that use of the Hillsborough offenses violated
the Hillsborough plea agreement. 18 In the new Hillsborough appeal,
however, the supreme court refused to set aside the plea agreement. It
reasoned that since it had set aside the Pasco sentence and ruled that the
State could not use the plea agreement in any subsequent penalty proceed-
ings, the matter was moot: Mr. Long had in effect received specific performance. 9
12. Id. at 897.
13. Id. at 898.
14. Id.
15. 529 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988).
16. Id. at 292.
17. Long v. State, 529 So. 2d 286 (Fla.) (Pasco County case), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1017 (1988); Long v. State, 517 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1987) (Hillsborough County case).
18. Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 1992).
19. Id.
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C. Evidence: Gruesome Photographs
Murder trials typically involve the State's use of gruesome photographs
of the decedent. In the past, the supreme court has deferred to the trial
court's discretion regarding the admissibility of such photographs, but
during the survey period, it strongly cautioned that their use may lead to
reversal of a conviction.2°
II. PENALTY PROCEEDINGS
A. Aggravating Circumstances
1. Sentence of Imprisonnent
2
'
There were no developments regarding this circumstance during the
survey period.
2. Previous Violent Felony Conviction
22
There were several recent developments regarding the "previous violent
felony conviction" circumstance.
a. Evidence
In the past, the supreme court has ruled the State may introduce
extensive evidence detailing the facts of a defendant's prior violent offens-
es. However, in two cases during the survey period, the court found
error when the State used photographs depicting the victims of the prior
violent felonies during the penalty phase of the case.24
20. See Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 804 (Fla. 1992); Elledge v. State, 613 So.
2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1993).
21. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(a) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed by a
person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control.").
22. See id. § 921.141 (5)(b) ("The defendant was previously convicted of another capital
felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.").
23. E.g., Rhodes v. State, 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998
(Fla. 1977). But see Freeman v. State, 563 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1990) (holding it was error to
permit spouse of victim, whom defendant had previously been convicted of killing, to testify
concerning victim's death at penalty phase of prosecution).
24. See Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993); Elledge, 613 So. 2d at 434.
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b. Weight
During the survey period, the court appears to have increased the
weight that is given to a prior violent felony when the prior violent felony
was a murder. In Duncan v. State, the court upheld a death sentence when
a prior violent felony was the only aggravating circumstance to support
Donn A. Duncan's death sentence for the murder of his fiancee.25 Mr.
Duncan had previously been convicted of a second degree murder commit-
ted in prison, and had a contemporaneous (and hence "previous")26 convic-
tion for a second degree murder of a fellow prison inmate twenty-one years
before.
In Slawson v. State,27 the court upheld three death sentences where the
only aggravating circumstance was that the defendant had "previous" violent
felony convictions for contemporaneous murders on various members of the
victim's family.28 The supreme court supported the trial court's reasoning
that the murder of two helpless children gave added weight to the circum-
stance.29
3. Great Risk"
The court upheld application of the "great risk" circumstance to the
curious facts in Trepal v. State." During a dispute with the neighboring
Carr family, George Trepal decided to put poison into bottles of Coca-Cola
in the Carrs' home. Peggy Carr died and two others were hospitalized. A
jury found Mr. Trepal guilty of first degree murder, six counts of attempted
first degree murder, seven counts of poisoning food or water, and one count
of tampering with a consumer product. The supreme court wrote of the trial
court's use of the "great risk" circumstance:
Trepal raises ... that it was error to find the aggravating circumstance
"great risk of death to persons." He argues that only a possible risk, a
mere speculation, existed and even the full bottles of cola were not
25. Duncan, 619 So. 2d at 279.
26. E.g., Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979). See generally Craig S. Barnard,
Death Penalty, 13 NOVA L. REV. 907, 912-16 (1989).
27. 619 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1993).
28. Id. at 260. The court also sustained the death sentence for the murder of another
family member where the trial court also applied the heinousness circumstance. Id. at 261.
29. Id. at 259.
30. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c) (1991) ("The defendant knowingly created a great
risk of death to many persons.").
31. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
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proven to contain a deadly dose of poison, so great risk of death was
not proven. He argues that only four persons resided in the Carr home,
the other three lived in the detached apartment; therefore, this is not
many persons. He also argues that as the number of persons who
consumed the cola increased the risk of death decreased because the
more people among whom it was divided the less the likelihood that a
sufficiently large quantity of poison would be consumed. We reject
these arguments. The evidence showed that seven family members
lived on the Carr property at all times, other family members visited
regularly, and Trepal knew that "there were a lot of people coming and
going" on the Carr property. The contents of the full cola bottles
contained lethal doses of thallium. The contents of the empty cola
bottles killed and seriously injured members of the Carr household.
Great risk of harm to many persons has been shown.
Trepal next argues that the "great risk" aggravating circumstance
was improperly doubled with the "prior violent felony" aggravating
circumstance. Prior violent felony may involve great risk of harm to
many persons but need not necessarily do so. Each of these circum-
stances deals with a different aspect of the crime; therefore, each is
proper.32
4. Felony Murder33
Application of the felony murder circumstance is usually straightfor-
ward; either the murder occurred during an enumerated felony or it did not.
In one case, however, the court struck the circumstance. In Clark v.
State,34 Ronald Clark shot a man with the apparent motive of obtaining the
man's job. After shooting him, he took his money and boots. The supreme
court disapproved use of the felony murder circumstance, reasoning that the
theft of the money and boots was an afterthought.35
32. Id. al 1367 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
33. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed while
the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery,
arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or
discharging of a destructive device or bomb.").
34. 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992).
35. Id.
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5. The Law Enforcement Circumstances: Avoiding
Arrest, Hindering Law Enforcement, and
Murder of Law Enforcement Officer
36
Of the three law enforcement circumstances, courts most frequently
apply the one involving avoiding arrest; the other two generally merge with
that circumstance. The court set forth the law which governs the aggravat-
ing circumstance of avoiding arrest in Robertson v. State:
37
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating
circumstance exists. Moreover, even the trial court may not draw
"logical inferences" to support a finding of a particular aggravating
circumstance when the State has not met its burden. In order to support
a finding that a defendant committed a murder to avoid arrest, the State
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's dominant or
only motive for the murder of the victim, who is not a law enforcement
officer, is the elimination of a witness. "Proof of the requisite intent to
avoid arrest and detection must be very strong" to support this aggravat-
ing circumstance when the victim is not a law enforcement officer.38
Thus, in the fairly typical case of Davis v. State,39 the court disapproved
use of the circumstance where Henry Davis killed an elderly woman whose
home he was burglarizing. 40 The trial court had found the circumstance
because the woman knew Mr. Davis and could identify him as the burglar.
The supreme court held that the fact that witness elimination may have been
a motive in the murder was insufficient to support the circumstance.41
Although Davis represents the usual approach to the circumstance, the
supreme court will sometimes uphold the circumstance even where there is
no clear evidence of motive. In Hall v. State,42 the court upheld the
36. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(e) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody."); Id.
§ 921.141(5)(g) ("The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise
of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws."); Id. § 921.141(5)0) ("The victim
of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties.").
37. 611 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1993) (striking circumstance where defendant murdered
woman who had witnessed her companion's murder).
38. Id. (citations omitted).
39. 604 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1992).
40. Id. at 795.
41. Id. at 798; see also Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993) (murder of store
clerk during robbery).
42. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993).
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circumstance when Freddie Lee Hall and another man kidnapped, raped and
murdered a woman, leaving her body in the woods. Citing to many prior
cases which applied the circumstance "when the victim is transported to
another location and then killed, 43 the supreme court determined "the
evidence leaves no reasonable inference except that Hall and Ruffin killed
the victim to eliminate the only witness to their having kidnapped and raped
her and having stolen her car." 4 4 One may wonder how this is not the sort
of "logical inference" forbidden by Robertson v. State.45
In Fotopoulos v. State,46 the supreme court also approved application
of the circumstance to Deidre Hunt's co-defendant, Konstantinos Fotopo-
ulos, as there was evidence that Fotopoulos killed a man who knew of his
illegal activities and planned to blackmail him.47 The court rejected the
defense's argument that witness elimination was but one of several motives
for the murder.48
6. Pecuniary Gain
49
Except when the murder occurs to obtain insurance proceeds,5" this
circumstance is usually merged with the felony murder circumstance."
Fotopoulos presented a somewhat different merger issue. The evidence was
that Mr. Fotopoulos committed two murders as part of a fantastic plan to
obtain insurance proceeds in his wife's murder. 2 The supreme court
rejected the defense's argument that it was error to give separate consider-
ation to the pecuniary gain and premeditation circumstances because they in-
volved the same aspects of the crime."
43. Id. at 477.
44. Id. at 477-78.
45. 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1992).
46. 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992).
47. Id. at 792.
48. Id. Another strong motive behind the blackmailer's murder was to ensnare Ms. Hunt
into a plot to kill Mr. Fotopoulos's wife. Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(f) (1991) ("The capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain.").
50. E.g., Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 784.
51. E.g., Davis, 604 So. 2d at 794.
52. Having had Ms. Hunt participate in the videotaped murder of a man who had been
blackmailing him, Mr. Fotopoulos used the tape to blackmail her into participating in a
scheme in which they would murder another man hired to murder Mrs. Fotopoulos, after
which they would gain insurance proceeds in the wife's death. The plan went awry when
the second man shot, but failed to kill the wife. Fotopoulos, 608 So. 2d at 784, 786.
53. Id. at 790.
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7. Heinousness54
The supreme court has held in the past that this circumstance does not
apply vicariously when the defendant ordered the murder but did not
command that it involve torture," and does not apply when the murder is
by gunshot. 6 During the survey period, the court struck the circumstance
in several cases in conformance with these precedents. 7 While cases
striking vicarious application are straightforward, gunshot cases turn on fine
distinctions. In Clark, the court rejected the State's argument that the
murder was heinous because the defendant reloaded his gun between the
first shot and the fatal shot so as to make the decedent aware of an
impending death:
The State argues that . . . because Carter was probably conscious
between the time the first shot was fired and the time he was killed by
the second shot, and therefore was probably aware of his impending
death. However, the evidence indicates that the fatal shot came almost
immediately after the initial shot to the chest. The fact that it took
more than one shot to kill this victim does not set this crime apart from
the norm of capital felonies, and there is no indication that the crime
was committed in such a manner as to cause unnecessary and prolonged
suffering to the victim. We therefore agree with Clark that this
aggravating circumstance is not present in this case.58
The Clark court cited Brown v. State59 and Lewis v. State6" in support of
its decision. In Brown, the court ruled the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravator was not warranted when the victim had been shot in the arm,
begged for his life, and then was shot in the head.6" Similarly, the Lewis
court held the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator was improperly found
54. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1991) ("The capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel.").
55. Omelus v. State, 584 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1991).
56. E.g., McKinney v. State, 579 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991).
57. Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993) (vicarious application); Archer v.
State, 613 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993); see also Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993)
(murder by gunshot); Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993); Robertson v. State,
611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1992); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992).
58. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 514-15 (citing Brown v. State, 526 So. 2d 903 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 944 (1988); Lewis v. State, 377 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1979)).
59. 526 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1988).
60. 377 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1979).
61. Brown, 526 So. 2d at 907.
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when the victim was shot in the chest, attempted to flee, and then was shot
in the back.62
One might have trouble squaring the supreme court's decisions in
Brown v. State63 and Lewis v. State64 with the court's decision in Rodri-
guez v. State,65 where the court wrote:
Next, we reject Rodriguez's claim that this murder was the result of a
simple shooting and therefore cannot be considered heinous, atrocious,
or cruel under section 921.141(5)(h), Florida Statutes (1989). After the
shooting, Rodriguez bragged that when Mr. Saladrigas would not turn
over his belongings, Rodriguez shot the man twice, first in the knee and
then in the stomach. As his victim ran, pleading for his life, Rodriguez
shot him again because Saladrigas still had not given up his watch.
After being wounded, Mr. Saladrigas ran over 200 feet with his attacker
in pursuit only to be shot a fourth time behind a car where he sought
cover. These facts set this murder apart from the norm of capital
felonies and support the conclusion that Rodriguez enjoyed or was
utterly indifferent to the suffering of his victim.66
Although they were decided in the same month, and were pending on
rehearing at the same time, Clark and Rodriguez make no mention of each
other. Similar to Rodriguez is Lucas v. State,67 in which the court upheld
application of the circumstance when, after repeatedly threatening her,
Harold Gene Lucas chased, beat, and repeatedly shot a 16-year-old girl.6"
The court continued to uphold the circumstance in almost all non-
gunshot murders.69  However, the supreme court recently rejected State
62. Lewis, 377 So. 2d at 646.
63. 526 So. 2d 903, 906-07 (Fla. 1988) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator
improperly fiund where victim was shot in the arm, begged for his life, then shot in the
head); see also Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1228 (defendant repeatedly shot woman as she cried
and screamed after he shot her companion); Bums v. State, 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992)
(striking circumstance where drug trafficker shot officer begging for his life while standing
in water-filled ditch).
64. 377 So. 2d 640, 646 (Fla. 1979) (heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator improperly
found where victim shot in the chest, attempted to flee, then shot in the back).
65. 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
67. 613 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1992).
68. Id. at 411 n.5.
69. See Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 478-79 (Fla. 1993) (rape and beating); Happ v.
State, 618 So. 2d 205, 206-07 (Fla. 1993) (beating and anal rape); Slawson v. State, 619 So.
2d 255, 259-60 (Fla. 1993) (shooting and slicing pregnant woman, expelling fetus from
abdomen); Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 291-93 (Fla. 1993) (strangulation); Davis v.
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argument that the trial court erred in not finding the circumstance in a
strangulation case, noting that it was not clear whether the victim was awake
when murdered.7"
Cases remanded by the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration in
view of Espinosa v. Florida7 are discussed below in the section on
appellate review.
8. Premeditation
72
The premeditation circumstance continues to be the one most prone to
misapplication. During the. survey period the supreme court struck the
circumstance in eight direct appeal cases,73 and affirmed it in ten. 74 As in
past years, it disapproved of the use of the circumstance in felony murder
cases when the evidence showed the felony, but not the murder, was
planned,75 or when the defendant was so upset that the murder was not
State, 604 So. 2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1992) (stabbing); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 464-65
(Fla. 1992) (beating, dragging, stabbing); Henry v. State, 613 So. 2d 429, 433-34 (Fla. 1992)
(burning); Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268, 1272-73 (Fla. 1992) (rape, choking, beating,
stabbing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 104 (1993); Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla.
1992) (beating); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856, 863-64 (Fla. 1992) (rape and stabbing of
12-year-old girl).
70. DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993).
71. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i) (1991) ("The capital felony was a homicide and was
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or
legal justification.").
73. See Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993); Cannady v. State, 620 So. 2d 165
(Fla. 1993); Padilla v. State, 618 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993); Maulden v. State, 617 So. 2d 298
(Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 214 (1993);
Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1993); Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992);
Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1992).
74. Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993); Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla.
1993); DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993); Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1993); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992); Jones v. State, 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.
1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 112 (1993); Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992);
Fotopolous v. State, 608 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1992); Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2366 (1993); Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1660 (1993).
These totals do not include cases on remand from the Supreme Court, or three cases
in which the trial court found the circumstance, and the supreme court reversed for other
reasons without holding whether the circumstance was properly found. See Scott v. State,
603 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1992); Hunt v. State, 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992); Valentine v. State,
616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1992).
75. Power, 605 So. 2d at 856.
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cold-blooded.76 In one case, the supreme court found it could not apply
the circumstance when the defendant was high on cocaine at the time of the
murder.77
The court reached differing results when the murders occurred after the
defendant had moved the decedent to a remote location. In Clark, the court
found error in applying the circumstance when Ronald Wayne Clark took
a man out to the woods and killed him with two blasts from a sawed-off
shotgun.78 Similarly, in Crump v. State, the court found error when
Michael Tyrone Crump bound, beat, and strangled a prostitute after driving
her to a park.7 9 In both cases, the court reasoned the state had not proven
an intent to kill when the decedents entered the killers' vehicles.8
Therefore, the circumstance did not apply. The court reached this decision
notwithstanding the fact there was evidence that Mr. Crump had murdered
another prostitute in very similar circumstances, which "showed that Crump
killed both [women] in a criminal pattern in which he picked up prostitutes,
bound them, strangled them, and discarded their nude bodies near cemeter-
ies.181
In Long v. State,8 2 the court took a less charitable view and upheld the
circumstance without discussion.83 The evidence showed that Mr. Long
bound and raped a prostitute and then, after deciding to return her to where
he had picked her up, he instead choked and beat her and cut her throat.
The supreme court also upheld the premeditation circumstance in Hall v.
State. 4 In Hall, the court addressed the sentencing of Freddie Lee Hall to
death in the abduction and brutal murder of a pregnant woman:
The evidence also supports finding the murder to have been committed
in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner with no pretense of
moral or legal justification. The record shows that Hall and Ruffin
intended to steal the victim's car. To that end, they could have taken
the car and simply left her in the parking lot. Instead, however, they
abducted, raped, beat, and finally killed her. Even if Hall did not fire
76. Cannady, 620 So. 2d at 169; Padilla, 618 So. 2d at 165; Maulden, 617 So. 2d at
298.
77. White, 616 So. 2d at 21.
78. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 514.
79. Crump, 622 So. 2d at 966.
80. Clark, 609 So. 2d at 515; Crump, 622 So. 2d at 972.
81. Crump, 622 So. 2d at 971.
82. 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992).
83. Id. at 1275.
84. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993).
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the shot that killed the victim, he was a willing if not predominant
participant in the other acts. The totality of the circumstances show this
murder to have been committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner. There is no merit to Hall's argument that his mental retarda-
tion provided a pretense of moral or legal justification. Additionally it
is not improper to apply this aggravator to killings committed before the
legislature adopted it.85
In Trepal v. State, the court rejected a claimed "pretense of moral or
legal justification."86 In Trepal, the contention was that the murder was
committed to get rid of unwanted neighbors.87
B. Mitigation
1. Treatment of Co-Defendants
In Scott v. State,8" the evidence was that Jeremy Lynn Scott and
Bryan Hall murdered a man to conceal the theft of his car. Mr. Hall,
testifying for the state, claimed that the theft and murder were not his idea
and that he hit the man only once, whereas Mr. Scott hit and strangled him.
Accepting Mr. Hall's testimony at face value, the court wrote:
[w]e also note that Scott's accomplice, Bryan Hall, received a life
sentence for his participation in the murder. While the disparate
treatment of equally culpable accomplices can serve as a valid
basis for a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, the
evidence presented at trial indicates that Hall and Scott were not
equally culpable.89
The court, however, did not explain why the jury could not reasonably
discount Mr. Hall's claim of lesser culpability.
The discussion in Williams v. State" was similar. Darrell Frazier,
Bruce Frazier, Timothy Robinson, and Michael Coleman participated in the
brutal murders of various persons suspected of crossing a drug trafficking
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993); see also Hall, 614 So. 2d at 473;
Jones, 612 So. 2d at 1370.
87. Trepal, 621 So. 2d at 1364.
88. 603 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1992).
89. Id. at 1277 n.4.
90. 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993).
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ring headed by Ronald Lee Williams.9' Testifying for the State, the
Fraziers contended that the murders were Williams' idea and that Coleman
and Robinson did the actual killing. Overriding a life verdict, the trial court
sentenced Mr. Williams to death. The Fraziers received life sentences for
their cooperation.92 The supreme court affirmed, saying that the disparate
treatment of the Fraziers was not a mitigating factor since (according to their
self-serving testimony) they were less culpable than Mr. Williams.93
In contrast, Scott v. State9" involved a defendant whose sentence was
reduced to life because of the disparate sentence of his co-defendant.
Abron Scott and Amos Earl Robinson kidnapped and murdered a man,
apparently to steal his car. On direct appeal, the supreme court affirmed
Mr. Scott's death sentence, 95 but reversed Mr. Robinson's in part because
the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on the mitigating circumstance
of minor participation.96 The court wrote that Mr. Robinson's statements
to the police, minimizing his involvement, could reasonably support the
mitigating circumstance.97 The trial court subsequently sentenced Robinson
to life imprisonment. 98 As a result of Robinson's resentencing, Mr. Scott
moved for post-conviction relief, asserting his co-defendant's lesser sentence
could reasonably lead to a lesser sentence for himself.99 He had powerful
evidence for this claim: the original trial judge who had sentenced both
men to death had written to the Clemency Board that she considered both
equally culpable, and recusing herself, said that she thought they were
"equally deranged and equally had poor records."'' °  In view of the
judge's representations, the supreme court reduced Mr. Scott's sentence to
life imprisonment.' Thus, one defendant's sentence, reduced in part on a
claim of minimal participation, led to reduction of the other defendant's
sentence on a claim of equal participation.
91. Id. at 458.
92. Mr. Coleman and Mr. Robinson were also sentenced to death, and their sentences
affirmed by the supreme court. Robinson v. State, 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); Coleman
v. State, 610 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 821 (1993).
93. Williams, 622 So. 2d at 464.
94. 494 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1986).
95. Id. at 1139.
96. Robinson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Fla. 1986).
97. Id. at 1043.
98. Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 468-69.
101. Id. at 470.
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2. Waiver of Mitigation
In Koon v. Dugger,10 2 the Florida Supreme Court established the
circumstances in which the trial court should allow defense counsel to waive
presentation of mitigation. The court stated:
When a defendant, against his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably believes
there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and what that
evidence would be. The court should then require the defendant to
confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these matters with
him, and despite counsel's recommendation, he wishes to waive
presentation of penalty phase evidence." 3
C. Evidence and Argument
1. The Character of the Decedent
The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no Eighth Amendment bar
to evidence and argument about the decedent's character in capital sen-
tencing proceedings.10 4 The Florida Legislature has amended the Florida
Statutes to authorize the same."' The Florida Supreme Court's treatment
of such evidence and argument is somewhat confusing.
In Thomas v. State,10 6 the court considered the decedent's criminal
activity irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Similarly, in Marshall v.
State, '7 the court seemed to disapprove of "negative characterization of
the victim" as mitigation."'8 On the other hand, the court in Jones v.
102. 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993).
103. Id. at 250.
104. Payne v. Tennessee, Il1 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
105. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(7) (Supp. 1992). At least one trial court judge has
declared this subsection unconstitutional. State v. Maxwell, No. 80-8767 (B) (Fla. 17th Cir.
Ct. June 22, 1993).
106. 618 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1993) ("The victim's efforts to buy cocaine are irrelevant to
Thomas' culpability."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 321 (1993).
107. 604 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1992).
108. Id. at 806 ("Furthermore, defense counsel's argument composed largely of a
negative characterization of the victim does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury's life
recommendation.").
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State"9 approved of evidence and argument regarding the decedent's state
of mind at the time of the killing."'
In Burns v. State,"' seeking to rebut assertions in the defense
opening statement, the State introduced evidence of the decedent's
background and character as a law enforcement officer." 2  Pointing to
Payne v. Tennessee, the supreme court rejected the argument that such
evidence violated the Eighth Amendment." 3 Nevertheless, reasoning that
counsel's opening statement is not evidence and therefore does not open the
door to rebuttal evidence, the court found the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony." 4 While the improper evidence constituted harmless error
as to guilt, the court found its erroneous admission required a resenten-
cing." 5 One may find this result baffling: even if the evidence was not
admissible as to guilt, it was apparently admissible as to penalty; if it was
admissible as to penalty, then the character of the victim was a valid
sentencing consideration. Perhaps what really troubled the supreme court
was the extent of the prosecutor's argument.
2. Argument Generally
Although the supreme court is sometimes disposed to think that juries
are improperly swayed by arguments of defense counsel," 6 it will seldom
reverse a death sentence because of improper argument by the State. It
109. 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992).
110. Id. at 1374 (citing Payne, I I! S. Ct. at 2597).
111. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
112. Id. at 603.
113. Id. at 605.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 606. The court stated:
Reverting to our earlier finding that it was error to admit the background
evidence of the deceased, we cannot with the same certainty determine it to be
harmless in the penalty phase. The testimony was extensive and it was
frequently referred to by the prosecutor. The prosecutor described the defendant
as an evil supplier of drugs and contrasted him with the deceased. These
emotional issues may have improperly influenced the jury in their recommenda-
tion.
Burns, 609 So. 2d at 607.
116. Eg., Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456, 464 (Fla. 1993); Marshall, 604 So. 2d at
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imposes a very high standard for reversal, and frequently finds claims of
improper argument defaulted." 7
Interesting questions regarding argument as evidence are presented by
Hunt v. State"' and Burns v. State." 9 Ms. Hunt contended that the
State's argument in her co-defendant's trial, that her co-defendant was the
leader and she was the follower, could be used as defensive evidence at her
resentencing. 2 ° The supreme court left the issue open.' 2 ' Burns estab-
lishes that counsel's opening statement is not evidence subject to rebuttal
testimony. 122
3. Hearsay
In Duncan v. State,'23 the court granted the State's cross appeal from
the trial court's finding of mitigation. Although the record contained Mr.
Duncan's statements to the police that he "went nuts" before the murder, the
supreme court found such evidence was hearsay and could not support a
mitigating circumstance.' 24 This conclusion is questionable since the State
used the statements as substantive evidence of guilt,'25 and the court has
elsewhere ruled that the defendant's unsupported statements to the police
can establish a mitigating circumstance,'26 and can negate an aggravating
circumstance. '27
117. See Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1993); Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500-01 (Fla. 1992) (defaulting issue for
failure to seek curative instruction even though defense objected and moved for mistrial);
Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992).
118. 613 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1992).
119. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 600.
120. Hunt, 613 So. 2d at 898.
121. Id. at 898 n.5. The court stated: "[W]e do not reach the merits of Hunt's conten-
tion, which was made in a notice of supplemental authority to her motion for judicial notice,
that the State's portrayal of Hunt as a victim in the Fotopoulos trial must be treated as
'judicial admissions by a party opponent:.' Id. (citations omitted).
122. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 605.
123. 618 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993).
124. Id. at 281.
125. Id. at 284.
126. See e.g., Robinson v. State, 487 So. 2d 1040, 1042-43 (Fla. 1986) (defendant's
statements to police could establish circumstance of minor participation).
127. See Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221, 224-25 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1087 (1989); Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723, 730-31 (Fla. 1983).
Vol. 1 8
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The court has continued to permit the State to present hearsay evidence
of the defendant's prior violent felonies. 2 ' In Thompson v. State,'29 a
resentencing case, the court found no error in the State's use of an unavail-
able witness's testimony at the first sentencing, despite defense argument
that the defense cross-examination at the earlier sentencing was mini-
mal. 1
30
4. Mental Health Evidence
In Burns, the trial court had denied a State motion to have its mental
health expert examine Mr. Bums in anticipation of the defendant offering
mental health as mitigating circumstance.' 3 ' Instead, the trial court permit-
ted the State's expert to be present during the penalty phase in preparation
for his testimony, notwithstanding the rule of sequestration of witnesses.,
32
The supreme court approved the decision waiving the rule of sequestration,
but left open the question whether the state could have its expert examine
the defendant.1 3 3 The court stated:
We do not pass on whether the court erred in denying the state's request
to have its expert examine Burns. However, because there is no rule of
criminal procedure that specifically authorizes a state's expert to
examine a defendant facing the death penalty when the defendant
intends to establish either statutory or nonstatutory mental mitigating
factors during the penalty phase of the trial, the matter has been brought
to the attention of the Florida Criminal Rules Committee for consider-
ation. 34
In Long v. State,'3 the court found no error in the State's penalty
phase use of a mental health expert who had examined Mr. Long regarding
his sanity at the time of the offense as the defendant had filed a notice of
intent to rely on a defense of insanity. 36
128. See Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268, 1274-75 (Fla. 1992).
129. 619 So. 2d 261 (Fla.), cert. denied, _ S. Ct. __ (1993).
130. Id.
131. Burns, 609 So. 2d at 603.
132. Id. at 606 n.8.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992).
136. Id. at 1275.
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In Johnson v. State,137 the court upheld the trial court's ruling that the
State could cross-examine a defense expert about Paul Johnson's prior drug
offenses even though Mr. Johnson had waived the mitigating circumstance
of lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity. 3
D. Jury instructions
The supreme court usually rejects jury instruction issues on grounds of
procedural default. In two cases, however, it indicated that it considers the
1991 jury instruction' 39 regarding the heinous aggravating circumstance
constitutionally adequate. 4 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court Committee
on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has proposed to submit an
amended instruction to the supreme court.'4
E. The Judge's Sentencing Order
The survey period contains several cases setting out the trial court's
duties in preparing its sentencing order.
137. 608 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1992).
138. Id. at 14.
139. The jury instruction provides:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to
inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the
suffering of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous,
atrocious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the
crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim.
In re Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases-No. 90-1, 579 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1991).
140. Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856 (Fla.
1992).
141. Comment sought on "heinous, atrocious or cruel, " THE FLORIDA BAR NEWS, Feb.
15, 1993, p.2 . The committee proposed the following instruction:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel. To commit a crime that is heinous, atrocious or cruel, the
defendant must have deliberately inflicted or consciously chosen a method of
death with the intent to cause extraordinary mental anguish or physical pain to
the victim, and the victim must have consciously suffered such mental anguish
or physical pain for a substantial period of time before death.
140
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1. Timeliness
The trial court must enter its written sentencing order, setting out its
written evaluation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, at the time
of imposition of sentence. 142 Accordingly, the supreme court reduced a
death sentence to life imprisonment where a trial court judge did not render
its sentencing order, and in fact did not give any oral grounds for the
sentence, until twelve days after imposition of the sentence.
In Spencer v. State, 44 the same judge erred in the opposite direction.
The judge met ex parte with the prosecutor to draft the order sentencing
Leonard Spencer to death before Mr. Spencer's attorney had an opportunity
to argue for his client's life:
Next, we find it important to address the ex parte communications
between the trial judge and the state attorney. In Grossman, we
directed that written orders imposing the death sentence be prepared
prior to the oral pronouncement of sentence. However, we did not
perceive that our decision would be used in such a way that the trial
judge would formulate his decision prior to giving the defendant an
opportunity to be heard. We contemplated that the following sentencing
procedure be used in sentencing phase proceedings. First, the trial
judge should hold a hearing to: a) give the defendant, his counsel, and
the State, an opportunity to be heard; b) afford, if appropriate, both the
State and the defendant an opportunity to present additional evidence;
c) allow both sides to comment on or rebut information in any
presentence or medical report; and d) afford the defendant an opportuni-
ty to be heard in person. Second, after hearing the evidence and argu-
ment, the trial judge should then recess the proceeding to consider the
appropriate sentence. If the judge determines that the death sentence
should be imposed, then, in accordance with section 921.141, Florida
Statutes (1983), the judge must set forth in writing the reasons for
imposing the death sentence. Third, the trial judge should set a hearing
to impose the sentence and contemporaneously file the sentencing order.
Such a process was clearly not followed during these proceedings.
It is the circuit judge who has the principal responsibility for
determining whether a death sentence should be imposed. Capital
proceedings are sensitive and emotional proceedings in which the trial
judge plays an extremely critical role. This Court has stated that there
142. Stewart v. State, 549 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990);
Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
143. Hemandez v. State, 621 So. 2d 1353, 1356-57 (Fla. 1993).
144. 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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is nothing "more dangerous and destructive of the impartiality of the
judiciary than a one-sided communication between a judge and a single
litigant." This statement was made in recognition of the purpose of
canon 3A(4), Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:
A judge should accord to every person who is legally inter-
ested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard
according to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither
initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding. 45
On the other hand, the court in Lucas v. State46 approved Harold
Gene Lucas' death sentence when the trial court prepared the sentencing
order before the sentencing hearing, but only after considering a defense
sentencing memorandum filed two months before.' 47
2. Treatment of Mitigation
The Supreme Court of Florida continues its inconsistency regarding
discussion of mitigation in sentencing orders. At one extreme is Farr v.
State, 41 in which the court reversed because the trial court failed to
consider mitigation that was apparent on the record even though Victor
Marcus Farr plead guilty, waived mitigation, and demanded that he be
sentenced to death.' 49 The court stated:
Farr argues that the trial court was required to consider any evidence of
mitigation in the record, including the psychiatric evaluation and
presentence investigation. Our law is plain that such a requirement in
fact exists. We repeatedly have stated that mitigating evidence must be
considered and weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to the
extent it is believable and uncontroverted. That requirement applies
with no less force when a defendant argues in favor of the death
penalty, and even if the defendant asks the court not to consider
mitigating evidence."'
145. Id. at 691.
146. 613 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1992).
147. Id.
148. 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993).
149. Id. at 1382.
150. Id. (emphasis added); see also Durocher v. State, 604 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1992)
(trial court "carefully considered and weighed all of the [mitigating] evidence about Durocher
that could be gleaned from" the record, despite defendant's adamant refusal to introduce
Vol. 18
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Thus, the supreme court sometimes reverses where a trial court's findings
regarding mitigation are unclear.'
51
At the other end of the spectrum is Duncan v. State,"2 where the
court used the vagueness of the trial court's discussion of mitigation in
striking mitigating circumstances and affirming the death sentence.'53
Granting the State's cross appeal, the court found the evidence did not
support findings of mitigation regarding Mr. Duncan's state of mind at the
time of the murder, and specifically pointed to the lack of clarity in the trial
court's discussion of mitigation regarding the defendant's intoxication.'"
The court stated:
As noted by the trial court in its sentencing order, "[a]ll witnesses
testified that the Defendant appeared sober and that no one observed
him drink any alcoholic beverages since the night before." In light of
this finding of fact, which is supported by the record, it is unclear
whether the trial court actually found that Duncan was under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the murder of whether the trial court
was merely reciting the mitigating circumstance as proposed by the
defendant.'5
3. Use of Incorrect Legal Standards
Claims that sentencing orders have applied incorrect legal standards
have met uneven results. In Scott v. State, 56 the court wrote that the trial
court's use of the lesser standard of clear and convincing evidence for
aggravating circumstances (rather than the correct standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt) "makes the sentencing order in this case fatally defec-
tive."' 57 The court added, "we caution trial judges to carefully apply the
proper standard in rendering their sentencing decisions."'58  The Scott
decision starkly contrasts with Henry v. State,' 59 in which the court stated
that, notwithstanding the trial court's explicit use of a beyond a reasonable
mitigation) (citations omitted).
151. See, e.g., Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993); Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1992).
152. 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993).
153. Id. at 284.
154. Id. at 283.
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. 603 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1992).
157. Id. at 1277.
158. Id.
159. 613 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1993).
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doubt standard in evaluating mitigation, it assumed the trial court intended
to use the correct standard which is a preponderance of the evidence. 6'
There also may be some inconsistency between Valentine v. State
16
and Hall v. State.162  In reversing Terance Valentine's conviction and
death sentence, the Valentine court announced without explanation that it
agreed with Valentine's contention that "the sentencing order [was] flawed
by the court's failure to conduct an independent weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances . *...,, In affirming Freddie Lee Hall's
death sentence, the Hall court rejected a similar claim by stating:
As noted earlier, Hall's jury recommended that he be sentenced to
death. In agreeing with that recommendation the court wrote: "It is
only in rare circumstances that this court could impose a sentence other
than what is recommended by the jury, although the court obviously has
the right, in appropriate circumstances, to exercise its prerogative of
judicial override." Hall now argues that the "rare circumstances"
language shows that the court used the wrong standard in considering
the jury's recommendation. We disagree. As we have stated previous-
ly: "Notwithstanding the jury recommendation ... the judge is
required to make an independent determination, based on the aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors." This judge recognized that the final
decision as to penalty was his and conscientiously weighed and
discussed the aggravating and mitigating evidence and made his decision
based on the evidence. We are convinced that he applied the proper
standard. 164
F. Appellate Review
1. Espinosa Remands
The Espinosa remand cases are a mixed bag. In 1992, after having
found unconstitutional Florida's former standard jury instruction on the
heinousness circumstance, the United States Supreme Court remanded
several cases to the Supreme Court of Florida for reconsideration in light of
that decision.' 65
160. Id. at 432.
161. 616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1993).
162. 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla 1993).
163. Valentine, 616 So. 2d at 974.
164. Hall, 614 So. 2d at 477 (citations omitted).
165. One Espinosa remand case, Hodges v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 33 (1992), presented a
challenge to the standard jury instruction on the premeditation circumstance. Mr. Hodges'
Vol. 18
144
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Caldwell
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida granted relief
in one remand case,166 while denying relief in six others on grounds of
procedural default and harmless error. 167  Happ v. State161 is typical of
the decisions denying relief. The Happ court found a procedural default
because, although William Frederick Happ's trial lawyer objected to in-
struction on the heinousness circumstance, the objection "was not based on
the assertion that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague but on the
assertion that the instruction was inapplicable under the circumstances of the
case."' 169  Furthermore, the court stated the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt since the murder was so brutal that "regardless of the
instruction given, the jury would have recommended and the trial judge
would have imposed the same sentence."' 70  Likewise, in Hodges v.
State,'7' the court applied a procedural bar and then stated: "[t]here is
ample support in the record for finding the cold, calculated, and premeditat-
ed aggravator. Any error in the instruction, if any existed, therefore, was
harmless and would not have affected the jury's recommendation or the
judge's sentence."' 72
The foregoing harmless error analyses are difficult to square with
Hitchcock v. State.17  Hitchcock represented a paradigmatic case of
heinousness. '7' Although, in the terminology of Hodges, there was
certiorari petition presented only this question for review: "Is the Florida standard jury
instruction on the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance for capital
sentencing proceedings unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments'?"
166. See Hitchcock v. State, 614 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1993).
167. See Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.), revised and superseded on denial of
rehg, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S385 (Fla. June 24 1993); Hodges v. State, 619 So. 2d 272 (Fla.
1993); Happ v. State, 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1993); Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 352 (1993); Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679 (Fla.), certdenied, 114
S. Ct. 328 (1993).
168. 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1993).
169. Id. at 206.
170. Id.
171. 619 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1993).
172. Id. at 273.
173. 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020
(1992).
174. See the discussion in Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2121 (1992). The
evidence was that Mr. Hitchcock strangled a 12-year-old girl because she was going to report
that he had sex with her. Hitchcock v. State, 578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020, reh g denied, 113 S. Ct. 21 (1992).
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"ample evidence"'75 to support the circumstance, the court asserted that it
could not find the improper instruction harmless by stating: "[w]e cannot
tell what part the instruction played in the jury's consideration of its recom-
mended sentence.'
176
2. Harmless Error
When constitutional error has occurred in a death penalty proceeding,
reversal is generally required'77 unless the State can demonstrate the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
8
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis on which "the
jury actually rested its verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is not
whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.
79
Thus, the State must show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' 80  "[T]he
question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt
has been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards
appropriate for criminal trials."'' The "appellate court can [not] fulfill
its obligations of meaningful review by simply reciting the formulation for
harmless error."'
' 82
The Florida Supreme Court does not always seem to comply with these
principles in its harmless error analysis. The Hodges analysis, that there
was "ample support" in the record to support the circumstance, is the exact
opposite of what the United States Supreme Court requires.8 3 Happ did
175. Hodges, 619 So. 2d at 273.
176. Hitchcock, 614 So. 2d at 484.
177. Alternatively, the appellate court can cure the error by engaging in independent
fact-finding or reweighing of evidence. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
The Supreme Court of Florida has eschewed this approach. See also Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at
2122-23.
178. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
179. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) (citations omitted).
180. Id. at 2081 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
181. Yates v. Evart, I11 S. Ct. 1884, 1898 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946)).
182. Sochor, 112 S. Ct. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946) (rejecting a similar
argument by the government).
Vol. 18
146
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Caldwell
not purport to determine whether the sentencing decision "actually rested"
on matters independent of the improper instruction."' In Jones v.
State,"'85 the court did not make any analysis in finding harmless a penalty-
phase instruction and stated: "Any error in the jury instructions, including
not telling the jury to merge the pecuniary gain and felony-murder factors
if found, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'86  In Sochor v.
State,"7 which had been remanded by the United States Supreme Court
for the state court's failure to undertake a harmless error analysis, the
Florida Supreme court merely asserted that the erroneous use of an
aggravating circumstance was harmless because there were other aggravating
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances found by the trial court
judge.'88 The court did not say that it concluded, or how it could have
concluded, that the erroneous circumstance, on which the trial court
explicitly relied, did not contribute to the sentencing decision.'89 Contrary
to Sochor is James v. State.9 ° In James the court ruled that use of the
unconstitutional instruction on the heinousness circumstance may have been
harmful even though there were four other valid aggravating circumstances
to weigh against no mitigating circumstances."'
Perhaps the most remarkable analysis of erroneous admissions of police
statements is in Thomas v. State,'92 where the court stated: "[t]he police
statements give a false picture of the crime and could easily mislead or
confuse the jury. On this record, however, we find the error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."'1 93
184. Happ, 618 So. 2d at 206.
185. 612 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 1992).
186. Id. at 1375 (citations omitted).
187. 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993).
188. Id. at 293.
189. Johnson contains this similarly brief discussion: "[s]triking a single aggravator
would not affect these sentences, and the trial court's erroneous finding of pecuniary gain for
the Beasley murder was harmless error. Therefore, we affirm Johnson's sentences of death."
Johnson, 608 So. 2d at 13; see also Stewart v. State, 620 So. 2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1993) ("On
this record, however, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
190. 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993).
191. Id. at 669.
192. 618 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1993).
193. Id. at 157. Although the court did not state whether it considered the error to be
constitutional, it applies the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to all errors. See
State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1134 (Fla. 1986).
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3. Procedural Default
The Espinosa remand cases may raise questions about the Florida
Supreme Court's use of procedural defaults as a bar to constitutional claims.
In Hodges, for instance, the court noted on remand from the United States
Supreme Court that in its original opinion it had not considered Mr. Hodges'
attack of the jury instruction procedurally defaulted and stated: "[w]e sum-
marily found the issue meritless [in the original opinion], but we should
have held it procedurally barred because Hodges did not preserve it for
review by objecting at trial. Therefore, we now hold that the sufficiency of
the cold, calculated instruction has not been preserved for review.' 194
Thus, it appears the court did not apply procedural defaults consistently
during the two or so years before Espinosa. Accordingly, federal courts
may be reluctant to find that procedural defaults bar litigation of constitu-
tional claims in Florida capital cases. A state's inconsistent application of
procedural defaults will not bar federal review of federal constitutional
issues. 9 ' Inconsistent application of procedural defaults may also violate
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitu-
tion.96
4. Proportionality
The Supreme Court of Florida produced several interesting decisions
regarding its proportionality review of death sentences. 9
194. Hodges, 619 So. 2d at 273. The court also applied procedural defaults for the first
time on remand in Davis v. State, 620 So. 2d 152 (Fla.), revised and superseded on denial
of reh'g, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S385 (Fla. June 24, 1993); Happ v. State, 618 So. 2d 205 (Fla.
1993); Ponticelli v. State, 618 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1993); Gaskin v. State, 615 So. 2d 679 (Fla.
1993); see also Occhicone v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1993), wherein the Florida
Supreme Court stated: "We could have, and probably should have, also said [in the 1990
direct appeal decision] that the claim was procedurally barred because of no objection at the
time that the claim was procedurally barred because of no objection at the trial court level.
In any event, the current claims are procedurally barred." Id. at 730.
195. See Ford v. Georgia, Ill S. Ct. 850 (1991); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341
(1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1086 (1985); Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 96 (1993); Smith v. Black, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1992).
196. See Myers v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990)
(inconsistent retroactive application of decisions violates Equal Protection); Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
197. See cases cited in this discussion infra, pp. 28-31.
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a. Weighing of Circumstances
The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly said in the past that it
does not reweigh circumstances in performing appellate review,198 and has
emphasized that its proportionality review does not involve reweighing.' 99
Yet, the survey period shows the court engaged in weighing circumstances
in the limited context of proportionality review.
In Kramer v. State,"' the court engaged in a type of reweighing.
The court stated:
In Tillnan v. State, we explained that the purpose of the doctrine of
proportionality is to prevent the imposition of "unusual" punishments
contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution, among other
reasons. While the existence and number of aggravating or mitigating
factors do not in themselves prohibit or require a finding that death is
nonproportional, we nevertheless are required to weigh the nature and
quality of those factors as compared with other similar reported death
appeals. 0 '
In the court's initial opinion regarding Douglas Cannady's two death
sentences in Cannady v. State,2 °2 the court seemed to engage in weighing
and rejected a proportionality argument. The court stated: "[i]n weighing
the nature of the convictions at issue, we find Cannady's proportionality
argument with regard to Boisvert's murder to be without merit.
2 3
Maulden v. State20 4 presented a different weighing issue. The trial
court wrote that it was the premeditated nature of the murders that called for
imposition of the death penalty. However, finding that the evidence did not
198. E.g., Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 319 (1991) ("[T]he Florida Supreme Court
has made it clear on several occasions that it does not reweigh the evidence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances.").
199. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 1988).
200. 619 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1993).
201. Id. at 277. In Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 168-69 (Fla. 1991), the court had
asserted that to conduct proportionality review is "to consider the totality of circumstances
in a case, and compare it with other capital cases. It is not a comparison between the
number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id (emphasis added).
202. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S67 (Fla. Jan. 14), supersededon grant ofreh'g, 620 So. 2d 165
(1993).
203. Id.
204. 617 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993).
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support the premeditation circumstance, the supreme court reduced the
sentence to life imprisonment." 5
b. Single Aggravator Cases
A reasonable postulate of proportionality review is that the death
sentence is to be reserved for the most aggravated and least mitigated
murders.2"6 Thus, the general rule is that the death sentence is inappropri-
ate for murders involving only a single aggravating circumstance unless
there is nothing, or very little, in mitigation.2"7 However, where the single
aggravating circumstance involves a prior murder, the supreme court has
found the death penalty to be a proportional punishment.0 8
In Burns v. State,20 9 the court struck the heinousness circumstance,
left only the avoid arrest circumstance, and reversed for resentencing, but
did not engage in any proportionality analysis even though there was
substantial mitigation in the record.210 Similarly, in Crump v. State,21'
the court vacated for resentencing without engaging in proportionality analy-
sis.2 12 In ordering resentencing in Crump and Burns, the court expressed
uncertainty about the trial court's findings of mitigation. In another one-
aggravator case,"' the court simply disapproved of the trial court's failure
to find mitigation, made its own determination that there was "strong
nonstatutory mitigation," and declared the death sentence disproportionate
to the crime.214 Similarly, in both White v. State215 and DeAngelo v.
205. Id. at 303.
206. See Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1989); State v. Dixon, 283 So.
2d 1, 7-8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom, Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
207. See Songer, 544 So. 2d at 1011.
208. See Duncan v. State, 619 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1993); Slawson v. State, 619 So. 2d 255
(Fla. 1993).
209. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
210. The substantial mitigation shown in the record was the statutory mitigating
circumstance of no significant criminal history, and the non-statutory mitigation, which the
trial court deemed "not significant," that Mr. Bums was raised in a poor rural environment;
he worked hard to support his family, he supported his children, he received an honorable
discharge from the armed services, and he expressed remorse for the murder. id. at 603.
211. 622 So. 2d 963, 973 (Fla. 1993).
212. Id.
213. Clark v. State, 609 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1992). The court struck three aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court, leaving only the pecuniary gain circumstance (Mr.
Clark had committed the murder to obtain the decedent's job). Id. at 514-16.
214. Id. at 516.
215. 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993).
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State,"6 the supreme court reduced the sentences to life imprisonment in
light of the substantial mitigation found below.
Not to be overlooked is the "no aggravator" case of Cannady v.
State.2"7 Thinking that his wife was depressed as a result of being raped,
although it is not clear that she actually was raped, Michael Cannady fatally
shot her. He then went to the home of the supposed rapist and fatally shot
him. Finding that the heinousness and premeditation circumstances applied
to both murders, the trial court imposed two death sentences. However, the
supreme court struck both aggravating circumstances and did a curious
thing. On the one hand, it decided the murder of the wife constituted a
previous violent felony so that the trial court erred in not applying that
circumstance to the man's murder, but on the other hand, and without
explanation, it did not find the murder of the man was a violent felony that
should apply to the wife's murder. It then reduced the sentence in the
wife's murder to one of life imprisonment because both circumstances found
by the trial court were invalid, and ordered resentencing in the other murder,
for consideration of the prior violent felony circumstance notwithstanding
that both circumstances found by the trial court were invalid. The court
specifically held that the death sentence was not disproportionate for the
man's murder.2"'
The court rethought the matter on rehearing, deciding that since the
State had not urged the prior violent felony circumstance, it had waived its
application. Therefore, it determined there were no longer any aggravating
circumstances applicable to either murder and both sentences were reduced
to life imprisonment.2"9
5. Review of Findings Regarding Circumstances
Although the supreme court will often give great deference to the trial
court's findings of sentencing circumstances, it may at other times engage
in strict scrutiny review.
Robertson v. State22° set a high standard for findings of aggravating
circumstances, reflecting a requirement of positive proof and forbidding
"logical inferences" as their sole support.22' However, the supreme court
216. 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993).
217. 620 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1993).
218. Id. at 169-70. The brief proportionality discussion makes no mention of the
substantial mitigation set out elsewhere in the decision.
219. Id. at 171.
220. 611 So. 2d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1993).
221. Id.
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in other cases has been willing to uphold circumstances on the basis of
inferences. The court in Clark v. State22 upheld the pecuniary gain
circumstance based on the defendant stating after the killing: "I guess I got
his job now," and his applying for the decedent's job the next morning." 3
In Trepal v. State,224 the court upheld the great risk circumstance based on
the inference that other persons could have drunk from the poisoned Coca-
Cola bottles and died.225
In DeAngelo v. State,226 the court announced that it would recognize
an aggravating circumstance not found by the trial court only where it "is
unquestionably established on the record and not subject to dispute." '227
As previously noted in Cannady, the court initially had found a circum-
stance not found by the trial court, but on rehearing decided the state had
waived this circumstance by not arguing it at the trial level and not filing
a cross appeal.228
6. Relief
The court continues to be inconsistent in its determination of what
relief to give for penalty-phase errors. When striking an aggravating
circumstance, the court may find the error harmless without any extensive
analysis; 229 order new jury sentencing proceedings; 23 ° order resentencing
without a jury;23' or may, on its own, reduce the sentence to one of life
imprisonment.232
222. 609 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1992).
223. Id. at 515.
224. 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993).
225. Id.
226. 616 So. 2d 440, 443 (Fla. 1993).
227. Id.
228. Cannady, 620 So. 2d at 171.
229. See Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285, 293 (Fla. 1993) (reversal not required because
there were other aggravating circumstances and no mitigating).
230. See Padilla v. State, 618 So. 2d 165, 170 (Fla. 1993) (new jury sentencing where
court used circumstance not supported by evidence); James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669
(Fla. 1993) (new jury sentencing even though there were four remaining valid circumstances
and no mitigation); Lawrence v. State, 614 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 1993) (stating that "due
to the peculiar facts of this case, we cannot find the error in instructing the jury on and
finding these inapplicable aggravators to be harmless.").
231. See Robertson, 611 So. 2d at 1234 (judge resentencing where trial court used
circumstances not supported by evidence).
232. See Maulden, 617 So. 2d at 303; DeAngelo, 616 So. 2d at 441.
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Craig v. State233 presents a curious situation. Robert Patrick Craig
and Robert Schmidt murdered two men to cover up their cattle stealing
operation. Mr. Schmidt received life sentences for his cooperation; Mr.
Craig received two death sentences, one pursuant to ajury death recommen-
dation, the other contrary to a life recommendation. The supreme court
remanded Mr. Craig's case for resentencing because of the trial judge's
refusal to consider additional mitigating evidence after the jury sentencing
proceedings.234 Because the error occurred after the jury's penalty verdict,
the court ordered resentencing without a jury. On remand, a new judge took
over the case and again imposed death sentences.235 The supreme court
ruled that tinder Corbett v. State,236 the judge could not sentence the
defendant without hearing all of the evidence heard by the jury.237
Accordingly, the supreme court vacated for new jury sentence proceedings
for the death verdict murder. The court also reversed the override sentence
"[b]ecause Craig's original jury recommended life imprisonment for
Eubanks' murder, the new jury will recommend a sentence only for
Farmer's murder. The judge, however, will sentence Craig for both
murders. 238
G. Tedder
Although the court affirmed two override sentences during the survey
period, 239 it strongly re-emphasized the Tedder v. State24 rule which
requires a trial court to follow a life verdict except in the most compelling
cases:
Under Florida law, the role of the jury is one of great importance, and
this is no less true in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Juries are at
the very core of our Anglo-American system of justice, which brings
the citizens themselves into the decision-making process. We choose
233. 620 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1993).
234. Id. at 175.
235. Id. at 175-76.
236. 602 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1992).
237. Craig, 620 So. 2d at 176.
238. Id
239. See Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1993); Marshall v. State, 604 So. 2d
799 (Fla. 1992); see also Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992), and Stevens v. State,
613 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1992), it reduced the sentences to life imprisonment. Craig (remanded
for resentencing) and Cannady (sentences reduced to life imprisonment) involved double
homicides with one life recommendation and one death recommendation.
240. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
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juries to serve as democratic representatives of the community, ex-
pressing the community's will regarding the penalty to be imposed. A
judge cannot ignore this expression of the public will except under the
Tedder standard adopted in 1975 and consistently reaffirmed since
then.24'
H. Race
In Furman v. Georgia,242 Justice Stewart stated:
My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race. But racial discrimination
has not been proved, and I put it to one side.243
In Foster v. State,44 the Supreme Court of Florida mirrored Justice
Stewart's brand of logic. In this case, while moving to preclude the State
from seeking the death penalty, Charles Kenneth Foster unsuccessfully
sought an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the Bay County State
Attorney's Office pursued prosecution more vigorously and fully in cases
involving white victims than in cases involving black victims:
In support of his claim, Foster proffered a study conducted by his
counsel of some of the murder/homicide cases prosecuted by the Bay
County State Attorney's Office from 1975 to 1987. Analyzing the raw
numbers collected, Foster concluded that defendants whose victims were
white were 4 times more likely to be charged with first-degree murder
than defendants whose victims were black. Of those defendants charged
with first-degree murder, white-victim defendants were 6 times more
likely to go to trial. Of those defendants who went to trial, white-
victim defendants were 26 times more likely to be convicted of first-
degree murder. The court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing,
finding that the alleged facts did not make out a prima facie claim of
discrimination.245
241. Stevens, 613 So. 2d at 403 (citation omitted).
242. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
243. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
244. 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1992).
245. Id. at 463.
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Relying on McCleskey v. Kemp,246 the supreme court concluded that
Mr. Foster had "offered nothing to suggest that the state attorney's office
acted with purposeful discrimination in seeking the death penalty in his
case."247  It rejected his claim that McKleskey did not govern because
Foster had only provided statistics regarding the individual office prosecut-
ing his case, rather than the statewide statistics which could have supported
his view. Further, the court criticized Mr. Foster's numbers as raw data and
pointed out that "[t]he figures indicating that of the defendants who went to
trial, white-victim defendants were twenty-six times more likely to be
convicted of first-degree murder than were black-victim defendants cannot
be attributed to a decision by the Bay County State Attorney's Office and
thus are not relevant here." '248
I. Discovery
One unfamiliar with Florida death penalty proceedings may be
astonished to learn that in twenty years of litigation, the supreme court has
never decided whether the discovery rule 249 applies to capital sentencing.
In Elledge v. State,25 the court reversed a death sentence based on the
trial court's failure to conduct a hearing when the defense claimed a
discovery violation in penalty proceedings.25' The court seemed to
operate on the tacit assumption that the State did have a duty to comply
with the discovery rule.
As previously noted, Burns v. State involved the discovery-related issue
of whether the State may have a mental health expert examine the defendant
in preparation for the sentencing hearing. 2 The court left the question
open.
253
246. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (while statewide statistics showed that persons killing whites
were 4.3 times more likely to receive death sentences than persons killing blacks, they did
not support inference that decisionmakers in individual defendant's case acted with purposeful
discrimination).
247. Foster, 614 So. 2d at 463.
248. Id. at 464 n.9.
249. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220.
250. 613 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1993).
251. Id. at 436.
252. 609 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 1992).
253. The practice regarding the Elledge and Burns issues varies widely from circuit to
circuit (and even from courtroom to courtroom) throughout the state. It is anticipated that
the Criminal Rules Committee will submit a proposed rule covering these matters by the end
of 1993.
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III. POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
A. Newly discovered evidence
Scott v. Dugger254 considered questions relating to presentation of
newly discovered evidence in post-conviction proceedings. As previously
noted, Abron Scott contended that his co-defendant's life sentence, entered
after his own death sentence was affirmed, constituted "newly discovered
evidence" to be raised in a post-conviction challenge to the death sen-
tence.255 The court agreed, setting out the standards that apply to such
claims:
Two requirements must be met in order to set aside a conviction or
sentence because of newly discovered evidence. First, the asserted facts
"must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel
at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel
could not have known them by the use of diligence." Second, "the
newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial." The Jones standard is also
applicable where the issue is whether a life or death sentence should
have been imposed. 56
B. Discovery
While a rule of criminal procedure governs motions for post-conviction
relief,57 they are considered civil proceedings governed at least partially
by the rules of civil procedure.5 Nevertheless, neither the civil nor the
criminal discovery rules seem to apply fully to post-conviction.259
However, Florida's Public Records Act26° provides for access to criminal
case records after appeal and operates as a vehicle for post-conviction
discovery. There continues to be substantial litigation regarding post-
conviction discovery via chapter 119.
In Hoffman v. State,26 ' Barry Hoffman requested from the State
Attorney documents possessed by agencies outside the State Attorney's
254. 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992).
255. Id. at 468.
256. Id. (citations omitted).
257. See FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.850.
258. See Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1984).
259. See Davis v. State, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1713 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1993).
260. FLA. STAT. §§ 119.01-119.16 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
261. 613 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1992).
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jurisdiction. The supreme court held that the defendant must address his
requests directly to agencies "outside the judicial circuit in which the case
was tried and those within the circuit which have no connection with the
state attorney ..... 16 The court added that
[a]t the same time, we encourage state attorneys to assist in helping
defendants obtain relevant public records from such outside agencies so
as to facilitate the speedy disposition of post-conviction claims.
[Furthermore,] all public records in the hands of the prosecuting state
attorney are subject to disclosure by way of motion under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850 even if they include the records of outside
agencies. Likewise, the public records of the local sheriff and any
police department within the circuit that was involved in the investiga-
tion of the case may also be obtained in the manner outlined in
Provenzano v. Dugger.263
In Walton v. Dugger,2 64 the state partially refused Jason Dirk Wal-
ton's chapter 119 request on the ground that some of the matters were
privileged. It also contended on appeal that he had defaulted his chapter
119 request by demanding compliance in his rule 3.850 motion without
initiating a separate civil action under section 119.11. In an interlocutory
order, the supreme court rejected the claim of procedural default, ruling that
a section 119.11 action was unnecessary where the defendant sought relief
under rule 3.850. As to the claim of privilege, it wrote: "[wihen, as in the
instant case, certain statutory exemptions are claimed by the party against
whom the public records request has been filed or when doubt exists as to
whether a particular document must be disclosed, the proper procedure is to
furnish the document to the trial judge for an in camera inspection."26 5
In Parole Commission v. Lockett,266 the court decided that a judge
presiding over a rule 3.850 motion does not have the power to order disclo-
sure of parole commission investigation files prepared for use in clemency
proceedings.
262. Id. at 406.
263. Id. (citing Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1990)).
264. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S309 (Fla. May 27, 1993).
265. Id. at S310.
266. 620 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1993).
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C. Retroactivity
The supreme court ruled that Espinosa v. Florida2 67 applies retroac-
tively in post-conviction proceedings when the defendant argued at trial that
the heinousness instruction was unconstitutional.268 But it refused to apply
the Espinosa Rule retroactively in post-conviction if the trial attorney did
not make the objection.269  It also held that Sochor v. Florida.. and
Stringer v. Black271 were not fundamental changes in the law such as to
apply on post-conviction.272
D. Rule 3.85173
The court held that the "speed-up" provisions of Rule 3.851, Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, are constitutional.274
IV. CONCLUSION
For the most part, decisions during the survey period involved case-
specific issues. The supreme court has yet to decide several issues affecting
virtually all capital cases, including the constitutionality of the standard
instruction on "premeditated murder," the standard instruction defining
"reasonable doubt," and various issues pertaining to penalty-phase discovery.
267. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
268. See James v. State, 615 So. 2d 668, 669-70 (Fla. 1993).
269. See Occhicone v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. 1993); Melendez v. State,
612 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 349 (1993).
270. 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992).
271. 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
272. See Mills v. Singletary, 606 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1992).
273. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.851 (providing for expedited treatment of post-conviction
claims when a death warrant is signed).
274. See Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and judicial interpretations of
those rules, continue to change and develop as part of the never-ending
struggle to secure "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."' Predictably, however, each change-no matter how thoughtfully
crafted, and each new interpretation-no matter how carefully analyzed,
potentially gives rise to unanticipated occasions of injustice, delay and added
cost. As a result, both courts and practitioners must remain vigilant in their
efforts to comport with both the spirit and the letter of the rules.
This survey provides an overview of the more significant developments
in Florida procedural law over the past year.2 The most obvious develop-
ment is the amendment to various provisions of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure which went into effect on January 1, 1993. Part II of the survey
will discuss and summarize the most important rule changes.
Part II of the survey discussesjudicial decisions interpreting the rules.
Not every case that refers to a procedural rule is covered in the survey.
Rather, an attempt has been made to highlight those cases that: are of first
impression, either resolve or give rise to conflicting interpretations, define
or clarify important terms, or provide the practitioner with useful guidelines
for complying with the rules. Additional commentary is provided where the
holding of a particular case seems at odds with the purpose or the overall
procedural framework established for Florida courts.
Finally, Part IV of the survey concludes with the author's observations
on trends in Florida Civil Procedure. Because this survey is written both by
and for practitioners, the author's comments and thoughts may be somewhat
slanted toward a practitioner's perspective. Care has been taken, however,
to balance that perspective with the concerns of the courts and judicial
administrators who are ultimately responsible for interpreting and enforcing
the rules.
II. AMENDMENT OF THE FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Florida Supreme Court published its amendments to the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, after reviewing and considering the quadrennial
I. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
2. The survey covers rule changes and cases decided between July 1992 and July 1993.
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report of the Florida Bar Civil Procedure Rules Committee, in July 1992.'
The amendments became effective at midnight, January 1, 1993.' Taken
as a whole, the amendments are not likely to revolutionize the judicial
process. Nevertheless, at least one of the amendments has a significant
substantive impact, while others will influence the way in which courts and
practitioners approach the various phases of litigation.'
The first noteworthy change relates to service of process pursuant to
Rule 1.070. Former Rule 1.070(d), regarding service of process on
numerous defendants, was deleted in its entirety.6 In addition, Rule
1.070(i) 7 was amended to emphasize that a dismissal resulting from failure
to serve a defendant within 120 days after filing the initial pleading "shall
not be considered a voluntary dismissal or operate as an adjudication on the
merits under rule 1.420(a)(1)."8
Rule 1.080 was revised to permit service by facsimile of pleadings and
papers after the initial pleading is made.9 A copy of the pleading or paper
must also be served in accordance with some other method permitted by the
rule.'" Service by facsimile "occurs when the transmission is complete,""
and a document served after five p.m. is considered served on the next
business day.' 2 The supreme court noted that the requirement of serving
a second copy by means other than facsimile is intended "to ensure that a
legible copy is received."' 3
3. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 604 So. 2d 1110 (Fla.
1992).
4. Id. at 1111.
5. The most pervasive change to the rules involved the incorporation of gender-neutral
language into the rules themselves. Compare id. at 1110 with In re Amendments to Rules
of Civil Procedure, 458 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1984) (reflecting transition to gender-neutral
language). Although this change has no discernible effect on procedure, the deletion of
recurrent references to "he" and "his" may help to promote the supreme court's goal of
fostering gender equality in Florida courts.
6. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070.
7. Formerly 1.0700).
8. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i).
9. Id. 1.080(b).
10. Id.
I. Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.080(b). Two other recent rule changes reflect the supreme court's
conscious efforts to bring Florida's judicial system into the 90's. Specifically, Florida Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.055 now requires that all papers filed in state court must be on
recycled paper. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.160. Rule 2.071 requires trial courts to grant
requests for telephone appearances at any scheduled hearing for fifteen minutes or less. FLA.
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Notices of hearing on motions must now "specify each motion or other
matter to be heard" under the amendment to Rule 1.100(b). 4 One hopes
that this amendment will not affect the current practice of most attorneys.
The amendment may, however, have the salutary effect of deterring those
who insist on introducing and arguing matters that "just recently came to my
attention" by providing the trial court with an explicit basis for refusing to
hear matters not properly noticed.
An amendment to Rule 1.200(a) now permits any party to schedule a
case management conference in the same manner as one would notice a
hearing on a motion.' 5 A court order scheduling the management confer-
ence is no longer required.' 6 Like any notice of hearing, "reasonable"
notice must be given in advance of the requested case management
conference.' 7 The rule specifically requires twenty days notice in the case
of a pretrial conference. 8 While this amendment may not seem signifi-
cant, Rule 1.200 has the potential to become a powerful tool if properly
used to inform the court of the status of pending matters, or to enlist the
court's assistance in facilitating settlement of meritorious claims. To avoid
abuse of the privilege, trial court administrators should consider making
express provision for conducting party-scheduled management conferences
during unifbrm motion calendar in all but the most complex cases.
Rule 1.400, which addressed the publication, of depositions, has been
repealed in its entirety to conform with the suggested practice under Rule
1.31 0(f)(3) that deposition transcripts not be filed as a routine matter.' 9
Rule 1.420(f) has been amended to clarify the effect of dismissal on a
lis pendens filed in connection with the dismissed claim.20 Under the
amended rule, a lis pendens is automatically dissolved if, for instance, it is
related to a claim that is settled and therefore dismissed, even though other
claims remain pending.2 '
An amendment to Rule 1.43 1(g)(2) aligns the rule regarding perempto-
ry challenge of alternate jurors with the provisions of Rule 1.431(d)
regarding peremptory challenges generally.22 Prior to the amendment,
R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.071.
14. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b).
15. Id. 1.200(a).
16. See id.
17. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200(c).
18. Id.
19. Id. 1,400.
20. Id. 1,420(f).
21. Id. 1,420.
22. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(g)(2).
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there was no provision for equalizing the number of peremptory challenges
permitted when the number of parties on each side was not the same. 3
Rule 1.432 regarding disqualification ofjudges has been repealed in its
entirety. Procedures governing the disqualification of judges can now be
found in the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration.24 In one of the more
significant changes to the rules, the supreme court repealed former Rule
1.442 regarding offers of judgment and replaced the former rule with
directions to comply with the procedural provisions of section 768.79 of the
Florida Statutes.25 This change reflects the supreme court's prior decision
in Timmons v. Combs.26 In Timmons, the court attempted to resolve years
of conflict between the supreme court and the Florida Legislature regarding
the appropriate treatment of offers of judgment by adopting section 768.79
as the governing rule.27 Only time will tell if the supreme court's efforts
have the desired effect.
Rule 1.510(c) has been amended to require timely filing of affidavits
submitted in opposition to motions for summary judgment. 8 Under the
amended rule, opposing affidavits must be served by mail no later than five
days prior to the hearing on the motion or delivered to the office of the
moving party's counsel no later than five p.m. two business days prior to
the hearing.2 9 No court has yet been called upon to determine whether the
provisions for service via facsimile pursuant to Rule 1.080(b) ° are appli-
cable to service of opposing affidavits, or whether an illegible affidavit,
"delivered" by facsimile two days prior to hearing on the motion, satisfies
the requirements of this rule.
Finally, Rule 1.540(b) has been amended to eliminate the one-year time
limit for filing motions for relief from judgment in situations where relief
is sought in marital cases on the basis of allegedly fraudulent financial
affidavits.3" Although this change affects only a limited class of litigants,
the change is substantial in that it carves out an exception to the otherwise
mandatory requirement that claims for relief based on "intrinsic fraud" be
filed within one year from judgment. 32  The amendment addresses a
23. See id
24. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.160.
25. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
26. 608 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992).
27. Id. at 3.
28. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
31. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
32. See id.
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recurring problem in marriage dissolution cases in which fraudulent
affidavits form the basis for property settlements, but the former spouse does
not learn of the fraud until years after judgment is rendered.
III. CASES INTERPRETING THE RULES
A. Process and Service of Process
1. The "120-day" Service Requirement of Rule 1.070(i)
During the past year, most of the action in Florida's appellate courts
regarding process and service of process focused on the 120-day requirement
set forth in Rule 1.070(i). This requirement provides that initial process
must be served upon a defendant within 120 days after filing of the initial
complaint.3 If service is not made within the 120-day limit, the lawsuit
is dismissed without prejudice unless the plaintiff can show good cause why
service was not made.34
The decision on this rule with the most far-reaching implications came
in Pearlstein v. King.35 At issue in Pearlstein was whether the 120-day
service requirement applied to complaints filed prior to January 1, 1989, the
effective date of the 120-day provision. The supreme court concluded that
it did, approving the third district court's ruling in Berdeaux v. Eagle-Picher
Industries, Inc.,36 and overruling conflicting decisions by the fifth and
second districts3 7 Specifically, the supreme court held that applying the
120-day service requirement to actions pending on January 1, 1989 merely
required plaintiffs to serve defendants within 120 days from that date.38
The court characterized this interpretation of the rule as a "prospective
application [which] puts no extra burden on prior filings and does not
diminish the time for complying with the rule.
39
33. Id. 1.070(i).
34. Id.
35. 610 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1992).
36. 575 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Berdeaux, 589 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1991).
37. Pearlstein, 610 So. 2d at 445 (overruling Partin v. Flagler Hosp. Inc., 581 So. 2d
240 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); King v. Pearlstein, 592 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)).
38. Pearlstein, 610 So. 2d at 446.
39. Id.
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In Austin v. Gaylord,4" the court concluded that, absent a showing of
due diligence or good cause, the 120-day requirement of Rule 1.070(i) is
mandatory." Similarly, in Gondal v. Martinez,42 the court concluded that
filing an affidavit of diligent search and inquiry more than 700 days after
the complaint was filed and while a 1.070(j) motion to dismiss was pending,
did not constitute good cause and did not preclude dismissal. 3
By contrast, in Sirianni v. Kiehne,4 the appellate court reversed the
trial court's order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 1.070 because plaintiff had
shown good cause for failure to serve complaint within 120 days of filing.
The court construed the phrase "within that time" in Rule 1.070(i) to mean
the time within which service must be made absent showing of good cause
and not the period within which good cause must be shown.45 The court
concluded that plaintiff may either seek an extension prior to expiration or
may show good cause at a hearing pursuant to a motion filed after the
120-day period has expired.
46
2. Additional Time for Response After Service By Mail
With respect to the extra time provided by Rule 1.090(e) after service
by mail, the court in Dominguez v. Barakat,47 concluded that additional
time is not available for filing Rule 1.530 motions for rehearing or new trial
after rendition of judgment. In Dominguez, the trial court entered judgment
on May 24, 1991 and provided copies of the order of judgment to counsel
by mail. Apparently under the assumption that Rule 1.090(e) extended the
ten-day deadline for filing motions for rehearing, the non-prevailing party
filed its motion eleven days after judgment. The trial court had denied the
40. 603 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
41. Id. at 67. The court distinguished, for purposes of taking jurisdiction to review the
nonfinal order denying the motion to dismiss, Macke Laundry Services, Inc. v. Saintil, 568
So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (no jurisdiction to review denial of motion to
dismiss based on "untimeliness" rather than complete lack of compliance). Austin, 603 So.
2d at 67.
42. 606 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
43. Id. at 491. The court further determined that plaintiff's affidavit did not cure the
defect in his complaint. This plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant was a nonresident,
a former resident, or a person concealing his whereabouts, as required before service on the
Secretary of State would establish jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
44. 608 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 609 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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motion for rehearing on October 24, 1991, and the non-prevailing party filed
its notice of appeal on November 20, 1991.41
The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the
notice was not filed within thirty days of rendition of judgment.49 The
court held that Rule 1.530(b), which requires motions for new trials to be
made within ten days after return of a jury verdict or the filing of judgment
in a non-jury action, does not provide for additional time for service by mail
pursuant to Rule 1.090(e). 5° Thus, for purposes of calculating the time for
filing a notice of appeal, rendition of judgment is not postponed by a motion
for rehearing when the motion is not served within the time prescribed by
Rule 1.530.
B. Pleadings and Motions
1. Proper Treatment of Affirmative Defenses
In Diaz v. Bravo,5 the court reiterated the well-settled rule that res
judicata, estoppel and laches are affirmative defenses as defined by Rule
1.110(d), and are therefore not properly raised in a Rule 1.140 motion to
dismiss. Similarly, in Warwick v. Post,52 the court found that the trial
court improperly determined the affirmative defense of res judicata on
defendant's motion to dismiss. The court further held that it was improper
to dismiss the case for failure to state a cause of action under Rule 1.140(b),
even where the defendant claimed that the case had already been resolved
pursuant to binding arbitration.3
2. Requirements for Third-Party Complaint Under Rule 1.180
More detailed analysis was required by the court in Rupp v. Philpot,
54
to resolve an issue arising under the Rule 1.180 third-party practice provi-
48. Id. at 665.
49. Id. at 664.
50. Id.
51. 603 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The court also concluded that the
trial court erred if it had dismissed the case for failure to post nonresident cost bond pursuant
to section 57.011 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 107. The court suggested that the more
appropriate procedure would be to provide plaintiff with an opportunity to remedy the failure
prior to dismissing the action. Id.
52. 613 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id. at 564.
54. 619 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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sions. Rule 1.180 permits a defendant to serve a summons and complaint
in a third-party action for indemnity, contribution or subrogation." In
reviewing a final summary judgment order entered in favor of a third party
defendant, the Rupp court analyzed the following language from Rule
1.180(a):
At any time after commencement of the action a defendant may have
a summons and complaint served on a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of plaintiffs
claim against the defendant and may also assert any other claim that
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the plaintiffs claim. 6
The court concluded that use of the word "and" permitted non-related claims
to be raised in addition to, but not in the absence of, an underlying claim for
indemnity, contribution or subrogation. 7 Accordingly, the court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the third-party defendant where the third-
party complaint did not allege any of the above causes of action.5"
3. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings Under Rule 1.190
Rule 1.190(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely
given when justice so requires."59 In a series of cases decided during the
past year, Florida appellate courts have re-emphasized that motions to
amend should be granted unless doing so would somehow prejudice the
opposing party. For example, in Walker v. Nolke,6 ° the court found that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to permit an amendment over
what amounted to a scrivener's error. In Caduceus Self Insurance Fund v.
Sacred Heart Hospital,6 the court held that one amendment to a complaint
does not constitute abuse of the amendment privilege, and that the trial court
erred in dismissing plaintiffs complaint with prejudice.6" Similarly, in
Thompson v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,63 the appellate court reversed an
55. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a).
56. Rupp, 619 So. 2d at 1048 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180(a)) (emphasis added).
57. Id. (citing Leggiere v. Merrill Lynch Realty/Fla., Inc., 544 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
58. Id.
59. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190.
60. 614 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
61. 615 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
62. Id.
63. 615 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
[Vol. 18
168
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Schultz / Weber
order dismissing the plaintiffs claim with prejudice after only one amend-
ment. In this case, the plaintiff sought and obtained leave to file an
amended complaint to add a new defendant. The new defendant moved to
dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice. The trial court also denied plaintiffs motion for rehearing and
motion to file a second amended complaint. The appellate court reversed,
stating that, absent exceptional circumstances, requests for leave to amend
pleadings should be granted and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
allowing the amendment. "[R]efusal to allow amendment ... [is] an abuse
of discretion unless [the amendment would clearly] prejudice opposing
party; the privilege to amend has been abused; or amendment would be
futile.
' 64
In Anson, Inc. v. Deutsch,6" similar considerations prompted reversal
of an order denying a defendant's motion to amend her answer and
affirmative defenses. The court concluded that the trial court erred in
denying defendant's motion for leave to amend when the case was not yet
scheduled for trial and where plaintiff would not have been prejudiced by
the amendment.66
The "relation back" provisions of Rule 1.190(c) received attention in
Schachner v. Sandler.67 The court reviewed an order stating that appel-
lant's amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the original plea-
ding. The initial complaint named various corporations as plaintiffs in a
professional malpractice action against attorneys. Appellant was specifically
mentioned as owner of corporations but not named as plaintiff. Later, the
complaint was amended to include appellant as a plaintiff. Defendants
moved to dismiss on grounds that appellant's claim was time barred, and the
trial court granted the motion. On appeal, the court stated that the Rule
1.190(c) relation back provision should be liberally interpreted. 61 More-
over, the court determined that defendants were not prejudiced because the
initial complaint provided fair notice of "kindred interest" between the
original and subsequently added plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court concluded
that appellant's claim related back to the date of the initial complaint, and
was therefore not time barred.69
64. Id. at 797 (citations omitted).
65. 613 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
66. Id.
67. 616 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id.
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Finally, in Stewart v. Purina Mills, Inc.,7 the court concluded that a
pro se defendant should have been permitted to amend his original answer
to include a demand for jury trial.71 Curiously, neither the trial court nor
the appellate court concluded that no amendment was needed, despite the
fact that the plaintiff ultimately filed an amended complaint in response to
which defendant timely served a responsive pleading including a demand for
jury trial.72 Under Rule 1.430(b), a party may demand jury trial within ten
days after service of "the last pleading directed to such issue."" There-
fore, the plaintiffs amended complaint was undoubtedly "a pleading
directed to" the issues for which defendant sought trial by jury, a fact that
should have obviated the need for defendant to amend any prior pleading to
include the demand.
4. Requirements for Interpleader Actions Under Rule 1.240
In Motzkin v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,7 the court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of an interpleader brought by a broker to resolve conflict-
ing claims by a father and his daughter to proceeds from sale of bond. The
trial court ruled that the father could bring separate, subsequent action
against daughter. The appellate reversed, finding that this case presented a
classic interpleader situation as defined by Rule 1.240. Moreover, the court
concluded that where the facts so closely comport with the provisions of the
rule, the broker need not demonstrate all common law elements of
interpleader action."
5. Substitution of Parties Under Rule 1.260
An interesting question regarding the time for motions to substitute
parties pursuant to Rule 1.260 was raised in Musician's Exchange Down-
town Cafe, Inc. v. Mercede City Center, Inc.76 This was an action by a
tenant against its landlord over issues involving condition and use of leased
premises. After the lawsuit was filed, the tenant declared bankruptcy under
Chapter 7. Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee moved to reinstate the action
against the landlord and to substitute itself for the tenant in the original
70. 615 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
71. Id. at 877.
72. See id.
73. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430(b).
74. 611 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
75. Id. at 593.
76. 613 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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action. Both motions were denied on the grounds that the motions were not
filed within ninety days of tenant's bankruptcy. The trial court apparently
misread the ninety-day time limitation set forth in 1.260(a), regarding
service of substitution motion after filing suggestion of death, as also
applying to the transferred interests provisions of 1.260(c). The appellate
court reversed the order denying the motion to substitute parties, reasoning
that the reference in 1.260(c) to "service of the motion" refers only to
method of service set forth in 1.260(a), but not to the time limits set forth
in 1.260(a). The court noted that federal bankruptcy law provides trustees
with two years in which to continue pending action on behalf of the debtor,
and that the trustee's motions in this case were both timely filed under
federal law."
6. Requirements for Ordering Separate Trial Under Rule 1.270
In Norris v. Paps,78 the court reviewed for abuse of discretion an
order pursuant to Rule 1.270(b) severing defendants' compulsory counter-
claim for fraud from the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. Signifi-
cantly, defendants raised the issue of fraud by way of affirmative defense,
as well as by way of counterclaim. The mortgagee moved for judgment on
the pleadings because defendants admitted in their answer that they executed
a note and mortgage and failed to make payments. The trial court ordered
the counterclaim severed and entered judgment for plaintiff on the mortgage.
On appeal, the court held that the trial court did not have discretion to defer
the jury trial on factual issues raised in the counterclaim, especially where
the same fact issues were presented by way of affirmative defense.79
Otherwise, the trial court would in effect be entering judgment on the
pleadings without resolving the affirmative defense of fi'aud, or by resolving
the fraud issue without having heard any evidence. Although severance of
compulsory counterclaims may sometimes be permissible, severance should
not be granted if an affirmative defense and a counterclaim raise interrelated
fact questions."
77. Id. at 135; see II U.S.C. § 108 (1988).
78. 615 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
79. Id. at 737.
80. Id.
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C. Discovery
1. Scope of Discovery
Recent appellate decisions regarding discovery rules fall into two broad
categories: the appropriate scope of discovery and the appropriate sanctions
for failure to comply with discovery. Decisions rendered over the past year
show a surprising consistency in favor of the party from whom discovery
is sought. Whether this alignment signals a trend against abusive discovery
practices or is, instead, the result of pure coincidence remains to be seen.
The decision in Krypton Broadcasting, Inc. v. MGM-Pathe Communications
Co.81 presents some interesting ramifications for both courts and practi-
tioners. In an action involving film distribution rights, plaintiff MGM
served interrogatories seeking, inter alia, exhaustive biographical informa-
tion (employment and residence histories, social security numbers, dates and
place of birth, etc.) for a variety of people, including some, such as
defendant Krypton's stockholders, who had "no discernible relationship to
the issues of the case." 2 Another interrogatory sought "any other informa-
tion useful or necessary for the location of all persons who are believed or
known by defendant KRYPTON ...[and] its attorneys ...to have any
knowledge" of various matters.8 3 MGM further requested documents
evidencing any communication between Krypton and any person or entity
concerning the subject matter of the lawsuit. It also asked in interrogatories
for detailed written summaries of documents that were also subject to
requests to produce. Krypton objected on a variety of grounds, including
relevance, vagueness, and attorney-client privilege. The trial court, while
limiting the time frame of the requested information from ten years to six
years, otherwise overruled the objections and ordered Krypton to respond. 4
Approximately three weeks after this order, Krypton served its answer,
affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Krypton denied having assumed
obligations under the contracts as alleged, raised defenses of custom-in-
trade, unconscionability and estoppel, and sought declaratory relief, damages
for injury to its trade reputation, and specific performance. Because the new
issues in Krypton's responsive pleading were not introduced until after the
trial court's order compelling discovery, Krypton contended on appeal that
the appellate court must limit its inquiry into MGM's discovery requests to
81. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1092 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. April 28, 1993).
82. Id. at D1094.
83. Id. at D1093.
84. Id.
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the issues raised in MGM's complaint. Krypton also argued that the trial
court erred in overruling its other objections.
The appellate court first rejected Krypton's argument that the discovery
requests must be limited to issues raised in MGM's complaint.85 In so
doing, the court was forced to distinguish Jerry's South, Inc. v. Morran,86
which held that "[w]hen considering a petition for writ of certiorari, this
court considers the record as it existed at the time the complained of
discovery order was entered."87  The court observed that the discovery
order in Jerry's South involved financial records of a former party, and thus
came at a time when the issues had been considerably narrowed. By
comparison, the court noted that in the instant case, "the issues in litigation
expanded significantly" after the trial court entered its discovery order, and
concluded that the discovery requests must be viewed in light of those
expanded issues.8" While the distinction drawn between this case and
Jerry's South is somewhat strained, the court's conclusion has the expedient
and practical effect of permitting resolution of all issues pending at the time
the appeal is heard.
The court next addressed the substance of Krypton's objections and
concluded that MGM's discovery requests, taken as a whole, were "a classic
'fishing expedition' and were clearly calculated for harassment."89 The
court also noted that at least some of the interrogatories and document
requests were so broad as to include documents and information protected
by attorney-client and other privileges.9° Accordingly, the court held that
the trial court's order compelling discovery was "a substantial departure
from the essential requirements of law," and ordered MGM's discovery
requests stricken in their entirety, albeit without prejudice to conduct further
discovery in accordance with Rule 1.280. 9' The court then went one step
further, ordering MGM to file all future requests with the trial court, and,
in the event of an objection, placing upon MGM the burden of demonstr-
ating that its requests were within the scope of Rule 1.280. The court so
held because MGM's request sought voluminous, privileged and extraneous
information which constituted a clear abuse of the discovery process.92
85. Id.
86. 582 So. 2d 803 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.'App. 1991).
87. Id. at 804.
88. Krypton, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1093.
89. Id. at D1094.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Furthermore, the court suggested that "the trial court may, at MGM's
expense, appoint a special master" for the purpose of resolving future
discovery disputes.93
The legal basis for these final two requirements is unclear. The
requirement that MGM pay the cost of a special master appears to be a
prospective sanction, one that does not permit the trial court to exercise
discretion or judgment in assessing the validity or appropriateness of any
objections Krypton might raise to future discovery requests, or to determine
when and if one party should bear more than its proportionate share of the
expense of resolving disputes. As this case demonstrates, Krypton was not
immune from making its own unsuccessful discovery arguments. Nonethe-
less, the cost of resolving future disputes is placed solely on MGM.
Although Rule 1.380 permits sanctions for failing to comply with discovery,
the rule does not seem to contemplate sanctions merely for serving
objectionable discovery requests, and certainly does not contemplate
open-ended sanctions that can be influenced, and perhaps controlled, by
one's opponent.
Perhaps even less legally defensible is the court-mandated burden shift
from the party objecting to discovery to the party propounding discovery.
It is well settled in Florida that the party who objects to discovery requests
bears the burden of proving that the requests are in fact objectionable on
some grounds.94 By contrast, the court in this case has reversed the tradi-
tional burdens by requiring the party seeking discovery (MGM) to prove that
its discovery requests were proper simply because the party seeking to avoid
discovery (Krypton) filed an objection.
It is doubtful that these two clearly punitive aspects of the court's
decision would withstand further scrutiny. Nonetheless, the message sent
by the First District Court of Appeal is unmistakable: harassing, abusive
discovery requests that look more like fishing expeditions than attempts to
uncover relevant facts will not be looked upon favorably, and will be met
with judicial rebukes and costly sanctions.
In re Estate of Ransburg95 is another case in which the court ad-
dressed itself to determining the proper scope of discovery directed to a
party. After filing a petition to revoke probate which included a prayer for
attorney's fees, the estate's beneficiaries served a production request seeking
documents related to the petitioners' attorney's fees. Petitioners objected on
the grounds of relevancy, work product, and attorney-client privilege. The
93. Krypton, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D1094.
94. See, e.g., Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, 88 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1956).
95. 608 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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trial court ordered production of complete copies of the requested records
for in camera inspection and "sanitized" copies for the beneficiaries. The
appellate court declined to address the work product and attorney-client
privilege objections, limiting its discussion solely to the question of
relevancy.96 The court first observed that, in Stockman v. Downs,97 the
Florida Supreme Court had held that claims for attorney's fees must be
pleaded-a ruling which forces parties seeking reimbursement of fees to
raise the issue early on in the proceedings.98 However, it does not
necessarily follow that discovery of actual fees or fee arrangements is
appropriate, or even relevant, in the initial phases of the lawsuit. The court
analogized the claim for attorney's fees to a claim for an accounting,
recognizing that discovery in an accounting action is typically bifurcated,
with that part of the discovery related to the actual accounting deferred until
it is determined whether any party is entitled to an accounting. The court
concluded that "under normal circumstances," discovery related to attorney
fee claims should similarly be bifurcated with discovery pertaining to both
fee agreements and the amount of fees deferred until the end of the
underlying proceedings-after entitlement to attorney's fees have been
decided.99
Beyond the discussion of the proper scope of discovery set forth in
Krypton and Ransburg, the court in Crandall v. Michaud,'00 addressed the
scope of discovery directed to non-party witnesses. In Crandall, an
independent medical examiner ("IME") sought certiorari review of an order
which both denied his motion for a protective order and compelled him to
produce all patient reports (with patient names "whited out") prepared for
any defense law firm or insurance company during the previous two
years.' The IME's motion for protective order was based on the grounds
that the requested information was confidential and privileged, that
disclosure would violate his patient's statutory privacy rights, that the
information sought was irrelevant, and that production would be unduly
burdensome and oppressive. Plaintiff, obviously seeking evidence of the
96. Id. at 50.
97. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
98. In re Estate of Ransburg, 608 So. 2d at 51 (citing Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 835).
99. Id.
100. 603 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
101. An example of one court's refusal to permit inquiry into a physician's potential bias
through discovery of confidential patient records, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Miles, 616 So.
2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), is discussed infra at notes 133-38 and accompanying
text.
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IME's potential bias, argued that it would be unduly burdened and unable
to effectively present its case without the requested information." 2 The
appellate court approached the issue using the "balancing test" set forth in
North Miami General Hospital v. Royal Palm Beach Colony, Inc., '3 and
Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, Inc., °4 and further considered
whether disclosure of the requested reports would violate the patient privacy
and confidentiality provisions of section 455.241 of the Florida Statutes.'
Turning first to the statutory issue, the court questioned whether masking
patient names would sufficiently protect their privacy interests in compliance
with section 455.241. The court acknowledged that similar evidence had
been held discoverable in other cases such as McAdoo v. Ogden, °6 but
distinguished those cases on the ground that the IME was required to pro-
duce invoices sent to defense lawyers and insurers, but was not required to
produce the patient records themselves.0 7 Without squarely answering the
statutory question it had earlier posed, the court concluded that the informa-
tion contained in the requested patient records went beyond what was
relevant to the question of the IME's potential bias.'0 8 Moreover, the
court concluded that requiring the IME to review numerous files in order to
locate the requested records, copy the records, mask all references to patient
identity, and then copy the masked reports, imposed a burden disproportion-
ate to the potential value of the information sought.0 9 In a concurring
opinion, Judge Stone agreed that the trial court had departed from the
essential requirements of law on the privilege and privacy issues, but
emphasized that certiorari relief was not being granted on the grounds of
undue burden.'"
2. Examination of Persons: Waiver of
Patient-Psychotherapist Privilege
In Sykes v. St. Andrews School,"' the court exercised certiorari
jurisdiction to review an order requiring a parent to release her own
102. Crandall, 603 So. 2d at 638.
103. 397 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
104. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
105. Crandall, 603 So. 2d at 638-39.
106. 573 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
107. Crandall, 603 So. 2d at 639.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 639-40.
110. Id. at 640 (Stone, J., concurring).
11I. 619 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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psychiatric records in the suit she brought as next friend on behalf of her
daughter. Initially, both parents brought suit against St. Andrews and a
number of individual defendants for damages related to an alleged sexual
battery of their daughter. In addition to seeking damages for emotional
harm to the daughter, the original complaint sought recovery for emotional
and mental harm to the mother. The mother was examined by defendants'
psychiatric expert who in turn was deposed by plaintiffs attorneys. Defen-
dants subsequently filed a motion to compel the mother to authorize the
release of her previous psychiatric records. At a hearing on this motion, the
mother's attorney made clear that the mother's separate claims were being
abandoned. Nonetheless, the court ordered the mother to authorize the
release of the requested records."'
On appeal, the mother contended that the trial court's order was a
departure fi'om the essential requirements of law in that it violated the
psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in section 90.503 of the Florida
Statutes. Defendants argued that the privilege does not apply where the
mental condition of the party is an element of the party's claim.13
Defendants contended in the alternative that under Rule 1.360(b)(2) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the deposition of the defendants'
psychiatric expert effectively waived any privilege the mother may have had
"regarding the testimony of every other person who has examined or may
thereafter examine that party concerning the same condition.""' 4  In
analyzing the privilege/waiver provisions of the statute in conjunction with
the rule, the appellate court stated that a party could not use "the privileges
as both a sword and a shield."' 5 In other words, a party may not, on the
one hand, seek to recover damages related to emotional or mental conditions
while, on the other hand, invoke the privilege to thwart its opponent from
discovering facts regarding those same conditions. In this case, however,
the court concluded that the mother dropped her sword when she abandoned
her independent claim." 6 In addition, the court determined that, notwith-
standing the language of Rule 1.360(b)(2), the mother had not "irrevocably"
waived her privilege by deposing the defendants' expert." 7 Rather, the
court concluded that the waiver provision of the rule was only effective to
112. Id. at 467-68.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 468-69.
115. Id. at 469.
116. Sykes, 619 So. 2d at 469.
117. Id.
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the extent that the examined "condition" continued to be relevant as an
essential element of a pending claim.' 8
3. Discovery Sanctions
Although discovery abuse has become the scourge of both practitioners
and courts, recent cases involving sanctions for failure to comply with
discovery have generally been sympathetic to the party who allegedly failed
to comply with the discovery rules. One notable exception to this apparent
trend occurred in McCormick v. Lomar Industries, Inc."9 In that case, the
trial court dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit as a sanction for failing to respond
to a request for production of documents for 134 days after the request was
served, and for failing to comply with two intervening court orders
compelling plaintiffs response. The second order compelling production
was entered during a hearing on March 21, 1989, which plaintiff's counsel
did not attend. The order required plaintiff to produce the requested
documents by March 24, 1989 or "face 'unduly harsh penalties. ,'121 On
April 3, 1989, plaintiff filed a response to the discovery request. On April
10, 1989, the court entered an order striking plaintiffs pleadings and
awarding attorneys fees to defendant. The appellate court affirmed, noting
that plaintiffs conduct went beyond mere "'foot dragging"' and evidenced
a "'deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority"'-a
"deliberate thumbnosing at the court and the rules of civil procedure.' ' 2'
The court also noted that while the plaintiff did respond prior to the court's
order imposing sanctions, the order striking plaintiffs pleadings and
awarding fees was nothing more than a "confirmation" of the court's oral
pronouncement during the March 24, 1989 hearing.12
2
While McCormick may seem like a godsend to any attorney who has
wasted time and effort seeking to compel recalcitrant parties and their
counsel to comply with lawful discovery requests and to any court faced
with repeated motions to compel responses to the most basic discovery, the
opinion is difficult to reconcile with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's
118. Id.
119. 612 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 708 (quoting the trial court's order).
121. Id. at 708-09 (quoting U.S.B. Acquisition Co. v. U.S. Block Corp., 564 So. 2d 221,
222 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)); cf Turner v. Marks, 612 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (upholding order striking pleadings after two years of failure to comply with
discovery requests).
122. McCormick, 612 So. 2d at 709.
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opinion in Wildwood Properties, Inc. v. Archer of Vero Beach, Inc.'23
Wildwood Properties also involved striking claims as a sanction for failing
to make discovery. The sanctioned party, the defendant, did not attend a
continued deposition on March 9, 1991, at which time opposing counsel
informed the defendant's attorney that he would move to strike defendant's
pleadings for failing to appear. The motion to strike was presented for the
first time at the close of argument during a hearing on a previously set
motion for summary judgment. 24 The trial court reserved ruling on the
motion to strike, but twenty days later, with no intervening hearing or
opportunity for defendant to appear, granted the motion. On appeal,
defendant's attorney objected to the motion to strike because he had
received it for the first time at that hearing, and accordingly, had not
informed his client to be present. The appellate court reversed, stating that
"[a] party to be sanctioned for discovery violations must first be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard and offer mitigating or extenuating
evidence as to why discovery did not take place.' 2 ' Failure to provide
such notice and opportunity, the court held, constitutes a violation of due
process. 26
As stated previously, the broad holding in Wildwood Properties is
difficult to reconcile with the same court's opinion in McCormick, filed less
than five months earlier. Recall that in McCormick, the harshest of all
possible discovery sanctions was imposed virtually sua sponte. Admittedly,
the trial court in McCormick had previously ordered a response to a
particular discovery request on two prior occasions, and had warned that
failure to respond would result in "unduly harsh penalties." Nonetheless, the
court did not afford the sanctioned party an opportunity either to be heard
or to offer mitigating or extenuating evidence prior to striking its pleadings.
Significantly, the order striking the pleadings was the first sanction imposed
by the court; all prior orders simply imposed deadlines for compliance with
discovery requests. More importantly, the sanctioned party had, in fact,
complied with the discovery request prior to entry of the court's order. At
worst, the party would have been required to offer extenuating evidence for
its failure to timely comply, but not for its total failure to comply.
Obviously, the facts in Wildwood Properties do not lend themselves as
123. 621 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
124. Id. This type of "ambush litigation" should be precluded by the recent changes to
Rule 1.100(b). See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 692 (citing Kuechenberg v. Creative Interiors, Inc., 424 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
126. Id.
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neatly to the characterization of "deliberate thumbnosing" as did the facts
in McCormick. Nonetheless, entitlement to due process protection should
not turn on the degree of sympathy with which the court views a particular
litigant. If an opportunity to appear and be heard is required under
Wildwood Properties, it would seem that the sanctioned party in McCormick
should have been provided this opportunity as well.
This view finds further support in JE.i Airlines, Inc. v. Britton,
Cassel, Schantz & Schatzman, P.A. 27 In that case, the trial court entered
a pre-trial order on November 20, 1990, stating that appellant must submit
to deposition on November 27, 1990 or have its complaint dismissed.
Appellant did not appear as ordered, and without hearing or further
proceedings, the trial court dismissed the case. The appellate court found
that the trial court's order imposing the sanction of dismissal was defective
in that it did not expressly find that J.E.I.'s conduct "demonstrated a
deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority or evidenced
[sic] a willful failure to submit to discovery."' 28 Although the court did
not address the due process issues raised by J.E.I. on appeal, it is evident
that the court was influenced by the fact that neither notice nor an oppor-
tunity to present mitigating circumstances was provided prior to the court's
imposing of the extreme sanction of dismissal.
Beyond any issue of procedural due process, there remains the question
of proportionality in any order that forecloses a party's claim as a sanction
for failure to comply with discovery requests. As the court observed in
Martin v. Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc.,' 29 "the sanction of dismissal of a
party's action is a drastic remedy which should be used only in extreme
situations .... [T]he severity of the sanction must be commensurate with
the violation ... ,o The Martin court acknowledged that the standard
of review in discovery sanction cases is whether the trial court abused its
discretion, and noted that "[i]f reasonable persons could differ as to the
propriety of the action taken, there can be no finding of an abuse of
discretion."'' Notwithstanding this accommodating standard, the court
stated that "[i]n absence of some demonstration that the [party seeking
discovery] has been prejudiced due to [his opponent's] defaults, this court
127. 605 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
128. Id. at 1010.
129. 619 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
130. Id. at 438 (citations omitted).
131. Id. (citing Commonwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Tubero, 569 So. 2d 1271,
1273 (Fla. 1990)).
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is reluctant to affirm such a severe sanction as dismissal.' 32 In view of
this formulation, it seems highly unlikely that the issue in McCormick would
be so prejudicial as to justify dismissal, regardless of whether the delay
caused undue expense and was'
therefore subject to some lesser sanction.
One final case on the topic of discovery explores the circumstances in
which a non-party who prevails on a discovery-related motion is entitled to
recover atto:mey's fees pursuant to Rule 1.380 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. In Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Miles,' the defendant in a slip
and fall case sought documents from a plaintiffs treating chiropractor
regarding the chiropractor's prior treatment of other patients represented by
plaintiff's counsel, and information regarding attorneys other than plaintiff s
who had requested that the chiropractor perform medical examinations for
their clients. Plaintiff moved for a protective order on the grounds of undue
burden; the chiropractor submitted a supporting affidavit attesting to the
burdensomeness of the request. Apparently, during the hearing on plaintiff's
motion, counsel for the chiropractor asserted his own motion, ore tenus, for
a protective order. The trial court granted the motion and awarded
attorney's fies to the chiropractor as the successful movant under Rule
1.380(a)(4).'
Reviewing the trial court's order for abuse of discretion, the appellate
court applied the "balancing test" for expert witness discovery suggested by
cases like McAdoo v. Ogden.13 The court concluded that the defendant's
request went beyond what might be relevant to the chiropractor's potential
bias, that the chiropractor's confidentiality interests should be given
substantial weight, and that the defendant had done nothing to refute the
132. Id. at 439.
133. 616 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 1109-10.
135. 573 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (trial court must balance "the
competing interests of the relevancy of the discovery information sought as impeachment
information, against the burdensomeness of its production and the confidentiality interests of
the doctor."). Although the balancing test employed by the court relates to expert witness
discovery, there was no suggestion that either party had listed the chiropractor as an expert
witness in this case. In fact, the court expressly stated that "[the chiropractor] is not an
expert witness. Rather, he is the plaintiff's treating physician." Miles, 616 So. 2d at I1 11.
Accordingly, it seems that the court could have reached the same result by referring to the
medical records confidentiality requirements of section 455.241 of the Florida Statues, as
qualified by the! waiver provisions of Rule 1.360(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
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chiropractor's affidavit regarding the burdensomeness of the request."'
Accordingly, the court upheld the protective order.'37
The court also upheld the award of attorney's fees on the grounds that
the chiropractor's ore tenus motion was sufficient to cast him in the role of
a moving party for purposes of Rule 1.380(a)(4).'38
D. Dismissal of Actions
Cases decided pursuant to Rule 1.420, which governs voluntary and
involuntary dismissal of actions, can be grouped according to four categories
suggested by the rule itself: (1) voluntary dismissals and their effect on
pending claims; (2) involuntary dismissals in nonjury trials where the facts
and the law show that the claimant is not entitled to relief; (3) involuntary
dismissals as sanctions for failure to comply with court orders; and (4)
dismissal for failure to prosecute.' 39 Dismissal of a claim in the face of
other pending claims presents an intriguing procedural puzzle that challenges
the courts to balance plaintiffs control over his lawsuit with considerations
of judicial economy and efficiency. By contrast, recent cases involving
court-ordered dismissals underscore the traditional reluctance of courts to
terminate a lawsuit on grounds other than the merits.
1. Voluntary Dismissal
As to the first category of cases, the court in Layne Dredging Co. v.
Regus, Inc. ,140 reviewed the propriety of a voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Rule 1.420(a)(l)(A), where defendant's motion to amend its answer to file
a cross-claim against a codefendant was still pending. On appeal, the court
distinguished cross-claims from counterclaims, the latter of which can
survive voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 1.420(a)(2). The court
reasoned that "[a]ny purpose the defendant ... may have had to transfer its
liability through a cross-claim ...was nullified at the moment when [the
plaintiff] accomplished the voluntary termination of its lawsuit."''
Because the court believed that defendant's cross-claim was "extinguished"
by plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, it ruled that the trial court should not have
136. Miles, 616 So. 2d at 1111.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also Rule 1.280(c) (incorporating by reference the Sanction provisions of
Rule 1.380).
139. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420.
140. 622 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
141. Id. at 8.
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granted the motion to amend.'42 Both the reasoning and the result in this
case are somewhat suspect. Although the court's opinion does not describe
the substance of the defendant's claim against the codefendant, a cross-
claim, pursuant to Rule 1.170(g), can relate to "any claim by one party
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of either the original action or of a counterclaim therein or
relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action."'4 3
Unlike third-party claims under Rule 1.180, a cross-claim is not limited to
seeking indemnity or contribution, and is not entirely dependent upon
plaintiffs underlying lawsuit except, perhaps, definitionally.'44  It there-
fore does not follow that dismissal of the underlying complaint necessarily
resolves claims and issues that are properly raised in a cross-claim.' 45
By comparison, the court in Our Gang, Inc. v. Commvest Securities,
Inc., "'46 reversed a trial court's ruling that, due to the voluntary dismissal
of the underlying complaint, it lacked jurisdiction to grant a motion for
leave to file a counterclaim and cross-claim. In this case, plaintiff filed an
interpleader action to determine the appropriate distribution of a portfolio
account. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a
counterclaim and cross-claim against two other plaintiffs. One day before
hearing on the motion, the original interpleader plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed its complaint. Following Gull Construction Co. v. Hendrie,'47
the appellate court held that voluntary dismissal was improper pursuant to
Rule 1.420(a)(2) in light of the pendency of a motion to file a counterclaim,
even though no counterclaim was pending at the time."'
At the opposite end of the voluntary dismissal spectrum, the court in
Sprague v. P.I.A. of Sarasota, Inc., "' reversed summary judgment in
favor of defendant where plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim by filing
and hand-delivering a copy of the notice to opposing counsel one day prior
to hearing on defendant's summary judgment motion. The appellate court
noted that Rule 1.420(a)(1) permits a plaintiff to "abort his lawsuit by
142. Id.
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g).
144. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
requirements for a third party claim made pursuant to Rule 1.180.
145. See Cutler Ridge Corp. v. Green Springs, Inc., 249 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971) (dismissal of complaint was not the "predicate" for subsequent entry of summary
judgment on surviving cross-claim).
146. 608 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
147. 271 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
148. Our Gang, 608 So. 2d at 544.
149. 611 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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serving 'a notice of dismissal at any time before a hearing on motion for
summary judgment."" 5  Because the voluntary dismissal effectively
brought the lawsuit to an end, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to
enter judgment.' 5 '
2. Involuntary Dismissal During Nonjury Trial
An order of involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiffs case in
chief is appropriate only where plaintiff has failed to present a prima facie
case. In Banyan Corp. v. Schucklat Realty, Inc.,152 the court reversed an
order of involuntary dismissal entered in an action to collect real estate sales
commissions. At trial, seller's broker moved for involuntary dismissal
pursuant to Rule 1.420(b) at the close of the evidence presented by buyer's
broker. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that, pursuant to
section 475.42(d) of the Florida Statutes, the real estate agent representing
the buyer lacked authority to enter into a binding commission agreement on
behalf of her broker. On appeal, the court determined that the buyer's
broker presented sufficient evidence to suggest a ratification of the
agreement of its sales agent, and that in any event, Florida law provides that
a broker acquires an interest in a commission agreement entered into by its
sales agent regardless of the broker's knowledge of the agreement. 153
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed, finding that the buyer's broker
had presented a prima facie case, that different conclusions could be drawn
from plaintiff's evidence, and that under these circumstances, involuntary
dismissal against the buyer's broker was improper.
1 4
3. Dismissal as Sanction for Failure
to Comply With Court Order
In Carr v. Dean Steel Buildings, Inc.,'55 the trial court ordered the
parties to a construction contract dispute to conduct a physical inspection of
the subject property. Approximately ten months went by without the
ordered inspection being performed. Accordingly, the trial court, sua
sponte, entered an order dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 1.420. While
150. Id. (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(I)).
151. Id.
152. 611 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 1282-83 (citing Marks v. M.S.F. Management Corp., 540 So. 2d 138 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
154. Id. at 1281-82.
155. 619 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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recognizing that the decision to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to comply with
legitimate court orders rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, the
appellate court observed that the drastic remedy of dismissal should be
employed only in extreme circumstances and concluded that dismissal in this
case, without notice or hearing, was too harsh a sanction.'56 Moreover,
the appellate court noted that the order dismissing the case lacked the
requisite finding of willful disregard of the trial court's order.'
Kozel v Ostendorf'58 provides the counterpoint to Carr, but raises
important questions regarding the limits of the trial court's discretion in
ordering involuntary dismissal as a sanction for failure to comply with court
orders. In Kozel, the plaintiffs initial complaint was dismissed without
prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint within twenty days.
The parties agreed to an additional ten day extension; however, plaintiff did
not file her amended complaint for more than five months, prompting the
trial court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with
the court's prior order.'59 The appellate court affirmed, noting the "ex-
treme delay" in amending the complaint, and "the lack of any showing that
the delay was solely the fault of counsel ....
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Altenbernd recounted Florida's "well-establ-
ished tradition of discouraging sanctions that simply cause a party to sue its
lawyer for malpractice," and decried the lack of any established framework
within which the trial court's discretion should be exercised.' 6' Judge
Aitenbernd suggested that such a framework "should identify the relevant
factors that are typically important in making the discretionary decision" and
stated that the proposed framework should be "used by all trial courts.' 62
Judge Altenbernd's point was apparently well taken; the Florida
Supreme Court recently quashed the majority decision in Kozel. 163 While
recognizing that the decision to impose sanctions rests within the discretion
of the trial court, the supreme court observed that, "[a]lthough such broad
power is vested in the trial court, it is not necessary or beneficial for that
power to be exercised in all situations.',164 Further, in response to Judge
156. Id. at 394.
157. Id.
158. 603 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed by, Kozel v. Ostendorf, 18
Fla. L. Weekly S557 (Fla. Oct. 28, 1993).
159. Id. at 602-03.
160. Id. at 603.
161. Id. (Altenbernd, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. See Kozel v. Ostendorf, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S557 (Fla. Oct. 28, 1993).
164. Id. at S557 (emphasis added).
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Altenbernd's request for a more objective decisional framework, the
supreme court stated:
To assist the trial court in determining whether dismissal with prejudice
is warranted, we have adopted the following set of factors set forth in
large part by Judge Altenbernd: 1) whether the attorney's disobedience
was willful, deliberate, or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect
or inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously sanctioned;
3) whether the client was personally involved in the act of disobedience;
4) whether the delay prejudiced the opposing party through undue
expense, loss of evidence, or in some other fashion; 5) whether the
attorney offered reasonable justification for noncompliance; and 6)
whether the delay created a significant problem of judicial administra-
tion. Upon consideration of these factors, if a sanction less severe than
dismissal with prejudice appears to be a viable alternative, the trial court
should employ such an alternative.' 65
Adherence to these factors may ultimately lead to greater consistency
among trial court decisions to impose sanctions. For now, however, the
guidelines set forth by the supreme court seem to invite additional litigation
to determine how many of the enumerated factors must be present prior to
entry of an order of dismissal, which factors carry the most weight, the
degree to which any particular factor must be present, whether an evidentia-
ry hearing is necessary to adequately assess the factors, etc. Moreover,
while these factors arguably should be considered in any decision to impose
sanctions, a narrow reading of Kozel would limit use of the supreme court's
decisional framework only to those cases involving sanctions imposed under
Rule 1.420(b). The members of the Florida Bar's Civil Procedure Rules
Committee should revisit these issues in the near future, and perhaps should
propose rule changes that further refine and make uniform the application
of the Kozel formula.
4. Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution
In Samuels v. Palm Beach Motor Cars, Ltd.,' 66 defendant moved to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint on October 30, 1991, on the ground that no
record activity had occurred during the preceding twelve months. However,
on July 17, 1991, plaintiffs counsel appeared at a court-ordered status
conference and, as a result of defendant's nonappearance at the conference,
165. Id. at S557-58.
166. 618 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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obtained a default judgment on August 13, 1991. On August 28, 1991, the
default judgment was set aside pursuant to defendant's motion.' 67 Despite
this activity, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The
appellate court, distinguishing Toney v. Freeman,6 ' reversed the dismiss-
al. 169 In Toney, the Florida Supreme Court had held that a status order
and responses thereto did not constitute record activity because the purpose
of the order was to provide the trial court with information, not to advance
the action. 7 ' In Samuels, however, the court found that a trial court order
requiring appearance at a status conference is, "almost by definition . . .
reasonably calculated to advance the cause toward resolution .... '""
The court observed that "attendance at a status conference can significantly
advance a cause toward resolution, for example, by narrowing the issues to
be tried or through exploration of settlement possibilities."'7 2 Moreover,
the court noted that plaintiff had been able to obtain a default judgment by
appearance at the status conference in this case.'73 Accordingly, the court
held that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs
complaint in light of "ample record activity in this case."'' 74
Similarly, in Bialy v. Stinson,175 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed an order of dismissal for lack of record activity. Plaintiff filed her
complaint on March 1, 1990. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to dis-
miss. The last record activity was a re-notice of hearing filed April 25,
1990, scheduling a hearing on the motion to dismiss for June 4, 1990.
Plaintiff's counsel attended the hearing, but there was no record of any order
having been entered on the defendant's motion. "On May 13, 1991, the
trial court, sua sponte, entered a motion, notice and judgment of dismissal
in accordance with Rule 1.420(e).' 1 76 The appellate court found that the
appearance of plaintiff's counsel at a properly noticed hearing on the motion
to dismiss constituted sufficient non-record activity to preclude dismissal for
lack of prosecution. 17
167. Id.
168. 600 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1992).
169. Samuels, 618 So. 2d at 310.
170. Toney, 600 So. 2d at 1100.
171. Samuels, 618 So. 2d at 311 (citing Miami Beach Awning Co. v. Heart of the City,
Inc., 565 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 617 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Likewise, in Pope v. Sose,'78 the appellate court reversed an order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute where plaintiff had caused a summons to
be issued to a named co-defendant within one year prior to defendant's
motion to dismiss.
79
Another example of the improper application of Rule 1.420(e) occurred
in In re Forfeiture of: 1977 Chevrolet Corvette.8 ° On October 24, 1990,
the trial court entered final judgment of forfeiture in favor of the City of
Auburndale after the Corvette owner apparently failed to show cause why
his car should not be forfeited. Pursuant to the judgment, the city sold the
Corvette. Thereafter, on December 10, 1990, the trial court entered an order
setting aside the judgment. Significantly, the trial court never provided the
City with notice of the order setting aside judgment; in other words, the City
was unaware of any further proceedings after entry of final judgment of
forfeiture and the subsequent sale of the car. On June 15, 1992, the original
owner of the automobile filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.
Based on the lack of record activity and the City's failure to show good
cause in writing at least five days prior to the hearing on the motion, the
trial court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. The appellate court
reversed, observing that "the purpose of Rule 1.420(e) is to move the case
toward resolution" and that in this case, the City reasonably believed that the
case had been completely resolved.'' Under these circumstances, the
court held "that the city is not required to comply with the good cause in
writing requirement" of the rule.1
2
Conversely, in Heinz v. Watson,'83 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
upheld an order of dismissal pursuant to Rule 1.420(e), at least partially on
the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show good cause in writing why the
case should not be dismissed at least five days prior to the hearing.'84 In
this case, an amended complaint for malpractice was filed on April 27,
1990. Defendants filed their answer on October 10, 1990. Plaintiff's
counsel filed a motion for mediation conference on April 25, 1991, but the
motion was never set for hearing and no mediation conference was ever
held. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution on January 28,
178. 610 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
179. Id. at 56-57.
180. 619 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 615 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
184. Id. at 753-54.
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1992, and the trial court granted the motion, albeit without prejudice.' 85
On appeal, the court concluded that "a motion for mediation conference,
standing alone and without any follow-up activity during the subsequent
six-month period, is not record activity implemented to advance the case
forward to a conclusion on the merits."' 86 The court stated that a notice
of hearing on the motion would have constituted sufficient record activity
had one been filed.'87 Nonetheless, citing Norflor Construction Corp. v.
City of Gainesville,'88 the court characterized plaintiffs conduct as "the
manifestation of 'an intention to act,' but not actual record action."'8 9
Finally, the court noted plaintiff's failure to show good cause at least five
days prior to dismissal as required by Rule 1.420(e). 9 ° Accordingly, the
court upheld the trial court's order dismissing the case.' 9'
In Toney v. Freeman,'92 the Florida Supreme Court quashed the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision reversing an order of dismissal
and directed the court to "address the issue of whether good cause was
shown for failure to prosecute."' 93  On remand, in Freeman v. Toney,'94
the court cited Barton-Malow Co. v. Gorman Co.,' 95 for the proposition
that '"good cause requires some contact with the opposing party and some
form of excusable conduct or occurrence which arose other than through
negligence or inattention to pleading deadlines."" 96 Under this standard,
the court held that the departure of a lawyer from the firm representing
plaintiff, and the resultant failure of plaintiff to learn of the trial court's
order requesting status advice, did not constitute good cause for failure to
prosecute. 197
185. Id. at 751-52. Although it is not clear in the appellate court's opinion, it is possible
that the trial court's order created a problem for the plaintiff under the statute of repose gov-
erning medical malpractice actions. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (b) (1991). This might explain
why plaintiff took an appeal from an order dismissing his complaint without prejudice.
186. Heinz, 615 So. 2d at 753.
187. Id.
188. 512 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
189. Heinz, 615 So. 2d at 753.
190. Id. at 753-54.
191. Id. at 754.
192. 600 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1992).
193. Id. at I101.
194. 608 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
195. 558 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
196. Toney, 608 So. 2d at 863-64 (citing Barton-Malow Co., 558 So. 2d at 521).
197. Id.
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Finally, in Diamond v. Peninsular Life Insurance Co.,'98 the trial
court held that the one year provision of Rule 1.420(e) does not apply to
motions for relief from judgment filed pursuant to Rule 1.540. The trial
court struck appellant's rule 1.540(b) motion and supporting affidavit
because appellant never noticed the motion for hearing and no action was
taken for sixteen months after the motion was filed. The appellate court
observed that Rule 1.420(e) authorizes dismissal only for failure to
prosecute, but "does not authorize the [trial] court to strike a motion to set
aside a judgment rather than ruling on its merits."'99
E. Juries and Jury Trials
Two important lines of cases developed under this topic during the past
year. The first relates to waiver of the right to jury trial under Rule
1.430(d). The second pertains to post-verdict interviews of jurors pursuant
to Rule 1.431(h). Both lines of cases provide considerable guidance to
courts and practitioners.
1. Waiver of the Right to Jury Trial Under Rule 1.430(d)
Addressing the question of waiver of the right to jury trial, the court
in Herrera v. Wee Care of Flagler County, Inc.,2' reviewed a case involv-
ing the trial court's discretion to grant a motion for jury trial when demand
has not been made timely. The Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that
plaintiff had not requested a jury trial until two years after the litigation
commenced, and stated that "[w]hen a motion for jury trial is untimely, the
trial court is called upon to exercise sound discretion in determining whether
justice requires the granting of a motion." '' In this case, the trial court,
concerned with the competence of the pro se plaintiff to represent herself,
conditioned its order granting jury trial on plaintiff s continued compliance
with the rules of civil procedure and orders of the court.2"' On the day
trial commenced, plaintiff and her parents apparently created a scene in the
courtroom which prompted the judge to hold a non-jury trial "as it would
not allow [plaintiff] to appear before a jury and cause an immediate mistri-
198. 620 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
199. Id.
200. 615 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
201. Id. at 224 (citing Wertman v. Tipping, 166 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1964)).
202. Id.
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al.,,1 3 The appellate court found that in light of the circumstances, the
ultimate denial of plaintiff's request for jury trial did not constitute abuse of
the trial court's discretion." 4 The court also rejected plaintiff's argument
that once the trial court placed the action on the jury trial docket, plaintiff
became "vested" with the right to a jury trial.2" 5
In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Arvidson, °6 the court addressed
the more technical aspects of jury trial waiver. Plaintiff filed a complaint
for rescission and declaratory relief regarding an insurance policy. Defen-
dants counterclaimed and demanded a jury trial. Plaintiff filed a notice of
non-jury trial and the trial court subsequently issued an order setting the
case for non-jury trial. Both parties filed unilateral pretrial statements in
which they listed the issues to be determined at trial. Additionally, the
defendants listed the issues raised in their counterclaim. On appeal,
defendants argued that they never noticed their counterclaim for either jury
or non-jury trial, although the counterclaim itself did set forth a demand for
jury trial. Defendants further argued that they could not waive th eir right
to jury trial absent some "specific and affirmative stipulation or by
announcement in open court."2 7 The appellate court disagreed, conclud-
ing that by filing a pretrial statement which included their counterclaims as
issues to be decided at the noticed non-jury trial, defendants had waived
their right to jury trial on their counterclaim.0 8 Practitioners, beware!
2. Post-Verdict Juror Interviews Under Rule 1.431(h)
In Rabun & Partners, Inc. v. Ashoka Enterprises, Inc.,209 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal quashed the trial court's order permitting post-verd-
ict inquiry into juror deliberations. The case involved a construction dispute
in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of an architect for services
rendered in the design of a hotel, and a lesser verdict on the hotel owner's
counterclaim for damages caused by the architect's delays. After the
verdict, the hotel owner moved pursuant to Rule 1.43 1(h) for an interview
of one of the jurors who had allegedly told the hotel owner that some jurors
"refused to look at the documentary evidence" and that others "were
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Herrera, 615 So. 2d at 224.
206. 604 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, Arvidson v.
Independent Fire Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1993).
207. Id. at 858.
208. Id.
209. 604 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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prepared to rule against [the hotel owner] because [he] was a rich doctor and
did not need the money."21  The appellate court turned to the recent
Florida Supreme Court decision in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v.
Maler2 . for guidance." 2 In Maler, the supreme court reviewed a case
in which two jurors apparently told defendant's lawyers that while the
defendant in a medical malpractice case should have prevailed, verdict was
rendered against the defendant out of sympathy for the child plaintiff.2"3
The supreme court upheld the quashing of the trial court's order granting a
juror interview, stating that "[t]o the extent an inquiry will elicit information
about overt prejudicial acts, it is permissible; to the extent an inquiry will
elicit information about subjective impressions and opinions ofjurors, it may
not be allowed." '214 Taking guidance from Maler, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal first recognized that an express agreement between two or more
jurors to ignore evidence or to otherwise disregard their oath might well
constitute the type of "overt act" into which inquiry would be appropriate
under the Maler standard.215 The court concluded, however, that there
was no indication of an express agreement between jurors, or of any other
overt act that would justify a juror interview under the rule. Rather, the
court held that even if the jury voted against the hotel owner "because he
was a rich doctor and did not need the money," this motive reflected noth-
ing but "the emotions and mental processes of the jurors, matters which
essentially inhere within the jury verdict."2 6
The court in Carcasses v. Julien,2 7 reviewed the propriety of the trial
court's order limiting the scope of its post-verdict hearing on plaintiffs
allegations of juror misconduct. Plaintiff alleged that after the jury was
discharged in this medical malpractice action, one of the jurors told her that
he had spoken with his sister about the case, that his sister had undergone
similar treatment, and that his verdict had been influenced by sympathy for
the doctor's reputation. The trial court interviewed the jury pursuant to
Rule 1.431(h) but limited the scope of the interview to any non-record
information received by the juror in question. At the close of the hearing,
the court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. On appeal, plaintiff
210. Id. at 1285.
211. 579 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1991).
212. Rabun, 604 So. 2d at 1285 (citing Maler, 579 So. 2d at 97).
213. Maler, 579 So. 2d at 97.
214. Id.
215. Rabun, 604 So. 2d at 1286.
216. Id.
217. 616 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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contended that the trial court should have inquired into the juror's desire not
to harm the doctor's reputation." 8 The Third District Court of Appeal
rejected plaintiffs argument, citing Maler for the proposition that "'to the
extent an inquiry will elicit information about subjective impressions and
opinions of jurors, it may not be allowed.""'2 9  The appellate court
determined that the trial court properly limited the scope of its hearing to
information allegedly received by the subject juror from his sister,
concluding that any inquiry into the juror's "sympathy" for the doctor's
reputation "fits within the category of prohibited inquiry into the emotions
and mental processes of the jurors" prohibited by section 90.607(2)(b) of the
Florida Statutes.220
In Walgreens, Inc. v. Newcomb,22' the court addressed whether
information obtained from a juror in violation of Rule 1.431(h) could
nevertheless provide grounds for a new trial.222 This case involved a slip
and fall in which plaintiff claimed that a dangerous condition was created
by Windex sprayed on the floor of the restaurant in which she fell. After
a verdict for defendant, plaintiff's counsel, who apparently could not believe
the result, took it upon herself to contact one of the jurors in an attempt to
find out "what went wrong."22 As a result of her conversation with the
juror, plaintiff's counsel learned of the possibility that two jurors had
conducted their own experiments with Windex and communicated their find-
ings to other jury members.224 With respect to the communication
between plaintiffs counsel and the juror, the appellate court found that the
communication violated Rule 1.43 1(h), which provides that a juror may not
be interviewed unless the trial court so orders after notice and hearing.225
The court also found that the communication violated Rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of
218. Id.
219. Id. at 488 (quoting Maler v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 559 So. 2d 1157 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
220. Id. at 487-88.
221. 603 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, Newcomb v.
Walgreens, Inc., 613 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1993).
222. Id. at 6. For purposes of analyzing court decisions under Rule 1.431, this
discussion is limited to the court's treatment of juror interviews. The implications of this
decision of new trial motions are discussed, infra, in the section pertaining to Rule 1.530.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. For further discussion of the parameters of the rule governing post-verdict juror
interviews, and the impact of such interviews on Rule 1.530 motions for new trial, see
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 608 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar which sets forth similar require-
ments.226
F. Offers of Judgment
The current version of Rule 1.442 does nothing more than incorporate
by reference the procedural provisions of Florida Statutes, section 768.79
regarding offers of judgment. The former rule was repealed effective July
9, 1992.227 The new rule was added July 16, 1992, but did not become
effective until January 1, 1993.28 It is unclear whether the new rule will
resolve the variety of complications that have arisen around offer of
judgment provisions in force at various times over the past decade. What
is clear is that the new rule may have come too late to be of use to parties
whose cases were decided in the past year.
Specifically, in Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 29
the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to article V,
section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, to resolve an apparent conflict
between the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in this case and the
Second District Court of Appeal's decision in A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
v. Davis.3' At issue is the retroactive application of offers of judgment,
and the concomitant right to attorney's fees, pursuant to section 768.79 of
the Florida Statutes.
In its opinion in Jones Boatyard, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, the
Third District Court of Appeal held that section 768.79 applied only to
offers of judgment made in actions accruing on or after July 1, 1986, the
effective date of the statute.' The supreme court reviewed the language
of the statute in question as construed in Mudano v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. 232 and observed that under Chapter 768:
"NEGLIGENCE" is divided into three parts. Part III, "DAMAGES,"
contains sections 768.71 through 768.81. Section 768.71, entitled
"Applicability; conflicts," provides, in part:
226. Walgreens, 603 So. 2d at 6.
227. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1992).
228. See In re Amendments to Florida Rules Civil Procedure, 604 So. 2d I 110 (Fla.
1992).
229. 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1993).
230. 559 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
231. 588 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
232. 543 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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(2) This part applies only to causes of action arising on or after July
1, 1986, and does not apply to any cause of action arising before that
date.2 33
The supreme court in Metropolitan Dade County concluded that by its own
terms, section 768.79 does not apply to offers of judgment in actions
accruing before the referenced date.2 34  In A.G. Edwards, the Second
District Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of retroactive application
of the provisions of Florida Statutes, section 45.061 regarding offers of
settlement. 35 The court concluded that the statute was applicable to
causes of action accruing before its effective date because "the operative
event, the only event crucial to operation of the statute, is the making of an
offer of settlement." '2 36 The supreme court tacitly approved this interpreta-
tion in Leapai v. Milton.
237
In Metropolitan Dade County, the supreme court resolved the apparent
conflict in the interpretation of the two statutes by observing that "section
768.79 is part of an integrated statutory scheme . . .[which] by its plain
language attaches the right to attorney's fees to the underlying cause of
action. 2 3' By contrast, the court interpreted section 45.061 as giving rise
to its own independent cause of action for sanctions, one which does not
rely on the underlying lawsuit. 23 9 Specifically, the court stated that section
45.061 "exists as a distinct independent statute under the civil procedure
chapter of the Florida Statutes.,,240 Accordingly, the court approved both
the Third District Court of Appeal's interpretation of the retroactive
233. Metropolitan Dade County, 611 So. 2d at 513 (citing Mudano, 543 So. 2d at 876).
The "Damages" provisions now constitute Part 11 of chapter 768. Formerly, Part II of the
chapter set forth provisions governing Medical Malpractice Claims and Related Matters.
These provisions have since been repealed or renumbered as part of chapter 766.
234. Id. at 514
235. 559 So. 2d at 236.
236. Id. at 237 (quoting Hemmerle v. Bramalea, Inc., 547 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
237. 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992).
238. Metropolitan Dade County, 611 So. 2d at 514.
239. Id.
240. Id. In 1990, the Legislature amended section 45.061(6), limiting its applicability
to causes of action accruing prior to October 1, 1990. Ch. 90-119, § 22 1990 Fla. Laws 370,
381 (amending FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1991)). This amendment was apparently undertaken
to eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the existence of separate statutory provisions
for offers of settlement (section 45.061) and offers ofjudgment (section 768.79), and a third
provision under then existing Rule 1.442 that failed to either fully incorporate or fully
reconcile the different requirements of the two statutes.
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application of section 768.79 and the Second District Court of Appeal's
interpretation of retroactive application of section 45.061.241 Moreover,
the supreme court mildly chided the plaintiff for not anticipating the
different interpretations, stating that plaintiffs counsel "had or should have
had the expertise to analyze section 768.79 and discover the possible
inapplicability of section 768.79 in the case subjudice and the likely need
to file under section 45.061. "242
While the supreme court's statutory interpretation may be valid, the
result in this case seems to unnecessarily elevate form over substance. The
provisions of section 45.061 and section 768.79 are substantially similar,
with the notable exception of the label (section 46.051 or section 768.79)
placed by the offeror on his offer to settle the lawsuit. Both statutes reflect
the spirit and purpose of Rule 1.442, which is "to encourage defendants to
acquiesce in claims discovered during litigation to be meritorious and to
shift to the claimant the financial burden of carrying on litigation beyond the
point where an appropriate offer of judgment on the merits is made., 243
In fact, the supreme court has treated the two types of statutory "offers" as
interchangeable variations on the theme established by the rule. 4
Specifically, in Leapai, the supreme court addressed the constitutionality of
offers of settlement pursuant to section 45.061, and stated that "[t]he offer
of judgment process is not a new subject to us. 24s
Given that the two statutory provisions under consideration promote the
purposes of Rule 1.442 in all its various incarnations, and further, that some
version of the rule was both in effect and valid at the time plaintiffs offer
was made, the supreme court's disparate treatment seems hypertechnical and
yields a result contrary the primary goal of the rules of civil procedure:
promoting the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"
through early resolution of lawsuits and the efficient administration of
justice. The Legislature's effective repeal of section 45.061 for causes of
action accruing after October 1, 1990 and its modification of section 768.79
to clarify that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are entitled to recover under
the statute, has now paved the way for the supreme court to ignore section
45.061 and to adopt in toto the procedural provisions of section 768.79, thus
241. Metropolitan Dade County, 611 So. 2d at 514.
242. Id.
243. Wisconsin Life Ins. Co. v. Sills, 368 So. 2d 920, 922 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct, App.
1979).
244. See, e.g., The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442
(Offer of Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1989).
245. Leapai, 595 So. 2d at 15 (emphasis added).
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resolving the on-going conflict between the various provisions. While these
changes came to late to be of any use to the parties in this case, one hopes
that future litigants will no longer be required to anticipate a plethora of
different interpretations of Florida's offer of judgment law.
On a somewhat less preachy note, in Liebling v. Florida Energy
Management, Inc., 46 a personal injury case, the defendant made an offer
of judgment in the amount of $5,001.00 sixty days prior to trial. Plaintiff
rejected the offer. A jury subsequently found the defendant solely negligent
and awarded plaintiff property damage in the amount of $1,237.39, but
found that plaintiff had not met the threshold requirements of section
627.737(2) of the Florida Statutes for establishing bodily injury. The trial
court awarded defendant costs pursuant to Rule 1.442(h), but permitted the
plaintiff, as the prevailing party, pursuant to section 57.041 of the Florida
Statutes, to offset costs incurred prior to service of the offer of judg-
ment.247 The appellate court reversed the Rule 1.442 award noting that
the trial court failed to make an express finding that plaintiffs rejection of
the offer of judgment was "unreasonable.""2 The court, citing State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lathrop,249 held that a party's
rejection of an offer of judgment must explicitly be found to have "caused
an unreasonable delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation," in
addition to violating the percentage requirements imposed by the rule.25°
The court also reversed the trial court's limitation on the plaintiffs section
57.041 claim to costs incurred prior to service of the settlement offer.25'
The court noted that plaintiff was the prevailing party and that section
57.041 entitles a prevailing party to recover all taxable costs without regard
to the effect of a rejected offer of judgment.252
In Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto,253 the Third District Court of
Appeal determined that the offer of judgment provisions of section 768.79
of the Florida Statutes are applicable in Jones Act cases brought in state
court. The court first observed that the award of attorneys' fees "as a
component of maintenance and cure is traditionally within the equitable
246. 619 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
247. Id. at 443.
248. Id.
249. 586 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
250. Liebling, 619 So. 2d at 443 (citing State Farm, 586 So. 2d at 1127).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. 614 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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jurisdiction of the courts" in admiralty actions.254 Additionally, the court
stated that Florida's offer of judgment provisions, like rules governing
mediation, pertain to the state's control of the judicial process, rather than
to the substantive elements of Jones Act claims.255 Accordingly, the court
held that "[b]ecause Florida's rules relating to offers of judgment are an
integral part of this state's management of its courts' proceedings and do not
conflict with federal admiralty law," the award of attorneys' fees pursuant
to section 768.79 is proper in a Jones Act case.256
Two recent cases create an apparent conflict regarding how specific an
offer of judgment must be to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.442. In
State Farm Life Insurance Co. v. Bass,257 plaintiff served an offer of
judgment in the sum of $64,000 (his insurance policy limit) "exclusive of
costs and attorneys' fees ... [which] would be agreed to or determined by
the court at a later date. 258 On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the offer was insufficient to support an award of costs and fees,
observing that Rule 1.442(c)(2) required the offer of judgment to state "the
total amount of the offer., 259  Insofar as the offer did not specify a
particular amount for costs and attorneys' fees, the court concluded that the
defendant would have been unable "to determine the acceptability of the
offer." Rejection of the offer, therefore, did not expose the defendant to
liability for plaintiff's fees and costs.
In apparent contrast to Bass, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
concluded in Hellman v. City of Orlando260 that an offer of judgment
made pursuant to section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 in the sum of $8,500.00
plus costs provided a sufficient basis for the later award of costs and fees.
The court turned for guidance to its recent decision in Williams v. Bro-
chu,26 ' in which it held that "'the statutory term "judgment obtained" [in
section 768.79] means the amount of the judgment for damages awarded by
the jury for the cause of action being tried and does not include taxable
costs or attorneys' fees . . '"262 The court then analyzed the meaning
of the term "offer" in section 768.79 and similarly determined that "an offer
254. Id. at 520 (citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962)).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 605 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
258. Id. at 909.
259. Id. at 910.
260. 610 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
261. 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
262. Hellman, 610 So. 2d at 104 (quoting Williams v. Brochu, 578 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
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should be construed as including all damages 'which may be awarded in a
final judgment."'263 Based upon this formulation, the court concluded that
because reference in section 768.79 to "judgment obtained" does not include
taxable costs "incidental to a jury's consideration of a damage award," an
offer of judgment need not assign a dollar amount to such costs.2 64 The
court therefore found the plaintiff's offer of judgment valid and remanded
the case for further proceedings.265
The two cases are perhaps reconcilable because, unlike section 768.79
(which also requires an offer to "state its total amount"), then-existing Rule
1.442 did not define an offer of judgment as "including all damages which
may be awarded in a final judgment." Accordingly, the type of analysis
employed in Jones Boatyard, upholding both interpretations because they are
based on different, albeit substantially similar provisions, may be ap-
propriate. While this result would be of little comfort to parties who have
made indefinite offers of judgment under former Rule 1.442, it would have
the salutary effect of closing a potential loophole in the new rule, which
incorporates section 768.79 by reference. The loophole is created by
requiring the offering party to accurately predict the amount of fees that
may eventually be incurred as a result of an opponent's intransigence. This
requirement would give rise to the possibility that a party who in good faith
makes an offer of judgment on the merits of her claim will be precluded
from recouping costs and fees if she overestimates the amount of fees that
might be incurred in prosecuting her case to final resolution. The same
loophole could allow a party to escape the sanctions contemplated by the
rule, despite the fact that the party caused and contributed to further need-
less litigation by refusing an offer of judgment.
An interpretation that permits this loophole to exist would thwart the
very purpose of the rule, which is to place the burden of future costs and
fees on litigants who are unwilling to concede to meritorious claims. It
makes eminently more sense for an offer of judgment to be limited to the
amount a party expects to pay or receive as a result of the primary claim(s)
made in the lawsuit, and to leave the question of fees and costs for later
determination by the court. Thus, even if the supreme court eventually
approves the Third District Court of Appeal's interpretation of former Rule
1.442 in Bass, it should adopt the Fifth District Court of Appeal's construc-
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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tion of section 768.79 for all cases involving the current version of Rule
1.442.
G. Directed Verdict
In Elmowitz v. Gloria E. Zimmerman, Revocable Trust,266 the Third
District Court of Appeal reviewed a directed verdict rendered in favor of a
third party defendant. Reiterating the well-settled standard for directed ver-
dicts that the trial court "[m]ust view the evidence adduced and every
conclusion therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
resolving every conflict and inference for that party," the court found that
the record evidence conflicted in material respects and that the jury should
have been allowed to consider the conflicting evidence and enter a verdict
accordingly. 267 The most interesting aspect of this case is that after the
trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the third party defendant,
the jury eventually determined that the third party defendant was fifteen
percent liable for the third party plaintiffs damages. This verdict doubtless
influenced the appellate court's decision.
H. Default Judgment
In a series of cases, various district courts of appeal underscored the
trial court's duty to terminate litigation through entry of default judgment
only in the most extreme cases. For example, in Tufo v. Oxford Resources
Corp.,268 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a default judgment
in favor of the plaintiff where the plaintiff failed to serve defendant's
counsel with notice of its motion for default or its motion for entry of final
default judgment.
In Carr v. Glass-Tech Corp.,26 9 the Third District Court of Appeal
likewise reversed a default judgment because of service improprieties.27 °
In Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. ,27 the
court set aside a default judgment against defendants on the grounds that
defendants had filed a motion to dismiss, which, while untimely, was filed
before the trial court's order entering default judgment was filed with the
clerk of the court.
266. 610 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
267. Id. at 53.
268. 603 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
269. 614 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
270. Id. at 1227-28.
271. 611 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The well settled rule that default judgment is not appropriate where a
party fails to appear at trial was reiterated in Turner Properties, Inc. v.
Marchetta.272 In Turner Properties, the Third District Court of Appeal
stated that "[n]onappearance by defendants does not relieve the plaintiff of
its obligation to introduce evidence on liability, and is not a basis for entry
of a default., 273 In Electric Engineering Co. v. General Electric Canada,
Inc.,274 the Third District Court of Appeal found that a misdirected
transfer of the complaint from defendant's registered agent to defendant,
who, unbeknownst to its registered agent had changed its address, constitut-
ed excusable neglect and good grounds for setting aside a default.
275
Finally, in Carazo v. Status Shipping, Ltd, 76 the Second District
Court of Appeal reversed the default entered against defendants despite
defendants' failure to appear at a court ordered case management conference
and failure to comply with the court's order to serve their answer to
plaintiff's amended complaint within ten days. The appellate court stated
that while it did "not condone" the behavior of defendants' counsel, the
behavior did not rise to the level of "flagrant, persistent, willful, or other-
wise aggravated violation" of the trial court's order.277 While Rule 1.200
permits the trial court to "take any ... appropriate action" in response to a
party's failure to attend a pretrial conference, the sanction of default was
disproportionate to the complained of conduct on the part of defendants and
their attorneys. 278 Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order
entering default.
2 79
I. Summary Judgment
Four cases decided by the Fourth District Court of Appeal during the
past year reemphasize the necessity of negating issues raised by way of
affirmative: defense in order to obtain summary judgment. For instance, in
Elkins v. Barbella,28 ° the court noted that the moving party's affidavit
supported only the allegations in her complaint, and that the movant had
done nothing more than to "merely den[y]" her opponent's affirmative
272. 607 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
273. Id. at 507.
274. 610 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
275. Id. at 52.
276. 613 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
277. Id. at 1330.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 603 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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defenses."' Based upon this record, the court stated that "[o]nce again we
reverse a summary judgment because the moving party failed to disprove
opposing affirmative defenses or establish that they were insufficient as a
matter of law." '82
In Crago v. Citibank,283 the same court reversed summary judgment
in a mortgage foreclosure case, observing that the mortgagor failed to
disprove one defendant's contention that title to the mortgaged property had
been obtained from him under duress. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
again reversed summary judgment in Pile v. Geltex Trading Corp.,284
because "plaintiff failed to disprove opposing affirmative defenses or estab-
lish that said defenses were insufficient as a matter of law."285 The court
also noted that the defendant apparently had not been served with copies of
the Motion for Summary Judgment or the Notice of Hearing on the
motion."'
Finally, in Doss v. Steger & Steger, P.A.,287 the court reversed final
summary judgment where the moving party "failed to negate appellant's
affirmative defense." '288 In addition, the court commented on the fact that
the affidavit submitted in support of the motion failed to comply with both
the procedural and substantive requirements of Rule 1.510(c), in that it
consisted almost entirely of inadmissible hearsay statements.
289
The subject of affidavits was also raised in Silva v. Hernandez,29 °
albeit for different reasons. In Silva, the supreme court addressed a direct
conflict between the Third District Court of Appeal's interpretation of Rule
1.5 10(c) regarding service of opposing affidavits, and the Second District
Court of Appeal's interpretation in Burton v. GOV Contracting Corp.
29 1
At issue was whether an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must be filed at least one day prior to hearing on the
motion. 292 The supreme court approved the approach taken in Burton,
281. Id. at 727.
282. Id.
283. 610 So. 2d 65, 67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
284. 610 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 613 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
288. Id. at 137 (citing Solimine v. Numerica Sav. Bank, 587 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
289. Id.
290. 612 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1993).
291. 552 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
292. Silva, 612 So. 2d at 1377.
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which held that Rule 1.510(c) "only requires that opposing affidavits be
served at least one day prior to the day of the hearing." '293 The supreme
court observed that Rule 1 .510 does not require the opposing affidavit to be
filed at any specific time, and stated that filing is proper at any time prior
to the actual hearing, even if such filing takes place on the same day as the
hearing. 94
In Heritage Real Estate & Development Co. v. Gaich,295 the Fifth
District Court of Appeal provided guidance as to the proper application of
the summary judgment rule in a case involving a pending counterclaim.
Citing prior decisions from the Third, Fourth and Fifth Districts, the court
held that under Rule 1.5 10,
[T]here are two ways to deal with a pending counterclaim. First, a trial
court can enter partial summary judgment for a plaintiff and then take
evidence on the counterclaim or, in the alternative, enter final summary
judgment on the complaint but "stay" its execution pending resolution
of the counterclaim.296
Logically, these alternatives should equally be available to a defendant
seeking summary judgment on its counterclaim where issues in the
complaint remain pending.
One other case involving the procedural aspects of summary judgment
motions deserves mention. In Kozich v. Hartford Insurance Co.,2 97 the
court determined that a trial court is without discretion to determine whether
to hold a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Perhaps following
the lead of local federal courts,298 the trial court entered an order setting
forth procedures and deadlines for various filings related to defendant's
motion for summary judgment, and stated that the "[c]ourt will advise the
parties in the event a hearing is required., 299 After all parties had submit-
ted briefs on the motion, the trial court entered judgment without hearing.
On appeal, the court noted that Rule 1.510(c) specifically provides for a
hearing, and does not admit any discretion on the part of the trial court to
293. Id. (emphasis added).
294. Id.
295. 620 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
296. Id. at 1119.
297. 609 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. See, e.g., S.D. Fla, LR 7.1 (setting forth local rules governing motion practice in
the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida).
299. Kozich, 609 So. 2d at 148.
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determine whether such hearing is required.300 Accordingly, the order
entering summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for pur-
poses of holding the hearing required by Rule 1.51 0(c).3 '
J. Motions for Rehearing and New Trial
In Walgreens, Inc. v. Newcomb," 2 the court addressed whether
information obtained from a juror in violation of Rule 1.431(h) could
nevertheless provide grounds for a new trial.3"3 This case involved a slip
and fall in which plaintiff claimed that a dangerous condition was created
by Windex sprayed on the floor of the restaurant in which she fell. An
informal juror interview revealed that two jurors may have impermissibly
conducted their own Windex experiments and related their findings to the
remaining jurors. Based upon this information, the trial court granted
plaintiffs motion for a new trial. On appeal, the court noted that while this
type of juror conduct would normally support a motion for new trial, the
information regarding the impermissible experiment had been obtained by
plaintiff's counsel in violation of Rule 1.43 1. The court reasoned that "[a]
party ought not be able to obtain relief by violating the Rules when the
relief could not be obtained by compliance with the Rules."30 4 According-
ly, the court reversed the trial court's order granting a new trial and
remanded the case for entry of judgment consistent with the original
verdict.30 5
The supreme court's opinion in Keene Bros. Trucking, Inc. v. Pen-
nelP°6 resolved a direct conflict between the decision of the Second
District Court of Appeal in that case307 and the supreme court's earlier
decision in Frazier v. Seaboard System Railroad,3"8 which dealt with
simultaneous entry of orders granting motions for new trial and for
300. Id.; cf S.D. Fla. LR 7.1.B ("No hearing will be held on motions unless set by the
court.").
301. Id.
302. 603 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
303. For purposes of analyzing court decisions under Rule 1.530, this discussion is
limited to the court's treatment of plaintiff's motion for new trial. Issues regarding juror
interviews are discussed, supra, in section E2 pertaining to Rule 1.43 1.
304. Walgreens, 603 So. 2d at 6.
305. Id.
306. 614 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1993).
307. Pennell v. Keene Bros. Trucking, Inc., 589 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
308. 508 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1987).
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judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The supreme court acknowledged
that its Frazier opinion did characterize such orders as "mutually inconsis-
tent."3 9 The court also observed that Frazier expressly contemplated the
possibility of the mutually inconsistent orders being entered "in the
alternative" to promote judicial economy.31 The supreme court concluded
that the trial court in this case had properly considered and decided the
motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the
alternative. 1
The resolution of this conflict did not, however, dispose of all issues
raised on appeal because the trial court had also declared a mistrial prior to
discharging the jury.3" The practitioner should take special note of the
bright-line test established to clarify apparent confusion regarding the timing
and resultant treatment of mistrial orders. First, the court observed that
"[t]he legal effect of a mistrial is the equivalent of there having been no trial
at all., 313  Accordingly, an order of mistrial entered before the jury is
discharged is a non-appealable order that removes the court's authority to
reinstate a verdict or to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. By
contrast, an order granting a mistrial entered after the jury is discharged
operates as a motion for new trial. The court determined that the appropri-
ate demarcation between these alternatives is the discharge of the jury,
rather than the less easily ascertainable point at which the jury verdict is
"rendered.'314
The practitioner should also take note of one other case that indirectly
involves new trial motions pursuant to Rule 1.530. In Dominguez v.
Barakat,315 the court held that Rule 1.530(b) requires motions for new
trials to be made within ten days after return of a jury verdict or the filing
of judgment in a nonjury action. The rule does not, however, provide for
additional time for service by mail pursuant to Rule 1.090(e). 3 6 Thus, the
court held that for purposes of calculating the time for filing a notice of
appeal, rendition of judgment is not postponed by a motion for rehearing
when the motion is not served for eleven days after entry of judgment,
309. Keene Bros. Trucking, 614 So. 2d at 1084.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1085.
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. Keene Bros. Trucking, 614 So. 2d at 1085.
315. 609 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
316. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530.
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notwithstanding the fact that notice of the final judgment is provided to
counsel by mail.3" 7
K. Relief from Judgment
Courts and practitioners alike continue to grapple with the appropriate
circumstances under which a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
Rule 1.540 can be raised. A series of cases decided in the past year shed
considerable light on the proper application of the rule. For example, in
Rolfs v. First Union National Bank of Florida,"' the court addressed the
trial court's denial of a Rule 1.540 motion to vacate final judgment of fore-
closure on the grounds that the mortgagor had not filed the original note and
mortgage with the trial court.319 The appellate court emphasized the
well-settled rule of law that motions for relief from judgment are no
substitute for a proper appeal, and concluded that "the error, if any, was
reviewable by plenary appeal from the final judgment.""32
Similarly, in A. W. Baylor Plastering, Inc. v. Mellon Stuart Co.,32
plaintiff moved for relief from judgment claiming that the trial court was
mistaken in the law it relied upon in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.322
On appeal, the court first observed that orders denying motions for relief
pursuant to Rule 1.540 are nonfinal, and accordingly, that briefs must be
filed within fifteen days from notice of appeal from such orders.323 In this
case, appellant's initial brief was filed more than two months after its notice
of appeal. Recognizing that appeals should not normally be dismissed on
the basis of "inadvertent procedural omission[s], '324 the court nevertheless
dismissed the appeal because it was evident that the plaintiffs Rule 1.540
motion was impermissibly filed as a substitute for appellate review or a
317. Dominguez, 609 So. 2d at 664.
318. 604 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
319. The original documents had been produced for the mortgagor's inspection, and had
been presented to the trial court at the hearing on the mortgagee's motion for summary
judgment, but had not actually been "filed" with the court. Id. at 1270.
320. Id.
321. 611 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
322. The trial court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff, a corporation, filed a
complaint that was not signed by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida.
The trial court denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint on the grounds that such a
complaint could only be stricken, not amended. Id. at 109.
323. Id.
324. Id.
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motion for rehearing pursuant to Rule 1.530, either of which would have
been appropriate in this case.325
By comparison, the court in Nichols v. Hepworth326 held that two
separate motions for relief under Rule 1.540 were proper. Initially, the
defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action moved for relief from summary
judgment based upon lack of notice of the motion, the hearing on the
motion, and judgment entered on the motion. The relief was requested
nearly one year after judgment had been entered. The trial court character-
ized the motion for relief as one for rehearing, and denied the motion
without explanation. Due to excusable neglect, defendant's counsel was
unaware of the order denying the motion until well after the time for filing
an appeal had run. Accordingly, the defendant filed a second motion
pursuant to Rule 1.540 seeking relief from the order denying defendant's
first motion for relief. The trial court denied this motion as "succes-
sive. 327
The appellate court reversed, observing that the initial motion could not
have been one for rehearing pursuant to Rule 1.530 since it had been filed
nearly one year after judgment was entered.328 Moreover, the court
concluded that the initial motion did not challenge the summary judgment
on its merits, but rather sought relief due to mistake or inadvertence related
to the lack of notice received by the defendant of the motion for summary
judgment and subsequent proceedings thereon. 329 Finally, the court held
that the two motions were not successive, reasoning that "[a]n order entered
under 1.540 may itself be subject to relief under the same rule when, as
here, the motions do not seek relief from the same order and are based on
different grounds. 33°
In Davidson v. Lenglen Condo Ass 'n,33' the court also found a motion
for relief under Rule 1.540 proper. In this case, plaintiff reached settlement
with one of the defendants and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which,
inadvertently, failed to limit dismissal to the settling defendant. The
plaintiff subsequently filed a corrected notice and a motion to strike the
325. Id. at 109-10.
326. 604 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
327. Id. at 575.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 576; see also Bermuda Atlantic Line, Ltd. v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 622
So. 2d 489 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (abuse of discretion to deny relief from judgment
where party was not properly served its attorney's motion to withdraw, order granting the
motion, or not ice of pretrial conference).
331. 602 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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original notice and substitute the corrected notice. The trial court denied the
motion. On appeal, the court acknowledged that plaintiffs motion to strike
and substitute did not indicate the cause of the mistake, but determined that
the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff's counsel in support of the notice
provided sufficient information to support granting of the requested
relief.332
In Gold v. Wohl,3" the court reviewed a set of circumstances singu-
larly deserving of post-judgment relief. In this case, a virtual comedy of
errors resulted in the trial court's dismissal of a case in which both parties
fully complied with all court orders, and in which neither party sought,
desired or agreed to dismissal. In its initial brief, appellant contended that
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant relief pursuant to Rule
1.540 where it was clear and undisputed that the court had made a mistake
in dismissing the case. The appellate court noted that appellee filed a one
page brief stating that he "is in concurrence with the brief filed by
appellant." '334 The court suggested that "[w]hen the lawyers for the
adversary parties agree that a mistake has happened and immediately and
unambiguously notify the trial court that she is in error as to both her
notation and recollection," the trial court should give serious consideration
to the possibility of a mistake which makes relief appropriate under Rule
1.540."'
Two other cases were not so easily resolved by the appellate courts.
In Mangham v. Jenks,336 the appellate court was unable to determine
whether the trial court had reserved jurisdiction over the parties in an action
to abate a nuisance. Consequently, the appellate court could not ascertain
whether the defendant was entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(5) on
the grounds of full performance and satisfaction of the judgment entered
against her.337  Similarly, in Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services. v. Schein,338 the appellate court, unable to ascertain from the
record whether an order granting a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 1.540
was agreed to by the parties, stated that, absent agreement, the relief should
not be granted because there was no evidence to support the moving party's
332. Id. at 689.
333. 617 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
334. Id. at 410.
335. Id.
336. 610 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
337, Id. at 86.
338. 616 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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claim.33 9 Obviously, trial counsel are not the only ones who sometimes
have difficulty with this rule; the cautious practitioner should therefore make
every effort to have the trial court clarify the basis for its orders granting or
denying the relief requested.
Two recent cases analyze the concept of a "void" judgment under Rule
1.540(b)(4). In Patton v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servic-
es,340 the appellant sought to set aside a default and final judgment entered
against him in a paternity suit. The default and final judgment were entered
as sanctions for appellant's failure to cooperate in discovery. Plaintiff
contended that the trial court's order lacked the specific findings of willful
or deliberate refusal to obey a court order required by the supreme court in
Commonwealth Federal Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Tubero,34' and that the
absence of such findings rendered the judgment "void" pursuant to Rule
1.540(b)(4), thus entitling him to relief.342 The court first concluded that
the trial court's failure to set forth express findings of willful disobedience
did not render its judgment void, but merely incapable of review.343 The
court next observed that appellant's arguments necessarily related to events
that transpired prior to rendition of judgment, and had no bearing on the
timeliness of his post-judgment motion for relief.344  Finally, the court
concluded that regardless of any infirmities in the trial court's order of final
judgment, appellant's motion for relief came more than one year after that
judgment, and was therefore improper under the provisions of Rule
1.540."'
The question of "void" judgments was addressed more squarely in
Department of Transportation v. Bailey.346 In this case, the Department
of Transportation ("Department") appealed from ajudgment which provided
for prejudgment interest in violation of the express provisions of Florida
Statutes, section 768.28(5), which limits waiver of sovereign immunity with
respect to punitive damages and prejudgment interest.347  The Depart-
ment's first Rule 1.540 motion for relief from judgment referred to section
768.28, but failed to directly raise the question of the trial court's subject
339. Id. at 599.
340. 620 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
341. 569 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1990).
342. Patton, 620 So. 2d at 1109.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. 603 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
347. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1985).
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matter jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the
motion. In its second motion for relief, the Department presented a detailed
argument regarding the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to award
prejudgment interest. This motion was also denied.
At the outset, the appellate court recognized that the award of
prejudgment interest was clearly erroneous, rendering the trial court's
judgment void.34 However, the court also acknowledged the strong
policy against entertaining successive motions pursuant to Rule 1.540 in
which the movant alleges matters that either were or should have been
raised in prior motions, and observed that the Department's first motion
raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, even if indirectly. 49
Nevertheless, because the court could not determine from the record the
basis for the trial court's denial of the Department's first motion, it held that
the denial had no res judicata effect on the issue of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.35° Accordingly, the court found that the Department's second motion
was "not strictly repetitive," and therefore should not have been denied.35'
Two final cases draw a razor-sharp line at the outer bounds of the relief
available under Rule 1.540. In the first case, Viscomi v. Viscomi,352 the
court held that allegations made by a former wife in a complaint for
modification of final dissolution of marriage that her ex-husband fraudulent-
ly concealed assets prior to entry of a final judgment of dissolution at best
constituted intrinsic fraud, and must therefore be raised by a Rule 1.540(b)
motion for relief from judgment.353 Since the allegations were not raised
for more than a year after the judgment was rendered, the fraud claims were
untimely.354
In the second case, Lamb v. Leiter,3 5 the court upheld the propriety
of an "independent action" commenced to vacate a final judgment of
348. Bailey, 603 So. 2d at 1386-87.
349. Id. at 1387. The appellate court pointed out that the Department should have taken
a direct appeal from the final judgment. Id. Having failed to do so, and having subsequently
failed to timely file a notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying its first motion for
relief from judgment, the Department would ordinarily have been stuck with the result even
though it was contrary to law. Id. Thus, the significance of the propriety of the Depart-
ment's second motion for relief.
350. Id.
351. Bailey, 603 So. 2d at 1387.
352. 609 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
353. Id. at 147.
354. Id. Rule 1.540(b) was amended effective January i, 1993 to eliminate the one-year
time limit in marital cases involving fraudulent financial affidavits.
355. 603 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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dissolution and set aside property settlement. The former wife alleged that
the initial settlement was procured through coercion, duress and deceit. The
trial court entered judgment against the former wife on the grounds that her
allegations consisted of intrinsic fraud, were not brought within one year of
the final judgment, and therefore did not comply with Rule 1.540(b)(3). On
appeal, the court determined that the former husband's alleged use of
coercion and duress to prevent his former wife from "litigating child
custody, alimony and property division issues" constituted the type of
extrinsic fraud defined by Rule 1.540(b)(4).356 Accordingly, the judgment
was reversed and the case remanded for resolution of the former wife's
independent action on the merits, even though the action was brought more
than three years after the initial final judgment was rendered.3"7
L. Injunctions
In Denison v. Denison,35 the court reviewed the trial court's order
modifying an injunction obtained pursuant to divorce proceedings. Appellee
had obtained an ex parte injunction to prevent his exclusion from the
operation of the family business and to curtail appellant's operation of the
business." 9 Appellants moved to dissolve or modify the injunction. The
trial court conducted six days of hearings on the motion, listening to
seventeen hours of testimony from appellee and extensive cross-examination
of appellee's witnesses. At the close of appellee's presentation, appellants
moved for involuntary dismissal of the injunction on the grounds that
appellee had not presented sufficient facts to support its issuance. After
extensive argument on the motion by counsel, but without further proceed-
ings in which appellants could present evidence on their behalf, the trial
court entered an order modifying the injunction.
On appeal, the court stated that on appellant's motion for involuntary
dismissal, "the trial court's duty [was] to determine whether a prima facie
case has been made for relief, not to weigh the credibility of the witness-
es."'360  Based upon the record presented, the court determined that the
trial court had impermissibly weighed the evidence in arriving at its decision
to modify the injunction."' Because "[d]ue process requires an oppor-
356. Id. at 635.
357. Id.
358. 603 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
359. The appellants included appellee's son, the business itself, and the business's board
of directors.
360. Denison, 603 So. 2d at 116.
361. Id.
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tunity to be heard," the trial court erred by modifying the injunction
"without giving the appellants an opportunity to be heard on their side of
the case." '362
Considering that appellant's motion for involuntary dismissal was
premised exclusively on appellee's failure to present sufficient facts to
support issuance of the injunction, it is curious that the appellate court found
fault with the fact that the trial court considered only appellee's evidence in
its tacit denial of appellant's motion for involuntary dismissal. Obviously,
additional evidence from appellants would have no bearing on whether
appellee met his burden of presenting a prima facie case. Thus, reference
to the appropriate standard on a motion for involuntary dismissal seems
inapposite. With respect to the trial court's order modifying the injunction,
however, the appellate court correctly determined that appellant should have
been given the opportunity to present their evidence pursuant to Rule
1.61 0(a)(2).
In Schiller v. Miller,363 the court affirmed a temporary restraining
order prohibiting one of the parties from disposing of four pieces of jewelry,
including a 5.8 carat diamond ring, and limiting the opposing party's bond
to $1,000. Citing Esposito v. Horning,3 64 the court observed that while
injunctions are not normally issued for retention of personal property, an
injunction may properly be issued where the property is "unique" and where
the party seeking the injunction demonstrates that there is no adequate
remedy at law.365 Although it appeared that appellee might have an
adequate claim for damages in the event the jewelry was misappropriated,
the appellate court, relying on the trial court's findings of the unique nature
of the jewelry and the difficulty in ascertaining its value, declined to rule
that the trial court had abused its discretion in issuing the injunction.3 66
M. Miscellaneous Rules and Decisions
Objections to the report and recommendations of a special master
pursuant to Rule 1.490(h) were the subject of Barnett Bank of Martin
County, NA. v. RGA Development Co.3 67 The appellate court held that
the entry of an order on a special master's report and recommendations less
362. Id.
363. 621 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
364. 416 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
365. Schiller, 621 So. 2d at 482.
366. Id.
367. 606 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 18
212
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Schultz / Weber
than ten days after the report and recommendations are served constitutes
reversible error because Rule 1.490(h) provides parties with ten days to file
exceptions after service of the report and recommendations.368 The court
also concluded that the "acceptance of benefits" doctrine is inapplicable in
appeals from trial court orders that are not final adjudications on the
merits.369 In a concurring opinion, Judge Polen suggested that there may
be certain circumstances other than final judgments in which the "acceptance
of benefits" doctrine may be applicable, although this case did not give rise
to such circumstances.37 °
In National American Insurance Co. v. Charlotte County,3 7 1 the court
reviewed an order denying a motion filed pursuant to Rule 1.550(b) for stay
of state court proceedings pending resolution of a prior declaratory judgment
action filed in federal court. Citing Wade v. Clower,372 Schwartz v.
DeLoach,37 and State v. Harbour Island, Inc.,3 the court noted that a
subsequently filed state court action should ordinarily be stayed until
resolution of a pending federal case that involves substantially the same
issues.375 The court recognized that a motion for stay may be denied
"upon a showing of the likelihood of undue delay in the disposition of the
prior action," but concluded that no such delay was threatened in this
case.
376
Last, but not least, in Avril v. Civilmar,3 " the court exercised its
certiorari jurisdiction to review a trial court order imposing sanctions
pursuant to Rule 1.720(b) and 1.730(c) for failure to negotiate in good faith
during court.-ordered mediation. The trial court ordered the parties to attend
mediation approximately eighty days after service of the complaint upon the
defendant. The defendant's attorney and a representative of defendant's
insurance company attended the mediation in accordance with Rule
1.720(b)(2)-(3). Stating that they had not had sufficient time to conduct
discovery, defendant's representatives claimed they were unable at that time
to offer anything more than $1,000 to settle the case. Thereafter, the
plaintiffs moved for sanctions and the trial court granted the motion.
368. Id. at 1259.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1260 (Polen, J., concurring).
371. 611 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
372. 114 So. 548 (Fla. 1927).
373. 453 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
374. 601 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
375. National Am. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d at 1285.
376. Id.
377. 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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On appeal, the court noted that Rule 1.730(b) allows sanctions "only
for failing to appear at a duly noticed mediation conference, '37' and that
Rule 1.730(c) provides for sanctions only if a party fails to perform pursuant
to a mediation agreement.3 79 The court concluded that any "mischief' in
this case was attributable to plaintiffs' "rush into mediation before their
carrier had completed their reasonably necessary discovery. 383 The court
therefore reversed the award imposing sanctions."'
On its face, the court's opinion is both sensible and just, and in full
accordance with the express provisions of the cited rules of civil procedure.
However, the broad holding in this case invites the worst type of bad faith
"participation" in mediation conferences, in direct contravention of the spirit
and purpose of the mediation rules. Prior to so literally limiting the
meaning of the phrase "failure to attend," the court should perhaps have
referred to analogous provisions in the rules governing discovery sanctions.
Specifically, Rule 1.380(a)(3) defines "failure to answer" as any evasive or
incomplete answer, in order to give full effect to the purpose of the
discovery rules. Similarly, one can envision many scenarios in which a
party's bad faith during mediation is tantamount to a failure to attend. If
the courts are unable to read a similar provision into Rule 1.720, the Florida
Bar's Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure should consider including
an express provision in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the tremendous amount of time and resources expended,
sometimes needlessly, on litigation related to discovery, it is heartening to
see the courts cracking down on discovery abuse by keeping close tabs on
the proper scope of discovery and by imposing sanctions on litigants who
resist or ignore proper discovery requests. It is likewise heartening to have
renewed confirmation of the Florida judiciary's traditional reluctance to
resolve matters on grounds other than the merits. This confirmation is
somewhat clouded, however, by the often inconsistent exercise of the trial
courts' discretion in awarding the extreme sanctions of striking pleadings,
dismissal, and default. The Florida Supreme Court's adoption of the
guidelines suggested by Judge Altenbernd's dissenting opinion in Kozel v.
378. Id. at 989.
379. Id.
380. Id at 990.
381. Id.
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Ostendorf is a significant step toward the restoration of consistency in this
area.
Both the Florida Supreme Court and the Legislature are to be
commended for their cooperative efforts to resolve the confusion surround-
ing offers of judgment. The supreme court should also be commended for
taking steps, such as gender-neutral language and service by facsimile, that
help our judicial system keep step with ever changing times.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"If an ox gore a man or woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Exodus 21:28
Forfeiture has its roots in biblical times. The common law followed
with the view that property used to cause the death of a King's subject was
forfeited to the King. The King would convert the property to a charitable
use. Forfeiture later became a source of Crown revenue. America adopted
forfeiture with a proliferation of in rem and in personam statutes designed
both to punish the offender and to take contraband property from the care-
less property owner.1 Although Florida has both in personam and in rem
* J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1969; B.A., Miami University, 1964; M.B.A., Miami
University, 1965; Chief Assistant State Attorney, 1974-76; President, Florida Association of
Police Attorneys, 1982-84. Mr. Purdy is a partner in the law firm of Shailer, Purdy and
Jolly, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The firm has represented law enforcement agencies in
forfeiture cases since 1980. Mr. Purdy is the author of the Florida Police Advisor, a monthly
police legal bulletin published since 1976. Mr. Purdy co-authored (with Judith A. Secher,
Esquire) Florida Forfeiture Practice and Procedure, first published in 1990.
I. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). In Calero-
Toledo, the Supreme Court approved forfeiture of a yacht worth over $100,000 because it
216
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
statutes, this article is limited to in rem forfeitures pursuant to the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act, sections 932.701 through 932.707 of the Florida
Statutes.
It is inherently just and proper that the vehicle used as the getaway car
in an armed robbery be taken from the robber for subsequent use by the
sheriff to provide road patrol protection for the public. This is called
contraband forfeiture, which is a great concept. In practice, however,
forfeiture threatens due process because an in rem forfeiture is not limited
to vehicles owned by the criminal. Furthermore, neither an arrest nor a
conviction is required for, or relevant to, forfeiture proceedings.2 The legal
fiction that the vehicle is the offender eliminates the need for a conviction.
Originally, in federal courts, innocence of the vehicle owner was not a
defense to forfeiture, even if the owner was not present or did not otherwise
know of the crime. To prevent forfeiture, the innocent owner had to prove
that the vehicle was stolen from him by the robber, or that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the use of his vehicle in the
robbery.3
Prior to 1980, Florida had a limited, weak, ineffective and seldom used
forfeiture statute.4  Three times in the past thirteen years the Florida
Legislature made substantial changes to forfeiture law. In 1980, Florida
made a serious entry into the forfeiture arena with the enactment of The
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.5 Prior law applied only to vessels,
motor vehicles, and aircrafts, and forfeited only those items used in commit-
ting crimes related to drugs, gambling, beverage or tobacco laws, and motor
contained one marijuana cigarette. Id. The owner, Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., had no
knowledge of the violation. Id. at 663, 690.
2. City of Tallahassee v. One Yellow 1979 Fiat 2-Door Sedan, 414 So. 2d 1100, 1101-
02 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
3. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90. The Calero-Toledo Court stated:
It therefore has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the constitutional
claim of an owner whose property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from
him without his privity or consent. Similarly, the same might be said of an
owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that circumstance,
it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1974) (Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.704 (1981)).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1980).
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fuel tax violations. 6 The 1974 to 1980 law was further limited by courts to
apply only in "drug trafficking operations." '7  The 1980 amendments
expanded forfeiture to any personal property, including currency, used in
any felony.8 The new law shifted the burden of proof from the state or
agency to the property owner. 9
Incentive for law enforcement and attorneys to use the Contraband
Forfeiture Act of 1980 was provided by allowing the seizing agency to use
funds from the sale of property forfeited and by allowing agencies to use
their own or outside counsel to file the action.'" Formerly, proceeds from
sold property went into the general revenue fund of the municipality or
county, and only the often reluctant State Attorney could file the action."
In 1989, the Act was amended to add real property used "to facilitate
the transportation, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession,
purchase, s;ale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contraband
article."' 2 It is obvious that forfeiture of real estate that is used to conduct
a ten dollar crack cocaine sale or to store over twenty grams of marijuana
substantially increased the value of potential forfeitures. The 1989
amendments also added proceeds from the sale of contraband property and
provided that other property of the defendant could be forfeited if the
contraband property was sold or otherwise gone prior to seizure. 3
Since 1980, Florida law enforcement agencies have benefitted by the
forfeiture of currency and property, valued in many millions of dollars.
However, the use of the forfeiture law has not been without detractors in
both the courts and public domain. Forfeitures are considered harsh
exactions and they are not favored in law or equity. '4 They are strictly
construed against the government. 1" Justice Barkett, Chief Justice of the
Florida Supreme Court, described the authority granted to law enforcement
by the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as "awesome."' 6 Judge Glick-
6. FLA. STAT. § 943.42 (1979) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.702 (1981)).
7. See, e.g., Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978).
8. FLA. STAT. § 943.41(e) (1980) (emphasis added) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §
932.701(e) (1981)).
9. Id. § 943.43 (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.703 (1980)).
10. Id. § 943.44(1) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.704 (1980)); id § 943.44(3)(a)
(renumbered at FLA. STAT. § 732.704(3)(a) (1980)).
11. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 943.44(5) (1979).
12. FLA. STAT. § 932.702(3) (1989).
13. Id. § 932.703(1).
14. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1991).
15. In re Forfeiture of $91,357.12, 595 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
16. hi re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992).
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stein of the Fourth District Court of Appeal termed forfeiture a "draconian
remedy" in a stinging dissent to a majority opinion that upheld the forfeiture
of an aircraft used in a registration felony and owned by a "player in the
Noriega trial because of reported drug smuggling activities."17  Judge
Glickstein was greatly influenced by the series of newspaper articles in the
Stuart News and the Pittsburgh Press entitled "Presumed Guilty," which he
adopted in great detail in an unusual "Epilogue to Dissent."' 8  Other
Florida newspapers have attacked the forfeiture law by describing it as an
apparently unjust and excessive use of the law against "innocents."' 9
It is against this background of judicial and public negativity that the
Florida Legislature made its third substantial alteration of forfeiture law.
Our lawmakers were aided by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property.2° The court held the
1989 Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act to be constitutional but only by its
interpretation that the statute included substantive and procedural safeguards
that were not in the wording of the Act.2' In July of 1992, the Florida
Legislature substantially adopted the requirements of the Department of Law
Enforcement opinion by enacting Florida Session Laws chapter 92-54.22
This survey of Florida law necessarily starts with the 1991 Department
of Law Enforcement v. Real Property decision and the July 1992 amend-
ments to the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. The decision and the
amendments substantially changed the law affecting several important legal
issues in forfeiture.
II. DUE PROCESS-JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
After holding that the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act was facially
constitutional in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,23 a case
of first impression, the Florida Supreme Court explained that the Act was
applied with minimum due process requirements, but not found in the
17. In re Forfeiture of One 1980 Cessna, 587 So. 2d 553, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (Glickstein, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 556-58.
19. See, e.g., Profit in the Name of the Law, SUN SENTINEL, Mar. 10-14, 1991. This
was a week-long series of articles by several authors critical of the forfeiture law.
20. 588 So. 2d at 957.
21. Id.
22. Ch. 92-54, 1992 Fla. Laws 500 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.707 (Supp.
1992)).
23. 588 So. 2d at 957.
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wording of the act that were specified in the opinion.24 The forfeiture
action was initiated by the seizure of 480 acres of land that included an
airstrip, a mobile home subdivision, a restaurant, a bath house, a personal
residence, garages and other improvements by the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement ("FDLE"). FDLE filed a forfeiture petition seeking to
forfeit the property on the grounds that it was used for drug trafficking.
Based upon the affidavit of a FDLE agent, the circuit court issued warrants
to seize the property. The FDLE filed notice of lis pendens the same day.
The 1989 Act did not provide for the filing of an affidavit, the issuing of a
"seizure" warrant, or the filing of a notice of lis pendens. The claimants,
property owners, moved to dismiss the petitions. The circuit court
dismissed the action on two grounds.25 First, the Act failed to provide
substantive due process. 6 Second, it was void for vagueness because it
required "parties to guess the proper procedures and protections" and
required insufficient notice as to what specific property was subject to
forfeiture.27
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction from the First District
Court of Appeal to decide a matter of great public importance that required
immediate resolution. 2' The court acknowledged that the Act "does not set
out any procedures for filing the petition or issuing the rule to show cause,
except that a rule shall issue upon the showing of 'due proof. 29  Prior
district court opinions characterized forfeiture proceedings as "procedural
quagmires"':"° and "murky."3I The Fifth District Court of Appeal stated
that "the Forfeiture Statute leaves much to the judicial imagination in
guaranteeing procedural due process ....32
In deciding the issue of whether The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
comports with substantive and procedural due process of law, the Florida
Supreme Court recognized that it must resolve the conflict between the
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 957.
29. Id. at 966.
30. Id.; see In re Forfeiture of $5300, 429 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App..
1983).
31. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 966; see One 1978 Green Datsun
Pickup Truck v. State ex rel. Manatee County, 457 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
32. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Charles, 606 So. 2d-750, 751
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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principle that forfeiture statutes are strictly construed and not favored in law
or equity, and the traditional judicial policy that all doubts as to the validity
of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably
possible.33 The court recognized its rule making powers but cautioned that
it could not legislate and violate the separation of powers prohibition.34
The court resolved that it could require the missing safeguards by relying
on the procedures set forth in prior case law and thus construe the Act to
comport with minimal due process requirements.35 Thereafter, Florida's
high court vociferously legislated several substantial changes to the Act.
The following fourteen requirements were added to the 1989 Act by the
opinion. Each is followed by the provision added to the 1992 Act that
corresponds to and adopts the Florida Supreme Court opinion:
1. Immediately after ex-parte seizure of personal property for
forfeiture, the seizing agency must notify all interested parties that
the property has been taken and that they have the right to request
a post seizure adversarial preliminary hearing. The hearing is
"anticipated" to be within 10 days of any such request.36
1992 Statute: "Personal property may be seized at the time of the
violation or subsequent to the violation, provided that the person
entitled to notice is notified at the time of the seizure or by
certified mail, return receipt requested, that there is a right to an
adversarial preliminary hearing after the seizure to determine
whether probable cause exists to believe that such property has
been or is being used in violation of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act . . . . it shall be held within 10 days after the
request or as soon as practicable. 37
2. Prior to any initial restraint of real property other than lis pendens,
the seizing agency must provide notice of and schedule an
adversarial hearing for interested parties. The petition for
forfeiture and recording of notice of the petition (lis pendens)
33. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 961.
34. Id. at 961-62; see FLA CONST. art. I, § 3.
35. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 959.
36. Id. at 965-66.
37. FLA. STAT. § 931.703(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
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should be filed simultaneously. The hearing is anticipated to be
within 10 days of filing the petition.3"
1992 Statute: "Real property may not be seized or restrained,
other than by lis pendens, subsequent to a violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act until the persons entitled to notice are
afforded the opportunity to attend the preseizure adversarial
preliminary hearing.... [T]he pre-seizure adversarial preliminary
hearing provided herein shall be held within 10 days of the filing
of the ]is pendens or as soon as practicable.
39
3. The agency seeking forfeiture may file its complaint by applying
to the circuit court for issuance of a rule to show cause.4
1992 Statute: "The seizing agency shall promptly proceed against
the contraband article by filing a complaint in the circuit court
within the jurisdiction where the seizure or the offense oc-
curred."'"
4. The "petition" must be verified and supported by verified affida-
vit.41
1992 Statute: "The complaint shall be styled, 'In RE: FORFEI-
TURE OF ' (followed by the name or description of the
property). The complaint shall contain a brief jurisdictional
statement, a description of the subject matter of the proceeding,
and a statement of the facts sufficient to state a cause of action
that would support a final judgment of forfeiture. The complaint
must be accompanied by a verified supporting affidavit. ' 43
5. The court shall sign and issue a rule to show cause if it ex-parte
determines that the petition on its face states a cause of action.
38. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 965.
39. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(b) (Supp. 1992).
40. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
41. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(4) (Supp. 1992). The 1992 Act eliminated the "Rule to Show
Cause" language and requirement.
42. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
43. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(a) (Supp. 1992).
44. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
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1992 Statute: "If no person entitled to notice requests an ad-
versarial preliminary hearing, as provided in s. 932.703(2)(a), the
court, upon receipt of the complaint, shall review the complaint
and the verified supporting affidavit to determine whether there
was probable cause for the seizure. Upon a finding of probable
cause, the court shall enter an order showing the probable cause
finding."45
6. A copy of the petition and the rule shall be served on all persons
the agency knows or should know have a legal interest in the
property.46
1992 Statute: "If the property is required by law to be titled or
registered, or if the owner of the property is known in fact to the
seizing agency, or if the seized property is subject to a perfected
security interest in accordance with the Uniform Commercial
Code, chapter 679, the attorney for the seizing agency shall serve
notice of the forfeiture complaint by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to each person having such security interest in the
property. 47
7. The rule to show cause shall require that responsive pleadings and
affirmative defenses be filed within twenty days of service of the
rule to show cause.48
1992 Statute: "The court shall require any claimant who desires
to contest the forfeiture to file and serve upon the attorney
representing the seizing agency any responsive pleadings and
affirmative defenses within 20 days after receipt of the complaint
and probable cause finding.,
49
45. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(b) (Supp. 1992). The "Order" replaces the former
requirement of a "Rule to Show Cause."
46. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
47. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(6)(a) (Supp. 1992).
48. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
49. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(5)(c) (Supp. 1992).
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8. "The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall otherwise control
service of process, discovery, and other administration of forfei-
ture proceedings." 5
1992 Statute: "The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern
forfeiture proceedings under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
unless otherwise specified under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act."51
9. Forfeiture is decided by a jury trial unless the claimants waive that
right. 2
1992 Statute: "Any trial on the ultimate issue of forfeiture shall
be decided by a jury, unless such right is waived by the claimant
through a written waiver or on the record before the court
conducting the forfeiture proceeding."53
10. The seizing agency has the burden of establishing probable cause
at the adversary preliminary hearing. 4
1992 Statute: " 'Adversarial preliminary hearing' means a hearing
in which the seizing agency is required to establish probable cause
that the property subject to forfeiture was used in violation of the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. 55
11. At trial, the seizing agency has the burden of establishing by clear
and convincing evidence that the property has been used in
violation of the forfeiture statute. "Due proof" in the statute
means by clear and convincing evidence. 6
1992 Statute: "Upon clear and convincing evidence that the
contraband article was being used in violation of the Florida
50. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
51. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(2) (Supp. 1992).
52. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967.
53. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(3) (Supp. 1992); see In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van,
493 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986).
54. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 966.
55. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
56. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 967-68.
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Contraband Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the seized
property forfeited to the seizing law enforcement agency."57
12. At trial the claimant (owner) has the burden of establishing by the
preponderance of the evidence the defense of lack of knowledge
that the property was used in criminal activity."
1992 Statute: "No property shall be forfeited under the provisions
of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act if the owner of such
property establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he
neither knew, nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry,
that such property was being employed or was likely to be
employed in criminal activity."59
13. If probable cause is found during an adversarial preliminary
hearing, the court must order the property restrained by the least
restrictive means that will protect against disposal. Restraining
order, property bond and notice of lis pendens were suggested.6"
1992 Statute: "If the court determines that probable cause exists
to believe that such property has been, is being, or was attempted
to be used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act,
the court shall order the property restrained by the least restrictive
means to protect against disposal, waste, or continued illegal use
of such property pending disposition of the forfeiture proceed-
ing."1
6 1
14. "Forfeiture must be limited to the property or the portion thereof
that was used in the crime. 62 The court does not discuss the
reasoning for this potentially devastating limitation on real
property forfeiture. Although the trial court listed vagueness as
one of the reasons for finding the act violates due process because
the act does not require "what specific property is subject to
57. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(8) (Supp. 1992). The term "due proof' was eliminated from
the Act.
58. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 968.
59. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(6)(a) (Supp. 1992).
60. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 964-65.
61. FLA. STAT. § 932.703(2)(d) (Supp. 1992).
62. Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 968.
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forfeiture,"63 there is no other discussion of the reason or mean-
ing of this limitation in the Florida Supreme Court opinion.
1992 Statute: The legislature ignored this limitation. Section
932.701(2)(a)(6) expanded the definition of real property as
contraband to include "any right, title, leasehold, or other interest
in the whole of any lot or tract of land, which was used ... in the
commission of ... any felony .... "
III. OTHER STATUTORY CHANGES AND ADDITIONS: 1992
In addition to adopting the requirements of the Department of Law
Enforcement opinion, the 1992 Legislature made the following significant
changes and additions to the Act:
I. The 1992 Act added a policy statement:
It is the policy of this state that law enforcement agencies
shall utilize the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfei-
ture Act to deter and prevent the continued use of contraband
articles for criminal purposes while protecting the proprietary
interests of innocent owners and lienholders and to authorize
such law enforcement agencies to use the proceeds collected
under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act as supplemental
funding for authorized purposes."
2. "Promptly proceed" or time to file the complaint from the date of
seizure was reduced from ninety days to forty-five days.66
3. "Complaint" is now defined as "a petition for forfeiture in the
civil division of the circuit court ... ."" The former Act did
not specify the original pleading to be a "complaint" or a "peti-
tion." As noted earlier in this article, the court in Department of
Law Enforcement found that the agency "may file its complaint"
63. Id. al 959.
64. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a)(6) (Supp. 1992).
65. Id. § 932.704(1).
66. Id. § 932.701(2)(c).
67. Id. § 932.701(2)(d).
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and then "the petition must be verified."68  Since the Act now
defines complaint as a petition, it is apparently proper to call the
initial pleading a petition.
4. The party with proprietary interest in the property is designated as
a "claimant."69  Litigants and courts, including the Florida
Supreme Court, had often referred to interested parties as "defen-
dants" despite the in rem nature of the proceedings.
5. Use of seized property by the seizing agency is prohibited until
title is perfected. Operation for maintenance is permitted only to
minimize loss of value.7 ° This was in reaction to media cover-
age that was critical of police using vehicles and other seized
property prior to obtaining a final order of forfeiture.
6. Vehicle rental or leasing companies are now specifically excluded
from forfeiture if the claimants establish that they neither knew
nor should have known the vehicle was used in criminal activi-
ty.7 Claimants do not have the added burden of reasonable
inquiry imposed on other innocent owners and lienholders. They
also have the right to immediate possession.72
7. Innocent co-owners other than spouses have the same protection
as other innocent owners up to the value of their interest in the
property. Co-owner spouses retain the right to defeat the forfei-
ture entirely if they make the requisite showing of no knowledge
and reasonable inquiry.73
8. The "attempt" to use property in violation of the Act was added
to the definition of "contraband article," i.e., real and personal
68. See supra notes 40, 42 and accompanying text.
69. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(h) (Supp. 1992).
70. Id. § 932.703(1)(c).
71. Id. § 932.703(6)(d).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 932.703(7). This amendment was to conform the Act to In re Forfeiture of
1985 Ford Pick-Up Truck, 598 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1992), which held that the interest of
innocent co-owners must be protected in order to construe the statute in a constitutional
manner. In November 1992, in a forfeiture case brought under the Florida RICO Act, the
Florida Supreme Court held that forfeiture of homestead property is forbidden under article
X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
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property that may be subjected to forfeiture.74 Formerly, at-
tempted use was not sufficient.
9. Settlements made prior to conclusion of the forfeiture proceeding
must be approved by the court, a mediator, or an arbitrator unless
waived by the claimant in writing.75 This was also in response
to media publicity of some prior claimants who settled pre-trial
and then complained they were coerced or "extorted" into paying
money to the agency to avoid the delay and cost of litigation. It
is expected that forfeiture litigation will continue to be settled pre-
trial as any other civil litigation, and that the settlement will now
include the required waiver.
10. If the claimant prevails at trial, any decision to appeal must be
made by "the chief administrative official of the seizing agency."
If the claimant prevails on appeal, the court may require the
agency to pay the claimant lost income and lost value of the
seized property if the seizing agency retained the property during
the appeal.76
11. If the claimant prevails at trial, the court may award reasonable
attorney fees and costs if it finds the agency did not proceed in
good faith or the action was a gross abuse of the agency's
discretion.77
12. The 1992 Act retained the agency right to use or sell forfeited
property and retained the contraband forfeiture "law enforcement
trust fund" for deposit of currency and proceeds from sale. The
Act established priority in payment of liens (where lienholders
established their "innocent" defense), storage, maintenance,
security, forfeiture costs and court costs. Remaining funds may,
as before, be used by the agency, upon approval of the governing
body, for law enforcement purposes, but not for "normal operating
needs of the law enforcement agency." Fifteen percent of trust
funds over $15,000 annually must be donated to drug treatment,
74. FLA. STAT. § 932.701(2)(a) (Supp. 1992).
75. Id. § 932.704(7).
76. Id. § 932.704(9)(b); see In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer, 546 So.
2d 1083 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), affid, 576 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1990).
77. FLA. STAT. § 932.704(10) (Supp. 1992).
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abuse education and prevention, crime prevention, safe neighbor-
hood, or school resource programs. Reporting requirements by
the agencies to the Department of Law Enforcement and the
Legislature were changed and specified in the 1992 Act.78
13. The 1992 Act requires training of law enforcement officers in the
area of seizure and forfeiture of property. Training is to begin by
October 1, 1993. 79
14. Strength was added to the previously largely ignored reporting
requirement by the addition of penalties of up to $5000 against
agencies that fail to comply.8°
15. The 1992 Act became effective July 1, 1992."
IV. CASE LAW, JULY 1992 TO JULY 1993
A. Burden and Standard of Proof-Sufficiency of Evidence
In In re Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet,82 a son used his mother's
vehicle to commit a felony. The trial court found that the mother "did not
use reasonable care to see that her son did not use the car for criminal
purposes."83 Accordingly, the court held that the agency failed to meet the
statutory requirement of actual or constructive knowledge that property was
employed or likely to be employed in criminal activity.84 The statute does
not provide a defense for effort to prevent use although such evidence or
lack of same may be relevant in proving constructive knowledge.85
Application of the Department of Law Enforcement standard of proof
was made in Fink v. Holt.86 Martin County Sheriffs Deputies chased a
doctor for three miles until he crashed his 1985 Chevrolet Corvette.
Deputies found a partially smoked marijuana cigarette on the driver's seat
78. Id. § 932.7055 (tentatively renumbered at § 932.7055).
79. Id. § 932.706.
80. Id. § 932.707.
81. Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, ch. 92-54, § 11, 1992 Fla. Laws 500, 513.
82. 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 1323.
84. Id.
85. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
86. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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and several controlled substances that were not in marked containers in his
briefcase. Possession of controlled drugs without a prescription or without
labels are both felonies in Florida. The Sheriff initiated forfeiture proceed-
ings against the Corvette. The doctor contested the forfeiture on grounds
that no crime was committed because, as a doctor, he was privileged to
possess the unlabeled drugs. The trial court found that there was probable
cause to seize the vehicle under the totality of circumstances. 7 On appeal,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not establish
probable cause because the Sheriff failed to overcome the presumption of
innocence accorded to a physician that possession of schedule II substances
is in the normal course of practice."8 "We do not believe that the mere
presence in a physician's un- or mislabeled containers is enough to suggest
that the physician is not using the schedule II drug 'in the usual course of
[his] business or profession' or 'in good faith and in the course of profes-
sional practice."'8 9 Further, the district court held that the trial court erred
in using the probable cause standard.9" Relying on Department of Law
Enforcement, the court found that the Sheriffs proof was "at best in equi-
poise" and does not establish the Sheriffs entitlement to forfeiture by clear
and convincing evidence.9'
The City of Deland appealed a trial court's directed verdict in a
forfeiture action against $301 and a 1979 Ford van in City of Deland v.
Miller.92 City police seized the van and cash after observing the owner
transport stolen property in the van. The only evidence to support forfeiture
of the cash was that the owner acquired the money through his television
and stereo business from which he had not reported sales for the months of
June through September, 1990, to the Department of Revenue.93 The trial
court did not permit this evidence and entered a directed verdict. The Fifth
District Court of Appeal affirmed as to the cash but reversed and remanded
as to the van, noting that it was undisputed that stolen property was
transported in the van and that the owner admitted the identity of the van
in pleadings and joint pre-trial compliance.94
87. Id. at 1335.
88. Id. at 1336.
89. Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. Fink, 609 So. 2d at 1337.
92. 608 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id.
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In Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Charles,95 the
Florida Highway Patrol had probable cause to believe $39,390 was intended
to be used to purchase drugs (contraband) where they stopped a Chevy
pickup truck that was southbound on 1-95 in Volusia County and the cash
was found under a tarpaulin in a metal can stacked in bundles secured by
different colored rubber bands. A baggie with marijuana was also found in
the can. The three men in the van denied ownership of the money and
knowledge of how it got in the truck. A K-9 drug-trained dog alerted
positive to the presence of narcotics on the truck seat, the metal can and a
separate baggie of cash found in one of the men's pockets. Troopers gave
expert opinions regarding the method of packaging money and the notoriety
of Miami, Florida as a center for drug smuggling and as a source of
supply.96 Two of the truck occupants had prior drug crime records.
Valium prescribed to another person was found in the coat pocket of one of
the occupants and he gave two conflicting accounts of how it got into his
pocket. The truck and occupants were from Kentucky. On this evidence,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
forfeiture and found probable cause did exist based upon "the totality of the
circumstances."97 The court cautioned that upon remand the department
must show grounds for forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence pursuant
to Department of Law Enforcement.98
In a case that gives no facts other than that the trial court forfeited
jewelry worn by a person during a drug sale, the First District in Jenkins v.
City of Pensacola99 reversed and remanded for entry of an order dismissing
the forfeiture.' ° The reversal was based upon the Department of Law
Enforcement clear and convincing standard.'' It is difficult, however, by
any standard to imagine how the drug dealer used jewelry worn by him as
an instrumentality in the crime or in aiding or abetting the crime. Perhaps
the "jewelry" was a watch and he looked at it to verify the appointed time
for the drug sale thus establishing a nexus between the watch and the crime.
95. 606 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
96. Id. at 752. In a footnote, the court said "Regrettably Miami, Florida, has achieved
a degree of notoriety for being a center for drug smuggling and a source of supply." Id. at
n.4 (citing United States v. $4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1056 (1986)).
97. Id. at 754.
98. Id. at 751; see Department of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 755.
99. 602 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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In re Forfeiture of $8489"02 was another reversal of forfeiture, based
upon Department of Law Enforcement. The Second District Court of
Appeal questioned whether the "clear and convincing" standard of proof will
result in greater protection for Floridians or will just result in forfeiture
cases being filed in federal court where the standard of proof remains by the
preponderance." 3 Judge Altenbernd wrote the opinion questioning the
value of the new standard in a case where $8489 was forfeited by the trial
court upon evidence that the currency was found in a home pursuant to
execution of a search warrant that also produced eight and one-half pounds
of marijuana, a triple beam scale and other paraphernalia common for drug
sellers.0 4 The district court reversed and remanded for a new hearing to
consider the evidence in light of the higher standard.0 5 Certainly the
evidence in this case provided probable cause and, under pre-Department of
Law Enforcement law, the claimant had the burden to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the currency was not drug money. On remand, the
agency has the burden to prove it was drug money by clear and convincing
evidence. Given that most similar cases are based solely upon the
circumstances, it appears many of these cases may not rise to the level of
clear and convincing proof.
The positive alert of a trained drug dog has long been sufficient to
supply probable cause to search cars and arrest persons.'0 6 This rule,
however, was questioned by Third District Court of Appeal Judge Ferguson
in a concurring opinion of Metro-Dade Police Department of Dade County
v. Hildalgo.'o7 Judge Ferguson opined that an alert by a drug dog coupled
with association with a criminal suspect supplied only "founded suspicion"
and not "probable cause" to seize a vehicle for forfeiture.0 8
Where claimants, who were in a 1986 Ford truck, picked up two minor
females who had solicited a ride, and took them to a place where they had
illegal sexual activity, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the use
of the truck was only incidental to the crime and accordingly it was not
subject to forfeiture.0 9  The men, however, then drove the females
102. 603 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
103. Id. at 98.
104. Id. at 97.
105. Id. at 98.
106. See In re Forfeiture of $62,200, 531 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
107. 601 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming forfeiture dismissal on
other grounds).
108. Id. at 1261 (Ferguson, J., concurring).
109. In re Forfeiture of 1986 Ford PU, 619 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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looking for a motel and ended up staying overnight where one of the men
lived and there further illegal felony sex occurred. The court held that this
second incident was sufficient to provide a nexus between the illegal acts
and use of the truck to transport the girls to the scene of the crime."'
Forfeiture of the truck was affirmed because it was used in the second
incident to aid the commission of a felony by transporting the parties to the
scene. I "
B. Ownership-Standing
An important question of standing was clarified by the Florida Supreme
Court in Byrom v Gallagher."' An aircraft was seized as contraband after
it had been used illegally and sold but prior to the Federal Aviation
Administration's recording of the bill of sale. Since the prior owner was the
"registered" owner at the time of seizure, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
denied standing to Byrom who was the registered owner at the time of the
forfeiture hearing." 3 In reaffirming a prior decision, the Florida Supreme
Court held that "[t]he fact that a person is a bona fide purchaser in itself is
not adequate to give a party standing.""' 4  However, in prior cases, the
party making a claim in the forfeiture was not the registered owner at the
time of the forfeiture. The court decided to allow Byrom and future
claimants to establish standing if they prove the additional element that they
were bona fide purchasers." 5
Consequently, in determining whether a person has standing the trial
judge should consider: 1) whether that person holds legal title at the
time of the forfeiture hearing or has complied with the requirements for
receiving title; and 2) whether that person is in fact a bona fide
purchaser. The trial judge should consider the facts surrounding the sale
to determine whether the transfer is in fact a bona fide purchase. The
relationship of the parties, the date the instruments were executed, the
value of the property, the sale price, and canceled checks or bank
deposits to show actual payment and receipt of money are all factors
which the trial court should consider in determining whether the transfer
110. Id. at 339-40.
Il. Id.
112. 609 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1992).
113. Id. at 24-25 (citing Byrom v. Gallagher, 578 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
114. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 26 (citing Lamar v. Wheels Unlimited, Inc., 513 So. 2d 135
(Fla. 1987)).
115. Id. at 27.
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is a bona fide purchase. This list is not intended to be exhaustive but
rather illustrative of the consideration to be made by the trial judge. In
making the determination whether a title holder is also a bona fide
purchaser, the trial judge should be able to sift the wheat from the
chaff.' 16
The sword cut from the other side on the titled owner principle of
standing in forfeiture in In re Forfeiture of 1987 Chevrolet."7 The court
rejected the: contention that the son who used a 1987 Chevrolet titled to his
innocent mother was the "de facto" owner.' It was again held that the
term owner in section 932.703(2) "is limited to one who has obtained a title
certificate . *...""' The final order of forfeiture was reversed because the
trial court made no finding that the mother had the requisite knowledge that
her son used the vehicle in a felony. 21
Without reference to its holding in the previous case, and without
reference to, but probably because of, Byrom,' the First District inexpli-
cably cited Department of Law Enforcement to support its holding that the
presumption of title by co-ownership of a motor vehicle can be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. 2 2 In this case, the court held that the
pickup truck titled to a father and son jointly was not a true co-ownership
and the innocent father had no standing because he was only a nominal
owner. 23 The district court remanded for a new hearing on the issue of
the father's interest under a clear and convincing standard. 24 The case is
in a hopeless legal morass. Standing must be shown by the claimant not the
agency. "[O]nly persons who have standing can participate in a judicial
proceeding.'25  Furthermore, "standing is limited only to those persons
who can show a recorded title or compliance with the requirements for
116. Id. at 26-27. The court also noted that this requirement for standing is limited to
property where the state requires a title or compliance with title requirements to show
ownership. Id. at 27 n.3. In other types of property, a party would only have to show he
or she is a bona fide purchaser. Id.
117. 605 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 1323.
119. Id. (citing Lamar, 513 So. 2d at 137).
120. Id. at 1325.
121. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 24.
122. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
123. Id. at 697.
124. Id.
125. Byrom, 609 So. 2d at 26 (citation omitted).
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receiving title."'26 The First District has remanded with directions for the
trial court to require the wrong party to establish standing by the wrong
standard of proofl The case should have been remanded with instructions
to follow Byrom.
C. Notice Requirements
In State Department of Natural Resources v. 62 Ft. White De Vries Len
Ketch Sailboat,'27 the trial court dismissed a forfeiture for failure to give
notice of right to a post seizure hearing where the agency had sent notice of
the seizure prior to Department of Law Enforcement but did not send a
supplemental notice advising of the right to post seizure hearing.'28 The
Third District reversed, holding that Department of Law Enforcement did not
require a supplemental notice and even if it did, the omission was harmless
since claimant knew of the right and did not request a hearing.129 In
another case, where there was no notice at all, the Third District held that
the notice requirement was not grounds for reversal because the seizure was
prior to Department of Law Enforcement.3' The district court also held
that neither the statute nor Department of Law Enforcement requires a
warrant, consent or exigent circumstances to seize property for forfei-
ture. '3 In a decision handed down this year, without citing Department
of Law Enforcement, the Fifth District reversed a forfeiture of a co-owners
interest in a 1973 Trojan boat because the rule to show cause was not
directed to that co-owner and the sheriff failed to comply with the notice
provisions of the forfeiture statute.
32
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1980, Florida contraband forfeiture law has been a dynamic force
in the courts and in the Legislature. The use of forfeiture has gone from
virtual nonoccurrence to a peak. More recently, the laws regarding
126. Id.
127. 617 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 774-75.
129. Id. at 775.
130. In re Forfeiture of 1986 Ford PU, 619 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
131. Id. at 338.
132. Blanchard v. Osceola County Sheriff's Office, 618 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
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forfeiture have been redefined and limited to avoid unduly oppressive results
against innocent owners.
Although federal statutes and the United State Supreme Court have
permitted forfeiture of contraband property from innocent owners,1
3
Florida has; always had innocent owner protection in it's forfeiture law.'34
Despite this protection, because forfeitures are not favored by the courts and
are absolutely loathed by the fourth estate, the Florida Supreme Court and
the Legislature have reacted by imposing numerous additional due process
requirements since 1991.' The 1992 amendments to the Act finally
provided a procedural framework that was not in the original 1980 Act, an
omission that caused much confusion and misunderstanding in the interven-
ing twelve years.
Forfeiture will continue to be a useful vehicle to punish offending
property owners and convert criminal assets to good public use. However,
with the new clear and convincing standard of proof, forfeitures will have
to be supported by stronger proof of illegal use. It is the foremost desire of
the author that law enforcement agencies act responsibly and with great
discretion in continuing to use this awesome law. The goose that laid the
golden egg in 1980 was seriously wounded by the few excessive applica-
tions, the media exposure and the court and legislative response. Hopefully,
the goose will fully recover and resume its productive life.
133. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (forfeiture
of a yacht worth over $100,000 because it contained one marijuana cigarette even though the
owner had no knowledge of the violation).
134. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-943.44 (Supp. 1974) (Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act) (renumbered at FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.704 (1981)).
135. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991);
FLA. STAT. §§ 932.701-932.707 (Supp. 1992).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has remained in the forefront of developments in criminal law
and procedure, and in many respects serves as an incubator for new
approaches and ideas which facilitate the operation of our criminal justice
system. With a Florida Constitution that provides protections in addition to
those guarantees secured by the Bill of Rights, the Florida Supreme Court
has not hesitated to utilize Florida law to promote individual freedoms.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett,' the Florida
Supreme Court continues to follow a judicial philosophy of recognizing the
rights of both victims and defendants, promoting fairness in the relationship
I. As the people of the State of Florida applaud the tremendous leadership of Chief
Justice Rosemary Barkett, practitioners should note with both sadness and exhilaration that
the Chief Justice will be leaving the Florida court system to become a Circuit Judge of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. She will, no doubt, carry her insight, concerns, and
leadership to the federal bench.
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between prosecution and defense, and looking beyond the technical
requirements of the law to restore meaning to the justice system.
This article surveys Florida criminal law and procedural developments
which occurred between September 1992 and September 1993. While the
primary focus of this survey is an exploration of the pronouncements of the
Florida Supreme Court, developments in the Florida Legislature and the
district courts of appeal are analyzed as deemed necessary. The approach
used throughout this article highlights important developments, analyzes
legal precedent, and suggests future issues of concern for the criminal law
practitioner. Although specialized issues which arise in capital and death
penalty litigation are not included in this survey, the article is otherwise
comprehensive.
During the past year, as Florida saw the continued growth of crime and
the apparent lack of resources to control that escalation, the Florida
Legislature made a serious effort to promote an effective and fiscally
responsible criminal justice system. The result was the enactment of a
comprehensive new criminal justice package known as the Safe Streets
Initiative of 1994,2 which revised the sentencing guidelines to emphasize
incarceration in state prison for violent and repeat offenders, and to utilize
alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent and first time defendants. The
Legislature also overhauled the control release laws, authorized the develop-
ment of circuit pretrial intervention programs, revised DUI laws by lowering
the blood alcohol level necessary for a conviction, and even added a change
of venue law known as the "Lozano venue bill" in response to the highly
charged debate about relocating high profile trials.
Juvenilejustice issues also received substantial attention from the courts
and the legislature. Law enforcement received authorization to release the
names of juvenile offenders adjudicated guilty of certain offenses. Using or
carrying weapons at bus stops and on school buses was prohibited, perhaps
a surprise to all those who thought this was already illegal. With an eye
toward promoting meaningful rehabilitation, the juvenile justice bill
mandated comprehensive, community-based juvenile programs and services,
and authorized pretrial intervention for certain juvenile crimes.
No survey of Florida criminal law and procedural developments for the
past year would be complete without recognizing that the Florida justice
system has responded to a number of unexpected crises this year. Images
of just another fall season, suitable for watching sports on television or
getting the children ready for school, were blown away with the unwel-
2. Ch. 93-406, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911.
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comed arrival of Hurricane Andrew on August 24, 1992. The first order of
business for the Florida Supreme Court was to ensure the normal operation
of the justice system in South Florida. On September 2, 1992, responding
to a request by the Dade County State Attorney, the supreme court issued
an order tolling "all time limits authorized by rule and statute affecting the
speedy trial procedure in criminal and juvenile procedure" in Dade County
for the two weeks after Hurricane Andrew.3 The court also acknowledged
that Hurricane Andrew's impact extended well beyond Dade County, and
accordingly permitted a tolling of time limits in situations "where a party
demonstrates that the lack of compliance with the requisite time periods was
attributable to Hurricane Andrew."4
At the same time, the supreme court took action to protect the
operation of our democratic form of government by approving a delay of the
primary election in Dade County for one week because voters were still
recovering from the damages caused by Hurricane Andrew.' Both of these
unprecedented decisions demonstrate the willingness of the Florida Supreme
Court to utilize its considerable power to protect the people of the State of
Florida, a philosophy which is evident in many of the court's decisions.
II. SENTENCING
Because both the Florida Legislature and the courts expended
considerable effort on sentencing law and corrections policy, we begin our
examination of Florida law with that perspective.
A. Legislative Enactments
The 1993 legislative session was, in large measure, a response to the
public outcry over an escalating crime rate. The legislative result was a
unique balance of the expected "tough on crime" approach with the
recognition that available resources must be used efficiently to address our
most pressing needs. The final legislative solutions dealt harshly with
violent crimes, enhanced existing offense classifications, mandated
sentencing violent offenders to longer prison sentences, approved building
more prison beds, and created new criminal offenses. The most anticipated
3. In re Emergency Petition to Extend Time Periods Under All Florida Rules of
Procedure, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 2, 1992).
4. Id. at S579.
5. State v. Dade County, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Aug. 31, 1992).
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change, however, was the wholesale revision of the sentencing guidelines
and the elimination of many minimum mandatory sentences.
1. Sentencing Guidelines Revision
The Florida Legislature designated the 1994 revision of the sentencing
guidelines as the "Safe Streets Initiative of 1994."6 It is one of the most
comprehensive and sweeping revisions of sentencing law and policy in
recent memory. The new guidelines are designed to emphasize incarceration
in the state prison system for violent offenders and nonviolent offenders
who have repeatedly committed criminal offenses and who have demonstrat-
ed an inability to comply with the less restrictive penalties previously
imposed. The new law pays close attention to prison population limitations
and requires that any legislation which creates a felony, enhances a
misdemeanor offense to a felony, moves a felony from a lesser offense
severity level to a higher offense severity level, or reclassifies an existing
felony offense to a greater felony classification, provide that such change
results in a net zero sum impact in the overall prison population.7 The zero
impact may be avoided if the legislation contains a funding source sufficient
to accommodate the change, or by the adoption of a statutory provision
which specifically abrogates the application of this requirement.8
The revised guidelines, effective January 1, 1994, are no longer
procedural rules, but are contained in the statutes. 9 They are intended to
eliminate unwarranted disparity. They mandate the imposition of sentences
within the guidelines, unless the court orders a departure within written
guidelines. If a recommended sentence within the guidelines exceeds the
maximum sentence otherwise authorized by law, the guidelines sentence
must be imposed absent a departure. ° The court can order a departure
sentence above or below the guidelines when sufficient statutory factors are
proved by a preponderance of the evidence." The extent of a departure
is not reviewable.12
6. Ch. 93-406, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911.
7. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2917 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (Supp. 1992)).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.001). The
Sentencing Guidelines Commission is required to prepare, adopt, and submit to the Florida
Supreme Court for approval, procedures for implementing the revised guidelines.
10. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1992)).
11. Ch. 93-406, § 13, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2941 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
921.0016).
12. Id. § 5. 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1992)).
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The revised sentencing guidelines now group offenses into levels
contained in an offense severity ranking chart.' 3 This chart is used to
compute a sentence score, as opposed to the nine separate offense categories
utilized under the existing sentencing guidelines. The ranking has ten levels,
with "ten" being the most severe.' 4 Each crime is assigned a level based
on offense severity. 5 This ranking system allows greater flexibility in
revising the recommended sentence because it allows individual offenses to
be moved to another level without changing the punishment for other
offenses. Prior offenses are now weighed according to their assigned
severity, and are no longer a function of the category of the primary offense.
A major provision of the Safe Streets Initiative is the repeal of
numerous minimum mandatory sentences, including the three-year minimum
mandatory for purchase and possession of a controlled substance with intent
to purchase or sell within 1,000 feet of a school, 6 some of the minimum
mandatories for drug trafficking," the minimum mandatories for violent
offenses against law enforcement officers and related personnel, 8 as well
as the three-year minimum mandatory for an assault or battery on a person
sixty-five years of age or older,"' among others. Some minimum mandato-
ry penalties have been retained, including the minimum mandatories for
possession of firearms during the commission of certain felonies,2" the
three-year minimum mandatory for sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a
school, 2' and the fifteen and twenty-five year minimum mandatories for
trafficking in controlled substances.22
Another substantial statutory change is the deletion of language which
prohibited eligibility for parole or control release for certain drug offenses.
Control release eligibility has been expanded, and with regard to drug
defendants establishes an order of priority, beginning with minimum
mandatory sentences, followed by habitualized offenders whose primary
offense at conviction was not burglary, and then a consideration of habitual
offenders whose primary offense was burglary. The Control Release
13. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2925 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.0012).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ch. 93-406, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2949 (amending FLA. STAT. § 893.13
(1991)).
17. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
18. Id. § 775.0823.
19. Id. § 784.08.
20. Id. § 775.087.
21. Id. § 893.13.
22. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
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Authority is mandated to maintain the state prison population at or below
97.5% to 99%, and establishes responsibilities for the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and the Chair of the Parole Commission when
the state prison population exceeds 99.5% of lawful capacity.23 Basic gain
time is abolished for all offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994,
while incentive gain time has been expanded.24
Another revision designed to reduce the prison population permits a
sentencing court to place a defendant, whose presumptive guideline sentence
is up to twenty-two months imprisonment, in a local jail as a condition of
probation or community control for offense categories five through nine. 5
The Legislature also expanded the definition of criminal restitution,
permitted restitution orders to bear interest at 12%, to become liens as on
real estate and continue for twenty years if not paid, and exempted
restitution orders from discharge in bankruptcy.26
2. Habitual Offenders
The operation of the habitual offender statute received legislative
attention, due in part to increased concern that the statute was not being
utilized against appropriate defendants and that the statute was being
disproportionately applied against black offenders. The statute has been
changed to prohibit habitual offender treatment if the felony for which the
defendant is being sentenced, or one of the two prior felony convictions, is
the purchase or possession of drugs.27 Also, prosecuting attorneys are now
required to adopt uniform criteria for seeking habitual offender sentencing,
with a case file explanation required for all deviations. 2 Deviations from
the criteria are not subject to appellate review.29
23. Ch. 93-406, § 27, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2960 (amending FLA. STAT. § 947.146
(Supp. 1992)).
24. Id. § :26, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2958 (amending FLA. STAT. § 944.275 (1991)).
25. Id. § 36, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2967 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.188).
26. Ch. 93-37, § I, 1993 Fla. Laws 198 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (Supp. 1992)).
27. Ch. 9:3-406, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2913 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1991)).
28. Id § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2915 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.08401).
29. Id.
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B. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Single Scoresheet
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(1) requires that "[o]ne
guideline scoresheet shall be utilized for each defendant covering all
offenses pending before the court for sentencing. '30  The guidelines
provide that a particular scoresheet must be used in the case of specific
offenses, with category one used in all cases of murder or manslaughter
except first degree murder and alcohol-related manslaughter charges,3'
while a category nine scoresheet is used for any felony not otherwise
contained in any category. 32 The guidelines do not specify what scoresheet
to use for the offense of solicitation of murder. The court addressed this
issue in Hayles v. State.33 The defendant in Hayles claimed that because
inchoate offenses, e.g., conspiracy and solicitation, are included within the
category of the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to,34 a category
nine scoresheet should have been used for his sentencing, since category one
does not apply to first degree murder. 35  The supreme court disagreed,
finding that solicitation to commit first degree murder requires use of a
category one scoresheet for sentencing guidelines purposes, since the
"solicitation was intended to effectuate a murder here, and so [the defen-
dant] falls under category one of the guidelines. 36
2. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court announced several
decisions which analyzed the propriety of departure sentences. The court
adhered to prior decisions in holding that "advance planning and premedita-
tion are permissible reasons for a departure in the context of sexual
battery."37 In evaluating this ground for departure, the court explained that
because premeditation and advance planning are not inherent components
of the sexual battery offense, these factors constitute departure grounds in
a sexual battery case if they are of a "heightened variety," which "consists
30. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(1).
31. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(c).
32. Id.
33. 608 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1992).
34. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(c) (Comm. Note).
35. Hayles, 608 So. 2d at 14.
36. Id.
37. State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 1992).
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of a careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold fore-
thought."3 The court carefully limited its holding to sexual offenses, and
stressed "that heightened premeditation never can be a reason for departure
in cases that inherently involve cold forethought, such as conspiracy or drug
trafficking cases. ' 39
The temporal proximity of a defendant's crimes does not, by itself,
provide a valid reason for departure from the sentencing guidelines without
a finding of a persistent pattern of criminal conduct.4" A defendant's
efforts to cover up a crime do not constitute proper grounds for a departure
from the sentencing guidelines.41
C. Habitual Offender Sentences
The habitual offender law was designed "to allow enhanced penalties
for those defendants who meet objective guidelines indicating recidi-
vism."42  In determining whether a defendant satisfies the criteria for
habitual felony offender sentencing, the trial court must find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies as an habitual felony
offender.43 It is the defendant's burden to assert a pardon or to set aside a
prior conviction as an affirmative defense.4 When the state introduces
copies of the defendant's prior convictions and the defendant concedes the
validity of the convictions, the trial court's failure to make an express
finding that the prior convictions were not pardoned or set aside constitutes
harmless error.45 The habitual offender classification is permitted where
the predicate offense for which the defendant was convicted occurred after
the commission of the offense for which the defendant is being sen-
tenced.46
Although the state is required to provide notice of its intention to have
the defendant sentenced as an habitual offender,47 the purpose of the
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Cave v. State, 613 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 1993).
41. State v. Varner, 616 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993); Smith v. State, 620 So. 2d 187 (Fla.
1993).
42. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219, 223 (Fla. 1980).
43. Id. at 224.
44. Id. at 223.
45. State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1993); State v. Anderson, 613 So. 2d
465, 465 (Fla. 1993).
46. Perkowski v. State, 616 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1993).
47. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(3)(b) (1991).
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requirement of prior notice "is to advise of the state's intent and give the
defendant and the defendant's attorney an opportunity to prepare for the
hearing."4  Where the state fails to provide advance notice, but the
defendant and counsel had actual notice in time to prepare for the sentencing
hearing, the failure of the state to provide notice is a mere technical
violation which constitutes harmless error.49 A mere technical violation
does not rise to the level of actionable error.
A criminal defendant declared to be an habitual violent felony offender
is subject to enhanced punishment pursuant to the habitual offender
statute.50 The statute defines an "habitual violent felony offender" as a
person who has "previously been convicted of a felony or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit a felony and one or more of such convictions was for"
one of the enumerated violent felonies listed in the statute.' In Tillman
v. State,52 and Reeves v. State," the supreme court upheld a defendant's
sentence as an habitual violent felony offender even though the offense of
conviction was a nonviolent felony. Since the defendant's prior conviction
of a violent felony indicated the "incorrigible and dangerous character of the
accused and establishe[s] the necessity for enhanced restraint,""' the
supreme court determined that the enhanced penalties met the statutory
objective of punishing recidivism.55 The supreme court also held that the
habitual violent felony offender provisions did not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights concerning due process, double jeopardy, or ex post
facto laws.56
In considering what sentence to give an habitual offender, the supreme
court resolved a conflict within the districts by declaring that a defendant
convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as an
habitual offender.57 Curiously, notwithstanding the legislative intent of
48. Massey v. State, 609 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1992).
49. Id.
50. FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1991).
51. Id. § 775.084(l)(b).
52. 609 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 1992).
53. 612 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1992).
54. Tillman, 609 So. 2d at 1298.
55. This holding has been altered by Chapter 93-406 of the Laws of Florida, which
prohibits habitual offender sentencing if the current offense or one of the prior felonies is the
purchase or possession of drugs. Ch. 93-406, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2913 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1991)).
56. Tillman, 609 So. 2d at 1297-98; Merriweather v. State, 609 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1992).
57. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1992).
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severe punishment for habitual offenders, a trial judge has discretion to
place an habitual felony offender on probation. 8
D. Youthful Offenders
In State v. Arnette,59 the supreme court explained that a defendant
sentenced to prison and community control as a youthful offender maintains
that youthful offender status even upon a subsequent violation of community
control.6" Under the youthful offender statute, the maximum term of
imprisonment for a violation of community control is six years.6
E. Probation
A court is permitted to impose conditions of probation which are
reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation.62 When a defendant
challenges the relevance of a special condition of probation, the condition
is invalid if it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality. 63 Consequently, a condition of probation which prohibits the
use or possession of alcoholic beverages is improper where the offense was
not alcohol related and where the presentence investigation report contained
no suggestion that the defendant had a negative propensity toward alco-
hol.64
An uncounseled guilty plea to an offense will not support a revocation
of probation unless the defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel in
the earlier case.65 In order to shift the burden to the state to prove that the
convictions were counseled or that counsel was knowingly waived, a
defendant must do more than state under oath that no counsel was provided
in the prior proceedings.66 Utilizing the holding of State v. Beach,67 the
court held:
58. McKnight v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993).
59. 604 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1992).
60. Id. at 484.
61. FLA. STAT. § 958.14 (1991).
62. Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
63. Id. at 734-35.
64. Id. at 735.
65. State v. Rock, 605 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id.
67. 592 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1992).
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The defendant must assert four facts under oath in order to shift the
burden to the State: (1) that the offense involved was punishable by
more than six months of imprisonment or that the defendant was
actually subjected to a term of imprisonment; (2) that the defendant was
indigent, and thus, entitled to court-appointed counsel; (3) that counsel
was not appointed; and (4) that the right to counsel was not waived.68
An indigent defendant cannot be held to have violated probation due
to an inability to pay court-ordered restitution.69 If a probationer cannot
pay restitution or the costs of supervision, a court is required to consider
"alternative measures" of punishment other than imprisonment, such as
community service or similar measures which do not amount to community
control, probation, or imprisonment.7" A court has no ability to extend
probation upon a defendant's failure to pay, in the absence of finding that
the defendant willfully violated the terms of probation.71
F. Restitution
When restitution is made an original condition of probation, a court is
authorized to determine the amount of restitution at a later date, even
beyond sixty days after sentencing.7" Setting the amount of restitution
already authorized does not constitute the addition of a new condition of
probation."
Concern with the rights of crime victims continues to be an important
issue for the courts. In Hodge v. State,74 the court held that restitution
could be ordered for the reasonable value of the time necessarily spent and
the costs incurred by a theft victim in determining and documenting the
extent of loss as required by a fidelity bonding company.
68. Rock, 605 So. 2d at 458.
69. Hewett v. State, 613 So. 2d 1305, 1306-07 (Fla. 1993).
70. FLA. STAT. § 948.06(4) (1991).
71. Hewett, 613 So. 2d at 1307.
72. Gladfelter v. State, 618 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1993).
73. Id.
74. 603 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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III. DISCOVERY
A. Access To Information
Defining the limits of reciprocal discovery has been a vexing problem
for prosecutors and defense lawyers alike. In Lanes v. State,75 the Third
District held that a defendant does not elect to participate in discovery in a
criminal case by engaging in discovery in a parallel administrative
proceeding. The court noted that while Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.220(a)76 provides that "the defendant's taking of the deposition of any
person ... shall be an election to participate in discovery," the rule requires
"that the defendant must participate in the discovery process in the pending
criminal case in order to trigger the defendant's obligation to provide
reciprocal discovery to the state . . . ." The rule does not apply "to
discovery taken by the defendant in parallel administrative or civil proceed-
ings."5
78
A discovery deposition is not ordinarily admissible as substantive
evidence. However, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1900) 71 governs
the taking of depositions intended to perpetuate testimony. In Rodriguez v.
State,8" the supreme court held that, unless a party complies with the
requirements of Rule 3.190(0), a traditional discovery deposition is not
admissible as substantive evidence, even though all parties participated in
the deposition and the witness is otherwise unavailable at the time of
trial.8  Without the safeguards found in Rule 3.1900),82 which are
designed to ensure that both parties have an opportunity and motive to fully
develop the deposition testimony, a discovery deposition does not qualify for
admission as evidence.
The Rodriguez decision may not end the "deposition as evidence"
discussion. The supreme court "requested that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure Committee consider and make recommendations as to whether the
Criminal Rules should be amended to provide for the use of discovery
depositions as substantive evidence subject to certain safeguards which
75. 603 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
76. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
77. Llanes, 603 So. 2d at 1297-98.
78. Id.
79. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900).
80. Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, _ U.S. __ (1993).
81. Id. at 498-99.
82. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900).
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would be provided in the rules." 3 To date, the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure Committee has not acted on the court's referral.
B. Privacy Interests
Another of the more celebrated cases to reach the Florida Supreme
Court this year was Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe, 4 which involved the
Kathy Willets prostitution scandal. In July 1991, the Broward County
Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant for the home of Kathy Willets
and her husband, Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Willets, who were believed to be
involved in a criminal prostitution scheme. The police seized various pieces
of evidence, including a directory containing names and addresses, and other
lists stating the names, amounts paid, and sexual preferences of Kathy's
customers. When the state charged Kathy Willets with prostitution, and her
husband with living off the proceeds of prostitution, the defense requested
production of all materials seized during the search warrant, including
Kathy's list. Nervously, numerous John Does filed motions in the trial court
to deny public access to the pretrial discovery materials. Their concerns
were that release of the information would invade their privacy and damage
their personal and professional reputations. The trial court refused to
withhold release of the discovery, stating that people named on a prostitute's
client list have no reasonable expectation of privacy.85
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the John
Does possessed standing to challenge the release of the discovery materi-
als.86 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(m) provides that "[u]pon
request of any person, the court may permit any showing of cause for denial
or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of such showing to be made in
camera."87  In addition, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(l)8
allows the court to restrict disclosure of discovery to protect a witness from
"harassment, unnecessary inconvenience or invasion of privacy."89
Having allowed the John Does to litigate the disclosure, the court began
an analysis of criminal procedure rules, the public records law, and the
constitutional right to privacy. The public does not have a universal right
to all discovery materials, and courts may act to protect the privacy interests
83. Rodriguez, 609 So. 2d at 499 n.2.
84. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
85. Id. at 550.
86. Id.
87. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(m).
88. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(l).
89. Post-Newsweek, 612 So. 2d at 550-51.
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of litigants and third parties.9" The party seeking to prevent disclosure
bears the burden of proving that restricting access is necessary to prevent an
imminent threat to privacy rights. 9' When balanced against the policy that
public records are to be open for public inspection and that access to pretrial
discovery information should be limited only when necessary to protect the
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process, the supreme court
concluded that the John Does had no substantial privacy interest in their
names and addresses sufficient to negate production of the discovery. 92
With the right of access to discovery materials now firmly entrenched in
Florida jurisprudence, the moral of this case may well be that one must be
careful lest one's immorality becomes a public spectacle.
C. Discovery Violations
Discovery violations do not automatically mandate the imposition of
sanctions. In a criminal case, a trial court must consider all pertinent
circumstances before imposing sanctions for a discovery violation. When
sanctions are ordered, the court must impose the least severe sanction
necessary to address the violation.93 Excluding a witness as a sanction for
the state's failure to provide an address for the witness was found to be
erroneous because the trial court did not consider less severe sanctions, such
as ordering a continuance or directing the state to comply with the discovery
request.94
. A defendant offering an alibi witness is required to furnish the
prosecuting attorney with notice of an intent to call the witness, setting out
the name and address of the witness, at least ten days before trial.95 When
a defendant fails to provide advance notice, the trial court is required to
conduct a hearing to determine the circumstances of the defendant's failure
90. Id. at 553.
91. Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 118 (Fla. 1988).
92. Post-Newsweek, 612 So. 2d at 553.
93. Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
94. State v. Schwartz, 605 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The court
was mindful that the criminal process is intended to be a search for the truth:
In a system in which the search for truth is the principal goal, the severe
sanction of witness exclusion for failure to timely comply with the rules of
procedure should be a last resort and reserved for extreme or aggravated
circumstances, particularly when the excluded testimony relates to critical issues
or facts and the testimony is not cumulative.
Id. (quoting Austin, 461 So. 2d at 1381).
95. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200.
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to provide notice before ordering sanctions.96 As often as the courts have
repeated this message, trial courts continue to impose sanctions without
holding the required hearing,97 even though the few minutes needed for a
hearing is so much more efficient than a subsequent retrial of the entire
case.
IV. JUVENILE PROCEDURE
The courts, perhaps like many parents, are experiencing problems
controlling unruly juveniles. Therefore, the authorized procedure for
punishing a juvenile for contempt of court was an important issue for the
court in A.A. v. Rolle,98 which involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the incarceration of six children in secure detention facilities for
contempt of court. Chief Justice Barkett noted although juveniles can be
found in contempt of court, "juveniles may not be incarcerated for contempt
of court by being placed in secure detention facilities."99  The majority
opinion recognized that judges handling juvenile matters are often frustrated
by the deficiencies of Florida's juvenile justice system, and noted the
deficiencies were the result of a lack of adequate and meaningful fund-
ing.'0° The court noted the Legislature "has recognized the critical need
to provide appropriate placements or services for such children, but these
services have not been made available" to meet the needs of the chil-
dren. ' This is an area which is ripe for continued judicial attention, and
how involved the courts will become in overseeing the operation of
Florida's juvenile justice system is a serious question.
The Legislature also addressed some of the inadequacies of the juvenile
justice system,"' as it ordered the development of comprehensive, com-
munity-based juvenile programs and services. 13  The Legislature also
96. Small v. State, 608 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 621
So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993).
97. See Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
98. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
99. Id. at 818-19.
100. Id. at 819.
101. Id.
102. See Ch. 93-200, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 1799, 1800 (amending FLA. STAT. § 20.19
(Supp. 1992), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19(4)); Ch. 93-230, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws
2359, 2373 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045(9) (1991)); Ch. 93-408, 1993 Fla. Laws 2975.
103. Ch. 93-200, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 1799, 1800 (amending FLA. STAT. § 20.19 (Supp.
1992), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19(4)).
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authorized the release of the names of juvenile offenders adjudicated guilty
of capital, life, first, or second degree felonies involving a victim."0 4
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Right to Counsel
The right of the police to record or to intercept conversations between
a defendant and a co-defendant is severely restricted once the defendant has
been arrested and obtained counsel. In Peoples v. State,' °5 a defendant
obtained the services of defense counsel shortly after being arrested. After
the defendant was released on bail, the co-defendant, who had begun to
cooperate with the police, received permission from the police to record his
telephone conversations with the defendant. The recordings of these
conversations were admitted in evidence during the defendant's drug
trafficking trial. The supreme court found that the recordings were obtained
in violation of the defendant's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution.0 6 That right to counsel attaches at the earliest of three
points, as indicated in Rule 3.111(a):' 0 7 "[w]hen [a defendant] is formally
charged with a crime via the filing of an indictment or information, or as
soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at first appearance."'0 8 Plainly,
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel had attached and had been
invoked by the time the taped telephone conversations were made. In order
to avoid future confusion, the supreme court announced a bright line rule for
this situation: "[o]nce the section 16 right to trial counsel attaches and is
invoked, the State is barred from obtaining incriminating statements on a
charged offense by knowingly circumventing an accused's right to assistance
of counsel during a crucial encounter with the State."'0 9  In this case,
however, the introduction of the tape recordings at trial was deemed
harmless error.
104. Ch. 93-230, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws 2359, 2373 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045(9)
(1991)).
105. 612 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1992).
106. Id. at 556-67; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
107. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a).
108. Peoples, 612 So. 2d at 556 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 970 (Fla.
1992) (footnotes omitted)); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a).
109. Peoples, 612 So. 2d at 557; see Phillips v. State, 612 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1992) (right
to counsel under Florida and United States Constitutions attached upon appointment of
counsel at defendant's first appearance prior to initiation of adversarial proceeding).
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A trial court order prohibiting the defendant from speaking with
counsel during a recess immediately following direct examination of the
defendant, and prior to the defendant's cross-examination, implicates
constitutional protections and constitutes clear error which requires reversal,
unless there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the jury ver-
dict."O
B. Confessions and Admissions
The decision in State v. Guess.1. is convincing proof that Florida
courts are willing to utilize the Florida Constitution to guarantee rights
which are not protected by the United States Constitution. In Guess, the
supreme court held a trial court's refusal to receive the defendant's
testimony bn the voluntariness of a statement outside the presence of the
jury was error that is not subject to the harmless error analysis." 2 In so
holding, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the United States Supreme
Court holding in Arizona v. Fulminante,"3 which employed the harmless
error rule in situations involving the admission of an unconstitutionally
obtained confession. '14
The corpus delicti rule is a concept studied by every law student, but
promptly forgotten upon passing the Bar. Yet the rule is alive and well in
Florida, and is designed to limit the admission into evidence of a defen-
dant's confession in the absence of independent, substantial evidence which
proves the crime was committed." 5 The policy reason for the corpus delicti
rule is simple to understand: "[t]he judicial quest for truth requires that no
person be convicted out of derangement, mistake or official fabrication.""' 6
The rule is applicable to any statement by a defendant which tends to
establish or disprove a material fact in the case, including both confessions
and admissions against interest. ' 7  Circumstantial evidence remains
sufficient as a foundation for proving corpus delicti." 8
110. Amos v. State, 618 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1993).
Iii. 613 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1992).
112. Id.
113. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
114. Guess, 613 So. 2d at 407.
115. See Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 443 n.2 (Fla. 1993).
116. State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1976).
117. See Burks, 613 So. 2d at 444.
118. Id. at 443.
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C. Double Jeopardy
Traditionally, under a federal constitutional analysis, a defendant cannot
be subjected to multiple punishments and successive prosecutions for two
or more offenses which contain the same elements.119 This traditional test
has been referred to as the "Blockburger test."'2° Recently, in Grady v.
Corbin,2' the Supreme Court added another element to the Blockburger
test, holding that a subsequent prosecution must satisfy the "same conduct"
test to avoid the double jeopardy bar.'22 The "same conduct" test provides
that "if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted," a second prosecution
may not be had.'23 Three years later, citing substantial dissatisfaction with
the Grady analysis, the Supreme Court overruled the "same conduct" test
and reestablished the preeminence of the Blockburger test.2"
Another doctrine involving double .jeopardy is that of "manifest
necessity." A mistrial occasioned by "manifest necessity" enables a
defendant to be retried without violating the prohibition against double
jeopardy.'25 However, if a jury is discharged, before reaching a verdict,
for legally insufficient reasons and without the defendant's consent, the
discharge precludes a subsequent trial for the same offense.2 6 In Perkins
v. Graziano,'27 one juror was erroneously dismissed after the jury had
been sworn, based on the juror's misunderstanding that the trial had been
canceled. The court thereafter declared a mistrial and discharged the jury
without exploring the alternatives of continuing the case while attempting
to locate the sixth juror or determining the availability of an alternate.
119. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
120. Id.
121. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
122. Id. at 510.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993). The majority opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, is a fascinating exercise in distinguishing precedent and parsing
meaning from other authority. Additionally, Justice Scalia's pointed comments demonstrating
the errors of Justice Souter's analysis in Grady v. Corbin deserve close reading. Portions of
the discussion appear to suggest that Justice Souter actually miscited precedent. See id. at
2860-63.
125. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
126. State ex rel. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1956).
127. 608 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1993]
255
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
Because this situation did not constitute a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial,
the subsequent trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.12
Application of the "manifest necessity" standard for determining
whether a mistrial is appropriate requires a case-by-case analysis.'29
Courts have struggled with situations in which a trial participant or counsel
becomes ill or is viewed as unable to continue with the trial. 3° In
determining whether a particular trial event mandates the declaration of a
mistrial, the "Florida Constitution requires a trial judge to consider and
reject all possible alternatives before declaring a mistrial over the objection
of the defendant . . "'."' So, when a trial judge, sua sponte and without
considering and rejecting all possible alternatives, declared a mistrial based
on the subjective impression that defense counsel was not competent to
proceed with the trial because of illness, the defendant's double jeopardy
protection precluded a retrial. 32
D. Search and Seizure
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,133 a case certain to spawn extensive
litigation, the United States Supreme Court recognized the "plain feel"
doctrine, which authorizes the seizure of contraband detected through the
sense of touch during a patdown frisk. Using the analogy of the "plain
view" doctrine, the Court explained that a police officer lawfully engaged
in a patdown (where he or she can immediately identify an object as
contraband) is entitled to seize that property without a warrant. The
rationale is that there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons. 34  The
approval of this doctrine did not, however, salvage the seizure in Dickerson
because the police officer was unable to determine the incriminating
character of the object upon an initial feel. Instead, the officer conducted
a further exploratory search, which was not authorized by Terry v.
128. Id. at 533.
129. Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1993).
130. Perkins,608 So. 2d at 532; Cohens v. Elwell, 600 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Ostane v. Hickey, 385 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
131. Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1239.
132. Id. at 1239-40. The defendant specifically advised the court he believed his counsel
could proceed and he wanted to proceed with the trial. Id. at 1236.
133. 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
134. Id.
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Ohio.1' Because the further search was constitutionally invalid, the
seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional.
136
Identifying the circumstances which result in a voluntary abandonment
of property which is retrieved by the police was the subject of Hollinger v.
State. 37  Acknowledging the general rule that a seizure does not occur
until a person is actually physically subdued by an officer or submits to an
officer's show of authority,' the Florida Supreme Court held that where
a reasonable person, when approached by police officers clad in masks and
SWAT-team-type regalia, would not feel free to move, the subsequent
dropping of cocaine is the fruit of the officers' illegal seizure. Conse-
quently, contraband seized in such a case is properly suppressed.' 39
A similar situation resulted in a different conclusion in Perez v.
State,4 ° which involved a defendant who was chased by the police after
failing to heed a call to halt. The firearm which the defendant dropped
during the chase was declared by the court to have been abandoned, and the
recovery of the firearm was not an illegal seizure because the defendant vNas
not seized until he was actually caught by the police.' 4 ' The rationale for
the court's decision is simple: a defendant who flees from the police is not
subject to constitutional protections until apprehended, while a defendant
who remains pursuant to the police show of authority is entitled to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.'
135. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing a less intrusive "pat down" search as valid
on less than probable cause).
136. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
137. 620 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1993).
138. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
139. Hollinger, 620 So. 2d at 1243.
140. 620 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 1993).
141. Id. at 1258.
142. See id. Perez contains an interesting philosophical discussion of precedent and the
nature of stare decisis. Perez held that the Florida Supreme Court "is bound to follow the
United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and to provide no
greater protection than those interpretations." Id. Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Shaw
and Kogan dissented, concluding that the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution incorporated only the existing opinions of the United States Supreme
Court and not future opinions. Id. at 1266, 1270. Justice Kogan declared that in view of the
"precipitous retreat from its own precedent that characterizes the... [Supreme] Court today,"
no one envisioned that the Supreme Court would take away those rights which were
recognized and approved by the precedent existing when the 1982 amendment was approved.
Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1270. Curiously, Justice Overton, who first stated the view that the
1982 amendment applied only to existing Supreme Court precedent and not to future
interpretations, Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 994 (1988) (Overton, J., concurring in
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When a motor vehicle is lawfully stopped by a law enforcement officer
and the driver consents to a search of the vehicle, that consent extends to the
search of a closed paper bag found within the vehicle.'43 Further, the
United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Padilla'4 that the
rule regarding standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or
seizure is not subject to a "co-conspirator exception." The Court rejected
this exception, that "a co-conspirator obtains a legitimate expectation of
privacy ...if he has either a supervisory role in the conspiracy or joint
control over the place or property involved in the search or seizure.""'
VI. TRIAL ISSUES
A. Evidence
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is not applicable to situations
involving child abuse or neglect, by action of the statutory requirement to
report child abuse. 146  The statute essentially waives the psychotherapist
privilege with regard to communications concerning child abuse. 47
Consequently, as part of the discovery process in a criminal case, a
defendant is entitled to examine a psychotherapist or psychologist concern-
ing communications he or she had with the victims of child abuse.148
The accident investigation privilege is designed to ensure that accident
information may be compelled from individuals involved in traffic accidents
without compromising constitutional protections.'49 But, the accident
investigation privilege cannot be used to bar the introduction of a driver's
statements regarding a traffic accident where the driver was never advised
he was obligated to answer questions, and where the driver was given his
judgment), nevertheless concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis mandated that the court
follow the existing precedent in Bernie, and incorporate all of Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment precedent. Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1259. Given the likelihood of future changes
in the membership of the Florida Supreme Court, this issue may be revisited.
143. State v. Hester, 618 So. 2d 1365, 1366 (Fla. 1993).
144. 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1937 (1993).
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 415.512 (1991).
147. Jett v. State, 605 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc), review
granted, 620 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1993).
148. Id. at 928.
149. See State v. Norstrom, 613 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4)
(1991).
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Miranda rights. 5 ' The accident investigation privilege can be summarized
as follows: the accident investigation privilege is applicable if no Miranda
warnings are given; if a law enforcement officer gives any indication to a
defendant that the defendant must respond to questions concerning the
investigation, the officer must clearly state that "this is now a criminal
investigation," and follow immediately with Miranda warnings before any
statement by the defendant may be admitted against that defendant at
trial."'
In prosecuting drug offenses, prosecutors often attempt to utilize expert
testimony to explain the operation of drug organizations and the impact of
certain conduct taken by the defendants. Prosecutors often seek to introduce
this evidence in the form of expert opinion testimony. A limitation on the
ability of the prosecution to introduce expert opinion testimony is the result
of the decision in Ruth v. State.' In a prosecution for maintaining an
aircraft used for keeping or selling drugs, concealing aircraft registration
numbers, and aircraft registration fraud, the state introduced the expert
opinion of a customs agent that the aircraft was used to smuggle narcotics.
This opinion regarding the purported use of the aircraft addressed a
necessary element of the charged crime. The appellate court, recognizing
the considerable impact opinion testimony can have, held the evidence was
inadmissible because it constituted an opinion on the ultimate issue involved
in the trial."'
A defendant may not be convicted solely upon the basis of an expert
opinion as to the actual commission of the ultimate act which consti-
tutes the commission of the crime charged. Such a situation clearly
runs afoul of the ultimate issue rule. Without evidence of the actual
presence of drugs in connection with the use of the plane, it was error
to admit [the customs officer's] opinion testimony.'54
150. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
151. Norstrom, 613 So. 2d at 440-41. In State v. Riley, 617 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), the court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST-ACCI-
DENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL NOT IN POLICE CUSTODY
AND NOT GIVEN WARNINGS PURSUANT TO MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER SECTION 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES
(1991).
Id. at 341.
152. 610 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id.
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The court also held that the opinion was "purely speculation" and was not
based on facts or inferences supported by the evidence.'55 Without factual
support for the opinion, the erroneous opinion evidence invaded the
province of the jury. The defendant's conviction was, accordingly,
reversed. '56
Impeaching a witness through a prior felony conviction or a conviction
for an offense involving moral turpitude should be a rather simple process.
Yet, lawyers continue to attempt impeachment in a manner which informs
the jury of the underlying crime, which is almost always error. An
unsuccessful impeachment attempt occurred in Tampling v. State,157 where
the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant, asking whether the defendant
had been convicted of jury tampering. As surprising as it might seem for
a prosecutor to attempt that type of impeachment, it is inexplicable that the
trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection. 5 ' As a result, the
defendant's conviction was reversed, and the appellate court gave a lengthy
explanation instructing the parties on the only permissible method for
impeaching a witness by conviction of a prior crime:
[T]he prosecutor is permitted to attack the defendant's credibility by
asking whether the defendant has ever been convicted of a felony or a
crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and how many times. If
the defendant admits the number of prior convictions, the prosecutor is
not permitted to ask further questions regarding prior convictions, nor
question the defendant as to the nature of the crimes. If, however, the
defendant denies a conviction, the prosecutor can impeach him by
introducing a certified record of the conviction. The prosecutor is not
permitted to ask the defendant questions about prior convictions unless
the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant has been convicted of
a crime and has evidence necessary for impeachment if the defendant
fails to admit the number of convictions for such crimes. The proper
method to impeach the witness who answers the question regarding his
prior convictions incorrectly, is to offer a certified record of the
witness's prior convictions, which will necessarily reveal the nature of
the crimes. It is improper for the prosecutor or questioning party to
name the specific crimes or to state the nature of the crimes.'59
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id.
157. 610 So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 101-02; (quoting Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)).
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The supreme court had an opportunity to evaluate the admissibility of
DNA test results in Robinson v. State.60 While the court did not give a
green light to the admission of DNA evidence in every case, the court
nevertheless found the prosecution presented sufficient evidence demonstrat-
ing the reliability of the DNA testing method, while the defendant produced
neither evidence nor authority that questioned the general scientific
acceptance of the testing. 6' Consequently, the court held that the defen-
dant had not demonstrated abuse of the trial court's discretion regarding the
admissibility of DNA test results.1
62
Meanwhile, as the Florida Supreme Court was reiterating traditional
reliance on the "general acceptance" test for the admission of scientific
evidence, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded the "general acceptance" test for admissibility of
scientific evidence first established in Frye v. United States.163 In Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,64 the Court noted that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate a "general acceptance"
standard as a prerequisite to admissibility.'65 In determining whether
scientific evidence is admissible, the Supreme Court set out the following
standard:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodolo-
gy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake
this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.' 66
160. 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
161. Id. at 1291.
162. Id. DNA profile evidence introduced by the prosecution in a burglary and sexual
battery offense obtained judicial approval in Toranzo v. State, 608 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), review dismissed, 613 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1993).
163. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
164. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
165. Id. at 2794.
166. Id. at 2796 (footnotes omitted).
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Among the factors considered important by the Court were whether the
scientific methodology has been tested, whether the scientific theory has
been subjected to peer review, the known or potential rate of error, and the
level of support within the scientific community. The approach, the Court
emphasized, is "a flexible one."' 67
Given the similarity between Rule 702168 and the Florida analog,'69
the relevant question after Daubert was whether the Florida Supreme Court
would abandon the "general acceptance" test and move toward the more
flexible approach espoused by the Supreme Court. That did not happen
when the court was asked to approve "sexual offender profile evidence" in
Flanagan v. State.' 70 There, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the
"general acceptance" test in concluding that "sexual offender profile
evidence" is not generally accepted in the scientific community and
therefore does not meet the test of admissibility for use in a sexual battery
prosecution. The court acknowledged the decision in Daubert,'7' but
stated firmly that "Florida continues to adhere to the Frye test for admissi-
bility of scientific opinions."'
172
The admissibility of similar fact evidence in a sexual battery case led
the supreme court to conduct a thorough analysis of the admissibility of
other crimes evidence in Williams v. State.173 There, the court acknowl-
edged that evidence of other criminal activity may be prejudicial, but is
subject to a "broad rule of admissibility based on relevancy ....
Especially in a sexual battery case, other nonconsensual sexual encounters
which are factually similar may well be probative of the defendant's
common plan or scheme to seek out particular victims and to rebut a
defense of consensual sex. When admitted, the court noted, the evidence
should not be "made the focal point of [the] trial" and "proper cautionary
instructions" should be given.' 75
167. Id. at 2797 (footnote omitted).
168. FED. R. EvID. 702.
169. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1991).
170. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S475 (Fla. Sept. 9, 1993).
171. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
172. Flanagan, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at S476 n.2.
173. 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993).
174. Id. at 414.
175. Id. at 417.
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B. Jury Selection
In State v. Aldret, 76 the supreme court explained that "the state has
standing to object to a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and . . . the Florida Constitu-
tion."'77  In evaluating a claim of discriminatory peremptory challenges,
a trial court has abundant discretion in fashioning the appropriate remedy in
order to protect the constitutional rights of the parties.
178
It is now well settled that neither the state nor the defense is permitted
to exercise a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory or biased man-
ner. "'79 Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on peremptory challenges
utilizes the abuse of discretion standard, so long as the lower tribunal's
determination does not result from an incorrect application of the law. 80
Trial counsel must properly preserve the issue of alleged racial bias in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. In Joiner v. State,'8' the supreme
court instructed lawyers that moving to strike the jury panel is not the only
way to preserve a Neil 2 objection for review. A party sufficiently
preserves the issue by renewing the objection or by accepting a jury subject
to an earlier Neil objection.'83
When a party raises an objection that a peremptory challenge is being
utilized in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial court is required to
conduct an inquiry during which the offending party must provide a racially
neutral justification for exercising a peremptory strike.8 4  "[T]he proper
remedy in all cases where a trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry
is to reverse and remand for a new trial.' 85
176. 606 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1992).
177. Id. at 1458; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
178. Id. at 1157; Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1992).
179. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
Black Americans are not the only protected ethnic group. The protection against discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges was extended to hispanics as a cognizable ethnic group in State
v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1993).
180. Files v. State, 613 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Fla. 1992).
181. 618 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1993).
182. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (holding that presumption of constitution-
al use of peremptory challenges may be rebutted by a timely objection followed by a showing
that such challenge was based solely on race).
183. See Joiner, 618 So. 2d at 176.
184. State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22 (Fla. 1993).
185. Id. at 1322; see also Valentine v. State, 616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1993). In Valentine,
the supreme court noted that "reversal would have been unnecessary if the trial court had
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C. Speedy Trial
The supreme court finally adopted a speedy trial rule for civil traffic
infractions in an attempt to remedy "the effect on an individual of outstand-
ing pending civil traffic infractions for an unreasonable time."' 86 Rule
6.325187 requires that "every defendant charged with a noncriminal traffic
infraction shall be brought to trial within 180 days of the date the alleged
infraction took place." If trial is not commenced within 180 days, the
defendant is entitled to dismissal of the infraction charged.' 88
When a trial date is set beyond the speedy trial time, and defense
counsel does not lodge an objection to the date, the defendant has not
waived the right to speedy trial. 89 The defendant or counsel must make
some affirmative statement in support of the trial date or request the
particular setting in order to waive speedy trial rights.
While defense counsel's devotion to a client is absolutely essential to
the proper operation of our criminal justice system, counsel must neverthe-
less play by the rules, even if fair play disadvantages the client. One such
example of defense counsel's failure to stay within the limits of appropriate
advocacy is found in State v. Reaves,'9" in which that court determined
that defense counsel played fast and loose in attempting to obtain a speedy
trial discharge. Counsel filed a demand for speedy trial in a pleading
entitled "Demand Pursuant To Rule 3.191(a)(2)" without including in the
caption the phrase "Demand for Speedy Trial." As anticipated by defense
counsel, the clerk of court, whose duty it is to notify the court of a speedy
trial demand and set a date for a calendar call, did not recognize the motion
as a speedy trial demand. The appellate court did not appreciate counsel's
calculating efforts. To prevent such miscarriages of justice in the future, the
court declared that Rule 3.191 "mandates the use of the phrase 'Demand for
Speedy Trial' in the captioning of that demand."' 9' In reversing the trial
simply followed Slappy's clear directive and resolved all doubt in favor of the objector. Our
holding in Johans will hopefully minimize such costly and frustrating errors-where a lengthy
and expensive trial is foredoomed at its very beginning for lack of a five-minute inquiry."
Id. at 975 (citations omitted).
186. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Practice and Proc. for Traffic Courts, 608
So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1992).
187. FLA. R. TRAFF. CT. 6.325.
188. Id.
189. Rivas v. Oppenbom, 605 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
190. 609 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1993).
191. Id. at 708.
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court's speedy trial discharge, the appellate court chastised defense counsel
for violating both the letter and the spirit of the oath of attorneys, finding
counsel had acted in a manner which subverted the cause of justice.'92
The court did not consider it significant that defense counsel's actions
initially led to the client's discharge.
D. Venue
Given the escalating number of high profile criminal cases in Florida,
determining where a fair trial can be held requires considerable effort.
Either the state or the defendant in a criminal case may move for a change
of venue "on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
county where the case is pending for any reason other than the interest and
prejudice of the trial judge."'9 3 As a consequence of the notoriety associ-
ated with moving a criminal trial to another county, the Florida Legislature
recently amended the law relating to venue in criminal cases. The
amendment requires a court, after ordering a change of venue, to give
priority to any county which closely resembles the demographic composition
of the original venue.'94
The impetus for the change of venue legislation was the celebrated case
of Lozano v. State,'95 involving a Miami police officer who was tried for
and convicted of two counts of manslaughter in connection with a highly
publicized shooting. The third district reversed the convictions and ordered
a new trial, holding that the failure to grant Lozano's motion for a change
of venue denied him the right to a fair trial.'96 On remand, the trial court
granted a change of venue, ordering the case removed to Orlando. Then,
sua sponte, the court reconsidered the venue change "in light of the widely
publicized Los Angeles riots and the racial makeup of the Orlando
area," 97 and transferred the trial to Tallahassee.
This game of movable trials caused the chief judge of the Second
Judicial Circuit to issue a sua sponte order removing and remanding the case
back to Orlando. The Florida Supreme Court, concerned with the public's
perception of the court system as a "ping-pong game" which undermined
192. Id. at 709.
193. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.240(a).
194. Ch. 93-225, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws. 2336, 2337 (amending FLA. STAT. § 910.03
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. 910.03(2)).
195. 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 595 So. 2d 558 (Fla.
1992).
196. Id. at 23.
197. State v. Gary, 609 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 1992).
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confidence in the judicial function, declared that "absent extraordinary
circumstances, a trial judge's order granting a change of venue may not be
reviewed by a successor trial judge in the new venue. Once such an order
has been issued, it must be honored in the new venue unless and until a
proper appellate court rules otherwise."' 98
E. Jury Instructions
Under Florida law, a party is entitled to an instruction on a permissive
lesser included offense when both the accusatory pleading and the evidence
support the commission of that offense.' 99 In State v. Von Deck,00 the
court answered the question of whether aggravated assault on a police
officer is a lesser included offense of the attempted murder of a police
officer. In that case, the defendant objected to the state's requested
instruction on the permissive lesser included offense of aggravated assault,
arguing that all the elements of this offense were not contained in the
information. The defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault and
appealed. The supreme court held that the prosecution is obligated to allege
a "putting in fear" element whenever it seeks an instruction on the
permissive lesser included offense of aggravated assault. 20 ' Because the
attempted murder information did not allege that necessary element, the trial
court should not have instructed the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser
included offense.20 2
In Taylor v. State, °3 the supreme court explained the distinction
between category-one "necessarily lesser included offenses" and category-
two "permissive lesser included offenses. 20 4 When "the commission of
one offense always results in the commission of another, the latter offense
is a category-one necessarily lesser included offense., 2 1 If the lesser
offense has at least one statutory element not contained in the greater, it
cannot be a category-one necessarily lesser included offense, but may be a
category-two permissive lesser included offense if all the required elements
198. Id. at 1294. The Lozano trial ultimately took place in Orlando, and resulted in an
acquittal on all counts. The result caused no riots in any community.
199. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1968).
200. 607 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1992).
201. Id. at 1389.
202. Id.
203. 608 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1992).
204. Id. at 805.
205. Id. (citing State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1991)).
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are alleged in the accusatory pleadings and proven at trial.2" 6 In determin-
ing whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction,
the trial court must analyze the charging document to see if the necessary
elements of the lesser offense are included.
When a jury asks a question during deliberations, the trial judge must
give counsel an opportunity to be heard before answering the jury's
question."' The failure to observe this rule constitutes per se reversible
error without regard to the harmless error rule.2" 8 Similarly, it is per se
reversible error when a trial court, in responding to a jury's request for
additional instructions, forwards the entire set of written instructions to the
jury without providing prior notice to the parties.20 9
F. Entrapment
In State v. Hunter,1 ° the supreme court held as violative of due
process the practice in cases where the informant's contingent fee was
conditioned on the giving of testimony. In those instances, the defense of
objective entrapment was permitted.21" ' The use of a paid confidential
informant to solicit the defendant's participation in criminal activity does not
violate due process, however, where payments to the informant were not
conditioned on the giving of trial testimony or on the obtaining of an
arrest.21 2
In Munoz v. State,1 3 the supreme court ruled that the objective
entrapment test has been abolished by the Legislature. The court analyzed
the subjective entrapment test still in use, and validated the two part test: (1)
whether the government agent induced the charged offense, and (2) whether
the accused was predisposed to commit the offense. The court acknowl-
edged that while entrapment is ordinarily a jury question, a trial judge has
the authority to rule on entrapment as a matter of law where the facts are
206. Id.
207. Mills v. State, 620 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1993).
208. Id. at 1007 n.l (citing Cherry v. State 572 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
209. State v. Franklin, 618 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1993).
210. 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1991).
211. Id. at 321.
212. State v. Sargent, 617 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. State,
612 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993); State
v. Ramos, 608 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 617 So. 2d 321
(Fla. 1993).
213. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S537 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
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not in dispute and the state fails to muster sufficient evidence of predisposi-
tion.
In Fruetel v. State,2"4 the appellate court held that the state's actions
constituted entrapment as a matter of law when a defendant, with no prior
criminal history, who was not the subject of an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion, was contacted by an informer whose sentence was subject to reduction
if he provided evidence which would lead to a drug arrest.215 The
informant in that case furnished the defendant with the money needed to
purchase drugs and even advised the defendant on how to proceed with the
drug transaction. The record revealed that the informant "acted in the drug
transaction without supervision and the record does not contain any evidence
that would show the police 'utilized means reasonably tailored to apprehend
only those already involved in ongoing criminal activity.""'2 6 Under those
circumstances, the Fourth District did not hesitate to reverse the defendant's
drug convictions and order the defendant's discharge.2"7 In light of the
judicial concern with the possibility that informants might fabricate evidence
in order to obtain a substantial personal benefit, law enforcement would be
wise to develop criteria for strict control and supervision of a cooperating
individual.
The illegal manufacture of crack cocaine by law enforcement officials
for use in reverse-sting operations constitutes governmental misconduct
which violates the due process clause of the Florida Constitution.2"8
Therefore, a conviction for purchasing drugs manufactured by law
enforcement officers is improper. In such a case, the supreme court has
expressed its concern with law enforcement officers who choose to use
methods which "cannot be countenanced with a sense of justice and
fairness." '219
VII. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSES
A. Driving Offenses
While driving a motor vehicle is generally regarded as a privilege and
214. 609 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
215. Id at 699.
216. Id. at 700.
217. Id.
218. State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1993).
219. Id. at 467.
[Vol. 1 8
268
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Kuehne
not a right, most drivers consider driving to be a necessity. A suspension
or revocation of driving privileges may have enormous practical conse-
quences to a driver. The Department of Motor Vehicles has authority to
seek review of an order reinstating the privilege to drive by petitioning for
certiorari review from the order of the lower tribunal.22 ° The standard of
review remains a determination of whether the court departed from the
essential requirements of the law.
Defendants routinely challenge the admissibility of blood alcohol test
results based on the failure of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS") to promulgate rules establishing standards for the use,
maintenance, testing, and upkeep of testing equipment. In Mehl v.
State,22' the court found that HRS met the statutory requirement of
providing an approved method of administration of the blood test.
Nevertheless, in order to promote public knowledge of testing requirements,
the supreme court declared that:
beginning at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1994, the State shall not be
allowed the benefit of the presumptions established in § 316.1934,
Florida Statutes (1989), unless (a) the [S]tate has established reasonable
definite rules specifying the precise methods of blood alcohol testing
that are approved for use in this State, and (b) the State and its agencies
substantially comply with these rules. Of course, even when the
presumption is not available, the State should still have the benefit of
the Robertson analysis, upon a proper request.
Continued problems with blood alcohol testing may have led to the
Mehl decision. For example, in Robertson v. State,223 the question before
the court was whether the prosecution should be permitted to introduce into
evidence test results of blood samples taken at the request of a law
enforcement officer if the statutory requirements were not satisfied.224
The court held that even if the person conducting the blood test was not
220. State Dept. of Highway Safety v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
221. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S487 (Fla. Sept. 16, 1993).
222. Id. at S488.
223. 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1992).
224. Id. at 787. The blood sample in Robertson was taken by a nurse at the direction
of an investigating police officer, who was attempting to gather evidence for a drunk driving
investigation. Id. at 786. The blood was analyzed by a licensed physician, who did not have
a valid HRS permit for the purpose of performing a blood-alcohol test pursuant to section
316.1933(2), Florida Statutes (1987).
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licensed by HRS, the test results are nevertheless admissible, provided that
the blood was drawn by a person authorized to do so by the implied consent
statute, 225 and the prosecution can establish that the test was reliable, was
performed by a qualified operator with proper equipment, and an expert
provides competent testimony concerning the meaning of the test.226
Drunk driving continues to have extraordinary consequences, beyond
what many casual drinkers may believe. A trial court has the power to
impose any valid condition of probation that serves a rehabilitative purpose.
For example, a condition of probation requiring the defendant to place and
pay for a newspaper ad consisting of the defendant's mug shot, name, and
the caption "DUI-convicted" was an allowable sanction.227
Yet another example of the dangers of drugs and the serious conse-
quences for those caught in possession of drugs is found in Lite v. State.228
There, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section 322.055(1)
of the Florida Statutes,229 which requires the revocation of the driving
license of those persons convicted of possession, sale, or trafficking of
controlled substances. The law was declared to be constitutional against a
claim that it violated substantive due process.
2 31
B. Burglary
What constitutes possession of "burglary tools" was discussed by the
court in Green v. State.23 ' There, the court considered the following
question: "[a]re items of personal apparel, such as common gloves, included
under the terms 'tool, machine, or implement' as used in section 810.06, [of
the] Florida Statutes?" 23 2 The court held that while "[c]ommon household
objects, which . . . might have a useful and lawful purpose, may be
classified as burglary tools if they are used with the intent to commit a
burglary," gloves and other items of personal apparel "are not objects which
225. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933(2)(a) (1987), includes a list of qualified health care
professionals. The Legislature amended the statute in 1991 to include other categories of
healthcare professionals. Ch. 91-255, §§ 2-3, 1991 Fla. Laws 2442, 2448 (amending FLA.
STAT. §§ 316.1932, 316.1933 (1989)).
226. Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 791.
227. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618
So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1993).
228. 617 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1993).
229. FLA. STAT. § 322.055(1) (Supp. 1990).
230. Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1059.
231. 604 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1992).
232. Id. at 472.
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actually facilitate the breaking and entering of a dwelling." '233 Conse-
quently, the court gave a plain and ordinary meaning to the statute and
declined to extend the definition of "tool, machine, or implement" to articles
of clothing. 34
C. Kidnapping
A kidnapping conviction requires proof of the forced movement or
confinement of the victim during the commission of another felony.235 In
Walker v. State,236 the supreme court revisited the question of what
constitutes movement in a kidnapping context. The court reiterated the
existing rule that
for a kidnapping conviction to stand, the resulting movement or
confinement (a) must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely
incidental to the other offense; (b) must not be of the kind inherent in
the nature of the other offense; and (c) must have some significance
independent of the other offense in that it makes the other offense
substantially easier to commit or substantially lessens the risk of
detection.237
The particular circumstances in Walker did not meet that test, because the
limited movement of the robbery victims was slight and inconsequential, and
was merely incidental to the robbery.23
D. Hate Crimes
The continuing escalation of hate crimes throughout Florida and the
country has led to the enactment of "hate crimes" statutes. The statutes are
233. Id. at 473.
234. Id.
235. Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).
236. 604 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1992).
237. Id. at 477.
238. Id. In Walker, the defendant entered a convenience store, took money from the
cash register, and then ordered all occupants of the store to go to the back room and lie on
the floor. Three victims moved a short distance away but did not lie down. The fourth
victim moved a shorter distance after the defendant threatened to shoot. The defendant
immediately left the store. The court noted that the victims were not bound, blindfolded,
barricaded inside a room, or dragged from room to room. Id. at 476. But see Faison, 426
So. 2d at 965-66; Marsh v. State, 546 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Johnson v.
State, 509 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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designed to outlaw discrimination in the selection of a crime victim." 9
The Florida "hate crimes" law enhances the penalties for the commission of
any felony or misdemeanor which is motivated by bigotry and preju-
dice.24° In this term, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Wisconsin statute. 24' The statute provided for enhancement
of a criminal sentence whenever the defendant intentionally selects the
victim based on the victim's race. The Court found that the statute did not
violate free speech rights.242
Although the Florida Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitution-
ality of the similarly drafted Florida hate crimes law,243 the statute was
ruled constitutional in Dobbins v. State.244 "[I]t is the act of discrimina-
tion against people because of their race, color or religion by making them
victims of crime that is prohibited and punished, not the specific opinion
that leads to that discrimination. 245
E. Fraud
The Florida statewide prosecutor is authorized by statute to prosecute
certain crimes that occur within two or more judicial circuits. 246 The prior
version of the statewide prosecutor statute provided jurisdiction for offenses
which included "criminal fraud" as an actionable crime. 247  The court in
State v. Nuckolls 2 48 gave an expansive definition of criminal fraud for
purposes of statewide prosecutor jurisdiction. The court held that the
239. E.g., Federal Religion Vandalism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1989); Federal Hate
Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1991).
240. FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1991).
241. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The Supreme Court distinguished
the Wisconsin statute from the hate crimes ordinance found unconstitutional in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), because the ordinance in R.A. V punished protected
public expression. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196.
242. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196.
243. The Florida Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of the Florida hate
crimes law in State v. Stalder, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992). The parties presented oral
argument on September 1, 1992.
244. 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewgranted, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992).
245. Id. at 925-26.
246. FLA. STAT. § 16.56(1)(a) (Supp. 1992).
247. Id. Effective April 8, 1992, section 16.56 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, was
amended to delete the reference to "criminal fraud" and substitute "any crime involving, or
resulting in, fraud or deceit upon any person." FLA. STAT. § 16.56(1)(a) (Supp. 1992); Ch.
92-108, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 906, 907 (amending FLA. STAT. § 16.56 (1991)).
248. 606 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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Legislature intended to incorporate a variety of violations which fell within
the generic heading of criminal fraud, rather than limit the reach of the
statute to a particular fraud crime.
249
F. Lewd and Lascivious Conduct
Florida law authorizes the prosecution of any person who "[k]nowingly
commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child under the
age of 16 years without committing the crime of sexual battery ....
The defendant in State v. Werner25 was charged with a violation of the
lewd and lascivious conduct statute as a result of his act of masturbating in
the presence of his 13-month-old daughter. At trial, the defense moved for
a judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove that the child
victim was actually aware of the lewd and lascivious act, as opposed to
merely being present when the act occurred. 5
The supreme court, in an exercise of statutory interpretation, deter-
mined that the meaning of "presence" as used in section 800.04(4),
"encompasses sensory awareness as well as physical proximity." '253 The
court was of the view that incorporating an awareness element was legally
correct and made practical sense. The court held that
[a]pplying the legal as well as the common-sense meaning of the word
'presence' to section 800.04(4), leads us to the conclusion that, while
the child need not be able to articulate or even comprehend what the
offender is doing, the child must see or sense that a lewd or lascivious
act is taking place for a violation to occur.254
The child victim in this case was too young to be aware of the father's
masturbation.
G. Public Corruption
In a potential benefit to prosecutors pursuing public corruption cases,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the "official misconduct"
249. Id. at 1207.
250. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (1992) (emphasis added).
251. 609 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1992).
252. Id. at 586.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 587.
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statute in Bauer v. State.255 The statute defining "official misconduct" '56
contains a general intent element of knowing that the act was unlawful, and
requires a specific intent only insofar as proving that the defendant intended
to cause a benefit to himself or harm to another.257 In this type of public
corruption case, a prosecutor need only prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge that the actions taken were wrongful and unlawful, and that the
defendant intended to reap a benefit or harm another. This statutory
analysis is likely to expand the possible uses of the statute to prosecute
public corruption cases.
H. Contempt
A direct criminal contempt results when offending conduct is commit-
ted in the actual presence of a judge.258 It may be punished summarily by
the judge who saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt. In
contrast, indirect criminal contempt, defined by Rule 3.840,259 concerns
conduct that has occurred outside the presence of the judge.26 ° The
indirect criminal contempt procedure requires that all procedural aspects of
the criminal justice process be accorded a defendant, including a charging
document, an answer, the right to bail, an arraignment, and a hearing. A
defendant is entitled to representation by counsel, may compel the
attendance of witnesses, and may testify.26" ' In Gidden v. State, the court
255. 609 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 613 So. 2d I (Fla.
1993).
256. Section 839.25 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) "Official misconduct" means the commission of the following act by
a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or another
or to cause unlawful harm to another:
(a) Knowingly refraining, or causing another to refrain, from performing
a duty imposed upon him by law; or
(b) Knowingly falsifying, or causing another to falsify, any official record
or official document.
(2) "Corrupt" means done with knowledge that the act is wrongful and
with improper motives.
(3) Official misconduct under this section is a felony of the third degree
FLA. STAT. § 839.25 (1991). This statute was amended in 1991 by eliminating subsection
(I)(a) as a form of official misconduct.
257. Bauer, 609 So. 2d at 610.
258. Gidden v. State, 613 So. 2d 457, 460 (Fla. 1993).
259. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840.
260. Gidden, 613 So. 2d at 460.
261. Id.
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held that the defendant may be charged with indirect criminal contempt for
failing to appear as required by his conditions of bond.262
In finding the defendant guilty of indirect criminal contempt, a court
is required to, at a minimum, announce oral findings on the record.263
"[W]ritten findings are discretionary, not mandatory. 264  This is in
contrast to the exacting requirements of direct criminal contempt, which
mandate that the "judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of
those facts upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. 265
I. Concealed Weapons
Whether a firearm is "readily accessible for immediate use" within the
meaning of the concealed weapon statute266 continues to be an elusive
concept. In Ridley v. State,267 the police located a gun under the driver's
seat of a car, and found ammunition for the gun and a fully loaded clip
under the passenger's seat. This location and accessibility of the firearm
and ammunition made the firearm readily accessible for immediate use for
purposes of' securing a concealed weapon conviction. 26' This conclusion
prompted a dissent from Justice Kogan, who analogized an empty gun to
one which is carried in the vehicle while "securely encased. 269  The
carrying of a "securely encased" weapon in a vehicle is not a crime.27°
Justice Kogan found the court's contrary conclusion to be inconsistent with
the statutory rationale which favors the "lawful use, ownership, and
possession of firearms and other weapons. 27'
J. Loitering
Although municipalities typically utilize loitering statutes for the
purpose of policing areas of the community, such ordinances are of
questionable constitutionality. Three such ordinances, which prohibited
262. Id.
263. Id at 459.
264. Id. (citing Gidden v. State, 593 So. 2d 294, 294-95 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
265. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.830 (emphasis added).
266. FLA. STAT. § 790.01(2) (1992).
267. 621 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1993).
268. Id. See Ashley v. State, 619 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1993) (an unloaded gun in a car with
no ammunition anywhere in the car is not readily accessible for immediate use, but an
unloaded gun underneath the seat with bullets lying in open view is readily accessible).
269. Ridley, 621 So. 2d at 410 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
270. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.25(5) (1991).
271. Ridley, 621 So. 2d at 410 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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loitering for the purposes of engaging in drug-related activity,2"2 soliciting
for prostitution,273 and illegally using a controlled substance,274 were
declared unconstitutional on the basis of vagueness, overbreadth, and a
violation of substantive due process. In light of the court's clear distaste for
loitering ordinances, municipalities would do well to develop other methods
of protecting the citizenry.
VIII. FORFEITURE
In a case having substantial consequences for the government in
forfeiture cases, the supreme court precluded the RICO forfeiture of
homestead property, finding that the constitutional provision exempting
homesteads from forced sale was intended to guarantee that homestead
property be preserved against any involuntary divestiture by the courts.27
This decision may make forfeiture much more difficult in Florida, especially
in view of the generous definition given to homestead property in the
Florida Constitution.276
Because forfeiture of property is a harsh sanction, the Florida Supreme
277Court has strictly construed the forfeiture statute. A person challenging
a forfeiture must be in a position to demonstrate a recorded title or
compliance with the requirements for receiving title.278 For example, in
Byrom v. Gallagher, there was an attempted forfeiture of an airplane.
Byrom asserted an interest in the airplane based on his prior purchase of the
plane. Unfortunately for the claimant, the registration of Byrom's owner-
ship by the Federal Aviation Administration had not taken place as of the
time the airplane was seized. Consequently, the circuit court found that
Byrom lacked standing to contest the forfeiture. The district court affirmed,
finding that because Byrom did not have title to the airplane, he did not
have standing to contest the forfeiture.279
The supreme court reversed, concluding that where seized property is
subject to title laws, the claimant must hold title or show compliance with
272. E.L. v. State, 619 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1993).
273. Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
274. Holliday v. City of Tampa, 619 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1993).
275. Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
276. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
277. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla.
1991).
278. Byrom v. Gallagher, 609 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1992).
279. Id. at 26.
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title requirements in order to show ownership."' A court should not
defeat an owner's claim for technical reasons. Instead, the supreme court
cautioned judges to conduct a searching inquiry in identifying individuals
who have standing to contest a forfeiture:
Consequently, in determining whether a person has standing the trial
judge should consider: (1) whether that person holds legal title at the
time of the forfeiture hearing or has complied with the requirements for
receiving title; and (2) whether that person is in fact a bona fide
purchaser. The trial judge should consider the facts surrounding the sale
to determine whether the transfer is in fact a bona fide purchase. The
relationship of the parties, the date the instruments were executed, the
value of the property, the sale price, and canceled checks or bank
deposits to show actual payment and receipt of money are all factors
which the trial court should consider in determining whether the transfer
is a bona fide purchase.2"'
In an effort to promote uniformity in the case style of forfeiture
actions, the Fourth District ruled in Fink v. Holt,2 2 that the case caption
in a forfeiture case must
identify the party seeking the forfeiture and the parties claiming an
interest in [the seized property], if known. A description of the
property to be forfeited should be used in the caption only where the
owner or some lienor is unknown. Similarly, when there is an appeal
from the forfeiture proceeding, the applicable rule of appellate proce-
dure requires that the caption contain the name and designation of at
least one party on each side.283
Thus, forfeiture proceedings should be brought in the name of the seizing
person or authority, and against the person claiming the property.
An owner or bona fide lienholder having an interest in property subject
to forfeiture may defeat a forfeiture action by establishing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a lack of knowledge the property was being used in
criminal activity.28 4  A certificate of title to a motor vehicle establishes
280. Id.
281. Id. (enphasis added).
282. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 1335.
284. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). The Supreme Court recently came to the same conclusion in a federal forfeiture
case. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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presumptive ownership of the vehicle. The presumption can be overcome
only by clear and convincing evidence.285
IX. POST CONVICTION AND APPEAL
For those lawyers handling criminal appeals, knowing when a brief is
due is a critical component of the practice of law, especially to keep
malpractice rates low. In Kuznik v. State,2 86 the circuit court, acting in its
appellate capacity, dismissed an appeal due to the untimely filing of the
record and initial brief, notwithstanding that a motion for extension of time
was pending before the court. On certiorari review of the dismissal order,
the Second District reinstated the appeal, holding that the "motion for
extension tolled the time to file his brief.'2 87  The court previously
cautioned, however, that a frivolous motion for extension will not toll the
filing time.288
Post-conviction proceedings and collateral attacks on criminal
convictions continue to demand the attention of Florida courts, particularly
the Florida Supreme Court in death penalty matters. What qualifies for
post-conviction relief remains a source of uncertainty. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, both at the trial and appellate stages, are by far the
most frequently litigated issue in post-conviction and habeas corpus
proceedings, but meeting the standard is difficult.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, the petitioner must show that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different.289
Ordinarily, a claim that defense counsel was ineffective is tested in a
post-conviction proceeding in state or federal court. An unusual twist led
the Florida Supreme Court to impose discipline in the form of a sixty day
suspension for an attorney who failed to properly prepare a first degree
285. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d at 697.
286. 604 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
287. Id. at 37.
288. E.g., Blanton v. State, 561 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
289. Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 688 (1984); Johnson v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)).
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murder case. In The Florida Bar v. Sandstrom,29 a defendant convicted of
the first degree murder of his wife succeeded in obtaining a vacation of the
conviction based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
because defense counsel failed to properly investigate and present evidence
that would have established the wife's death was attributable to medical
malpractice. The Florida Bar charged the attorney with inadequate
preparation and neglecting a legal matter, and sought disciplinary sanc-
tions.29'
The referee agreed the defense counsel provided deficient representa-
tion, and that those deficiencies rose to the level of an unethical violation
for inadequate preparation and neglect of a legal matter.292 The referee
recommended a one year suspension. The supreme court concluded the
defense counsel was guilty of violating the disciplinary rules, but found only
a sixty day suspension was warranted. The court recognized that disciplin-
ary action for ineffective representation is unusual, but that it was justified
in this case:
We note that most cases of ineffective assistance of counsel do not
rise to the level of a disciplinary violation. However, the circumstances
of this case involved such a flagrant lack of preparation and such
deficient performance by counsel as to warrant the finding that
Sandstrom violated the disciplinary rules.293
Counsel would be well advised to heed this warning when preparing cases.
Additionally, a conviction or a sentence may be set aside or vacated as
a result of "newly discovered evidence." In an effort to define the circum-
stances in which a claim may be made, the Florida Supreme Court recently
reiterated the basic standard of proof.294 To prevail on a claim of newly
discovered evidence, a defendant must satisfy two requirements. First, the
asserted facts "must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or
by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his
counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.""29 Second,
290. 609 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1992).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 584.
293. Id. at 584 n.I.
294. See Scott, 604 So. 2d at 465; Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991).
295. Scott, 604 So. 2d at 468 (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla.
1979). The Scott case involved a newly discovered evidence claim in a death penalty case.
Id. at 468. A co-defendant's life sentence, imposed after appellate affirmance of the
defendant's death sentence, constitutes newly discovered evidence for which post-conviction
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"the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 296
Post-conviction relief may also be granted when a defendant pleads
guilty or no contest to criminal charges, relying on the incorrect advice and
counsel of a defense lawyer. Defense counsel's inaccurate non-record
assurances to the defendant regarding sentencing consequences may
undermine the voluntariness of the defendant's plea, provided defense
counsel "knew or should have known" the representations were inaccu-
rate.2 97 It is for this reason trial courts should conduct a thorough and
exacting inquiry when accepting a plea to ensure the defendant has no other
understanding regarding the consequences of a plea.
The defense counsel must make every effort to correctly communicate
the facts and merits of a plea bargain offered by the state to the client. The
failure to do so may result in the granting of post-conviction relief, provided
the defendant is in a position to prove (1) that the defense counsel failed to
communicate a plea offer or misinformed the defendant concerning the
penalty, (2) that had the defendant been correctly advised, the defendant
would have accepted the plea offer, and (3) that the defendant's acceptance
of the plea offer would have resulted in a lesser sentence.298
Uniformity of judicial decisions extends to treating co-defendants
similarly for appellate purposes. A defendant is entitled to post-conviction
relief in a situation in which the defendant raised errors which were not
found to be reversible in his original appeal, although the very same errors
were found reversible in the co-defendant's later appeal by a different
appellate panel of the same court.29 9 Post-conviction relief is necessary
in order to avoid "diametrically opposite results [which] are 'manifestly
unjust, unfair and confound our search for uniformity.""'3 "
Coram nobis, as an extraordinary writ, is rarely utilized. Its use is
limited to cases in which a defendant is no longer in custody on the
sentence which is collaterally attacked.3 ' The procedure for obtaining the
writ is somewhat non-traditional. A petition for writ of error coram nobis
relief is authorized, where both defendants were equally culpable and the evidence would
enable the defendants to be treated similarly. Id. at 468-69.
296. Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915 (emphasis added).
297. Young v. State, 604 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Young v. State, 608 So. 2d 111-13 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
299. Wright v. State, 604 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id. at 1249 (citing Bourgault v. State, 515 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987)); Joseph v. State, 447 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 447 So.
2d 888 (Fla. 1984).
301. Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1989).
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must be filed in the original trial court if no appeal has been taken from the
judgment and sentence sought to be vacated; otherwise, the petition must be
filed with the appellate court which affirmed the conviction.3 °2  The
purpose of the writ of error coram nobis "is to correct fundamental errors
of fact," as opposed to errors of law.303 Because the coram nobis remedy
is designed to correct a miscarriage of justice, no express time limitation
exists to bar the filing of the petition.30 4 The passage of time between the
conviction and the filing of a petition for writ of error coram nobis, standing
alone, does not constitute the prejudice necessary to support a finding of
laches as a reason for denying consideration of the writ.3"5 In the appro-
priate case, the writ of error coram nobis can be a useful and extremely
potent tool for obtaining relief.
X. CONCLUSION
The Florida courts continue to chart out new territory in deciding
criminal cases. This year, in a special effort to bring solutions to the ever
growing crime problem, the Florida Legislature made the criminal justice
system the focus of its attention. Rather than press a meaningless "tough
on crime" approach, the Legislature addressed the principal cause of
problems in the criminal justice system-a lack of funding-and prioritized
the use of resources. The result is one of the most comprehensive and
sweeping revisions of sentencing law and corrections policy. The courts and
lawyers will be busy applying the new laws and resolving new problems.
The courts have not and cannot solve all the persistent issues which
plague the system, but the Florida Supreme Court has used this past year as
an opportunity to provide leadership and guidance to the courts and to
litigants. The Florida courts continue on the path of using common sense
and reason to safeguard individual rights and promote fairness to every
participant in the criminal justice system. Litigants should recognize that
fine line when attempting to apply legal precedent and when charting new
waters.
302. State v. Woods, 400 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1981).
303. Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
304. Id. at 949.
305. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike prior years in which the Florida Supreme Court was relatively
silent with respect to marital and family law issues, the past two years
brought a virtual torrent of family law opinions from the supreme court,
twelve in all, most of which reaffirmed established legal principles, but
several of which significantly altered the course of marital and family law
in Florida.
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At the appellate level, the past two years brought a series of decisions
reflecting at least four apparent trends,' and six areas of distinct conflict in
the opinions of the various appellate courts.2
II. AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The first trend that developed in the appellate decisions rendered during
the survey period was a clear movement toward very literal and strict
interpretation of the provisions of both antenuptial and postnuptial
(settlement) agreements, such that the relief or remedies available to the
parties entering into such agreements will be limited to what is precisely
provided for by the terms of the agreement. In Genunzio v. Genunzio,3 the
parties entered into an antenuptial agreement pursuant to which they agreed,
in the first paragraph of the agreement, that the property owned by them at
the time of the agreement would remain each person's separate property.
The second paragraph of the agreement required that all property acquired
during the marriage would be titled in a joint tenancy between them, and
said property would be equally divided between them upon dissolution of
I. The four trends which appear in the decisional law are a line of opinions indicating
that antenuptial and postnuptial agreements will be strictly and literally interpreted in accor-
dance with the precise language used by the parties; the development of a factual standard
for the award of permanent alimony; an inclination towards interpretation of the law so as
to provide the maximum ability to enforce alimony and child support awards; and a
tightening of the standards under which a trial court's imputation of income to a spouse in
alimony and child support cases will be affirmed.
2. The six areas of distinct conflict in the opinions of the appellate courts concern the
questions of whether a trial court may extinguish an obligor's temporary support arrearages
by the entry of a final judgment; whether a requirement that a spouse maintain medical
insurance on behalf of the other spouse or minor children must contain a specific dollar
limitation as to the amount of the obligation; whether a child's conduct toward the parent
owing a duty of support on behalf of the child may be so egregious as to warrant a
termination of that parent's support obligation; whether the enhanced value of premarital or
non-marital assets for equitable distribution purposes includes all of the enhanced value
however caused or whether such value includes only that portion of the enhancement directly
attributable to the marital labors or funds devoted thereto, when and under what circum-
stances may a party claim an entitlement to the fair rental value of property occupied
exclusively by a co-tenant former spouse; and whether an income deduction order may be
entered solely to enforce an alimony obligation where the case does not involve minor
children.
3. 598 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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their marriage. Following the execution of this agreement, the husband
purchased a home with his separate funds, and titled the home in his sole
name.
At the time of the dissolution of marriage, the trial court determined
that the wife was entitled to a partial interest in the home purchased by the
husband during the marriage. The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the wife was entitled to a fifty percent interest in the
home, and not the partial interest awarded by the trial court.'
In reversing, the district court held that the "plain meaning" of the
antenuptial agreement was just that, and while the wife was to have no
interest in the property of the husband owned at the time of the agreement,
she was entitled to one-half of all property acquired during the marriage.'
The district court based its decision upon a literal reading of the agreement,
noting that the second paragraph of the agreement did not exclude from its
operation property acquired by either party after the agreement with property
owned at the time of the agreement, nor did the provisions of the agreement
in this regard distinguish between property acquired with non-marital or
marital funds.6 The sole criterion for the operation of the paragraph was
whether property was acquired during the marriage. The court expressed no
hesitancy or reluctance in so interpreting the agreement. The court reasoned
that, "[i]f the husband's apparent decision not to except from paragraph 2
property purchased with nonmarital funds was unwise in hindsight, that is
not something from which a court of law is entitled to protect him. We
must construe the contract in accordance with its plain meaning."7
Following the decision in Genunzio, the Second District rendered its
decision in Osborne v. Osborne,8 again limiting the parties to an antenuptial
agreement to the strict language of their agreement. In Osborne, the
husband and wife married when they were both nineteen years of age. Less
than two years after they married, the parties divorced, and pursuant to their
settlement at the time, the wife received one-half of the equity in the home
($1,012.50), her car, and the household furniture. She received no alimony
or other form of support although the husband did agree to pay her
attorney's fees of $150. Several years later, the parties decided to remarry
but the husband, upset about how he had been "taken to the cleaners" in
4. Id. at 130.
5. Id. at 131.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 604 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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their earlier divorce, demanded that the wife execute an antenuptial
agreement. The wife did so.
The antenuptial agreement entered into by the parties provided that the
wife would waive all of her rights to any property solely owned by the
husband. With respect to alimony, the agreement provided that any alimony
to be paid by the husband would be rehabilitative in nature, and would not
exceed the sum of $1000 multiplied by the number of years of the marriage.
The full amount of such alimony, as calculated under the formula set forth
in the agreement, was to be paid to the wife in a lump sum provided that
the husband possessed the ability to pay the amount in a lump sum payment.
The determination of the husband's ability to pay was to be made solely by
the husband, and the agreement provided that his decision as to his own
ability to pay was to be "controlling and final."9 The agreement further
provided that if the husband decided that he lacked the ability to pay the
lump sum, then the alimony would be paid to the wife at the rate of $83.33
per month "for so long a period of time as the parties shall have been
married at the time their marriage is dissolved."'
Fifteen years after the execution of the antenuptial agreement, the
parties divorced. The husband sought to restrict the wife's alimony award
to the formula provided in the antenuptial agreement, but the trial court
determined that, despite the detailed language of the agreement regarding the
manner in which tile wife's alimony entitlement was to be calculated, the
agreement did not contain any type of waiver of the wife's right to seek
modification of the amount of alimony provided for in the agreement, nor
did the agreement contain a waiver of the wife's right to seek permanent
alimony. As such, the trial court, noting that a substantial change in the
circumstances of the parties occurred following the execution of the
antenuptial agreement, awarded the wife substantially more alimony than the
$83.33 per month as provided in the agreement. Additionally, the court
awarded the wife permanent alimony. Moreover, the trial court awarded the
wife the parties' former marital home which had been owned solely by the
husband."'
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the award of the home
to the wife, finding that the parties' antenuptial agreement clearly specified
that the wife had waived any claim to the husband's solely owned
property.' 2 However, the district court affirmed the trial court's alimony
9. Id. at 859.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 860.
12. Id.
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awards, upholding the authority of the trial court to grant relief not
specifically waived by the provisions of an antenuptial agreement. 3
Similarly, in Ryland v. Ryland,4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that the parties to an antenuptial agreement were bound by the
express language of their agreement, but where the agreement did not
specifically address a particular issue or waive a particular right, the trial
court was free to act within the bounds of its discretion as to that issue or
right.' 5 The parties in Ryland had entered into a "homemade" antenuptial
agreement which provided only that the wife waived any claims to the
husband's premarital property and if the parties divorced, the husband had
the right of first refusal to purchase the wife's interest in their home. In
their subsequent divorce case, the trial court awarded the wife lump sum
alimony, to be paid from the husband's separate assets, and attorney's fees.
The district court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that the trial
court had the authority to award both alimony and attorney's fees to the
wife because the antenuptial agreement neither mentioned nor waived the
wife's right to seek such relief.'6 The court opined that the specific
language of the antenuptial agreement only precluded the wife from making
a claim against the husband's separate assets.' 7 Therefore, the trial court
was empowered to award the wife the relief she sought, provided that the
court did not award relief to the wife specifically from the husband's
separate assets.'
8
The foregoing trend continued to develop in the decisional law
rendered during the first half of 1993. For example, in White v. White,'9
the trial court denied alimony to the wife on the basis that she had waived
her claim to alimony in an antenuptial agreement. The Second District
reversed, finding that nowhere in the agreement did the parties use the word
"alimony," and also, that the agreement lacked any express waiver of the
wife's right to seek future support.2"
Similarly, in Timble v. Timble,2" the parties agreed in an antenuptial
13. Osborne, 604 So. 2d at 860.
14. 605 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
15. Id. at 140-41.
16. Id. at 140.
17. Id.
18. Id.; In Porter v. Porter, 593 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the
Fourth District reversed the trial court's award to the wife finding that the award "deviated
from [the terms of the parties'] contract."
19. 617 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
20. Id. at 734.
21. 616 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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agreement that the husband would have "full rights, liberty [and] authority
• . . to use, enjoy, . . . convey, bequeath, mortgage, grant, sell, invest,
reinvest, alienate and dispose of . . every part of any stock or other
interest, or security he owns directly or indirectly, or may hereafter acquire"
in a certain corporation.22 The wife, at the time of the dissolution of
marriage, sought an award of the enhanced value of the husband's stock
holdings, and the district court determined that the wife had clearly waived
her right to an interest of any kind in the husband's stock holdings by the
clear language of the agreement.23
B. Postnuptial (Settlement) Agreements
The same trend towards strict and literal interpretation of agreements
is found in the appellate decisions pertaining to postnuptial or settlement
agreements, including one decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court.
In Pinrn v. Pimm,24 the supreme court was called upon to answer a
question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal, specifically:
[l]s the postjudgment retirement of a spouse who is obligated to make
support or alimony payments pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of
marriage a change of circumstance that may be considered together with
other relevant factors and applicable law upon a petition to modify such
alimony or support payments? 25
The parties in Pimm had entered into a settlement agreement which did
not address the subject of the husband's possible or potential retirement.
Rather, the agreement required the husband to make alimony payments to
the wife until such time as either party died or the wife remarried. When
the husband retired, many years after the execution of the agreement, he
sought to reduce the amount of his alimony payments to the wife based
upon a decrease in his income. The wife contended that the silence of the
agreement upon the subject of retirement, coupled with the requirement that
the alimony payments continue as long as she was unmarried, indicated that
the husband had agreed to pay alimony regardless of his retirement. The
supreme court disagreed, finding that although "it would be a better practice
to incorporate consideration of retirement and what will happen in the event
of retirement in an agreement," the silence of an agreement on the subject
22. Id. at 1189.
23. Id.
24. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
25. Id. at 535.
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will not preclude a trial court from considering a party's retirement as part
of the total circumstances in determining if sufficient changes in circum-
stances exist to warrant a modification.26
The silence of a settlement agreement as to a particular issue was also
addressed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Reynolds v. Dia-
mnond. 7 In Reynolds, the parties had entered into a settlement agreement
pursuant to which the husband agreed to provide for the "costs of education"
with respect to college, postgraduate and professional training for the
parties' two children. To be sure, twelve years after the execution of the
agreement, the parties were before the trial court upon the issue of the
meaning of the words "costs of education," with the wife contending that
the term included all expenses associated with higher education and the
husband arguing that the term meant only tuition and related expenses.2 8
At the appellate level, the husband argued that had he intended to agree
to pay for every expense attendant to a college education, such intent would
have been set forth in the agreement. The district court, however,
determined that the converse was true, reasoning that had the husband
wished to limit his contribution, "such language could have been included
[in the agreement] to make that intention clear." 9
The First District also so held in its 1993 decision of Maclaren v.
Maclaren.3" Therein, the husband sought to terminate his permanent
alimony obligation to the wife based upon his allegation that the wife had
relocated to New Zealand and was living with a man who was substantially
contributing to her support. The trial court denied the modification on the
basis that the parties' agreement did not mention cohabitation, and that such
silence could be interpreted as precluding a reduction or termination of
alimony upon such grounds. The First District refused to interpret the
silence of the agreement as a waiver of relief, and remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the merits of the husband's claims.3'
The Second District, in line with its decisions regarding antenuptial
agreements, also determined, with respect to postnuptial agreements, that the
clear and specific language used by the parties in a postnuptial agreement
will be binding upon the parties. In Agliano v. Agliano,32 the parties were
26. Id. at 537.
27. 605 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
28. Id. at 525-26.
29. Id. at 527.
30. 616 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Id. at 105-06.
32. 605 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 18
289
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Greene
divorced after twenty-seven years of marriage, and entered into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which the husband agreed to pay the wife rehabilita-
tive alimony for a period of fifteen years. The parties agreed that they both
irrevocably waived any right to modify the alimony provisions of their
agreement. After the divorce, the wife was diagnosed with incurable cancer.
She sought a modification of the alimony provisions of the settlement
agreement and contended that her agreement to accept rehabilitative alimony
was impliedly conditioned upon her capacity to achieve a self-supporting
status, which, because of her illness, was ho longer possible.33 Although
the trial court found that there was no question that the wife's illness had
"exacted a financial toll not anticipated or foreseen at the time of the
divorce," the court nevertheless dismissed the wife's request for modifica-
tion. The Second District affirmed the dismissal, finding that the parties'
agreement, "in unmistakable terms," defined the boundaries of the parties'
financial relationship, and those "boundaries" included a complete waiver
of either party's right to seek modification.34 The court noted that there was
"no indication in the agreement" that any event would "devitalize?' the
mutual waivers of the right to modify the terms of the agreement, and, in
very strong terms, held that the wife's illness, "however unanticipated,
however unfortunate, does not detract from the unqualified terms of [the]
agreement."3
All of the foregoing decisions, when read together, appear to indicate
a clear trend at the appellate level, with respect to the interpretation of
antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that: (1) if the parties intend to place
any limitations upon their rights or remedies, they must clearly state so; (2)
mere silence in an agreement as to a particular issue will not be interpreted
as a limitation or a waiver; and (3) if the parties specifically waive a right
or remedy in an antenuptial or settlement agreement, that waiver will be
upheld irrespective of the circumstances or conditions which may later
occur.
III. ALIMONY
A. Permanent Alimony
The single most significant development in the case law rendered
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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during the past two years was the attempt made by several of the district
courts of appeal to define the factual circumstances under which an award
of permanent alimony is appropriate. In fact, decisions on this subject may
have yielded a new "test" to be applied to determine whether permanent
alimony should be awarded in a given case. Although a total of eight
decisions were rendered addressing this issue during the survey period,
nearly all of the decisions trace their antecedent to Geddes v. Geddes,36 a
1988 opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
In Geddes, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of
alimony to the wife finding "no genuine inequities . . .created by [the]
dissolution" of marriage without permanent alimony.3" In so finding, the
Geddes court commented upon the fact that no minor children were born of
the marriage, and that "no skills were lost" by the wife as a result of the
marriage.3" This latter point subsequently became the standard for the
award of permanent alimony in cases decided between 1991 and the present.
In Spencer v. Spencer,39 decided in December of 1991, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed a rehabilitative alimony award following
a four year marriage, finding that the evidence presented at the trial level
did not establish "that the wife is without the means of self-support, as a
result of anything that has transpired during the marriage."4
Shortly thereafter, in LaHuis v. LaHuis,4' the Third District Court of
Appeal, addressing the denial of rehabilitative alimony, affirmed the trial
court's holding, noting that the wife's "earning potential after the marriage
was not diminished.,
42
Then, in early 1992, the Second District Court of Appeal rendered its
decision in Kremer v. Kremer,43 and reversed the trial court's award of
permanent alimony to a thirty-seven year old wife following a six year
marriage. 4 In reversing, the Second District, citing Geddes and Spencer,
opined that there was no showing that the wife was without the means of
self-support "as a result of anything that [had] transpired during the
marriage.' 45 The court noted that although the parties' respective incomes
36. 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
37. Id. at 1018.
38. Id.
39. 590 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
41. 590 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
42. Id. at 558.
43. 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
44. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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were disparate, that disparity did not result "in any substantial wayfrom the
marriage," because the parties' earnings levels were disparate before they
married.46
Thereafter, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Wright v. Wright,41
reversed the trial court's permanent alimony award to a thirty-nine year old
wife following a five year marriage. The court held, as in the prior
decisions, that the evidence did not establish that the wife was unable to
provide for her own support "as a result of anything that transpired during
the marriage."4
Then, in Gregoire v. Gregoire,49 the Second District Court of Appeal
attempted to explain the meaning of the term "transpired during the
marriage" by comparing the factual circumstances therein to the factual
circumstances of Kremer. ° According to the court, three specific factual
circumstances distinguished the two cases and permitted the award of
permanent alimony in Gregoire: (1) the parties had two minor children for
whom the wife was responsible; (2) the parties had specifically agreed that
the wife would stop working, permanently terminating her career, to become
a full-time homemaker; and (3) the achievement by the husband of his
substantial income producing ability was shown to have been directly
attributable to the wife having financially supported the family while the
husband's income was relatively minimal and he was beginning his
employment." Thus, the wife's inability to provide for her own support
and the disparity between the parties' earnings level were both the result of
events and circumstances that transpired during the marriage.
In 1993, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided the case of
Cornell v. Smith.5 2 Tracing its decision therein back to Geddes, the court
opined that "the courts of this state have consistently held that mere
disparity in incomes is not sufficient to justify an award of permanent
alimony where the wife is relatively young and her earning capacity has not
been impaired as a result of the marriage. '5 3
Then, following a rendition of all of the above decisions of the various
appellate courts, the Fifth District Court of Appeal determined, en banc, the
46. Id. at 215.
47. 613 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
48. Id. at 1333 (emphasis added).
49. 615 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
50. Id. at 694-95.
51. Id. at 695.
52. 616 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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case of Kennedy v. Kennedy,54 in which it reversed the trial court's perma-
nent alimony award and adopted what it termed the "doctrine of comparable
fairness."55  In Kennedy, the Fifth District determined that "comparable
fairness" can only be achieved if the trial courts specifically state the factors
upon which they base alimony awards and the weight given to those factors,
so that the appellate courts can ensure that similar results are obtained in
similar cases.56 In other words, the propriety and type of alimony award
(permanent versus rehabilitative) should be decided by comparison with the
specific facts of other cases in which alimony was either awarded or
denied.57
B. Rehabilitative Alimony
With respect to rehabilitative alimony, the cases yielded a series of
decisions from every district court of appeal which reiterated certain well-
established principles, the two most common being: (1) rehabilitative
alimony is not appropriate where the recipient demonstrates no need for new
training or new skills; and (2) rehabilitative alimony must not be awarded
in the absence of an evidentiary showing that the recipient has some ability
to become self-supporting following training or education.
In the first line of decisions, the appellate courts consistently reversed
rehabilitative alimony awards in cases in which the recipient did not
demonstrate an entitlement to any type of alimony in an attempt to reverse
a tendency on the part of trial judges to use rehabilitative alimony awards
as a means of providing the wife with "something" following a dissolution
of marriage.
In Spencer v. Spencer,58 the wife was unemployed and was receiving
welfare benefits at the time of the parties' marriage. When the parties
54. 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
55. Id. at 1033.
56. Id.
57. In reality, the doctrine of "comparable fairness" appears to describe that which the
appellate courts have been doing for quite some time. For example, in Gregoire, the Second
District went to great lengths to explain the difference between the facts therein (in which
the trial court's award of permanent alimony was affirmed), and the facts in Kremer (in
which the trial court's award of permanent alimony was reversed). See Gregoire, 615 So.
2d at 694-95. The significance of the Kennedy case is the Fifth District's insistence upon
specific findings of fact as to the factors considered and the weight given those factors so that
the same set of factors or weighing of factors will lead to the same or similar results in all
cases. See Kennedy, 622 So. 2d at 1033.
58. 590 So. 2d at 553.
[Vol. 1 8
293
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Greene
divorced four years later, the wife was employed on a full-time basis, yet
the trial court awarded the wife "rehabilitative alimony." The First District
Court of Appeal reversed the award, finding that the record failed to
demonstrate any need on the part of the wife for the "redevelopment" of
skills or for "training necessary to develop potential supportive skills."59
In Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano,6" the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant rehabilitative alimony following a
short-term marriage to a wife who was a medical doctor in Peru but not
licensed in the United States, and who voluntarily elected not to seek
employment in this country.6' The district court affirmed the denial of
alimony because the wife was found to have had a number of "marketable
ski Ils. ' 62
In Mahaffey v. Mahaffey,63 the trial court's rehabilitative alimony
award was reversed where the evidence established that the wife was a fully
employed college graduate who was earning more at the time of the
dissolution of marriage than she had earned during the marriage.64
Because the wife did not indicate the need or the intent to further her
education or training, the rehabilitative alimony award was erroneous. 65
In the second line of cases, the district courts attempted to correct
another apparent tendency on the part of the trial courts to award rehabilita-
tive alimony in circumstances where the more appropriate award would have
been permanent alimony. The district courts have had to remind the trial
courts that rehabilitative alimony is to be awarded only in cases where the
evidence establishes that the recipient will be able to become self-supporting
in the standard enjoyed during the marriage as a result of the use of the
award to obtain job skills or training.
In Lanier v. Lanier,66 the First District Court of Appeal reversed a
rehabilitative alimony award to a forty-seven year old wife who had been
married for twenty-five years, and was seeking to become employed as a
teacher who would then earn approximately $20,000 per year. 67 Noting
that the husband earned $50,000 per year, the district court opined that the
59. Id. at 554.
60. 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
61. Id. at 718.
62. Id.
63. 614 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
64. Id. at 650.
65. Id.
66. 594 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
67. Id. at 810.
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wife's potential teacher's salary would never permit her to "support herself
at a standard of living commensurate with that established during the
marriage," and, therefore, the award of rehabilitative alimony instead of
permanent alimony was erroneous.68
In Grant v. Grant,69 the First District again reversed a rehabilitative
alimony award where the trial record revealed "neither any previous skills
the [wife] could redevelop nor the potential for developing new supportive
skills."7 Finding that the evidence did not show any ability on the part of
the wife to become self-supporting, "or any substantial capacity for
rehabilitation," the court remanded the case for the entry of an award of
permanent alimony.7
In Bible v. Bible,72 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to a wife following a twenty-
five year marriage, where, despite evidence of the wife's employment as a
receptionist, the evidence also established that her earnings would never
approach the husband's earnings level.73
Similarly, in Adams v. Adams,74 a rehabilitative alimony award
following a twenty year marriage was reversed upon the basis that the wife's
potential earnings as a teacher would not provide her a level of self-support
commensurate with the standard of living established during the marriage,
and permanent periodic alimony was awarded in its place.7"
In Steinberg v. Steinberg,76 the trial court awarded rehabilitative
alimony for a period of one year to a wife suffering from severe emotional
problems who had been unemployed for over eight years. In reversing this
award, the district court opined that "[o]nly if the wife is capable of
establishing a standard of living commensurate with the standard set
throughout the marriage . . . is an award of rehabilitative alimony prop-
er."
77
68. Id. at 811.
69. 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id. at 68-69.
72. 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
73. Id. at 361.
74. 604 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 614 So. 2d 502 (Fla.
1993).
75. Id. at 496.
76. 614 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla.
1993).
77. Id. at 1129.
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C. Temporary Alimony
An interesting development in the decisional law arose in 1992 with
respect to whether a trial court may extinguish, in a final judgment,
temporary alimony arrearages which accrued prior to the entry of the final
judgment. Although two cases decided in 1992 held that the trial court may
not do so," a third case held otherwise."
In Grant v. Grant,8" the husband owed the wife substantial sums of
money pursuant to the trial court's temporary support order. However, the
trial court's final judgment relieved the husband of the arrearages. The First
District Court of Appeal reversed, determining that an "unchallenged"
temporary support order carries with it the presumption of an ability to
comply with the order on the part of the payor. Inasmuch as the husband
had never moved for modification of the terms of the temporary order, the
district court held that the trial court erred in relieving the husband of his
obligation to pay the accrued arrearages."
Similarly, in Burdick v. Burdick,2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in discharging, through the entry of a final
judgment, the arrearages accrued pursuant to an agreed temporary support
order prior to the entry of the final judgment. 3 In Burdick, the husband
had requested a modification of his temporary obligation and the trial court
had granted the modification. The district court found no error in the trial
court's granting of the requested modification, but held that the trial court
erred in entering a final judgment which "effectively discharged" the
arrearages that had accrued prior to the filing of the modification re-
84quest.
However, after deciding Burdick, the Fourth District decided the case
of Allison v. Allison.85 Therein, at the time of the entry of the final
judgment, the husband owed the wife the sum of $7,500 pursuant to the
terms of a temporary support order. The trial court, in the final judgment,
reduced the amount of the arrearages to $3,500. The district court affirmed,
78. See Grant, 603 So. 2d at 68; Burdick v. Burdick, 601 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
79. See Allison v. Allison, 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
81. Id. at 69.
82. 601 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 634.
84. Id.
85. 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla.
1993).
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finding that a trial court "can modify a temporary alimony award before
final judgment is entered."86
Unfortunately, the Allison case recites few facts. The opinion does not
indicate whether the husband had requested a modification of his temporary
support obligation or whether the trial court modified the husband's
obligation upon its own findings from the evidence presented at the final
hearing. Furthermore, the opinion does not indicate if, in fact, there was a
request for modification by the husband, and whether such a request was
made by written motion or by oral request at the time of the final hearing.
Thus, from the language of the Allison opinion, it appears that the decision
may conflict with both Grant and Burdick to the extent that the latter cases
require that some type of request for a reduction in temporary support be
made in order to authorize the trial court to reduce or eliminate temporary
support arrearages in a final judgment.
D. Lump Sum Alimony
Although it is now established law that lump sum alimony may be
awarded either for the purpose of equalizing a distribution of marital assets
and liabilities, or as a means of providing support to the recipient spouse,
one decision rendered in 1992 makes it clear that such purposes are the only
two purposes for which such alimony may be awarded. s7
In Harvey v. Harvey,88 the trial court attempted to resolve a recurring
problem which may, in fact, have no resolution, at least under the present
status of our law. Therein, the wife contributed immeasurably to the
husband's career, enabling the husband to find and obtain employment that
had the potential to double his salary over that which he had earned during
the years in which the parties were married. The trial court, believing that
the wife was entitled to be recompensed in some manner for her efforts on
behalf of the husband (which would now benefit only the husband), awarded
her the sum of $60,000 as lump sum alimony.89 The district court
reversed, holding that the Florida courts recognize only two types of lump
sum alimony: (1) that relating to support and requiring a showing of need
86. Id. at 131.
87. But cf Handsel v. Handsel, 614 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(affirming an award of lump sum alimony made for the purpose of partially compensating
the wife "for the overwhelming medical expenses incurred and anticipated because of the
husband's egregious behavior."). Such an award, of course, can be viewed as serving a
support purpose.
88. 596 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
89. Id. at 1252.
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and ability to pay; and (2) that pertaining to an equitable division of the
parties' marital assets and liabilities.9" Because the lump sum alimony
award in this case did not pertain to either recognized type of lump sum
alimony, it was reversed. 9
E. Enforcement
In what appears to be another emerging trend in Florida law, the
appellate courts, as a group, rendered a series of 1992 decisions liberally
interpreting existing law in a manner calculated to provide maximum
assistance to parties seeking to enforce alimony and child support awards.
With respect to alimony awards, the First District held that pre-judg-
ment interest must be awarded on amounts due for alimony and child
support arrearages;92 the Second and Fifth Districts held that the statute of
limitations does not apply to proceedings to enforce alimony or child
support orders;93 the Third District held that an equitable lien for the
purpose of' enforcing an alimony award could be applied to homestead
property; 94 and the Fourth District held that an income deduction order may
be entered solely to enforce an alimony award, even in the absence of minor
children, 95 and that an incarcerated husband's assets may be sequestered to
secure alimony and child support awards. 96
In Romans v. Romans,97 the trial court refused to award pre-judgment
interest with respect to the alimony and child support arrearages which the
wife was attempting to collect. The First District simply held that the wife
was "entitled" to such interest as a matter of law.9"
In Frazier v. Frazier,99 the wife filed a petition for registration of the
parties' twenty-seven year old Colorado divorce decree. The district court
held that the husband's statute of limitations defense was inapplicable
90. Id.
91. id.
92. See Romans v. Romans, 611 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
93. See Frazier v. Frazier, 616 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Popper
v. Popper, 595 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.
1992).
94. See Radin v. Radin, 593 So. 2d 1231, 1231-32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 605 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1992).
95. See Coleman v. Coleman, 614 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), approved,
18 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1993).
96. See Held v. Held, 617 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
97. 611 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
98. Id. at 93.
99. 616 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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because proceedings to enforce alimony and child support orders are
equitable in nature, and therefore, not barred by a statute of limitations in
Florida.00
Similarly, in Popper v. Popper,'0' the wife sought to enforce and
collect alimony due her from 1972. The husband's alimony obligation was
based upon the provisions of a settlement agreement which was incorporated
into a final judgment several years after its execution. The husband
defended on the basis that the wife's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. The Fifth District held that the wife's claims stemming from the
agreement were, in fact, barred by the statute of limitations, but the claims
arising after the incorporation of the agreement into a judgment were not so
barred. 112 The court opined that the enforcement of periodic alimony and
child support orders are equitable proceedings in nature, and such obliga-
tions are not barred by the running of the statute of limitations.0 3
In Radin v. Radin,'°4 the trial court, in order to enforce its earlier
alimony award which had been unpaid by the husband, imposed an equitable
lien against the husband's post-judgment separate property, which the
husband was in the process of selling. The trial court specifically found that
the husband had engaged in a "pattern of egregious conduct" represented by
significant nonpayment of alimony for a period of nearly ten years.
Although the district court reversed the trial court's order because the
amount of the lien could not be determined from the face of the judgment,
the court upheld the authority of the trial court to impose an equitable lien
upon homestead property in order to enforce an alimony award." 5
In Coleman v. Coleman,10 6 the parties were divorced in 1964, at
which time the husband was ordered to pay alimony. He did so until 1989,
when he sought a modification which was ultimately denied. Eventually,
the trial court entered a judgment against the husband, and then entered an
income deduction order. The husband appealed, contending that an income
deduction order is not proper when no minor children reside with the wife
receiving alimony. The Fourth District held otherwise, opining that the
"unmistakable language" of section 61.1301 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, is
100. Id. The district court, however, noted that the husband could still raise the affirma-
tive defense of laches. Id.
101. 595 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
102. Id. at 103.
103. Id.
104. 593 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id at 1232-33.
106. 614 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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that the enforcement of any alimony obligation requires an income
deduction order." 7 In so holding, however, the Fourth District recognized
conflict with the Second District's opinion in Schorb v. Schorb.' °8 This
conflict was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court, which approved the
Fourth District's holding in Coleman. °9
F. Security/Insurance"°
The single clearest area of conflict between the various appellate courts
in Florida deals with whether a trial court must specify a dollar amount
limitation upon the financial exposure of a spouse who has been required to
maintain medical insurance on behalf of the other spouse, or to pay for the
costs of uncovered medical expenses incurred by the other spouse. The
decisions addressing this question appear to routinely confuse and overlap
the two issues-maintaining medical insurance as distinct from providing for
uncovered medical expenses-and the various districts are clearly in conflict.
With respect to medical insurance, the First District Court of Appeal
has held, in Ginsburg v. Ginsburg,"' that "it is error for the court to
require the husband [to] secure medical coverage [for the wife] without
setting an amount or limitation on that obligation."' 2
In the Second District, in Kremer v. Kremer,"3 the district court
reversed the trial court's order that the husband maintain medical insurance
on behalf of his former wife for a period of three years, and held that the
trial court was required to place "reasonable limitations on the maximum
costs to the husband" regarding the insurance requirement." t4
107. Id. at 533.
108. 547 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
109. Coleman v. Coleman, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1993) (applying the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction in finding that section 61.1301(1)(a) was not
ambiguous, and that it was unnecessary, therefore, to look to legislative intent).
110. The following discussion addresses only the requirement that a party provide either
medical insurance or the costs of medical expenses with respect to the other party as a form
of alimony and not awards made as a form of child support.
111. 610 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
112. Id. at 656-57.
113. 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
114. Id. at 218. The Second District has consistently so held. For example, in Burgess
v. Burgess, 576 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that "the amount
of money the husband should pay for . . . health insurance [for the wife] be limited to the
amount the husband currently pays to maintain health insurance coverage for his spouse under
his present insurance policy." Id. at 1348.
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In the Fourth District, the waters become quite muddy. Three medical
expense and medical insurance cases were decided by the Fourth District in
1992: one dealing solely with a requirement that insurance be main-
tained," 5 and two dealing with both a requirement that insurance be
maintained and that the payor provide for uncovered medical expenses."
16
In Blythe v. Blythe,"7 the trial court had ordered the husband to
maintain medical insurance on the wife's behalf, of a type and an amount
equal to the insurance that had been provided during the intact marriage by
the husband's employer. On appeal, the husband contended that the order
was erroneous because the trial court had failed to set a monetary limit on
the cost of the health insurance. The Fourth District disagreed, finding that
the trial courts are not required to limit a payor's responsibility to "a
specific dollar amount."
'
"
18
Thereafter, in Watford v. Watford,"9 where the trial court had
ordered a husband to provide for both medical insurance and uncovered
medical expenses, the Fourth District again held that no specific dollar
limitation was required, and that a limitation "of reasonable and necessary
medical expenses [is] an adequate limitation" as either party could apply for
relief from such expenses should the circumstances require it.'2°
However, in Loss v. Loss,'' a different panel of the Fourth District
held contrary to both Blythe and Watford, finding that a limitation to
"reasonable and necessary" was not sufficient, at least with respect to a
requirement that a spouse pay for the medical expenses of the other.' 2
In Loss, the trial court had ordered the husband to maintain medical
insurance on behalf of the wife and minor children, and to provide for the
costs of any uncovered medical expenses. The Fourth District reversed the
award, initially holding that earlier opinions of the Fourth District had
established a requirement that a payor providing for medical expenses must,
"at a minimum," be limited to those expenses which are "reasonable and
necessary."'23 However, the court then went further and opined that even
if the trial court had imposed a "reasonable and necessary" restriction upon
115. See Blythe v. Blythe, 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
116. See Loss v. Loss, 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Watford v.
Watford, 605 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
117. 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 355.
119. 605 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
120. Id. at 1315.
121. 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id.
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the husband's obligation to provide for medical expenses, "it would still be
error" because "[s]uch an open-ended and unlimited financial liability is
unenforceable."'
2 4
In Young v. Young,'25 the Fifth District reversed the trial court's
requirement that a husband maintain medical insurance on behalf of the
former wife, finding that the obligation "should have been limited to a
specific sum commensurate with his current level of premium expense.,
126
With respect to medical expenses, as opposed to medical insurance, the
First District held in Payne v. Payne, 7 in accordance with their opinions
dealing with medical insurance costs, that "open-ended" awards of medical
expenses are error and must be reversed. 22 The requirement therein that
the husband pay "all reasonable and customary medical, hospital and dental
bills" was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court "to determine
the husband's maximum liability" for such expenses." 9
In the Second District, there are no opinions on the subject of medical
expenses during the survey period. The court's 1991 decision in Gay v.
Gay 30 applied the Second District's rule that the payor's exposure be
limited to a specific amount to both orders pertaining to medical insurance
and to orders pertaining to the payment of medical expenses.'
As the foregoing demonstrates, there is a clear conflict of opinion
between the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal with respect to whether the trial court must
provide a specific dollar limitation when one spouse is required to provide
medical insurance coverage on behalf of the other spouse. There is a
possible further conflict between the First and Second Districts and the
124. Id. at 42-43.
125. 600 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
1992).
126. Id. The Fifth District has also consistently so held. In Szemborski v. Szemborski,
530 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the court opined that although a trial court has
the power to order one party to obtain insurance coverage on behalf of the other, the
requirement must be "reasonable in amount." Id. at 361. Thereafter, in Marsh v. Marsh, 553
So. 2d 366 (Fla: 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the language in Szemborski was interpreted to
require the trial court to set a specific amount of the husband's obligation. The court held
that the trial court's failure to "set a monetary limit on the costs of the ordered health
insurance" was reversible error. Id. at 367 n.2.
127. 617 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 749.
129. Id. at 748-49.
130. 573 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Id.
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Fourth District, as to whether a dollar limitation is required with respect to
orders requiring one spouse to provide for the medical expenses of the other
spouse. The Fifth District has required such a limitation with respect to
medical insurance but has not, as yet, addressed the question of the cost of
medical expenses. The Third District has not addressed either issue as of
this date.
G. Imputed Income.32
Following several years in which appellate decisions affirming the trial
court's imputation of income to a spouse were legion, the past two years
have brought a series of decisions restricting the circumstances under which
imputation of income will be deemed appropriate and requiring compliance
with strict standards for such imputation of income. For example, in
Wendroff v. Wendroff,"' the trial court imputed income to the husband
apparently based on a calculation of the amount of deposits made into his
checking account over a seventeen month period. The district court
reversed, however, holding that the trial court erred in imputing income
without setting forth the amounts imputed and the sources of the alleged
imputed income."4
The Second District Court of Appeal rendered four "imputed income"
decisions during the survey period which reversed the trial court's findings
of imputed income, and one decision which affirmed the trial court's
finding. In Gildea v. Gildea,"' the parties had been married for twenty
years during which time the husband was employed in medical sales. Six
months after the dissolution action was commenced, the husband was fired
from his position due to a general decline in the industry. He sought
reemployment and interviewed regularly. The trial court based its alimony
award upon the husband's prior earnings history. The district court
reversed, holding that although a trial court may impute income to a party
who has no income or is earning less than is available to him, it must do so
based upon a showing that the party has the capacity to earn more by the
use of his or her best efforts.'36 However, such a determination must be
based upon a finding that the party to whom income is imputed has chosen
132. The following discussion addresses the issue of imputation of income with respect
to alimony awards. The issue of imputed income in child support cases is discussed in part
V1, section D.
133. 614 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 595.
135. 593 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
136. Id. at 1213.
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to earn less and has the ability to remedy the situation. In this case, the
husband had been involuntarily terminated from employment through no
fault of his own and had sought reemployment without success. Thus, the
imputation of income under the facts of this case was deemed errone-
ous.137
In Kinne v. Kinne, 38 the husband had sought a modification of his
alimony obligation because he had lost his job and began his own business,
but was earning substantially less than he had earned when employed. The
trial court denied the husband's requested modification, finding that the
husband was "underemployed" and was "capable of earning a greater
income."' 3 9 The district court disagreed and determined that the trial court
failed to apply the good faith test in determining whether the husband
needed to begin his own proprietorship. 40 Absent bad faith on the part
of the paying spouse, the district court opined that, "a court is not entitled
effectively to decide what an ex-husband's current employment should or
should not be.'
141
Thereafter, in Brooks v. Brooks,142 the Second District Court of
Appeal again reversed an imputation of income in an alimony case. The
evidence established that the husband had been diligently seeking employ-
ment, but failed to obtain work despite his best efforts. 43 The district
court noted that the husband had sent out over one hundred resumes, and
that at least twelve rejection letters were introduced into evidence at the trial
level. 44 One of the rejection letters received by the husband indicated
that over one hundred and fifty people had applied for the position in
question. Under these circumstances, the district court held that there was
no evidence establishing that the husband could have earned more than he
was earning at the time of the dissolution of marriage. 145
In McCall v. McCall, 46 the trial court imputed income to the husband
based upon the court's assumption that the husband's live-in girlfriend was,
or should be, paying one-half of the husband's living expenses. The district
court reversed the imputation of income, noting first, that it is "improper"
137. Id.
138. 599 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Id. at 192.
140. Id. at 194.
141. Id.
142. 602 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
143. Id. at 63 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 616 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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for a trial court to treat a roommate's income as though it belonged to the
spouse, and second, that there was no evidence presented that the husband's
live-in companion actually contributed to the husband's expenses.47
Within the past two years, Ugarte v. Ugarte"' was the sole decision
rendered in which the trial court's imputation of income was affirmed. This
decision differed from the other decisions relating to imputed income in one
significant way: the case involved a self-employed physician who, the court
noted, was "able to control and regulate" his own income level.' 49 Thus,
in Ugarte, the trial court's imputation of income to the husband was
affirmed. 5 ' The court noted that self-employed individuals, "in contrast
to salaried employees," may possess tax returns and business records which
"may not reflect their true earnings, earning capacity, and net worth."''
The Ugarte case was the only imputed income case rendered in 1992,
whether involving alimony or child support, in which an imputation of
income by the trial court was affirmed.
The theme of the foregoing decisions is apparent in light of the fact
that in five of the six decisions addressing imputed income in alimony cases
rendered within the past two years, the trial court's imputation of income
was reversed. Therefore, it is clear that the appellate courts are developing
strict standards with respect to imputation of income, and that those
standards must be met in order for such imputation to be sustained on
appeal.
H. Modification
One of the two most significant decisions of 1992 rendered by the
Florida Supreme Court involved the issue of modification of alimony. In
Pimm v. Pimm,5 2 the supreme court responded to a question certified by
the Second District Court of Appeal regarding the effect of the voluntary
retirement of the payor on the payor's alimony obligation. The supreme
court responded that voluntary retirement could justify a reduction in a
payor's alimony obligation provided that such retirement was reason-
able.' In determining whether a retirement is reasonable, the supreme
147. Id.
148. 608 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), cause dismissed, 617 So. 2d 322
(Fla. 1993).
149. Id. at 840.
150. Id. at 839-40.
151. Id.
152. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
153. Id. at 537.
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court directed the trial courts to consider "the payor's age, health, and
motivation -for retirement, as well as the type of work the payor performs
and the age at which others engaged in that line of work normally
retire."'5 4 The court further opined that the age of sixty-five "has become
the traditional and presumptive age of retirement for American workers"
and, therefore, a retirement prior to the age of sixty-five would place upon
the payor "a significant burden" to show that earlier voluntary retirement is
reasonable.' The foregoing notwithstanding, the court cautioned that
"[e]ven at the age of sixty-five or later, a payor spouse should not be
permitted to unilaterally choose voluntary retirement if this choice places the
receiving spouse in peril of poverty," and directed the trial courts to
"consider the needs of the receiving spouse and the impact a termination or
reduction of alimony would have on him or her."' 6
The Pimm decision also addressed another issue which had been
unresolved by earlier decisions of the various district courts of appeal:
whether a party seeking a modification of the provisions of an agreement
carries a heavier burden than a party seeking modification of the provisions
of a final judgment. In Pimm, the Florida Supreme Court specifically held
that "where the alimony sought to be modified was . . . set by the court
upon an agreement of the parties, the party who seeks a change carries a
heavier than usual burden of proof."' 57
I. Amount
Section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes specifies a list of criteria which
the trial courts are required to take into consideration in determining
whether alimony shall be awarded and, if so, the nature, type and amount
of such alimony.'58  In 1991, the Florida Legislature amended section
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Pimm, 601 So. 2d at 537 (quoting Tinsley v. Tinsley, 502 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). See also Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992). In Tietig,
the Florida Supreme Court made it clear that the heavy burden rule of Pimm is to be applied
only to alimony modification cases, and that the substantial change in circumstances standard
is to be applied to child support modification cases. Id. at 1251.
158. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1991). The statute requires the courts to consider all
relevant economic factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
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61.08 providing that, effective July 1, 1991, the trial courts "shall include
findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated" therein supporting an
award or denial of alimony.'59 This amendment, and the case law inter-
preting the amendment, led to three decisions from the First and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal, which reversed the trial courts holdings for a
failure to include such findings of fact within the final judgment of
dissolution of marriage. 6 ' These decisions mark the first time that such
holdings have appeared in Florida law.
In Walsh v. Walsh,' 61 the First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's final judgment in its entirety, finding itself unable to review the
judgment because of the absence of findings of fact concerning the wife's
need for alimony and the husband's ability to pay. 162  The district court
opined that the lack of findings made the award of alimony to the wife
"impossible to review," and, therefore, the case was reversed and remand-
ed. 16
3
Similarly, in Jacques v. Jacques, 64 the First District found them-
selves "unable to reach any reasoned decision" because the final judgment
lacked written findings of fact to support the alimony award. 65  Holding
that the amendment to section 61.08(1) required such findings, the First
District reversed the case, noting, "we are unable to discern the trial court's
determination as to the wife's needs and the husband's ability to provide for
such needs.' '
66
(d) The financial resources of each party, the non-marital and the marital assets
and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to,
services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career building of
the other party.
(g) All sources of income avoidable to either party.
Id.
159. Ch. 91-246, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 2408, 2410 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.08(l)
(1991)).
160. See Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Moreno v.
Moreno, 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Walsh v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
161. 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
162. Id. at 1223.
163. Id.
164. 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
165. Id. at 75.
166. Id.
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In Moreno v. Moreno,167 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached
the same conclusion. Upon the authority of section 61.08(1) of the Florida
Statutes, as amended, the district court reversed the trial court's alimony
award for its failure to make findings of fact, commenting that such findings
are necessary to "meaningful appellate review."' 68
All of the foregoing came to a head in the en banc decision of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in Kennedy v. Kennedy. 169 Therein, the majority
determined that, although the effective date of the statutory requirement for
findings of fact regarding alimony awards was July 1, 1991, the requirement
applied retroactively to cases in which decisions were rendered after such
date. '7 The majority also concluded that the requirement of findings of
fact means written findings in the judgment and not merely oral statements
in the record.'
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES, SUIT MONEY AND COSTS
A. Standards for Awards of Attorney's Fees
Among the most significant decisions of 1992 were three cases
addressing the question of attorney's fee awards. The first, P.A.G. v.
A.F.,' 72 discussed the issue of attorney's fee awards in child support
modification actions brought in cases where the underlying child support
award was entered in a paternity action rather than a dissolution of marriage
action. The second case, Brown v. Dykes,'73 determined the validity of
section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes. A literal reading of the statute
authorized an award of fees in paternity actions only to mothers against
putative fathers. In the third, Sotolongo v. Brake,174 the Florida Supreme
167. 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
168. Id. at 1281.
169. 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
170. Id. at 1034.
171. Id. Both Judge Sharp and Judge Diamantis, dissenting, did not agree. Id. at 1037-
39 (Sharp, J., dissenting); Id. at 1040-46 (Diamantis, J., dissenting). Both opined that the
finding of fact requirement of section 61.08(1) of the Florida Statutes may be met with
findings in the record and that the statutory language does not specify that written findings
are required. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d at 1038, 1044. Both also opined that the requirements
of the statute apply only to cases filed after July 1, 1991, and to decisions rendered after July
1, 1991. Id. at 1139, 1043-44.
172. 602 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992).
173. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1992).
174. 616 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1992).
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Court dealt with whether an attorney's fee award may exceed the amount
of fees provided for in the contract between the attorney and client.
In P.A.G., the Fourth District Court of Appeal had certified the
following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Whether the Florida
Statutes provide for an award of attorney's fees in a postjudgment proceed-
ing for modification of a child support obligation which was entered in a
paternity action?"'75 The question had arisen because the portion of the
paternity statute dealing with awards of attorney's fees, Florida Statutes
section 742.031, authorizes attorney's fees only for the determination of
paternity proceedings and does not address the award of attorney's fees for
subsequent proceedings.
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
affirmative, finding that the right to seek modification of a child support
order is established by section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes, which pertains
to "enforcement and modification of support, maintenance, or alimony
agreements or orders."' 7 6 The statute does not limit the court's enforce-
ment and modification authority to court-ordered payments arising from
dissolution of marriage proceedings. Instead, the statute provides that, upon
motion of either party, the circuit court has jurisdiction to modify an
agreement, whether in connection with a dissolution or separate maintenance
proceeding or with a voluntary property settlement.' 77 The court also has
jurisdiction "when a party is required by court order to make any pay-
ments." 78 Thus, the fact that an order of child support is entered as a
result of a paternity proceeding does not alter the fact that it is a "court
order" for child support and, therefore, subject to modification pursuant to
section 61.14. Because the modification action is brought under the
authority of Chapter 61 and specifically section 61.14 of the Florida
Statutes, the attorney's fee provisions of Chapter 61, which apply to "any
proceeding under this chapter," apply to the action. 79
In Brown v. Dykes, 8 ' the Second District Court of Appeal was called
upon to determine whether the provisions of the Florida statute dealing with
awards of attorney's fees in paternity actions was invalid on equal protection
grounds, in light of the fact that a literal reading of the statute would
authorize the award of fees only on behalf of prevailing mothers in paternity
175. P.A.G., 602 So. 2d at 1260.
176. Id. at 1261.
177. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (Supp. 1992).
178. P.A.G., 602 So. 2d at 1261.
179. Id.
180. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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cases. In order to find the statute valid, the Second District determined that
either prevailing party-whether such party be the mother or the putative
father-must be entitled to an award of attorney's fees.''
The Second District noted that Florida's paternity statutes were
amended in 1986 in order to allow either party-the mother or putative
father-to initiate an action for the determination of paternity.'82 Prior to
the amendment, only the mother of a child born out of wedlock could
initiate a paternity proceeding under the paternity statutes and the putative
father was left to resort to other legal remedies, such as an action for
declaratory judgment. A number of constitutional challenges to the paternity
statutes were brought by putative fathers, but the Florida Supreme Court
consistently upheld the validity of the statutes on the basis that putative
fathers had other legal remedies, such as declaratory relief, through which
to seek a determination of paternity. The constitutional challenges
eventually compelled the Florida Legislature to amend the statutes in 1986
to allow paternity actions to be initiated by either party or by the child.'83
However, when the statute was broadened, the Legislature failed to amend
the attorney's fee portion of the statute (section 742.031) which authorizes
the imposition of attorney's fees against the father only.'84
The Second District concluded that a gender-based classification must
be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective to withstand constitutional challenge.'85 The court opined that,
"the validity of any such classification must be determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women."' 86
However, the court further noted that when a statute treats a class of people
covered by the statute unequally, as compared to a class not so covered, a
court may make the choice of applying the statute to both classes or neither.
Thus, the Second District elected to construe the statute as applicable
regardless of gender and held that "a father may apply for attorney's fees
under section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes."'87
181. Id. at 570.
182. Id. at 569.
183. See ch. 86-220, § 150, 1986 Fla. Laws 1611, 1723 (amending FLA. STAT. §
742.011 (1987)).
184. See FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1991).
185. Brown, 601 So. 2d at 569.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 570.
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In Sotolongo v. Brake,' the wife had retained her counsel through
a pre-paid legal services plan and contractually agreed to pay her attorney
at the rate of $60 per hour. At the conclusion of the dissolution of marriage
proceedings, the trial court required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's
fees and the wife's attorney sought a fee award at a higher hourly rate than
called for by the contract with the wife. The supreme court determined that
in cases involving pre-paid legal service contracts, the hourly rate specified
in the contract is presumed to be reasonable and may not be exceeded in a
fee award against the other party.' 9 Accordingly, the contract attorney
is not entitled to compensation over and above the amount specified in the
legal services contract. However, the court further opined that in cases not
involving pre-paid legal service contracts, an attorney's fee award may
exceed the contract amount if the spouse seeking the fee award establishes
that because of the spouse's inferior economic status, the agreed upon fee
was below the customary and reasonable rate charged for similarly situated
clients. 9 ' If the spouse seeking the fee award establishes such facts, then
the burden will shift to the defending spouse to disprove the allegation. The
failure of the defending spouse to disprove the allegation will justify the trial
court enhancing the fee to compensate for the reduction below the
customary and reasonable rate.
B. Miscellaneous
Although the foregoing decisions were the leading cases with respect
to the issue of the standard for awards of attorney's fees, several other
significant decisions were rendered by the appellate courts.
In Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A.
v. Mullin,'9' the Third District Court of Appeal ordered the husband to
pay the wife's attorney's fees with respect to a certiorari proceeding in
which the husband was not a party. The court found that the basis of the
wife's claim in the appellate court arose from an order entered in a
dissolution of marriage action and, therefore, the appellate proceeding could
be considered a chapter 61 proceeding pursuant to which attorney's fees
may be awarded.' 9 In Jacobson v. Jacobson,93 the Fifth District Court
188. 616 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1992).
189. Id. at 413-14.
190. Id. at 414.
191. 602 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, Mullin v. Mullin, 613
So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1993).
192. Id. at 957.
193. 595 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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of Appeal held that, where the parties contract through a settlement
agreement, the prevailing party in any enforcement proceeding shall be
awarded his or her attorney's fees.'94 Further, the trial court must enforce
such an agreement and has no discretion to decline to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.1
95 
.
In Cooper v. Kahn,'96 the Third District Court of Appeal held that a
guardian ad litem in a matrimonial matter must present the same type of
evidence in support of an award of attorney's fees as is required of an
attorney seeking such an award. The trial court must also enter a judgment
setting forth the same type of findings of fact as are required in any other
attorney's fee proceeding.'97
In Mishoe v. Mishoe,98 the First District Court of Appeal held that
a trial court may not "reserve jurisdiction" to award attorney's fees at a
subsequent time if the party to be ordered to pay lacks the ability to pay at
the time of the proceedings.' 99 In Mishoe, the trial court found that the
husband lacked the ability to pay attorney's fees at the time of the final
hearing in the parties' divorce case. However, the court "reserved jurisdic-
tion" to award such fees to the wife in the future, when the husband would
presumably be financially better off. The First District held that once a trial
court makes the factual finding that the husband lacked the ability to pay
attorney's fees, any attempt to defer consideration "into the indefinite
future" was "ineffectual.""2 °  The test, according to the district court, is
the parties' relative ability to obtain counsel at the time of the proceedings
in question. The First District opined that if a court could reserve such a
determination until years after the dissolution, it would stand to reason that
if a party receiving an award of attorney's fees greatly improved his or her
circumstances in the future, that party could be required to reimburse the
payor spouse by the simple means of "reserving jurisdiction.2
194. Id. at 293-94.
195. Id.; see also Rose v. Rose, 615 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Of
course, the parties must have specifically agreed to the use of a "prevailing party" standard
because, absent such an agreement, a "prevailing party" basis for the award of fees in family
law cases is erroneous.
196. 600 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
197. Id. at 36.
198. 591 So. 2d I100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
199. Id. at I101.
200. Id.
201. Id. The court distinguished the type of"reservation of jurisdiction" attempted by
the trial court in Mishoe from the more customary situation in which the trial court deter-
mines an entitlement to attorney's fees and reserves jurisdiction to set the award at a
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There were two decisions rendered in 1993 that are of most interest
regarding the issue of the standard for awards of attorney's fees in
dissolution of marriage actions.2" 2 First, in Pelton v. Pelton,2 °3 the First
District Court of Appeal determined that the trial court must, in determining
both "need" and "ability to pay," reduce the income of the payor spouse by
the amounts required to be paid under the final judgment and increase the
income of the recipient spouse by such amounts. Only after having done
such calculations is the trial court permitted to determine the respective
incomes of the parties for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees.204
Second, in Steele v. Steele," 5 the Second District determined that an
award of attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action must pertain to
the relief requested in the actual dissolution proceedings.2 6 In Steele, as
part of the dissolution of marriage action, the wife filed a constructive trust
and partition action against the husband's parents who owned the former
marital residence jointly with the husband. At the conclusion of the case,
the trial court awarded the wife attorney's fees to be paid, in part, by the
husband's parents. The Second District reversed, holding that there was no
statute or case law permitting the award of attorney's fees in a constructive
trust and partition case and, therefore, the husband's parents could not be
made liable for the wife's attorney's fees.20 7
C. Enforcement
Two significant attorney's fees enforcement cases were decided in 1992
and early 1993, specifically City of Tampa v. Hines,208 and Reyf v.
Reyf 2 °9 In Hines, a writ of garnishment for the collection of attorney's
fees was issued against the city of Tampa with respect to a city employee,
a police officer, who owed attorney's fees on behalf of his former wife.
The city contended: that the garnishment statute, section 61.12 of the
Florida Statues, did not permit garnishment of a municipality because only
states and counties are mentioned; that the statute does not mention
subsequent date, noting that the latter is "clearly proper." Id. at n.l.
202. See Steele v. Steele, 617 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,_ So.
2d _ (Fla. 1993); Pelton v. Pelton, 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
203. 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
204. Id. at 717.
205. 617 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
206. Id. at 738.
207. Id.
208. 596 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
209. 620 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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attorney's fees among the matters for which such garnishment may be ob-
tained; that "as a matter of public policy, attorney's fees are not as
important as child support" and, therefore, represent a "mere debt" for
which garnishment should not lie; and that being subject to the writ would
constitute an unreasonable burden on the city.2" ° The Second District
Court of Appeal did not agree and held, with respect to three of the city's
four arguments: that the statute has been construed as applicable to
municipalities; that the words "suit money" which do appear in section
61.12 include attorney's fees; and that being subject to a writ of garnishment
constitutes a "relatively small administrative inconvenience" to the city. 21,
With respect to the city's third argument (the public policy argument) the
Second District, without commenting upon the accuracy of the city's
"ranking" of the importance of the fee award, noted that, even if such an
award were of lesser importance than a child support or alimony award,
"such a ranking would not mean that attorney's fees do not justify
garnishment., 21 2 Without counsel, the court commented, "a spouse might
well not be on an equal footing with the opposing spouse and be able to
provide a court with the necessary evidence to support an award of all the
alimony and child support he or she needs., 21
3
Hines dealt with an ordinary writ of garnishment. With respect to a
continuing writ of garnishment, however, the Third District held, in Reyfv.
Reyf , 4 that such a writ is not available for the enforcement of an attorn-
ey's fee award.
V. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Age of Majority
The fact that for over twenty years the age of majority in Florida has
been eighteen has not seemed to diminish the number of cases addressing
the issue of the age of majority and child support issues. During the survey
period, no less than eight cases rendered by the appellate courts dealt with
this issue.
210. Hines, 596 So. 2d at 161.
211. Id at 161-62.
212. Id. at 162.
213. Id.
214. 620 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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In Haydu v. Haydu,"5 the trial court ordered the husband to maintain
life insurance in order to secure the child support ordered paid on behalf of
the parties' minor children. The court did not specify, in the final judgment,
however, that the husband would have the right to remove the children as
beneficiaries as each child attained the age of majority. The First District
reversed the trial court for having failed to include such a cancellation
provision in the judgment, noting that "a father's duty of support expires
when his children achieve their majority."2 '1 6
Similarly, in Harris v. Deeb,2"7 the Second District, in a brief, one
paragraph decision setting forth no facts, stated, "the ex-husband should not
be required to provide life insurance to secure his obligation for support of
a child who dies, marries, becomes emancipated, or reaches majority and its
not thereafter entitled to support." '
Four decisions rendered by the Second District Court of Appeal in
1992 addressed issues pertaining to child support and the age of majority,
specifically: Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Herron,21 9
McCauley v. McCauley,220 Monitzer v. Monitzer,22 ' and Potts v.
Potts.22
2
In Herron, the father had been ordered to pay child support until each
of his children were emancipated pursuant to a decree entered in Indiana
where the age of majority is twenty-one. The father moved from Indiana
to Florida but the children remained in Indiana. In an enforcement
proceeding brought by the mother, the father contended that he was only
obligated to pay support until the children attained the age of majority.
Since he lived in Florida, such an order could only be enforced against him
in Florida until his children attained Florida's age of majority or, in other
words, the age of eighteen. Not surprisingly, the Second District Court of
Appeal did not agree with the father's position and held that "[t]he mere fact
that the father has moved to this jurisdiction which requires support only to
eighteen will not defeat his obligation required under the law of the foreign
jurisdiction which is now being enforced in Florida." '223
215. 591 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. Id. at 657.
217. 605 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
218. Id.
219. 592 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
220. 599 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. 600 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
222. 615 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
223. Herron, 592 So. 2d at 773 (quoting Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 426 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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McCauley v. McCauley, a Second District Court of Appeal was heard
en banc for the purpose of resolving the conflict between two earlier
decisions of the Second District, Thomasson v. Thomasson224 and Stultz
v. Stultz. 225  McCauley involved a husband who had been ordered to pay
child support until his child had attained the age of eighteen despite the fact
that at age eighteen the child would still be in high school. The wife
appealed from the trial court's decision to award child support only until age
eighteen and the district court affirmed, holding that if a legal duty to
provide post-majority support while a child remains in high school is to be
created, the legislature "is the fountain out of which that legal duty is to
spring. 226
In the en banc decision in McCauley, the Second District noted that
"there is no legal duty to pay child support beyond the age of eighteen-the
age of majority in Florida-absent a finding of physical or mental deficien-
cies. 227  In Monitzer v. Monitzer,228 the Second District addressed a
case in which such deficiencies were, in fact, present. The evidence
presented to the trial court in Monitzer established that the parties' child,
although she had attained the age of eighteen, remained "dependent" as a
result of"a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to her reaching
majority."2 29 Despite evidence that the child would become independent
at some time in the future, the child was dependent at the time of the
hearing and had been dependent for years prior to attaining the age of
224. 562 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that trial court could
properly find that an eighteen year old child who was still in high school was dependent and
therefore entitled to continuing child support).
225. 504 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a parent cannot be ordered
to continue child support payments on behalf of a child still in high school despite fact that
the child was economically dependent and required continuing support until graduation from
high school).
226. McCauley, 599 So. 2d at 1003. The Second District did not mention the 1991
revision to section 743.07 of the Florida Statutes, which became effective on October 1,
1991, and allows for continuing child support if the child is dependent in fact, is between the
ages of 18 and 19, and is still in high school performing in good faith with a reasonable
expectation of graduation before the age of 19. Ch. 91-246, § 8, 1991 Fla. Laws 2408, 2416
(amending FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1991)). In Walworth v. Klauder, 615 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Fifth District certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question
of whether section 743.07 is violative of equal protection because of the seemingly arbitrary
cut-off date of the age of 19.
227. McCauley, 599 So. 2d at 1002.
228. 600 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
229. Id. at 575.
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eighteen. As such, the Second District reversed the trial court's refusal to
order the husband to continue to pay support.23°
In the Third District, in Carbonell v. Carbonell,23' the trial court's
requirement that the husband continue to pay child support until such time
as the child "graduates from high school, becomes nineteen years of age
while still attending high school, dies, marries or becomes self-supporting,"
was stricken. The court held that attending high school does not make a
child dependent and that absent a statutory dependency, the obligation to
provide child support ends upon the child attaining the age of majority.232
The last of the post-majority child support cases decided by the Second
District during 1992 involved a situation in which the parties' twenty-six
year old son sued the husband seeking to enforce the terms of his parents'
1980 settlement agreement pursuant to which the husband had agreed to pay
for the son's college education. In Potts v. Potts,233 the district court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action for "failure to state a cause
of action," and held that the child was "entitled to maintain an action against
his father on purely contractual grounds. 234
In arguably the most interesting post-majority child support case of the
year, at least from the perspective of family law practitioners, the Third
District Court of Appeal in Krstic v. Krstic,235 affirmed an order of the
trial court which "reserved jurisdiction" to order the husband to pay for his
children's college education "should that relief become available under
Florida law. ' 236 The Third District opined that the order was not objec-
tionable as it "simply left open the possibility that should the law change,
such relief may be available for the children. 237
In the Fifth District, a very unusual fact pattern emerged in the case of
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Holland,238 which
involved post-majority enforcement of post-majority arrearages. In Holland,
230. Id
231. 618 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
232. Id. The Third District did not mention in this opinion the revisions to section
743.07 of the Florida Statutes, which became effective October 1, 1991.
233. 615 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
234. Id. at 697.
235. 604 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
236. Id at 1246.
237. Id. The Krstic case leaves open the question of whether attorneys should now seek
to have included in final judgments a reservation ofjurisdiction with respect to all possible
forms of relief which are not yet available under the existing law, but may be in the future,
and whether a failure to do so could constitute malpractice.
238. 602 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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the father was obligated to pay support for the parties' minor child beyond
the child's attaining the age of eighteen. After the child attained majority,
child support arrearages accrued and, thus, when the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services sought to collect the arrearages from the father
on behalf of the mother, they were seeking post-majority arrearages through
a post-majority enforcement action. The trial court determined that under
such circumstances, only the child had standing to enforce the obligation
and the district court affirmed.239
The Fifth District began its discussion by noting that there are several
sources for the duty to pay child support.24° The duty can be strictly legal
based on common law or statute, strictly contractual, or a confusion of both.
The confusion arises from the fact that separation agreements appurtenant
to dissolution of marriage actions are often a combination of both legal and
contractual duties, blurred by two practices. The first practice is using
agreements to contract as to the amount satisfactory to discharge a duty
imposed by statute or common law. The second practice is having a court
approve and order payment of purely contract based duties. Thus, confusion
results from the practice of having a trial court approve an agreement
relative to child support, and ordering payment, without distinction as to, or
appreciation for, the difference between a support agreement merely
quantifying the amount correctly necessary to discharge a legal (statutory or
common law) duty, and an agreement establishing a purely contractual duty
to pay an agreed amount of child support.24" '
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Fifth District opined that
(1) under law only one cause of action exists in one entity or person at
one time; (2) that a child for whom child support is due from a parent
is the equitable and legal beneficiary and the real party in interest and
in legal contemplation owns the cause of action to recover due monies
for its support; (3) when a child is under legal disability of non-age or
otherwise, the mother, or anyone else, who is the lawful custodial or
legal guardian for the child or even a next friend, is entitled to collect
child support money owed by the parent to discharge a legal duty for
child support ... ; (4) any non-volunteer stranger has a common law
cause of action against either parent for the cost of necessities provided
a child because of the parent's neglect to meet his or her legal parental
duties to support that minor child ... ; (5) a child of lawful age and
under no legal disability has the legal right to make the decision to
239. Id. at 653-54.
240. Id. at 654.
241. Id.
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enforce, and when to enforce, or not to enforce, its own legal rights;
and (6) one parent of a child, as such, does not have the legal right or
standing to enforce the child's cause of action or to collect support
money from the other parent after the child is of age and is under no
other legal disability.2
42
B. Modification
Six significant decisions regarding child support modification were
rendered in 1992 and 1993, three of them by the Florida Supreme Court.
In Pimm v. Pimm,143 the Florida Supreme Court was called upon to
respond to a question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal with
respect to the effect of a payor's voluntary retirement upon the payor's
alimony obligation. The court responded to the question by holding that
voluntary retirement could, under circumstances in which the retirement was
reasonable, constitute a substantial change in circumstances for the purpose
of decreasing the payor's alimony obligation. The court further noted,
however, that the obligation to pay child support differs from the obligation
to pay alimony and, therefore, "voluntary retirement cannot be considered
a change of circumstances which would warrant a modification of child
support.
244
In reaching its decision in Pimm, the supreme court also opined that a
party seeking a modification of the terms of an agreement, as opposed to the
terms of a judgment, faces a heavier burden of proof with respect to such
modification. Having so held, the supreme court found itself faced with the
problem presented in Tietig v. Boggs,245 in which a husband seeking a
downward modification of child support, had been denied the requested
relief on the basis that he had failed to meet his heavier burden. The Tietig
case then came before the Florida Supreme Court on the basis of conflict
with Bernstein v. Bernstein,246 in which the Fourth District Court of
Appeal had held that the heavier burden standard did not apply to child
support cases because Florida's public policy does not permit the terms of
a contract between parents to impinge upon the best interest of their
children.247
242. Id. at 654-55.
243. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
244. Id. at 537.
245. 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992).
246. 498 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
247. Id. at 1273.
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The supreme court resolved the apparent conflict between its decision
in Pimm-that a party seeking a modification of the terms of an agreement
bears a heavier burden than one seeking the modification of the terms of a
judgment--and Florida's public policy that prevents parents from contracting
to the detriment of their children, by holding that in child support modifica-
tion cases stemming from an agreement rather than a judgment, only the
party seeking a reduction in the amount of child support to be paid bears a
heavier burden. On the other hand, a party seeking an increase in the
amount of child support required pursuant to the terms of an agreement does
not bear such a "burden" and need only establish a substantial change in
circumstances. 48
In Miller v. Schou,249 the husband in a child support modification
case stipulated to his ability to pay any reasonable increase in child support
ordered by the court. Based upon this stipulation, the husband thereafter
refused to file a financial affidavit, contending it was unnecessary. The trial
court ordered him to do so. The Third District reversed, and the Florida
Supreme Court determined that the husband was, in fact, required to submit
a financial affidavit irrespective of his stipulated ability to pay."' On the
issue of the modification of child support itself, the supreme court opined
that an increase in the financial ability of the paying parent is sufficient, in
and of itself, to warrant an increase in child support.2 5'
Two other decisions of import regarding child support modification
were rendered in 1992: Evans v. Evans252 and Manning v. Manning,
253
both from the First District Court of Appeal. In Evans, the parties had been
divorced in 1987, at which time they agreed that the husband would be the
248. Id. at 1271. Contra Landa v. Massie, 593 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992). A request for an upward modification of child
support was denied on the basis that the petitioner had a "heavier burden" of proof because
the amount of child support was determined by an agreement between the parties. Id. at
1147. The Landa case, however, was rendered prior to the rendition of the supreme court's
opinion in Tietig v. Boggs.
249. 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1993).
250. Id. at 438.
251. Id. at 437-38. But see Kersh v. Kersh, 613 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993), in which the fact that the husband's income had increased by twenty-five percent was
held to be an insufficient basis upon which to order increased child support in which the
husband did not stipulate to an ability to pay any award made, and the husband's lifestyle had
not improved as a result of his increased income as he also had increased expenses. Id. at
586.
252. 595 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
253. 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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primary residential parent of their minor children. There was no mention
of child support in the parties' agreement or in the final judgment incorpo-
rating the agreement. Thereafter, the wife petitioned for modification of
custody and the husband counter-petitioned for child support.254 The
wife's petition for modification was denied and, again, no mention was
made in any court order of child support. In 1990, the husband filed a
petition for child support labeled "petition for modification." The trial court
denied the husband's request for child support on the basis that the original
agreement and final judgment did not award any support, and that no
support had been awarded in the parties' first modification case. The
district court reversed, holding that neither the final judgment nor the order
entered as a result of the first modification proceeding bore any indication
that the issue of child support had been considered by the court and that
neither a marital settlement agreement nor any other contract will serve to
abrogate a parent's obligation to support minor children.255
In Manning, the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated that the
standard for a downward modification of child support is a substantial
change in the circumstances of the payor that is "permanent in nature. '"256
The court noted that there is no set "time periods or particular circumstanc-
es" which in and of themselves will demonstrate "permanence"; rather, each
case must be decided on a "reasonable examination of the facts" of the
particular case. 57
C. Enforcement
In one of several Florida Supreme Court decisions rendered within the
past two years addressing family law issues, the court determined that
section 61.181(5) of the Florida Statutes, does not violate the Florida
Constitution by pledging public credit.2 58 In Dixon, the clerk of the court
of Polk County filed a declaratory action asserting that section 61.181(5) of
the Florida Statutes, which requires the disbursement by the clerk of funds
paid to the depository within four days, pledged the public credit because
254. Evans, 595 So. 2d at 988-89.
255. Id. at 990.
256. Manning, 600 So. 2d at 1275-76.
257. Id.; see also Freeman v. Freeman, 615 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
In Freeman, the Fifth District determined that the requirement that a change in circumstances
be "permanent" does not require a showing that the change is "forever." Id. at 226. Rather,
a showing of permanent change requires proof that the change is not temporary or transient,
but rather encompasses an extended period of time.
258. State v. Dixon, 594 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1992).
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the clerk was required to disburse the funds even if the check had not then
cleared.259 The Florida Supreme Court stated that the statute did not
require the pledging of public credit but, further noted, that even to the
extent that it could be held to pledge the public credit, doing so served a
strong public purpose:
It is a matter of national and state concern that children of broken
marriages and children born out of wedlock constitute a large percent-
age of people living in poverty in the United States today. Not only is
the amount of support ordered to be paid often inadequate, but also a
large percentage of the ordered support is never paid. The efforts of the
legislature to increase voluntary compliance with orders of support by
allowing the convenience of payment by personal check, and by making
the funds readily available to dependent spouses and children are
sufficiently strong public purposes to support any incidental pledge of
public credit.26
Three other child support enforcement decisions rendered in 1992 are
of interest to the extent that two imply 26 ' and one holds directly 26 2 that
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Putnam v. Putnam,263 rendered
over fifty years ago, is no longer "good law."
In Putnam, the Florida Supreme Court had held that a child's refusal
to visit with his or her father could serve as the basis of terminating the
father's child support obligation or, in some cases, could serve as the basis
of "forgiving" any child support arrearages that had accrued during the
period of time during which the child refused to visit.264 Not surprisingly,
Putnam continues to be cited as authority for these propositions sixty-four
years after its rendition.
In Carroll v. Carroll,265 the Second District determined that the
numerous changes in Florida law and Florida statutes over the past sixty
years have overruled the holding in Putnam. The Second District reached
this conclusion in a case where the parties' sixteen year old son petitioned
the trial court, in his own name, to terminate his father's visitation rights.
259. Id. at 296.
260. Id. at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
261. See Parker v. Parker, 610 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Lemaster, 596 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. See Carroll v. Carroll, 593 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
263. 186 So. 517 (Fla. 1939).
264. Id. at 518.
265. 593 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The trial court did so but also terminated the father's child support
obligation. The district court determined that it was unwilling to say that
conduct of a child, not shown to be orchestrated by one of the parents,
should relieve a parent of his or her duty to support the child because doing
so "would punish only the other parent's ability to pay for that child's
needs.
266
The Second District continued this line of reasoning in Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Lemaster,267 in which the Department,
on behalf of a mother who was owed child support, attempted to collect
nearly twelve years of child support arrearages from the father. The father
defended the enforcement proceeding by alleging that he had not seen his
child during the entire period of time for which he owed child support. The
trial court found that the father had not known the whereabouts of his child
during the time in which the arrearages accrued and thus "forgave" approxi-
mately $9,400 of the $14,900 in child support arrearages due and owing to
the mother. The district court reversed, holding that the obligation to pay
child support and visitation rights are unrelated and that the inability to
exercise visitation does not relieve the non-custodial parent from the
obligation to pay child support.26
These two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal, particular-
ly the decision in Carroll, appear to conflict with the earlier decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Riley v. Connor,269 in which the Fifth
District opined that "there may be conduct, on the part of a child who has
reached an age of discretion, of such disrespectful and contumacious
character, directed toward the obligor parent," which would justify the
suspension of the duty of support. 7 °  The Second District noted this
apparent conflict in its Carroll decision, but felt that it was simply unable
to agree with the Fifth District as to this point.
27
'
In Parker v. Parker,272 the parties' child refused to visit with the
husband (who had adopted the child at the age of four) because, according
to the child, he felt that the husband "was making him do things he didn't
266. Id. at 1132-33.
267. 596 So. 2d at 1117.
268. Id. at 1118. The court further opined that it would have been "a simple matter"
for the father to have "set aside each child support payment as it became due. Had he done
so, he would not now find the twelve year accumulation of arrearages to constitute an
intolerable lump sum for him to shoulder." Id.
269. 509 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
270. Id. at 1178.
271. Carroll, 593 So. 2d at 1133.
272. 610 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
[Vol. 18
323
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Greene
want to do." '273 The child had regained contact with his natural father and
refused to continue to use his adoptive father's surname. The child
threatened to run away if he were ordered to visit with the husband. The
district court awarded child support over the husband's objection that the
child's conduct was so disrespectful and offensive that any requirement that
he pay child support would be an abuse of discretion. 74 The district court
affirmed the support award on the basis that the trial court, through
mandatory counselling and structured visitation, was attempting to resolve
the problems presented by the case.275
D. Imputed Income
As with the imputed income decisions rendered in alimony cases over
the past two years, the appellate courts have reversed every reported case in
which income was imputed by the lower court with respect to child support
awards. During the survey period there were five such cases: one from the
First District Court of Appeal;27 6 two from the Second District Court of
Appeal;27 7 and two from the Third District Court of Appeal. 78
In Neal v. Meek,27 9 the parties were before the trial court in a paterni-
ty action. The father was unemployed but received income from the estate
of his late mother.28 ° The trial court determined that the father was
"'capable of [earning] additional income."' The court, however, did not
state any basis upon which it reached this conclusion nor state any presumed
amount which the father was "capable" of earning. The First District Court
of Appeal reversed, finding that the trial court failed to set forth findings of
fact indicating that it had determined the father's "employment potential and
probable earnings level" or his "recent work history, occupational qualifica-
tions, and prevailing earnings level in the community."2 ''
Similarly, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the two
imputed income cases it decided during 1992 based upon the trial court's
273. Id. at 720.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Neal v. Meek, 591 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
277. Braman v. Braman, 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Wollschlager
v. Veal, 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
278. Edwards v. Edwards, 615 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Levine v.
Best, 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
279. 591 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
280. Id. at 1045.
281. Id. at 1046.
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failure to state the basis upon which the income was imputed. In Braman
v. Braman,282 the trial court imputed income to the wife for child support
determination purposes despite the fact that the wife was unemployed at the
time of the final hearing. The trial court nevertheless assumed that the wife
was capable of earning the "minimum wage," and imputed such income to
her. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that although
the trial court was empowered to impute income to the wife if it was
determined that she was voluntarily unemployed, the trial court nevertheless
erred in failing to disclose the manner in which it calculated the amount of
the wife's child support obligation.283
Likewise, in Wollschlager v. Veal,284 the First District reversed the
trial court's imputation of income to the father, a full time dental student
who was not employed, because the trial court "failed to make sufficient
factual findings as to imputation of income and deviation from the child
support guidelines.""2 5
Recently, the Third District Court of Appeal has also reversed two
imputed income cases. In Levine v. Best, 86 the trial court's imputation of
income was reversed with a finding that the trial court erred in imputing
income "without setting forth what amounts it imputed and the sources of
this income." '287 Similarly, in Edwards v. Edwards,288 the trial court's
imputation of income was reversed where the evidence failed to demonstrate
an ability on the husband's part to pay the amount of the award made by the
trial court.289
VI. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
A. Marital versus Non-marital Assets
All equitable distribution cases may be divided into three categories of
issues: classification, valuation, and distribution. Classification is the
question of which of the parties' assets and liabilities are marital in nature
and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution, and which of their assets and
282. 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 683.
284. 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
285. Id at 275.
286. 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
287. Id. at 279.
288. 615 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
289. Id. at 179.
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liabilities are the separate property of one spouse or the other. With respect
to classification issues, nine significant decisions were rendered by the
district courts of appeal during the survey period.
At first blush, it would appear that the determination of the marital or
non-marital status of an asset or liability would be relatively simple to make
under the provisions of section 61.075, Florida's equitable distribution
statute. The statute provides that if an asset or liability was "acquired ...
during the marriage," then the asset or liability is "marital" unless it was
acquired during the marriage by "noninterspousal gift, bequest, devise, or
descent." '29  The complicating factors, however, are the questions of
commingling-the combination of non-marital or premarital assets with
marital assets-and enhancement-the appreciation in value of a non-marital
or premarital asset due to expenditure of marital labor or funds upon the
asset.
On the subject of enhancement, six significant decisions were rendered
during 1992 and 1993. Unfortunately, a clear conflict between these
decisions is readily apparent. In Moon v. Moon,29' the husband was a
participant in a profit sharing plan which had been commenced prior to the
marriage but was also funded during the marriage. The district court opined
that the portion of the plan funded during the marriage would be a marital
asset.112 The court went on to state that when a premarital asset has been
enhanced in value by the contribution of either marital funds or labors to the
asset, then "further enhancement in value of such marital asset due to
inflation or market conditions will become a marital asset., 293 In other
words, once appreciation in value has been shown, and once it has been
established that marital labors or funds contributed in any way to that
appreciation, then all of the enhanced value will be deemed a marital asset.
The First District repeated this principle in Glover v. Glover.294
Therein, the husband had owned a home prior to his marriage but subse-
quently transferred title jointly to himself and his wife during the marriage.
In reversing the trial court's finding that the husband had a "special equity"
in the home, the district court noted, that "'[o]nce the threshold requirement
of marital labor or funds has been established, increases in value attributable
to marital labor, funds, inflation and market conditions will all apply.'
295
290. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(5) (1991).
291. 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
292. Id. at 820.
293. Id. at 822 (citation omitted).
294. 601 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
295. Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
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Although nearly identical circumstances were present in Young v.
Young,296 another decision from the First District, the decision substantial-
ly differs from the decisions in both Glover and Moon. In Young, the
husband owned a home prior to his marriage but during the marriage a
number of improvements were made to the home, involving both marital
labor and marital funds. The trial court found that the home was entirely
the husband's non-marital property and the First District reversed, holding
that the wife's burden was only to show that marital funds or labors had
been devoted to the non-marital property.291 Once the wife met that
burden, the asset would be deemed marital in its entirety, unless the husband
were able to show that "any part of the enhanced value was exempt from
distribution because it was 'unrelated to either party's management,
oversight or other contribution, but instead due solely to purely passive
appreciation of the original asset.' ' 298
Meanwhile, in Dyson v. Dyson,299 the husband owned ten acres of
land prior to the parties' marriage but during the marriage marital funds
were used toward payment of the mortgage. The district court directed the
trial court to use a four step "formula" in determining the marital value of
the property, specifically: (1) determine the value of the property prior to
the marriage; (2) determine the current value of the property; (3) determine
the extent to which the value of the property "was enhanced by causes other
than the parties' contribution of marital funds and labor"; and (4) determine
the extent to which the value of the property was enhanced by use of marital
funds and labor.3"'
In 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal "joined the fray" with the
rendition of its opinion in Straley v. Frank.3"' In Straley, the district court
reversed the trial court's determination that the appreciated value of certain
property was a marital asset, finding the appreciation was not due to the
expenditure of marital funds, but instead, was the result of "inflation and
fortuitous market forces."3 2 However, with respect to certain real estate
partnerships owned by the husband prior to the marriage, the evidence
296. 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
297. Id. at 1270.
298. Id. (citation omitted).
299. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id. at 324.
301. 612 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, __ So. 2d _ (Fla.
1993). Although Straley is technically an opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal,
it was actually a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, en banc, sitting as the Second
District.
302. Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
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established that marital funds had been used to make mortgage payments on
the properties. The district court opined that, "[t]he appreciation in value
of these two partnerships as a result of the infusion of marital funds was the
amount by which [the husband's] share of the mortgage debt . ..was
reduced during the marriage."3 °3  In other words, even though marital
funds had been used in the preservation of the asset, the amount of
enhancement was determined to be only that attributable directly to the
funds.
In Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, °4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
in a footnote, commented that the increased value of assets solely owned by
one spouse prior to the marriage should be considered marital assets subject
to equitable distribution under certain circumstances. 35 The court stated
that equitable distribution would apply to the extent the increased value of
the assets was the result of either or both spouse's work efforts, or the
expenditure of marital funds or earnings of the parties.3"6
Three decisions on the subject of commingling of marital and
non-marital assets were rendered during the survey period, Amato v.
Amato," 7 Heinrich v. Heinrich,3°8 and Adams v. Adams.3"9 In Amato,
the parties had been married for thirty-five years and had four children. In
1983, one of the parties' adult children was killed in an automobile accident.
Prior to his death he had obtained a life insurance policy through his
employer and had designated his mother (the wife) as the beneficiary. Thus,
upon his death, the wife received insurance proceeds totaling $70,000. The
wife deposited the insurance proceeds into the parties' only bank account,
a joint account, and over the years the parties regularly utilized the funds
and deposited other funds into the account. At the time of the dissolution
of marriage, the wife asserted a "special equity" in $70,000 of the funds
maintained in the parties' joint bank account. The district court determined
the insurance proceeds had lost "their separate identity" and had become
"untraceable" because of the intermingling of funds for a several year period
before the dissolution action.31° Thus the funds were marital assets.3 '
303. Id.
304. 617 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
305. Id. at 329 n.2.
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
308. 609 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
309. 604 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
310. Amato, 596 So. 2d at 1244-45.
311. Id. Interestingly, this holding was not the original holding of the Fourth District
when this case was first decided. See Amato v. Amato, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2803 (Fla. 4th
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In Heinrich, the husband established a trust with his non-marital,
separate assets during the marriage. However, the husband then purchased
additional trust assets while married with marital funds. The Third District
held the commingling of marital and non-marital funds in the trust
transformed the trust income into a marital asset and any assets purchased
during the marriage with trust income were also deemed to be marital
assets.312
Similarly, in Adams, the Third District determined that commingling
occurred where the husband used his separate non-marital stock as collateral
for marital borrowing. The loans were then repaid with marital funds.
According to the Third District, the use of separate property as collateral for
marital loans causes the collateral to lose its "separate character."3 3
B. Valuation
Although valuation issues in equitable distribution cases are largely
evidentiary matters involving the presentation of testimony as to the specific
value of a specific asset, two issues of statutory interpretation were in the
forefront of the decisional law in 1992. First, what is the proper date for
valuation of assets in equitable distribution cases? Second, does the trial
court have to make specific findings of fact as to its valuation of the parties'
Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1991), opinion superseded on grant of reh'g, Amato v. Amato, 596
So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Initially, the Fourth District determined that the
insurance proceeds were the wife's separate property and that the husband had the burden to
prove that the wife intended to make a gift to him when she deposited the funds into the
parties' joint account, Id. at D2803. The district court first held that the funds in the joint
account at the time of the dissolution were clearly "traceable" because the amount of
insurance proceeds paid to the wife was known. Id. The Fourth District opined that once
the wife was able to establish that a portion of the funds in the joint account was derived
from a non-marital source, then the burden shifted to the husband to prove that the wife
intended to make a gift to him when she deposited the funds into the joint account. Id.
Judge Farmer dissented from the original opinion, noting that once the funds were deposited
into the joint account, they became intermingled with marital funds and were no longer
identifiable. Id. at D2804. Following the rendition of the original opinion in Amato, the
Florida Supreme Court rendered its decision in Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.
1991), a case originating from the Fourth District. The supreme court held that section
61.075 of the Florida Statutes, creates a presumption that jointly titled property is a marital
asset and the burden is upon the party seeking to have such property declared separate to
prove that a gift was not intended when title was taken in joint names. Id. at 493-94.
Thereafter, on rehearing, the Fourth District revised its opinion in Amato. See Amato v.
Amato, 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
312. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d at 95-96.
313. Adams, 604 So. 2d at 496.
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assets? In 1992, the case law on these two issues was entirely from the
First District Court of Appeal.
Section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes directs trial courts to value
marital assets at one of three points in time. The marital assets are valued
as the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, or at another date
expressly set forth in such a separation agreement, or as of the filing of the
dissolution of marriage action. However, the statute further provides that
the trial court may use another date if doing so would be just and equitable
under the circumstances of the case.3 14 In Moon v. Moon,3 15 the First
District determined that the trial court could value the parties' assets as of
the date that their separation provided that the court established in the final
judgment that such a date was "just and equitable under the circumstanc-
es." 316
However, in Dyson v. Dyson,3 17 the First District further opined that
the trial courts must state the date of valuation used in the written final
judgment in order to allow for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly,
the First District noted that,
[u]nless the circuit court distributing marital assets in a final judgment
of dissolution of marriage specifically identifies a valuation date of
these assets that is different from the date of filing of the petition and
also recites the specific circumstances and considerations that make use
of this date just and equitable, we shall presume that for such valuation
the circuit court used the date of filing the petition or the date the
parties entered into a valid separation agreement, whichever is earlier,
unless the record contains a specific written agreement executed and
filed by the parties establishing a specific date of valuation.3"'
The second issue with respect to valuation is whether the trial court
must specifically recite the value of each marital asset and liability in the
written final judgment. In a series of three cases: Dyson v. Dyson,3 19
314. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (1991).
315. 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
316. Id. at 822 (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.075(4) (1989)).
317. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
318. Id.; see also Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the date of valuation should be the date of filing unless the court recites specific
circumstances and considerations that make use of another date just and equitable); Barker
v. Barker, 596 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that compliance with
section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes requires that the trial court specifically state the date
of valuation in the written final judgment).
319. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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Walsh v. Walsh,32 and Nicewonder v. Nicewonder,32 ' the First District
held that such specific valuation findings are required.
In Dyson, the district court concluded that it was unable "to adequately
perform [its] appellate review function in determining whether the circuit
court abused its discretion in distributing the parties' assets" because the
final judgment contained no findings of fact with respect to the value and
amount of the parties' various marital assets and liabilities.32 2 Similarly,
in Walsh, the lack of findings as to valuation was deemed to have made the
trial court's distribution plan "impossible to review.
323
In Nicewonder, the First District concluded that, "[i]f the parties are to
be accorded full and fair appellate review of the findings of fact and rulings
made by the court below, that can be done only if the appealed order sets
forth adequate findings of fact as to valuation assigned to the various
properties by the court.
32 4
This particular problem was resolved by the 1991 amendments to
section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes. Pursuant to section 61.075(3), "any
distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by
factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial
evidence ... .,,325 Further, the statute specifically requires written
findings of fact with respect to the classification (identification) of marital
and non-marital assets and liabilities, the valuation of each marital asset and
liability and the party to whom each asset and liability is awarded.
326
C. Distribution
The question of findings of fact pertaining to equitable distribution in
written final judgments does not solely involve findings as to the date of
valuation or the value of the assets and liabilities distributed. Rather, the
question extends to the actual distribution of assets and whether the trial
courts must specifically state the basis upon which a particular equitable
distribution scheme was made. In 1992, the First, Second and Third
Districts all held that specific findings of fact are required in any case in
which the parties' assets and liabilities are not equally distributed.
320. 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
321. 602 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
322. Dyson, 597 So. 2d at 323.
323. Walsh, 600 So. 2d at 1223.
324. Nicewonder, 602 So. 2d at 1356.
325. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3) (1991).
326. Id.
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In Barker v. Barker,327 the First District reversed the trial court's
equitable distribution scheme because it was "unable to determine the basis
upon which the trial court distributed the marital assets. 328  The court
further noted "[i]t is appropriate to require explicit findings with respect to
disputed facts that form the factual basis on which a trial court undertakes
to award equitable distribution." '329
In Spillert v. Spillert,331 the trial court distributed sixty-two percent
of the parties' assets to the wife. The First District first noted that the final
judgment did not "set forth any findings in justification of [the] . . .
unbalanced split of the marital assets" and then held that "[i]f the trial court
decides to make an unequal division, the court should make findings which
support its conclusion. 33'
In the Second District, in Burston v. Burston,32 a case very similar
to Spillert, the trial court distributed the parties' only asset-their home-to
the husband without stating any basis for the award. The Second District
held that although specific findings of fact as to the court's rationale for
distribution of assets are not required, the record must show "some logic and
justification for the division. 333  In Burston, because the record did not
indicate such "logic and justification," the absence of written findings of fact
was significant because, as the court noted, "without findings to support the
final judgment we are unable to discern a proper basis therefor. 334
Three cases from the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the issue
of findings of fact with respect to the trial court's equitable distribution
scheme, if that scheme was such that the distribution of assets was not equal
between the parties, specifically, Sinclair v. Sinclair,335 Lozano-Ciccia v.
Lozano,336 and Ibanez- Vogelsang v. Vogelsang.
337
In Sinclair, although no facts are stated in the opinion, the trial court's
equitable distribution was reversed. The district court held that "no
extraordinary showing renders the unequal division appropriate. 338
327. 596 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
328. Id. at 1187.
329. Id. (citation omitted).
330. 603 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
331. Id. at 700. (citation omitted).
332. 604 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
333. Id. at 901.
334. Id.
335. 594 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
336. 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
337. 601 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
338. Sinclair, 594 So. 2d at 809 (citation omitted).
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In both Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano and Ibanez- Vogelsang v. Vogelsang,
the trial court's equitable distribution was clearly unequal and in favor of
the husband. However, the Third District affirmed the unequal distribution
in both cases because the trial court had made specific findings of fact
regarding its justification for the disparate distribution.339
D. Considerations of "Fault" in Equitable Distribution Cases
Two decisions of major significance were rendered by the Third
District Court of Appeal in 1992 regarding the relevance of a party's "fault"
or "marital misconduct" with respect to equitable distribution. In Rosenfeld
v. Rosenfeld,34° the trial court awarded all of the parties' marital assets to
the wife, finding that the husband had "wasted" assets during the marriage
and, therefore, had "already received his equitable distribution." 341 The
"waste" alleged by the wife included the husband having used marital funds
(his income) to support his mother and sister, to pay alimony to his former
wife and to pay attorney's fees to his lawyer with respect to his divorce
from his former wife. The district court reversed, finding that the wife's
allegations were essentially a request that the trial court "revisit the parties'
expenditures throughout the marriage, and should retroactively decide that
certain of the expenditures should not have been made." '342 The Third
District held that a judicial determination of "which spouse was the more
prudent investor and spender" was not an appropriate nor a valid justifica-
tion for a disparate distribution of marital assets.343
In Heilman v. Heilman,344 the wife, after twenty-two years of mar-
riage, left the husband to move in with a woman with whom she had fallen
in love. The trial court denied the wife alimony and made no equitable
distribution to her of the parties' marital assets. The Third District reversed
the denial of equitable distribution to the wife and held that "absent a
showing of a related depletion of marital assets, a party's misconduct is not
a valid reason to award a greater share of marital assets to the innocent
spouse.5345
339. See Lozano-Ciccia, 599 So. 2d at 718; Ibanez-Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d at 1303.
340. 597 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
341. Id. at 837.
342. Id.
343. Id. (citation omitted).
344. 610 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
345. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
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VII. MARITAL HOME
A. Right To Credit
The right of a spouse to a credit at the time of sale, for mortgage and
other related payments made upon the former marital residence following
an exclusive possession award to the other spouse, remains one of the most
confused and complex areas of marital and family law in Florida.
Although, generally speaking, the principles of real estate law
applicable to tenancies in common apply, questions abound. Is an award of
exclusive use and possession to one spouse an "ouster" of the other spouse?
What is the effect of an agreement or a judgment which is silent upon the
subject of credit? Is the spouse out of possession entitled to an award of the
fair rental value of the home? Although a number of appellate courts
attempted to resolve some of these issues in 1992, the questions remain.
There are three possible combinations of factual circumstances giving
rise to the question of credit upon the sale of a residence following an
exclusive possession award. First, the party in possession may pay for all
of the expenses associated with the home during his or her occupancy. In
such case, the party in possession would then seek a "credit" for having
made the other co-tenant's payments during the time of his or her occupan-
cy. Second, if the party in possession has provided for all of the expenses
associated with the home, and seeks a credit for having done so on behalf
of the other co-tenant, then the co-tenant out of possession may seek an
"offset" against such a credit for the fair rental value of the home. Third,
the co-tenants may equally pay for the expenses associated with the home
during one co-tenant's exclusive occupancy but, at the conclusion of that
exclusive occupancy, the co-tenant out of possession may seek reimburse-
ment for the fair rental value of the home for the period of time in which
he or she was out of possession. Various combinations of these factual
circumstances arise on a regular and continuing basis in marital law because
of the prevalence of awards of exclusive use and occupancy to one party in
dissolution of marriage actions.
In Adkins v. Adkins,346 the First District opined that where one
co-tenant has exclusive use of property, and uses the property for his or her
own benefit and does not receive rents or profits from the use of the
property, then the co-tenant in possession is not liable for rent to the
co-tenant out of possession unless he or she holds the property adversely or
346. 595 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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as a result of ouster or its equivalent.347 However, if the co-tenant in
possession under such circumstances makes a claim for a contribution from
the co-tenant out of possession for amounts expended in the improvement
or preservation of the property, then the co-tenant out of possession is
entitled to an offset against such claim for the reasonable rental value of the
property.34 Thus, the First District answered one of the many questions
surrounding exclusive use awards and credits upon the sale of the parties'
former marital residence as follows: the party out of possession will be
entitled to an award of the rental value of the property only as an offset to
a claim by the party in possession for reimbursement of his or her expenses
associated with the property during the term of his or her exclusive
occupancy.
349
Two conflicting opinions were rendered regarding entitlement to credit
in cases where the judgment or agreement is silent upon the issue of
credits.35  In Agerskov v. Gabriel,35 ' the parties' agreement (which was
incorporated into a final judgment) provided that the husband would pay the
mortgage, taxes and insurance on the former marital residence until such
time as it was sold, and upon the sale of the property would receive credit
for any reduction in principal and interest paid, after which the net proceeds
of the sale would be divided equally between the parties. The wife sought
an offset against the husband's credit for the rental value of the home. The
trial court found that because the parties' agreement was silent upon the
issue, general real estate principles applied and, therefore, the wife was
entitled to such an offset. The Second District reversed, holding that
because the parties' agreement made no mention of any entitlement on the
part of the wife to rental value, the trial court could not "modify" the
agreement by providing such a right to her.352
However, in Leventhal v. Leventhal,35 3 the First District held that a
party's right to reimbursement for ownership expenses "exists apart from
347. Id at 1033.
348. Id. at 1033-34.
349. Id.; see also Brisciano v. Byard, 615 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.) (holding
that if the co-tenant in possession seeks contribution for amounts expended in improvement
or preservation of property, including payments for mortgages, insurance, and taxes, that
claim may be offset by the reasonable rental value of the property), review denied, _ So.
2d _ (Fla. 1993).
350. Compare Agerskov v. Gabriel, 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) with
Leventhal v. Leventhal, 606 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
351. 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
352. Id. at 1172-73.
353. 606 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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any judgment or agreement. Such right is an implied term of any judgment
that is silent on the issue.
3 54
To be sure, there are distinctions between Agerskov and Leventhal. In
Agerskov, the party out of possession was seeking a credit for the rental
value of the property while the credit to be received by the party in
possession was specifically addressed by the parties' agreement. In
Leventhal, the party in possession was seeking a credit for the payments
made by him upon the property during the time of his possession. The
distinction between: who is seeking the credit, the party in possession or the
party out of possession; and, for what entitlement, reimbursement for
expenses actually paid or the fair rental value of the property, may be of
significance.355
B. Other Issues
Two cases involving the propriety of the filing of a lis pendens in
dissolution of marriage actions were decided in 1992, specifically, Finkel-
stein v. Finkelstein,356 and Gay v. Gay.357
In Finkelstein, the husband and wife entered into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which, in pertinent part, the wife was completely
absolved of any responsibility to pay child support. Thereafter, the husband
moved for modification and sought an award of child support from the wife.
The wife then petitioned to set aside the entire agreement which had also
required her to transfer her interest in the parties' former marital residence
to the husband. The wife filed a lis pendens against the property and the
husband moved to dissolve the lis pendens upon the grounds that he was
354. Id. at 1272 (citation omitted).
355. The Agerskovcourt noted an apparent conflict in the decisional law between the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, and the First and Third District Courts of Appeal. The
Fourth District held in both Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
and Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), that the right to credit
for payments made upon property by one co-tenant is an implied term of any agreement or
judgment that is silent upon the issue. In Janer v. Janer, 532 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) and Everett v. Everett, 561 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
576 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1990), the Third and First Districts held that the trial court cannot grant
a right to a credit if such right does not appear in an agreement or judgment, as doing so
would be an impermissible modification of the property terms of ajudgment or agreement.
The Second District distinguished its opinion in Agerskov from Brandt by opining that the
party seeking the credit in Brandt was the party in possession whereas the party seeking the
credit in Agerskov was the party out of possession. Agerskov, 596 So. 2d at 1173.
356. 603 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
357. 604 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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attempting to secure refinancing and the existence of the lis pendens
interfered with his ability to do so. The trial court discharged the lis
pendens and the district court reversed, holding that the party moving for the
discharge of a lis pendens has the burden of proving that the lis pendens
was inappropriate to the circumstances and cause of action stated in the
complaint, and that the party filing the lis pendens has an adequate remedy
at law and would not suffer irreparable harm if the court were to discharge
the notice.358
Of interest is the fact that the Fourth District's holding in Finkelstein
appears to be in direct conflict with the holding of the Fifth District in
Chiusolo v. Kennedy,359 in which the Fifth District, en banc, held that the
proponent of a notice of lis pendens bears the burden of proving irreparable
harm, an inadequate remedy at law and a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits.36
In any case involving the filing of a lis pendens, if the filing is not
premised upon a duly recorded instrument or a mechanic's lien, then the
trial court may control and discharge the lis pendens in the same manner as
the court may control and dissolve an injunction. In Gay, the Fifth District
was called upon to determine whether a deed to property held in the wife's
sole name entitled the husband in a dissolution of marriage action to file a
lis pendens against such property based upon a "duly recorded instru-
ment.
3 61
The wife, in Gay, initiated dissolution of marriage proceedings and the
husband filed a lis pendens with respect to two parcels of property that were
titled in the sole name of the wife but conceded to be marital assets. Both
properties were encumbered by a single mortgage which was delinquent and
neither party had the ability to pay the note. The wife negotiated for the
sale of the property and the husband objected to the sale alleging that he had
not been consulted with respect to the negotiations and that the sales price
was too low. The trial court dissolved the husband's lis pendens in order
to permit the wife to sell the property. On appeal, the husband contended
that the trial court lacked the authority to dissolve the lis pendens because
his underlying action (a counterclaim for dissolution of marriage) was
founded upon a recorded instrument, specifically, the deed to the property
which recited that the wife was "a married woman. 3 62 The Fifth District
358. Finkelstein, 603 So. 2d at 715.
359. 589 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
360. Id. at 421.
361. Gay, 604 So. 2d at 905.
362. Id.
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disagreed, holding that the husband's action was founded upon the statutory
provisions that allow the dissolution of an irretrievably broken marriage and
that the award of marital assets in such a case is a collateral issue. The
court further held that the existence of a deed reciting that the owner of the
property in question was a "married woman" at the time she acquired the
title to the property "did nothing to establish rights between the parties. 363
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Jurisdiction
In one of the most talked about decisions of the past decade, the
Florida Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in
Waite v. Waite.364 Therein, the supreme court determined that sufficient
reason for the continuation of the doctrine no longer existed and that both
public necessity and fundamental rights required judicial abrogation of the
doctrine.365 In discussing the principles under which the continuation of
the doctrine was formerly upheld, the court opined that there was no reason
to believe that married couples are any more likely to engage in fraudulent
conduct against insurers than anyone else; and, that there was also no reason
to believe that the type of lawsuits prohibited by the doctrine, if allowed, are
likely to foster unwarranted marital discord.366
As to other jurisdictional issues arising in family law cases, a review
of the case law reported during the survey period reflects that the district
courts of appeal were called upon to address nearly every jurisdictional issue
imaginable in dissolution of marriage actions, specifically: long-arm
jurisdiction, the type of jurisdiction obtained when service is constructive
rather than personal, and the definition and meaning of the residency
requirement.
In McCabe v. McCabe,367 the husband was in the military throughout
the parties' marriage. He retained his legal residency in Florida, maintained
363. Id. Another interesting holding in Gay is that a trial court has the power to order
a marital asset sold during the pendency of a dissolution of marriage action despite the
objection of the other spouse. The district court opined that "a trial court should have the
discretion to issue such orders as will preserve an asset or its proceeds for ultimate
disposition for the benefit of both parties." Id. at 907.
364. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
365. Id. at 1361.
366. Id.
367. 600 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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a Florida driver's license and filed federal income tax returns using a
Florida address. The husband petitioned for dissolution of marriage in
Florida and served the wife in North Carolina. The wife contested Florida's
jurisdiction and filed an affidavit stating that the parties had lived in Maine
throughout their marriage and, following the husband's discharge from the
military, had taken up residency in North Carolina with the intent to remain
there permanently. The trial court nevertheless determined that the wife was
a resident of Florida.368 The district court reversed, finding the husband's
allegations in his petition deficient for long-arm jurisdiction purposes
because the husband did not allege that the parties had maintained a marital
domicile in Florida at the time of the commencement of the action or that
the wife had resided in Florida prior to the filing of the action.369 The
husband's failure to so plead rendered the service of process upon the wife
under the long-arm statute void."
McCabe also addressed a second jurisdictional issue-the meaning and
definition of the residency requirement-as did two other decisions rendered
in 1992: Anechiarico v. Thompson37' and Sragowicz v. Sragowicz.37 2
In McCabe, the trial court relied upon the "general rule" that a wife's
residency follows that of her husband, despite the fact that the wife filed an
affidavit contesting the residency claims raised in the husband's petition for
dissolution of marriage. The district court reversed, holding that the fact
that the husband may be a resident of Florida does not "automatically confer
upon the trial court personal jurisdiction over the wife because the residence
of a wife does not necessarily follow that of her husband when facts
pertinent to her particular case indicate otherwise. 373
In a case that may be read as a corollary to McCabe, the Fourth
District, in Anechiarico, held that the trial courts are required to hold
evidentiary hearings when jurisdictional issues are raised by either party.3 74
368. Id. at 1184.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1184-85. See also Bimbaum v. Birnbaum, 615 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), in which the wife attempted to secure long-arm jurisdiction over the husband
by alleging that the husband had committed a tortious act, physically abusing her, while the
parties resided in Florida. The Third District held that the allegation of tortious acts of abuse
cannot provide the basis for long-arm jurisdiction and, further, that long-arm jurisdiction
based upon previous residence in the State of Florida may only be obtained where the
residency in Florida "proximately precede[d]" the cause of action. Id.
371. 596 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
372. 591 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
373. McCabe, 600 So. 2d at 1184.
374. Anechiarico, 596 So. 2d at 514.
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Lastly, in Sragowicz, the Third District determined that the claims of
residency by a wife were insufficient to establish her residency for
dissolution of marriage purposes.375 In this case, the wife came to Florida
from Brazil for the purpose of visiting her mother and attending a wedding.
The wife left all of her furniture, most of her clothing and most of the
children's clothing and toys in Brazil. The wife came to Florida with one
suitcase and did not register to vote or seek a homestead exemption with
respect to the parties' Florida condominium. The district court determined
that the evidence established that the wife had no intention of residing in
Florida at the time she came to Florida and did not develop an intention to
remain in Florida until sometime later when she and the husband had an
altercation." 6 As such, it was held that the wife failed to show "by clear
and convincing evidence" that she had resided in Florida with the intention
to make Florida her permanent residence six months prior to the filing of
her dissolution of marriage action. 77
Meanwhile, the Second District Court of Appeal, in Steffens v.
Steffens,37 determined the extent of jurisdiction obtained by resort to
constructive service of process in a dissolution of marriage action. Therein,
the husband was never personally served with process and the trial court
obtained jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding through publication of
notice and constructive service. The husband never appeared and a default
judgment was entered against him. The default judgment, however,
purported to award the wife a sum in excess of $100,000 representing the
"proceeds" of a certificate of deposit which was in the joint names of the
parties and which the husband had cashed in when the parties separated.
The default.judgment further awarded the wife a series of "credits" against
the husband's share of the certificate of deposit for certain costs, which the
wife claimed to have incurred as a result of an attempted purchase of
property which could not go forward following the parties' separation.
Lastly, the default judgment also purportedly awarded the wife her
attorney's fees, suit money and costs incurred in the proceedings. Ultimate-
ly, the husband moved to set aside the judgment. The district court
determined that such relief was entirely proper because of the court's total
lack of personal jurisdiction over the husband at the time of the entry of the
judgment in question.379 Without such personal jurisdiction, the district
375. Sragowicz, 591 So. 2d at 1084.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1085.
378. 593 :So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
379. Id. at 1157.
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court opined, all of the relief granted in the judgment other than the basic
dissolution of marriage, was "void and unenforceable.""3 '
Three interesting venue cases were decided during the survey period,
specifically, Brown v. Brown,38' Bowman v. Bowman,382 and Washington
v. Washington.3 The Brown decision merely recited the established long
established rule that venue in a dissolution of marriage action lies in the
county in which "the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing
union of the parties who intended to remain married, indefinitely, if not
permanently.""'
The Bowman case is unique because of the wife's attempt therein to
place a new slant to the firmly established rule as recited in Brown. In
Bowman, the wife, with the husband's consent and cooperation, moved from
Tallahassee to Palm Beach. Five months later, the husband petitioned for
dissolution of marriage and filed the action in Tallahassee. The wife sought
a change in venue from Tallahassee to Palm Beach, contending that venue
should lie in Palm Beach because the husband had agreed to her relocation
to that county. The district court, in holding fast to the well established rule
of venue in dissolution of marriage actions, held that it was unable to locate
any case finding that one party's consent to the other party's relocation had
any relevance to the issue of venue in a dissolution matter." 5
The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of venue in
Washington, a child support modification case. The court held that venue
may lie either in the county of the court issuing the original decree, or in the
county in which either party is residing when the modification petition is
filed.386
380. Id. at 1157. The wife in Steffens also claimed that the trial court had jurisdiction
because it acquired "in rem" jurisdiction over the certificate of deposit which she claimed bad
been described in her pleadings. The district court, however, held that property over which
such in rem jurisdiction is sought or obtained must be specifically described in the petition
and notice of constructive service. Id. at 1158. In the Steffens case, however, the wife's
pleading only stated that the parties had owned a certificate of deposit and the husband had
withdrawn the proceeds thereof several months before the filing of the action. Further,
according to the wife's petition, the whereabouts of the proceeds was unknown to her. As
such, no property was described in the wife's petition in a sufficient manner as to permit the
court to acquire in rem jurisdiction over such property. Id.
381. 592 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
382. 597 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
383. 613 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
384. Brown, 592 So. 2d at 326.
385. Bowman, 597 So. 2d at 399.
386. Washington, 613 So. 2d at 594-95.
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B. Discovery and Privileges
Three very significant decisions regarding discovery issues in family
law cases were rendered by the appellate courts within the past two years,
specifically, Schouw v. Schouw, 387 Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri,
Holton & Douberley, P.A. v. Mullin,388 and Swift v. Swift.389
In Schouw, the wife sought to compel the release of the husband's
psychological records, claiming that the husband was "mentally unstable"
based upon circumstances which the wife claimed existed approximately six
years earlier. The district court reversed the trial court's order releasing the
records and held that the wife's "mere allegations" that the husband was
"mentally unstable" were not sufficient to place the husband's mental health
in issue in the case and thereby overcome the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.39
Similarly, in Swift, the wife sought to depose the husband's psycholo-
gist and to inquire about "any extramarital relationship" which the husband
may have had during the parties' marriage. The wife attempted to defend
her discovery request by asserting that she was merely investigating the
husband's credibility because he had been asked in deposition whether he
had been faithful to his wife. The trial court denied the husband's request
for protection and the district court reversed holding, first, that issues of
"marital misconduct" are relevant in dissolution proceedings only where
such misconduct is alleged to have caused or contributed to economic
difficulties such that regardless of how the marital resources are divided, the
parties will suffer economic hardship.391 As to the wife's argument that
the discovery related to issues of the husband's credibility, the district court
opined:
[T]here is no case law support for the proposition that the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege is waived simply when a patient answers a
question by opposing counsel as to whether he engaged in any affairs.
Neither is there any support for the contention that denying such a
suggestion by counsel makes the issue suddenly relevant.392
387. 593 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
388. 602 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
389. 617 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
390. Schouw, 593 So. 2d at 1201.
391. Swift, 617 So. 2d at 835.
392. Id.
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In Mullin, the wife issued a subpoena to the law firm employing the
husband, seeking to determine the husband's interest in the law firm. The
law firm was not a party to the dissolution proceedings but nevertheless
filed an affidavit stating that the husband was a non-equity partner. The
trial court refused to issue a protective order following the submission of the
law firm's affidavit despite the fact that the wife's subpoena sought the
production of extensive documentation regarding the assets and income of
the law firm and the partners in the firm. The district court reversed,
finding the wife's discovery request overbroad, and limited the wife to
discovery specifically pertaining to the husband and documents (such as the
stock register) establishing the husband's lack of ownership interest in the
firm.
393
C. Judges and Masters
The past two years brought three significant decisions with respect to
the role of masters in the family court: one from the Florida Supreme Court
and two at the appellate level. 394 The decisions rendered at the appellate
level indicate a clear pattern of the appellate courts advancing a rather "hard
line" with respect to compliance with procedural requirements.
In Heilman v. Heilman,395 the supreme court determined that a party's
consent is not required in order for a master to hear a child support
enforcement proceeding because of the difference between Rule 1.490 and
Rule 1.491 of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife, in Heilman, filed
a motion for contempt against the husband with respect to the husband's
alleged failure to pay child support. The matter was referred to a hearing
officer pursuant to Rule 1.491 of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
husband objected to having the hearing held before a hearing officer. In
order to preserve his objection, the husband refused to participate in the
hearing. The trial court determined that the consent of both parties is not
required in order for a child support enforcement proceeding to be heard by
a hearing officer.396 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, but
certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court held
that Rule 1.491 constitutes a distinct and separate process from Rule 1.490
393. Mullin, 602 So. 2d at 955.
394. Heilman v. Heilman, 596 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1992); Gordin v. Gordin Int'l, Inc., 605
So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Petrakis v. Petrakis, 597 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
395. 596 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1992).
396. Id. at 1046.
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of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the latter of which addresses the power
and authority of masters (general and special) and requires the consent of
both parties to such a hearing, and the former of which provides for certain
child support matters to be heard by "hearing officers" and does not
expressly require the consent of the parties.397
In Petrakis v. Petrakis,398 the Third District Court of Appeal deter-
mined that the responsibility of ensuring that a written record of proceedings
held before a master lies with the master, not with the parties. Therein, the
trial court had denied the husband's exceptions to a master's report and
recommendations upon the basis that the husband had failed to present a
record of the proceedings to the trial court for review. The district court
reversed, holding that Rule 1.490 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the evidence presented to a master be reduced to writing and
filed with the master's report. The burden of doing so, according to the
Third District, is upon the master and it is not the burden or responsibility
of the parties to create or produce the required written record.399
Similarly, in Gordin v. Gordin Int'l, Inc.,4°° the Fourth District held
that a master's "sketchy, handwritten notations of the proceedings" were
insufficient to comply with the requirement that the master file a written
record of the evidence along with the report.4 1' Thus, as in Petrakis, the
district court placed the burden of creating, preparing and producing a
written record of the proceedings upon the master, not upon either party.
In Prater v. Lehmbeck,4 °' the Fourth District struck a trial court order
that required a party to object to a referral to the general master within five
days or be deemed to have waived any objection. The court held that "such
a practice violates the above-cited rule and has been condemned in other
cases." 43  The court also held that where one party has filed a "blanket
objection" to any and all referrals to the master, the trial court may not
require that party to file a separate objection each and every time a referral
is attempted. 4
On the subject of trial judges and disqualification, the last two years
brought a number of decisions involving the impropriety of certain actions
397. Id. at 1047.
398. 597 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
399. Id. at 857-58.
400. 605 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1992).
401. Id. at 155.
402. 615 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
403. Id. at 761.
404. Id.
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and statements by trial judges in terms of the appearance of impartiality.4" 5
However, the more interesting development was the discussion of the
standards for disqualification of a trial judge where a previous disqualifica-
tion had occurred in the case.
Pursuant to section 38.10 of the Florida Statutes, when a judge has
been disqualified on the basis of alleged bias and prejudice in a given case,
the second judge in the case "is not disqualified on account of alleged
prejudice ... unless such judge admits and holds that it is then a fact that
he does not stand fair and impartial between the parties."4 6
In Rodriguez-Diaz v. Abate,4"7 a non-matrimonial case, the Third
District described the distinction between a first and a later request for
disqualification as requiring that a "more stringent standard" be applied to
a second request for disqualification, specifically, a trial judge may not be
disqualified for bias and prejudice in a case once a previous judge was so
disqualified unless the judge specifically "admits and holds" that it is fact
that he or she does not stand fair and impartial between the parties.40 8 In
Radin v. Radin, °9 the Third District applied this "more stringent standard"
to a disqualification request in a matrimonial case.
IX. PATERNITY
A. HLA Testing
Although the past two years brought a number of cases dealing with
what has become a rather "standard" issue in family law-the use of a
denial of paternity to attempt to avoid enforcement of child support
arrearages 4 -the more interesting development in the law has been a line
405. See, e.g., Loss v. Loss, 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (trial judge
became overly involved in the parties' settlement negotiations); Wayland v. Wayland, 595
So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (trial judge was disqualified for advising the
divorcing parties that she might know someone who would be interested in buying their
house).
406. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1991).
407. 598 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
408. Id. at 198.
409. 593 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 599 So. 2d 1279
(Fla. 1992).
410. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Overby, 613 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The
result in all such cases is consistent: The award of child support presumes that the putative
father was determined to be the father of the child and such finding is res judicata and the
father is estopped to deny paternity thereafter. Id.
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of cases addressing the propriety of a party's denial of paternity within a
dissolution of marriage action. In 1993, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed this issue for the first time in Department of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Services v. Privette.41'"
In Privette, a petition was filed on behalf of the mother of a minor
child, alleging that the mother was unmarried and that Privette was the
natural father of the child. In fact, the mother was married at the time of
the birth of the child and the child's birth certificate listed her husband as
the father of the child. Privette objected to the court-ordered HLA testing
and claimed an invasion of his privacy rights. The supreme court, however,
was far more concerned with the rights of the minor child and the rights of
the person presumed to be the child's father to a continued relationship with
the child he believed to be his own:
Once children are born legitimate, they have a right to maintain that
status both factually and legally if doing so is in their best interests.
The child's legally recognized father likewise has a unmistakable
interest in maintaining the relationship with his child unimpugned such
that his opposition to the blood test and reasons for so objecting would
be relevant evidence in determining the child's best interests. 4 12
Thus, the supreme court opined, even if an HLA test were to show that
a person other than the husband in an intact marriage in which a child is
born is the natural father of a child, this fact, without more, would not
constitute grounds to grant a paternity petition:
While there may be some cases where the child has had little contact
with the legal father, other cases will be quite the contrary. It is
conceivable that a man who has established a loving, caring relationship
of some years' duration with his legal child later will prove not to be
the biological father. Where this is so, it seldom will be in the
children's best interests to wrench them away from their legal fathers.
The law does not require such cruelty toward children.1
Once HLA testing has been performed, the next question to arise is the
manner in which, from an evidentiary perspective, the results are presented
to the trial court. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
411. 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
412. Id. at 307-08.
413. Id. at 309.
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Moore,4 14 HLA testing performed upon the putative father and the child
indicated that the putative father was, in fact, the child's father within a
99.9% degree of likelihood. The trial court, however, never knew of the
results of the HLA testing because counsel for the mother was unable to lay
a proper evidentiary predicate. When the father's objections to the
admission of the test results were sustained, counsel for the mother
attempted to argue that the results should be admitted into evidence because,
first, the father had not objected "in advance" of the trial and, second,
because the test was performed at the father's insistence. The Fifth District
Court of Appeal opined that neither of such facts overcame the rules of
evidence and there is no such things as "advance notice of the intent to
adhere to the rules of evidence ....
B. Other Issues
Without question, the three most talked about decisions from the
Florida Supreme Court during the survey period are Mize v. Mize,416
addressing parental relocation issues; Waite v. Waite,417 in which the court
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Florida; and B.J.Y v.
MA4., 418 in which the Florida Supreme Court determined that the statute
which eliminated the right to trial by jury in paternity cases was unconstitu-
tional.
In B.J. Y, the Florida Supreme Court traced the history of paternity law
in Florida, finding that the nature of such proceedings has not changed since
1828.4'9 Although the procedure for bringing such an action has changed
somewhat, the proceeding and its purpose remain the same: to establish
paternity for the purpose of providing for the support of the child. The
Constitution provides for a right to a jury trial in situations where a jury
trial was conducted as a matter of right prior to the adoption of the
Constitution. The supreme court's history of paternity actions established
that at the time of the adoption of Florida's constitution, paternity cases
were tried by jury.42 ° Therefore, the constitution requires that the right to
trial by jury in a paternity case be preserved and, as such, the statute which
414. 603 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
415. Id. at 14
416. 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993).
417. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
418. 617 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1993).
419. Id at 1062-63.
420. Id. at 1062.
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eliminated the right to a jury trial in such cases was deemed unconstitution-
al.
Although B.J Y was clearly one of the most interesting cases of the last
two years, one of the more compelling cases of the last two years, at least
from a perspective of a lay person's traditional view of "equity" was
Wollschlager v. Veal.42' At issue in this paternity case was a father's
claim that he should not be ordered to support the child that he fathered
because he had been "defrauded" by the mother, who had assured him that
she was taking birth control pills. According to the father, it would be
"inequitable" to require him to bear the financial responsibility of a child
who would never have been born except for the "fraud" committed upon
him. This argument notwithstanding, the First District Court of Appeal held
that there was nothing in the statutory history of the paternity statutes which
would indicate that "the court should look at the question of which party
was more responsible for conception or the factors leading up to the
conception in determining the appropriate child support." '422
A second common issue to arise in paternity proceedings is the
appropriate surname to be given to the child. Within the past two years,
two cases have addressed this issue.
In Brown v. Dykes,4"3 the trial court ordered that the child bear the
surname of the mother, believing it was statutorily required to so order
because custody had been awarded to the mother. The district court
reversed, holding that section 382.013(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes permits
the trial court, in a paternity action, to determine the appropriate surname
for the child.424
Similarly, in Levine v. Best,425 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court has the power and authority to determine what shall
be a child's surname in a paternity case and that the basis for the trial
court's decision should be the "best interest of the child. 426
421. 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
422. Id. at 277.
423. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1992).
424. Id. at 569.
425. 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
426. Id. at 279.
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X. SHARED PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Relevant Factors
Because of the deference given to a trial court's "custody" (now termed
"primary residence") decision, cases at the appellate level discussing the
factors which may weigh in favor of one party or the other are somewhat
rare. However, within the past two years three decisions have been rendered
reversing the trial court's custody decisions.
In Wagler v. Wagler,4" the trial court determined that both parties
were "equally fit" despite the fact that the husband lived in a fine home and
had enrolled the child in an excellent school in which the child was doing
very well, and the wife lived in a "dirty, cluttered room," had lived in
twelve different residences in the three years prior to the final hearing, and,
at the time of the final hearing, was on probation for selling drugs. Further,
at the time of the final hearing, the wife had just completed an earlier
probation from an adjudication, in three criminal cases, that she was guilty
of passing worthless checks. The trial judge commented, "I'm still old
fashioned enough to believe that a child of this age is best served in the
custody of the mother . ,,428 To be sure, the appellate court reversed
this decision and remanded the case to the trial court so that the trial court
could "explain on what basis it determined that the child's interest would be
equally served by the father or the mother. 4
29
In Braman v. Braman,43 ° the Second District was similarly confronted
with a situation in which the facts demonstrated the mother of the child to
be a less than sterling moral example to others. In Braman, the wife
engaged in "recurring episodes of ... extramarital activity while the child
was present in the home., 43 Indeed, only one of the parties' two children
was fathered by the husband. The trial court awarded sole parental
responsibility of the child to the father on the basis that the mother was
"morally unfit" to share in the parental responsibility of the child. The
district court of appeal reversed, holding that a trial court must consider all
of the relevant factors set forth in section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes, in
427. 593 So. 2d 602 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
428. Id. at 603.
429. Id. at 604. But see Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that specific, written findings of fact regarding the basis upon which the trial
court reached its custody decision are neither required nor favored). The Wagler case, of
course, is somewhat exceptional because of its facts.
430. 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
431. Id. at 683.
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making a custody decision and may not base such a decision entirely upon
just one of those factors.432
In Lane v. Lane,433 the Fourth District addressed the factors to be
considered by the trial courts in making a custody and/or visitation
determination. The court held that it is the trial judge who must weigh the
factors, gauge the appearance and demeanor of the parties and make the
decision and the judge may not abdicate such decision-making to any other
person be that person a parent or an expert.43' The parties stipulated in
mediation that the question of whether the husband's visitation with the
minor child should be supervised or unsupervised would be made by a
certain psychologist. The psychologist rendered a report recommending
unsupervised visitation and the trial court reached its decision in the case by
resort to the "novel time saver" of the case being submitted upon written
submissions by each party setting forth each party's position. The district
court held that the type of decision made in custody and visitation cases is
"too important to both the child and parents to restrict a determination to a
reading of unemotional and dispassionate words on a printed page." '435
B. Third Party Custody
Third party custody claims involve actions for custody of a child
initiated by a person other than the mother or father of the child. Normally,
such claims are initiated by a relative of the child and frequently that
relative is the child's grandparent. The standard for the determination of
such custody claims is not the "best interest of the child" standard used in
dissolution of marriage or other proceedings between the child's natural
parents, but rather, is a far stricter standard under which custody will not be
denied a natural parent absent a showing that the parent is "unfit."
In In re Matzen,436 the First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's refusal to grant custody of a child to his natural father and
award of custody to the child's grandparent, holding that a natural parent's
right to fellowship and companionship with his or her offspring is "a rule
older than the common law itself."'437 The trial court had determined, at
the time of the parent's divorce, that neither parent was "fit." The minor
432. Id.
433. 599 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
434. Id. at 219.
435. Id.
436. 600 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
437. Id. at 488.
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children were then living with the maternal grandmother which the trial
court continued in effect. The father later petitioned for modification of
custody, alleging that he was fit and able to assume the custody of his
children. The trial court denied the modification request and the district
court reversed, holding that a denial of custody to the natural parent may be
sustained only upon a finding by the trial court, supported by clear,
convincing and compelling evidence, that the natural parent is unfit or the
placement of the child with the parent will be detrimental to the welfare of
the child. 38
The number of such "third party custody cases" notwithstanding, there
remains a substantial question under Florida law regarding the manner in
which such "custody cases" are brought before the court. In In re C.M, 43 9
the Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that there is no authority,
statutory or otherwise, which permits a non-parent to petition for "custody"
other than through a chapter 39 dependency proceeding.440
C. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Over the past several years the number of decisions interpreting and
implementing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act have continued
to increase despite the fact that the Act has been law in the State of Florida
for nearly fifteen years. In 1992 and 1993, four significant appellate
decisions were rendered regarding the U.C.C.J.A.
In Lamon v. Rewis, 441 the parties were divorced in Georgia in 1988.
The parties agreed that the husband would be the custodial parent of the
minor children. In 1989, the parties' son, by mutual consent, began to live
with the wife in Florida. In 1990, the wife filed an action, in Georgia, to
modify the custody of the son from the husband to her. When the case was
called for hearing, however, the wife did not appear. On the day the
Georgia case was to have been heard, the wife filed a modification
proceeding in Florida. The husband moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion over him, and the Florida court granted the motion but determined that
it would nevertheless proceed to adjudicate the custody issue at a future
date. Meanwhile, the Georgia court entered an order finding that it had
438. Id.
439. 601 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
440. Id.; accordSchilling v. Wood, 532 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988). But
see Waters v. Waters, 578 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a trial court
has "inherent jurisdiction" over minor children even when no underlying proceeding is
pending under either chapter 61 or chapter 39).
441. 592 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and adjudicated the wife
in contempt of court for wrongfully withholding the custody of the child
from the husband. The Florida court then determined that it had jurisdiction
and entered an order listing the reasons why the Florida court had "signifi-
cant connections" with the minor child. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding: (1) only the court in the state where the initial custody
order was entered should evaluate the contacts between the child and the
states involved in determining whether the initial state should relinquish
jurisdiction; (2) modification petitions should be addressed to the court
which rendered the original decree even if a second state has become the
"home state" of the child in the intervening period of time; (3) a second
state may only exercise jurisdiction where the court of continuing jurisdic-
tion (the court where the original custody decree was entered) expressly
determines that its exercise of jurisdiction is no longer appropriate or where
virtually all contacts with the state of continuing jurisdiction have ceased;
(4) only when the child and all parties have moved away is the deference
to another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required.4 2
In Greenfield v. Greenfield,44 3 the Fourth District was presented with
the "reverse side" of Lamon v. Rewis, in which Florida was the state of
continuing jurisdiction. In Greenfield, the parties were divorced in Broward
County in 1982. Thereafter, in September of 1990, the Broward County
court entered an agreed order as to child support which also provided that
all other provisions of the final judgment (which included a retention of
jurisdiction) remained in full force and effect. In October, 1990, the wife
and minor child moved to Illinois. According to the wife, the move was
temporary: she maintained her driver's license, voter's registration and
vehicle registration in Florida and continued to own real property in Florida.
In January of 1991, the wife secured employment in Florida but delayed her
return until the child had finished the school year in Illinois. One month
after the wife and child left Illinois, the husband entered an ex parte motion
in Illinois for an order granting him temporary custody of the child. The
order was granted. The wife then sought relief in Florida, and in August of
1991, the husband removed the child from Florida and took her to Illinois.
Thereafter. the wife obtained, in Florida, a temporary order finding that
Florida had jurisdiction and ordered the husband to return the child to the
wife. The Florida trial judge then entered an order for communication
between the two courts and found that Florida was the child's "home state;"
442. Id. at 1224-25.
443. 599 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 613 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992).
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had "significant connections" with the child; and Illinois had no significant
connections with the child. The district court affirmed the finding of
continuing jurisdiction in the State of Florida.444
The Fourth District also affirmed Florida's continuing jurisdiction in
Rothman v. Rothman.445 Therein, the parties' minor child travelled to
Georgia in July of 1990 for visitation with the husband. In August, 1990,
the Georgia court found the child to be "deprived" and ordered that the
temporary custody of the child be with his grandparents. The wife attended
the hearing in Georgia and consented to the child's placement with the
grandparents. For the next year the child lived with the grandparents and
then, in 1991, the Georgia court ordered the child placed in the custody of
the Department of Family and Children Services for eventual placement
with the husband. The Fourth District determined that the State of Florida
continued to have jurisdiction over the issue of the child's custody, holding
that Georgia had exercised only emergency jurisdiction and that such
emergency jurisdiction did not give the State of Georgia the authority to
render a final, permanent custody decision.446
Lastly, in McCabe v. McCabe,447 where throughout the parties'
marriage the husband had been in the military but retained his legal
residency in Florida, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's finding ofjurisdiction based upon the husband's residency in Florida.
Instead of basing its jurisdiction upon the husband's legal residence in
Florida, the district court opined that the trial court should have inquired as
to whether Florida was the "home state" of the child or whether Florida had
significant connections with the child. Because the trial court did not do so,
the trial court failed to apply the proper standards to a determination of
jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A.448
D. Geographical Limitations and Relocation Cases
The most eagerly awaited decision rendered in marital and family law
within the past decade was the Florida Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Mize v. Mize,449 a decision which ended literally years of appellate court
conflict upon the issue of parental relocation.
444. Id. at 1030-31.
445. 599 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
446. Id. at 261.
447. 600 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
448. Id. at 1186.
449. 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993).
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In Mize, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the approach enunciated
by the Third District Court of Appeal in Hill v. Hill,45° and held that as
long as a parent who has been granted the primary custody of the child
desires to move for a well-intentioned reason and founded belief that the
relocation is best for that parent's, and it follows, the child's well-being,
rather than from a vindictive desire to interfere with the visitation rights of
the other parent, the change in residence should ordinarily be approved.
The trial courts were directed to determine the following with respect to any
requested relocation: (1) whether the move would be likely to improve the
general quality of life for both the primary residential spouse and the
children; (2) whether the motive for seeking the move is for the express
purpose of defeating visitation; (3) whether the custodial parent, once out
of the jurisdiction, will be likely to comply with any substitute visitation
arrangements; (4) whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster
a continuing meaningful relationship between the child or children and the
non-custodial parent; (5) whether the cost of transportation is financially
affordable by one or both of the parents; and (6) whether the move is in the
best interests of the child.45'
XI. SPECIAL EQUITY
The question of what is a "special equity" and when a "special equity"
in property should be granted to a party in a dissolution of marriage action
continues to be an issue plaguing the trial courts. Within the past two years,
four decisions relative to "special equity" principles were rendered, three of
which reverse findings of "special equity" made by the trial court and one
of which contains a new statement of the law pertaining to "special equity."
In Glover v. Glover,452 the husband owned a home prior to the
parties' marriage but during the marriage transferred title to the home from
himself to he and the wife jointly. The trial court determined that the
husband had established a "special equity" in the home and the First District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that, pursuant to section 61.075 of the
Florida Statutes, the fact that property is titled in joint names raises a
presumption that such property is a marital asset. Accordingly, the party
450. 548 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1990).
451. Id. at 706.
452. 6(01 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
19931
354
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
seeking to establish otherwise has the burden to prove that a gift was not
intended when title was taken in joint names.453
The Third District held identically in Smith v. Smith,454 determining
that there is a presumption that jointly held property is marital property
regardless of who paid for it. Additionally, to establish a special equity the
party attempting to overcome the presumption must prove that a gift was not
intended when title was taken as tenants by the entireties.455
However, the Third District also announced in Smith a new statement
of the law of special equity, specifically, that the burden of establishing the
special equity is to prove same "beyond a reasonable doubt" and not merely
by clear and convincing evidence. This statement of the law marks the first
time that a traditionally criminal law standard of proof has been applied to
relief in a dissolution of marriage action.
XI. CONCLUSION
If one thing is clear from the family law decisions rendered during the
survey period, it is that significant questions remain to be decided by
Florida's appellate courts. Issues continue to arise which will need
resolution and the numerous conflicts between the appellate courts must be
resolved. However, the direction in which family law appears to be moving
is quite positive from both a social perspective and a legal perspective and
the trends evidenced in the recent decisional law give every indication that
such development will continue.
453. Id. at 233; see also Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992). In Young, the husband's mother conveyed the property's title to the husband and wife
jointly and the trial court awarded the husband a "special equity" therein. The district court
reversed, holding that the burden was upon the husband to establish that his mother had not
intended to convey the property as a gift to both the husband and the wife. Id.
454. 597 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
455. Id. at 371.
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attitude of the courts in the significant case of Florida Patient's Compensa-
tion Fund v. Rowe' followed with more explication by Standard Guaranty
Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom.2  The majority opinions in both cases
determined that a reasonable fee for any lawyer, for nearly any service, is
the reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,
called a lodestar method.3 Further, both Rowe and Standard Guaranty
make it clear that testimony regarding fees must be taken and must cover
specific areas, such as reasonable hourly rates and reasonable number of
hours.4 A bald affidavit that may have sufficed in the past is no longer
enough.5
In Rowe, the factual situation centered on payments of attorney fees to
attorneys representing claimants against the state-established Compensation
Fund, which came from public funds.6 In Standard Guaranty, the case
dealt with reasonable attorney fees when set by a court using a lodestar
method.7 It is in the decision of Standard Guaranty that the Florida
Supreme Court set the stage to review fee arrangements in probate matters
when it referred to situations wherein there was already an assurance of
collecting fees,8 and the attorneys involved would not be taking a risk of
nonpayment. It was this lack of risk that separated probate and other
similarly situated cases from the litigation risk that justified not only a
reasonable hourly rate times a reasonable number of hours, but also a
multiplier.
The Florida Probate Code outlines the criteria to be used in determining
reasonable attorney fees.9 It is strikingly similar to the guidelines set forth
in the lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct.' ° The statute is geared to
the payment of attorney fees due the attorney for being the personal
representative of the estate. It covers neither individual beneficiaries nor
creditors paying their attorneys nor how that would be determined since the
funds would not ordinarily be payable from the estate." Further, the
I. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
2. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
3. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 835; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.
4. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 834; Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
5. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150.
6. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1145.
7. Standard Guaranty, 555 So. 2d at 829.
8. Id. at 835.
9. See generally ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
10. See FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5(b) (1991).
I1. See ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
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statute did not specify the importance to be placed on each of the criteria in
its earlier versions. Traditionally, in the probate area, attorneys for the
personal representative of an estate were paid on the basis of a percentage
of the value of the estate. This may have made up for work done over the
years for the family for which no charge would have been made.
A. The Platt Case
Then came the NCNB Trust Department, which took the position that
taking three percent of a seven million dollar estate, for which they already
served as guardian of the property and marshalled the assets, was eminently
reasonable. In In re Estate of Platt,"2 the Florida Supreme Court revised
the way atlorney fee disputes may be resolved in probate cases. There are
actually two Platt decisions: one issued in April, 1991 ("Platt /,)"3 and
the other issued in October, 1991 ("Platt I]").4 The second was only a
revision of the first.
At the time of Lester Platt's death, the residuary beneficiaries of Mr.
Platt's estate declined to sign a contract sent to them by NCNB in which the
bank stated that they intended to take a three percent fee. A proposed fee
letter was also sent to the beneficiaries by the attorney for the estate, George
Patterson, who also served as co-personal representative of the estate.
Instead, the residual beneficiaries, who would bear the burden of the fees,
requested both the bank and the attorney to maintain time records. The
attorney complied with the request while the bank did not even attempt to
do so. 5 As disclosed in the appellate court opinion, there was a major
evidentiary hearing involving several recognized expert witnesses. They
testified as to reasonableness of the hourly rate for the attorney, his/her
reputation, the custom in the community for charging, and presumably the
other criteria to be used in properly determining attorney fees in a disputed
probate case.' 6
The Florida Supreme Court in Platt held the following: (1) in a
dispute, attorney fees for the attorney for the personal representative shall
be determined by multiplying a reasonable number of hours by a reasonable
12. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991) (quashing and superseding the supreme court's first
opinion of In re Estate of Platt, 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Fla. Apr. 4, 1991)).
13. 16 Fla. L. Weekly S237 (Fla. Apr. 4, 1991) [hereinafter Platt I].
14. In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d at 328 [hereinafter Platt I1].
15. Id. at 330.
16. Id. at 329-30.
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hourly rate and may not be determined by a percentage of the estate
assets;' 7 (2) the time and effort it takes for an attorney to recover his/her
fees is not to be paid from the estate; 8 and (3) unless agreed to by the
customer, time and effort are to be the only considerations in determining
the proper fees to be paid a corporate fiduciary serving as personal
representative' 9 and such fees are not to be based on a percentage.2" The
Supreme Court of Florida reversed the decision of the circuit court in
awarding fees to the attorney and the bank based on a percentage of the
estate, and directed the circuit court to take evidence and make a new
determination of proper fees in light of their new means of awarding
fees.2
Subsequent to Platt II and its progeny, several cases have been decided
that explicate Platt II or parts thereof. For example, in Carman v. Gil-
bert,22 the Second District'Court of Appeal sent the issue of attorney fees
back to the circuit court for further proceedings in a will contest, stating that
the lodestar principles in Rowe had not been followed.23
B. New Statutes for Attorney and Personal Representative Fees
In a decided effort to replace the holding of Platt II as the law that
applies to probate cases in Florida, the Florida Legislature passed House Bill
1295 in the 1993 Legislature.24 Many parts of this particular legislation
are covered elsewhere, but the portions relating to attorney fees and personal
representative fees will be addressed here. 5 Section 733.617 of the Florida
Statutes, governing compensation of personal representatives, has been
amended,2 6 and section 733.6171, a new section governing the compensa-
tion of attorneys for personal representatives, has been added27 to the
Florida Probate Code. A provision is also explicitly made for payment of
17. Id.
18. Id. at 336.
19. Platt II, 586 So. 2d at 337.
20. Id. at 336.
21. Id. at 337.
22. 615 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
23. Id. at 704-05.
24. See Fla. HB 1295 (1993).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 204-216.
26. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
27. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171).
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fees from the assets of a revocable trust,28 even though such assets have
not heretofore been considered subject to probate administration after In re
Estate of Katz.
29
Further, the Florida Legislature has returned to the past by statutorily
setting fees for the compensation of personal representatives in case of a
dispute."0 Such fees, called commissions, are to be based on a percentage
of the value of the estate subject to probate administration.31 It is a
graduated scale with three percent due for estates valued up to one million
dollars, two and one-half percent due for estates valued between one million
and five million dollars, two percent for estates valued between five million
and ten million dollars, and one-and one-half percent for estates valued over
ten million dollars. Additional fees are allowable in a dispute for certain
extra efforts that may be involved, such as running the decedent's business,
sale of real or personal property, or litigation involved in the estate.
Two particular reasons for additional compensation may spawn
litigation and definitely raise questions that are not resolved by the plain
meaning of the statute. Section 733.617(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes allows
extra commission for "[i]nvolvement in proceedings for the adjustment or
payment of any taxes. 32 In nearly every estate there will be a final federal
income tax return (Form 1040) due and, in some estates, there will be more
than one clue.33 In many estates, where income is generated, an estate
income tax return (Form 1041) is required.34 Occasionally, when real
estate tax assessments are determined during the course of administering an
estate, the personal representative is involved in determining the most
beneficial assessment to the estate and in adjusting the amount of tax due. 35
Considering the language in this statute, the question arises as to whether the
mere filing of a return constitutes an "involvement in proceedings" that
would justify payment of commissions in addition to the percentage.
28. See id.
29. 528 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
30. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(199 1)); see also Plait I 586 So. 2d at 334-36 (dismissing basis for determining fees on a
percentage).
31. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
32. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.617(3)(c)).
33. See BASIC PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.26 (1987).
34. Id. (Obligation to File Tax Returns and Notices For Decedent and Estate).
35. Id.
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Nevertheless, despite all of the particular reasons the Florida Legisla-
ture has enunciated in section 733.617(3), the statute gives no basis for
determining how much in additional fees should be paid. Is there an extra
percentage, or would a court need to follow the directives of Platt II,
Standard Guaranty, and Rowe? Is not the genuine involvement in revising
a value for real estate within the estate context a better example of what
would justify additional commissions?
In some estates where the gross value of all the assets exceeds
$600,000, a federal estate tax return is due nine months after the decedent's
date of death. The return is extensive, usually requiring a great deal of
explicit and accurate details, answers to numerous questions regarding many
tax and estate decisions that affect the estate, the taxes paid, and the
beneficiaries' interests. Frequently, voluminous attachments are required
with this return, which already contains thirty-three pages itself.36 While
it is an absolute requirement in larger estates, the question remains as to
whether this also would be considered "involvement in proceedings for the
adjustment or payment of any taxes." Frequently, there are situations in
which a surviving spouse receives enough of the assets such that the
combination of the marital deduction (no tax) and the unified credit amount
($600,000) result in no tax actually due, even though a Form 706 return is
certainly due.
The other subsection, to be codified at section 733.617(3)(e), appears
to be designed to allow courts to allow extra fees for situations not covered
by the statute but which clearly exceed the customary efforts required of a
personal representative.3 7 The personal representative's regular duties-
marshalling the assets, protecting and securing the decedent's assets,
determining and notifying creditors of their right to make claims against the
estate, paying proper claims timely, distributing assets to the beneficiaries,
filing any required tax returns, preparing an accounting, and closing the
estate-all must be handled efficiently and expeditiously. 8  However,
many questions like the following still remain: Do "special services" cover
taking care of a decedent's cat or dog? If included in the standard fee, what
period of care is covered? Do "special services" cover cleaning a decedent's
home or packing pictures for delivery to numerous beneficiaries? Do they
cover collecting rents on several out of state properties that are not subject
36. Id.
37. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(3)(e)).
38. BASIC PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.9; FLA. STAT. § 733.602(I)
(1991).
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to probate? Do they involve the time and effort involved in exhuming a
body that was buried before the decedent's wishes were known in the will?
Either the courts or the Legislature will be defining "special services" for
US.
The Legislature recognized that some estates more than others can
support more than one personal representative. 39  The new legislation
outlines the allocations to be made when there is more than one personal
representative and if the estate is valued at less than $100,000. In particular,
unless the estate is valued at less than $100,000, two personal representa-
tives may each take a full commission. However, if the estate is valued at
more than $100,000 and there are more than two personal representatives,
then all of the personal representatives share in the fees to which two
representatives would be entitled. In this situation, the personal representa-
tive holding the property or assets of the decedent and having primary
responsibility for their administration is entitled to receive a full commis-
sion. The remaining personal representatives are entitled to a proportionate
share of the second commission. For estates valued at less than $100,000
with multiple personal representatives, the one full commission normally
allowed to a sole personal representative must be apportioned among the
several personal representatives in proportion to their efforts.4"
What is not covered in House Bill 1295 is the compensation, if any, to
be paid to the trustee of a revocable living trust, and the compensation, if
any, to a personal representative for responsibility of transferring assets not
technically within the probate estate. It is not clear why there is a
distinction between compensation as a personal representative4 and for
attorney fees paid on the same estate.42
Additionally, according to current case and statutory law, an attorney
may be compensated twice.43 First, he/she may be compensated for his/her
work as a personal representative. 44 Second, he/she may also be compen-
sated for any legal services he/she may provide as the attorney for another
39. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(5)).
40. Id.
41. Id. 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991)).
42. See id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(2)).
43. See Plat I1, 586 So. 2d at 331-32.
44. Id.
19931
362
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
personal representative.4" This view was acknowledged as the law of
Florida in Platt.6
The particular provisions of House Bill 1295 concerning the effective
date of the statutes pertaining to attorney fees are unusual. The new statute,
instead of applying to situations based on a decedent's date of death, as is
common in changes in probate law, "appl[ies] to estates in which an order
of discharge has not been entered prior to its effective date [October 1,
1993] .. .
The other major fee section of the new legislation is the new statute,
to be numbered in the engrossed legislation as Florida Statutes, section 733.-
6171,48 which explicitly outlines the compensation to be paid to an
attorney for the personal representative which ispresumedto be reasonable.
The compensation package uses a combination of a percentage of the value
of the estate with an hourly rate. It was encouraged in part by probate
attorney Rohan Kelley and reflects the fact that there were fairness problems
with both the full percentage and with the reasonable hourly rate multiplied
by reasonable number of hours.4 9 Attomeys are still undeniably permitted
and encouraged to enter into contracts with clients for payment of fees.5
Contracts signed by both the personal representative and any residuary
beneficiaries are the strongest since both have something to say about
attorney fees." The new statute sets forth a schedule for payment of fees
from the estate to the attorney and no separate order is required. 2
When there is a dispute about fees, the trial courts in resolving such disputes
are directed to use as their criteria two percent of the estate inventory value
and income earned during administration plus one percent of the balance of
the gross estate when a federal estate tax return is due. This percentage
appears to explicitly recognize that there is additional work on someone's
part when a federal estate tax return is due. 3 In addition to the percent-
age, an attorney is allowed a reasonable hourly rate both for the attomey
45. Id.
46. Id. at 328.
47. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.6171(8)).
48. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171).
49. Platt 11, 586 So. 2d at 333.
50. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171(6)).
51. Id. at 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(2)).
52. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)).
53. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(a)).
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and for others working for the attorney with special education, training, or
experience." The language was certainly intended to cover paralegals but
it covers more, such as investment advisors hired by an attorney.
While this two-part formula is certainly intended to be a guideline, the
court may increase or decrease the sum paid and has specific additional
criteria to use in increasing or decreasing such fees." These additional
criteria, unlike the previous statute discussed in Platt I, appear to be
specifically' designed for the probate arena and not for civil litigation.
Section 733.6171(4)(h) of the Florida Statutes provides one of the most
interesting criteria: "any delay in payment of the compensation after the
services were furnished. 56 The message here is that slow-paying estates
may not make their lawyers their bankers.
In another departure from the holding of Platt II, the Florida Legisla-
ture in section 733.6171(7) of the Florida Statutes explicitly allows that the
litigation over attorney fees involving the personal representative's attorney
does not mean the attorney must lose money in trying to collect his/her
fee.5 7 Instead, trial court proceedings to determine compensation are part
of the estate administration process and the court decides from what part of
the estate such litigation costs should be paid 8 This appears to be a fairer
solution to the growth in litigation over fees; attorneys do not automatically
lose money if there is a contest about fees, and clients are not encouraged
to litigate fee issues to reduce fees which have been agreed to previously.
Some questions are raised by the language of the new statute. The
word "inventory" is not defined in the definition section of the Florida
Probate Code, section 731.201, as a probate inventory. The word "invento-
ry" must be defined in order to determine the "balance" noted in section
733.6171(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes.59 Some skeptics may argue that the
provision that allows the attorney to receive a percentage of the income
during the estate administration encourages prolonging of the estate process.
Furthermore, the provision on contracts between attorneys and decedents in
section 733.6171(6) leaves the issue unresolved whether such contracts are
54. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(b)).
55. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2504 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171(4)).
56. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(4)(h)).
57. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(7)).
58. See id.
59. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(a)).
19931
364
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
binding on estates when the residual beneficiaries, those who bear the
burden of the fees, are not parties.6"
Again, the effective date of this section is October 1, 1993, and applies
not to estates for decedents who have died as of that date, but to probates
still open or in which attorney fees have not been determined.6'
C. Other Attorney Fees Issues
The cases on attorney fees most often center around the fees to be paid
to the attorney acting for the estate and, in particular, the personal represen-
tative thereof. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Dourado v.
Chousa6 2 dealt with the obligation of the personal representative and
beneficiary to make up the difference in attorney fees due if there is a
deficiency.
II. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPT PROPERTY
The concept of homestead under Florida law continues to be an enigma
to lawyers and non-lawyers alike. While most lay persons think of
homestead only as a $25,000 exemption from real estate taxes, Florida
courts continue to wrestle with the concept of homestead as it relates both
to the descent and distribution of property and to creditors' claims on
decedents' property. Even though the change to the Florida Constitution
was effective in 1984, recent years have also yielded a plethora of litigation
spawned by homestead issues.
Two recent cases involve the descent of homestead property where the
surviving spouse had validly waived his homestead rights. In Sun First
National Bank Polk County v. Fry,63 the decedent was survived by a
spouse and six adult lineal descendants. The decedent's will had devised the
homestead property to a testamentary trust rather than to the spouse or lineal
descendants. Although the lineal descendants contended that the Florida
Constitution and Florida Statutes as to homestead were violated by the
decedent's improper devise, the court held that since the surviving spouse
60. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2505 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 733.6171 (6)).
61. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8)).
62. 604 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
63. 579 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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had waived homestead and there were no minor children, the property could
be freely devised even if there were adult children.64
Shortly thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court, in Hartwell v. Blasinga-
me,65 came to the same conclusion where an adult child sought to be the
heir to property that the decedent had devised to her former husband, the
surviving spouse having previously waived his homestead rights in a
prenuptial agreement. The court held the spouse's waiver to be binding;66
the spouse was deemed to have predeceased the decedent. Since there was
no minor child, there was no constitutional restriction on the devise of the
property by the decedent. The court cited its previous decision in City
National Bank v. Tescher67 as corroborating authority.68
Even though a surviving spouse is entitled to at least a life estate in
homestead property, in Breausche v. Prough69 the surviving wife received
more. The surviving wife claimed that she was misled by her husband into
believing that their home was jointly owned and that she would receive the
entire interest upon his death. She claimed that in reliance thereon she had
contributed funds to the construction of the home and payments on the
mortgage and had relinquished certain rights she had in other real estate.
The court ruled that the surviving spouse could seek to impose a construc-
tive trust on the homestead if she could produce admissible evidence in the
trial court to prove her claim."° Such evidence could include an affidavit
by a disinterested party as to direct knowledge of the decedent's prior
statements to his wife, which could overcome evidence otherwise barred by
the Dead Man's Statute.7
Creditors continue to attempt to assert claims and to force the sale of
homestead property that passed from the debtor-decedent to devisees. Two
cases involved whether the Florida constitutional protection from forced sale
of homestead property inured to the benefit of devisees who were heirs of
the decedent. In a decision favoring the rights of heirs, a district court in
Bartelt v. Bartel7 2 held that the protected "class designated 'heirs' does not
exclude those who, but for the decedent's foresight in executing a will,
64. Id. at 870.
65. 584 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1991).
66. Id.
67. 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991).
68. Hartwell, 584 So. 2d at 6.
69. 592 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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would have taken by the laws of intestate succession. 73 While article X,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution designates the exempt class of persons
as the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner, "it does not mandate the
technique by which the qualified person must receive title., 74  To hold
otherwise, said the court, would discourage the making of wills and
encourage the passing of property by the less desirable process of intestacy.
To the same effect was the holding in HCA Gulf Coast Hospital v.
Downing.7 5 There the court determined the heir possessed an equitable or
beneficial interest in real property through a spendthrift trust established by
the decedent. The court stated that the heir could assert the homestead
exemption from forced sale as though the property had passed directly from
the decedent to the heir by devise or by intestacy.76 The homestead
exemption, said the court, is to be construed liberally to accomplish its
design to secure a homeowner protection from creditors and financial
misfortune, and a court should go beyond mere technicalities in effectuating
the intent of a decedent as expressed in a will or trust.77 The court
cautioned, however, that in this case it might have decided otherwise if the
trustee had exercised more than a supervisory interest in the homestead as
the holder of legal title.78
On the other hand, an heir to homestead property is not protected
against certain creditors of the decedent. Where the decedent's friend had
lived with the decedent and claimed that she had provided funds used to
purchase and improve the homestead property, she fit into the exception
under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. In Burns v. Cobb,"
the court held that her claim for equitable ownership in the property, if
valid, would defeat the claims of the decedent's heirs who took with notice
of her possession of the property and her claim thereto. Furthermore, the
court declared that she would have a defense to the heirs' ejectment action
(even if they had a future possessory interest) "if that equitable ownership
interest is established as a legal title interest and includes a present
possessory right."'" While upholding her right to pursue a counterclaim
73. Id. at 284.
74. Id.; see FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
75. 594 So. 2d 774 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
76. Id. at 776.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 589 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 416.
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to the heirs' ejectment action, however, the court held that she could not
challenge this action in the probate court.8 2 The friend petitioned to reopen
the estate and contest the heirs' action in petitioning the probate court for
determination of homestead and closing the estate. Since the petition to
determine homestead did not constitute the opening and closing of a probate
estate administration and she did not seek as a creditor or other interested
person to open the administration of the estate, she could not move forward
in that arena. 3
Where homestead property passes to minor children, it is not subject
to claims of creditors because it is protected by article X, section 4 of the
Florida Constitution. In In re Estate of Tudhope,14 the real property
involved was encumbered by a mortgage, payments on which the children
were unable to meet. 5 As a consequence, the personal representative of
the decedent's estate was authorized to sell the property by court order.
Claims were filed by decedent's creditors in the probate proceeding (other
than the mortgagee), and the issue was whether the sale proceeds could be
reached by those creditors.86 The court held that since the property was
devised to heirs and the will did not direct that the property be sold, the
homestead estate was vested in the minor children prior to its sale. 7
Therefore, the proceeds were still characterized as homestead and thus not
subject to creditors. The court distinguished In re Estate of Price,"8 in
which the will had directed that the homestead be sold and the proceeds
divided among the adult children, thus causing the proceeds to lose their
homestead character and be subject to creditors' claims.8 9
Finally, in a recent case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced
with an issue of first impression on the homestead exemption. In Hubert v.
Hubert,9" the court was called upon to decide whether an heir's remainder
interest in his deceased father's homestead was exempt from the decedent's
estate creditors, where the property was subject to the life estate of a non-
heir.9 The court relied on both the Florida Constitution and Bartelt to
declare that the homestead exemption inures to the interest of the son-heir
82. Id.
83. Id. at 415.
84. 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 313.
87. Id.
88. 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
89. Tudhope, 595 So. 2d at 313.
90. 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
91. Id. al: 1049.
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acquired either by devise or by intestate succession.92 Even though the son
had no current possessory interest in the property and the decedent's
homestead exemption would not inure to the non-heir's life estate, it did
inure to the heir's remainder interest. The court was impressed with the
heir's arguments that since the vested remainder interest of a lineal
descendant is protected by the homestead exemption in situations where the
lineal descendant's vested remainder comes from an intestate estate of a
decedent who leaves a surviving spouse and a lineal descendant,93 or where
the decedent devised a life estate in his homestead to his wife with a
remainder to a lineal descendant, it should be protected in this case. The
court cited with favor the HCA Gulf Coast Hospital statement that the
homestead provision is to be construed liberally to effect its purpose, and
stated that the resolution in the instant case "is consistent with carrying out
the interest of the testator and the public policy of our homestead exemp-
tion. '"" The court distinguished the cases which held that an heir's future
interest was not exempt from the heir's creditors, since in those situations
the heir was not in possession and thus could not claim that the future
interest was exempt as the heir's homestead.95
The court was also called upon to define the term "automobile" under
section 732.402(2)(b), the exempt property statute. If automobiles are "held
in the decedent's name and regularly used by decedent or members of the
decedent's immediate family as their personal automobiles," they pass to the
surviving spouse and are exempt from all claims against the estate (except
for perfected security interests).96  In re Estate of Corbin97  involved a
motor home and a travel trailer. In Corbin, the court looked to the
"regularly used" portion of the statute rather than focusing on what is an
automobile. The court imposed this as a requirement and finding such
evidence lacking, decided against the spouse.98 The full definition of an
automobile, therefore, remains in doubt and may not always be necessary
to resolve cases.
92. Id. at 1050 (citing the FLA. CONST. art. 7, § 4(b); Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 732.401(l) (1991). Both the spouse's life estate and the vested
remainder would be protected as homestead. The same result would follow from a devise
in that form.
94. Hubert, 622 So. 2d at 1050 (citing HCA GuifCoast Hosp., 594 So. 2d at 774).
95. Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 733.402 (2)(b) (1991).
97. 603 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
98. Id. at 129.
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III. CLAIMS
Claims against estates which have substantially shorter time frames than
civil litigation still warrant appellate attention. Additionally, the Supreme
Court case of Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope99 and
local statutes following Pope create more opportunities for appellate cases.
Section 733.702 of the Florida Statutes provides that the following are
not binding on the estate, the personal representative, or on any beneficiary
unless such a claim is filed within three months after the time of the first
publication of the Notice of Administration: a claim or demand against a
decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent; a claim for
funeral or burial expenses; a claim for personal property in the possession
of the personal representative; a claim for damages, including, but not
limited to, an action founded on fraud or another wrongful act or omission
of the decedent. As to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the
Notice of Administration, the above stated claims are not binding unless the
claim is filed thirty days after the date of service of such a copy of the
notice on the creditor.' ° This is the statute adopted by the Florida
Legislature in response to the Pope case.
Spohr v. Berryman... held that Florida Statutes section 733.702 is a
statute of limitation, even though it is known as a statute of non-claim.
0 2
The requirement in section 733.702 that a claim be filed within three months
was not satisfied by filing a lawsuit within the non-claim period.' Thus,
probate procedures must be followed.
Section 733.702(3) of the Florida Statutes permits a circuit court to
extend the time period during which a claim may be filed.' 4 Thus, cases
frequently arise when the time within which to file a claim is enlarged. In
In re Estate of Myerson,' °5 the court, in a per curiam decision, held that
it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to extend the time for
filing a probate claim.0 6 However, the trial court did err "in enjoining the
disposition of any estate assets, without conducting a hearing on a request
for temporary injunction and requiring the appellee to prove up her
99. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
100. FLA. STAT. § 733.701(1) (1991).
101. 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991).
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 227-28.
104. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(3) (1991).
105. 596 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
106. Id. at 533.
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entitlement to injunctive relief."' °7
Sireci v. Deal' dealt with extending the time to file an independent
action after objection to the claim is filed.' 09 On September 4, 1989,
Roger McClelland, an attorney, filed a Petition for Appointment for a
Curator in the Estate of Donald M. Sparks. On September 15, 1989, Deal
filed a caveat by creditor in the estate, which was treated as a claim against
the estate. McClelland became curator and filed a Notice of Administration
and an Objection to Deal's claim and notified Deal. Eventually, a formal
estate was filed October 16, 1990, and Thomas J. Sireci, Jr. was appointed
personal representative on November 30, 1990. On May 2, 1991, the
personal representative filed a petition to bar Deal's claim. On August 26,
1991, the personal representative received an objection to the petition to bar
the claim. The probate court denied the personal representative's petition
to bar the claim and gave Deal ten days to amend his claim; however, the
personal representative appealed from this order."0
The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling. In doing so, the
court reasoned that the probate judge has broad discretion in determining
when good cause exists to grant an extension for filing an independent
action."' The court further stated that it could only override the probate
court's discretion if there is no factual basis for the probate court's
conclusion." 12 In this case, there was such a factual basis. During the
trial court hearing, Deal's attorney presented several reasons why the
independent action had not been filed." 3 For example, Deal's long-time
attorney from Pennsylvania testified that he believed the personal represen-
tative was representing Deal as a creditor and that the personal representa-
tive would therefore advise him of any formalities to make the claim
valid." '4 Furthermore, the Pennsylvania attorney testified he thought the
petition to bar the claim was intended to place the matter in abeyance until
a settlement could be reached among all the heirs." 5
Section 733.212(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires a personal
representative to promptly make a diligent search to determine the names
107. Id. at 533-34.
108. 603 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App 1993).
109. Id. at 35-36.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 36.
112. Id.
113. Serici, 603 So. 2d at 36.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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and addresses of creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable
and to serve on those creditors a copy of the Notice of Administration
within three months after the first publication of the Notice." 6 Personal
representatives usually need to review previously filed tax returns and
checkbook registers.
The determination of ascertainable creditors has been the subject of
several suits. Jones v. SunBank of Miami 17 concerned the sale of a gas
station approximately four years prior to a decedent's death. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision. At trial, the claimant contended she
should have received a Notice of Administration because she was a known
or reasonably ascertainable creditor."' The decedent had died August 15,
1989. Notice of Administration was published August 29, 1989 and the
claims period expired November 29, 1989. The claimant, the gas station
purchaser, filed suit against the decedent's estate March 15, 1990, seeking
damages for breach of contract and fraud for alleged environmental
contamination to the premises. The trial court determined the claim was
filed untimely and, as a result, the burden shifted to the claimant to seek an
order enlarging time to file the claim." 9 After a full evidentiary hearing,
the trial court ruled that the claimant was not a known or reasonably
ascertainable creditor who was entitled to receive a Notice of Administra-
tion. 12' The appellate court noted that the trial court should have stricken
the claim as untimely when there was no motion for enlargement of time to
file.'12
In this instance, the trial court also rejected the claimant's argument
that gas stations often cause environmental damage, which, as a result, gives
rise to a need to give actual notice to the purchaser upon decedent/seller's
death. 122 Finally, the trial court concluded that it:
does not interpret [Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v.] Pope
to require that a personal representative determine the identities of
persons or entities with whom a decedent had business dealings or other
transactions during a given number of years prior to death and to serve
a Notice of Administration upon each one merely because such person
might possibly have some uncommunicated dissatisfaction with a matter.
116. FLA. STAT. § 733.212(4)(a) (1991).
117. 609 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 101.
119. Id. at 100-01.
120. Id. at 101.
121. Id. at 102.
122. Jones, 609 So. 2d at 101.
1993]
372
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
As to those persons, notice by publication is sufficient to afford due
process. "23
To the relief of many practitioners, there is a limit to the efforts that need
to be made.
In Burgis v. Burgis, 2 4 Lynn Burgis, the former wife of the decedent,
filed a petition to require payment of her claim for past due alimony. The
personal representative, who was the decedent's second wife, was alleged
to have knowledge of Lynn's status as a creditor and of her claim for
unpaid alimony.'25 The Second District Court of Appeal held that due
process required actual notice pursuant to Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, and noted that Lynn's petition appeared to specifical-
ly meet the criteria of Florida Probate Rule 5.495, which was in effect at the
time the'Petition was filed.' 26
The appellate court reversed the trial court's order which denied the
petition because Lynn had previously filed an independent action which had
been dismissed.' The court noted that the issue to be determined was
merely whether Lynn should be able to explain her status and the reason she
untimely filed her claim. 28 It did not rule upon the validity of Lynn's
claim, which was not before the court.
29
Further, the court also noted that Florida Probate Rule 5.495 was
deleted effective October 1, 1991 because of the enactment of section
733.702 of the Florida Statutes. 3 ° As amended, the statute provides for
an extension of time in which a claim may be filed upon grounds of fraud,
estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.' 3'
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF WILLS
Florida's laws on the signing of wills have been on the books for many
years. Certainly it is a far more settled area of the law than the law of
123. Id. at 102-03.
124. 611 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 595.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 596.
128. Id.
129. Burgis, 611 So. 2d at 596.
130. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (1991).
131. FLA. STAT § 733.702 (1991).
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trusts; however, the procedural aspects of execution and proving of wills
continue to engender controversy.
In Simpson v. Williamson,' 32 the testator had signed the self-proving
affidavit but nowhere else on the will did his signature appear. In addition,
a witness submitted an affidavit that one of the two witnesses to the will had
not signed in the presence of both the testator and the other witness. The
attorney who drafted the will, on the other hand, filed an affidavit that the
testator, both witnesses, and he as the notary, all signed in the presence of
each other.'33  The court, in holding that the lower court improperly
granted summary judgment, stated that the testator had validly executed the
will. "'34 The court also stated that the attorney's signature on the self-
proving affidavit could be used as another witness to validate the will since
the determining factor is not where the witness's signature appears but,
rather, whether the signature was affixed under circumstances to indicate the
person is an attesting and subscribing witness.'35 In the end, the court
favored saving the will.'36
What if a validly executed will is lost and an unsigned carbon copy is
introduced into probate? Florida rules seem to indicate that it is not an
uncontested event to have the copy of the will admitted; rather, it is
automatically adversarial. In Kero v. Di Legge,' 37 the copy of the will
was not signed by the decedent and only one of the two subscribing
witnesses was available to testify as to the authenticity and execution of the
will. The court held that this was a "correct" copy within the meaning of
section 733.207(3) of the Florida Statutes, which requires the testimony of
only one witness to prove "due execution.',3' The court reasoned that the
necessary signatures are not required because the purpose of a correct copy
is not to prove execution but rather the contents of the original will.'39
Two recently decided cases involve a testator's attempt to revoke a will
or a codicil. In In re Estate of Dickson,'40 the court was called upon to
decide whether the decedent's intention to revoke was accompanied by the
requisite physical act of revocation. The decedent had written on the self-
132. 611 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
133. Id. at 545.
134. Id. at 547.
135. Id. at 546.
136. Id.
137. 591 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
138. Id. at 677.
139. Id.
140. 590 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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proof affidavit, which was the final page of the will: "March 16, 1987 I
MYSELF DECLARE THIS WILL NULL AND VOID OF SOUND MIND"
followed by his signature, and had written and circled the word "void" over
the raised notarial seal. 14 1 In finding this a sufficient physical act, the
court stated that Florida Statutes section 732.506 did not require any specific
degree of physical destruction, obliteration, or cancellation to accompany
clear evidence of intent. 42  The court also found that the self-proof
affidavit had been incorporated into the will; thus, the physical act
constituted a revocation of the entire will.
143
In re Estate of Tolin144 involved the following question, which was
certified to the Florida Supreme Court asone of great importance:
MAY A CODICIL TO A WILL BE REVOKED BY DESTROYING
A PHOTOGRAPHIC COPY IF THE TESTATOR BELIEVED THAT
BY SUCH ACT HE WAS DESTROYING THE ORIGINAL AND
THE TESTATOR INTENDED TO REVOKE THE CODICIL?
45
The court answered this question in the negative, stating that section
732.506 of the Florida Statutes requires that the document destroyed by a
physical act must be the original document. 46 However, because the
intent of the testator to revoke the codicil was undisputed, the court imposed
the equitable remedy of a constructive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment
of the codicil's devisee as a result of the testator's mistake. 4 7 The court
also noted the importance of distinguishing an original document from a
copy, and advised attorneys who prepare documents such as wills and
codicils to consider specifically designating which documents are copies,
since modern technology makes it difficult to distinguish them. 41 Un-
141. Id. at 472.
142. Id.
143. Id. No mention was made of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in this
case. Under that doctrine, if a testator cancels a will with the intention of making a new one
immediately and the new will is not made, it is presumed that the testator preferred the old
will to no will and consequent intestacy, and the old will may be admitted to probate.
Apparently, the testator in this case had not intended to make a new will immediately after
destroying the old one.
144. 622 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 989.
146. Id. at 990.
147. Id. at 990-91.
148. Id.
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doubtedly this case has changed procedures for signing wills in many law
offices.
In their interpretation of ambiguous provisions in wills, Florida courts
attempt to ascertain the intent of the testator. This intent is gleaned from
the context of the will and from parol evidence of the draftsman. In In re
Estate of Walker, 49 the decedent's will left "all of my personal property"
(as well as all real property) to named beneficiaries, but also contained a
residuary clause devising the remaining property to a church. At issue was
whether the term "personal property" should be interpreted to mean only
tangible personal property; in this case, the intangible personal property
would pass to the residual beneficiary. "5 ' The court withdrew its prior
decision in favor of a new opinion which upheld the admission of oral
testimony by the will draftsman.' The draftsman testified that the
testator had intended to limit the nonresiduary devise to tangible personal
property, thereby giving effect to the residuary clause which would
otherwise have been insignificant.' The interpretation made a difference
to the Presbyterian Church, the residuary beneficiary and to the malpractice
carrier for the draftsman. The court rejected the contention that the
testimony of the draftsman, who was also the personal representative
violated the Dead Man's Statute,' since in this case the personal repre-
sentative, would not gain or lose from either interpretation of the will.' 54
Even in the absence of parol evidence, Florida courts will liberally
construe the wording in a will to carry out the testator's intent. In In re
Estate of Reese,' the trustees sought permission from the court to divide
the trust created under decedent's will into a generation-skipping-transfer-
exempt trust and a nonexempt trust with the same dispositive provisions as
the single trust. The decedent's will directed the trustees "to reduce to the
lowest possible amount the federal estate tax payable by reason of my death
and any federal generation-skipping tax on any transfer with respect to
which I am the deemed transferor ... .""' The court found the dece-
dent's expressed intent to be unequivocal and held that the trust could be so
149. 609 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 625.
152. Id.
153. FLA. STAT. § 90.602 (1991).
154. Walker, 609 So. 2d at 625-26.
155. 622 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
156. Id. at 158.
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divided as a matter of construction rather than by reformation of the
will. 57
V. TRUSTS
Although the law on various aspects of wills is well-settled and
explicitly stated in statutes, this is not the case with the other popular estate
planning tool-the revocable living trust. Probably the most surprising
decision involving living trusts in Florida was handed down by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1993 in the case of Zuckerman v. Alter.' The question
certified from the lower court was:
WHETHER PARAGRAPH 689.075(l)(g), FLORIDA STATUTES
(1989), CREATES A SINGLE TEST, OR TWO ALTERNATIVE
TESTS, FOR THE VALIDITY OF AN INTER VIVOS TRUST
EXECUTED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1969, WHERE THE SETTLOR
IS THE SOLE TRUSTEE?159
r'he statute provides that an otherwise valid trust is not invalidated or an
attempted testamentary disposition thwarted
because the settlor is, at the time of execution of the instrument, or
thereafter becomes, sole trustee; provided that at the time the trust
instrument is executed it is either valid under the laws of the jurisdic-
tion in which it is executed or it is executed in accordance with the
formalities for the execution of wills required in such jurisdiction., 60
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the statute created two alternative tests and satisfaction of either test
sustains the validity of the trust.161 It had previously been thought by
most Florida attorneys that a self-declaration of trust executed in Florida
must conform to the Florida Statute of Wills. Such trusts, said the court,
may be created by writing or parol, or partially in each, provided that the
words used are sufficient to create a trust, which make a trust "otherwise
157. Id.
158. 615 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1993).
159. Id. at 662.
160. FLA. STAT. § 689.075(I)(g) (1989).
161. Zuckerman, 615 So. 2d at 663.
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valid." Furthermore, the trust does not have to be executed with the
formalities for the execution of wills (i.e., witnesses, notary, etc.).'62
In another case interpreting a trust, NCNB National Bank of Florida v.
Shanaberger, 6 3 the Second District Court of Appeal questioned language
granting the trustee sole discretion to invade the principal for a beneficiary's
"care, maintenance, support, and medical attention." Before invading the
principal to satisfy a demand for nursing home and related medical expenses
for the trust beneficiary, the trustee had requested information about other
sources of income available to the beneficiary. The trust instrument
provided no criteria for making the necessary determination to invade the
principal other than for the trust purpose. The court stated that its only
function was to determine whether the trustee had abused its discretion by
its request for information of outside sources of income.'64 The court held
that there was no abuse of discretion and that even an unlimited invasion
power is subject to accountability to remaindermen for an improper, an
arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of discretion.'65
VI. GUARDIANSHIPS
Even though court statistics reveal an increase in guardianships and
Florida has a recognized growing senior population, few guardianship cases
end up in the appellate courts. Selection of an appropriate guardian is
obviously a matter of great concern and was addressed in Tagliabue v.
Fraser.166 The Tagliabue court held that appointment of a non-relative as
guardian of property was inappropriate where the incapacitated person was
the sole life beneficiary under a trust and the appointed guardian was sole
residuary beneficiary under the same trust. 167 According to the court,
Florida Statutes section 744.309(2) prohibits the appointment of a non-rela-
tive as guardian where a conflict of interest may occur.'68
The issue of attorney fees has also received the appellate courts'
attention. Namely, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
Whaley 69 involved, inter alia, fees to be paid to a guardian ad litem.
162. Id.
163. 616 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
164. Id. at 97-98.
165. Id. at 98.
166. 576 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
167. Id. at 401-02.
168. Id. at 402.
169. 574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991).
1993]
378
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") was not
held responsible for fees of an attorney who was appointed by the trial court
as counsel for a guardian ad litem.'70 Therefore, the court observed that
HRS has no responsibility for or control over the guardian ad litem
program. This is a different statute than that required for appointment of an
attorney under guardianship laws in chapter 744 of the Florida Statutes, over
which the courts have jurisdiction to order payment of attorney fees from
a ward's assets.
Also concerning fees is In re Bockmuller,17' where the ward was
adjudicated incapacitated November 9, 1989, although she retained the rights
to vote and to marry. 172 After the ward was placed in a retirement home,
she told an attorney she wanted to go home and would hire someone to
assist her. The attorney filed an appearance and petitioned for restoration
of capacity and restoration of additional rights. The trial court found as a
matter of law there was no conflict, adverse interest, or any other basis for
removal of the guardians. However, the attorney continued to attempt to
remove the woman's guardians until her death on February 6, 1991. Later,
the attorney petitioned the trial court for attorney fees and costs, which were
to be paid from the ward's guardianship assets. Appeal was taken from the
trial court's order awarding attorney fees and costs. 173
The appellate court ruled that a ward's right to contract or hire an
attorney was removed by the order determining her incapacity.' 74 The
court stated that counsel for a ward must be contracted by one of the
guardians or appointed by the court. 75 Further, a ward has no power to
contract with an attorney to represent her in any proceeding.' 76  The
appellate court also found that the attorney's fees charged for time spent in
his continued efforts to remove the guardians served only to deplete the
ward's estate and served no benefit to the ward or her estate.' 77 The order
authorizing payment of attorney fees and costs was vacated and set
aside. 171
170. Id. at 101.
171. 602 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id. at 609.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. In re Bockmuller, 602 So. 2d at 609.
177. Id. at 610.
178. Id.
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The case of Metzger v. First National Bank of Clearwater'79 con-
cerned fees incurred by a party other than the guardian of the property. The
ward's husband unsuccessfully petitioned the court to partition jointly held
bank accounts for himself and the ward. The ward's daughter was guardian
of the person and a bank was guardian of the property. The guardian of the
person opposed the husband's petition for partition and defended the trial
court's order on appeal. The guardian of the person requested attorney fees,
asserting that her efforts benefitted the guardianship estate in the trial court
and appellate courts.
The appellate court ruled that attorney fees for services beneficial to the
ward may be awarded even though those services were not rendered by the
ward's guardian.' ° "[E]ven if [a person] is motivated by thoughts of
perhaps eventually inheriting what was left of the joint accounts if [ward
survived husband], the existence of such a motive is irrelevant to the
determination whether her efforts benefitted the guardianship estate."''
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Midland National Bank & Trust
v. Comerica Trust Co. 82 held that upon the death of an incapacitated
ward, unpaid administrative expenses and debts of a guardianship, as well
as debts of the ward which pre-existed creation of the guardianship but
which the court had ordered paid, are promptly payable from the ward's
guardianship estate prior to the guardian making distribution to the ward's
probate estate. 83  The court observed that the guardianship is a unique
entity that must, to the extent of its assets, satisfy or discharge all guardian-
ship administrative expenses, as well as obligations incurred by the guardian
for the ward, before the net assets remaining are distributable to the persons
entitled to them. 84
In re Brown"5 involved the court's jurisdiction over the guardian.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that there was no merit to
the guardian's contention that the lower court had no jurisdiction over her
in her capacity as the trustee of an inter vivos trust.'86 The court found
that the guardian had petitioned the court for appointment as guardian and,
179. 585 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
180. Id. at 373 (citing In re Dean, 319 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
181. Metzger, 585 So. 2d at 374.
182. 616 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
183. Id. at 1086.
184. Id.
185. 611 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
186. Id.
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in doing so, "clearly submitted herself individually to the court's jurisdic-
tion.""'
The guardian's power to act was the issue in Goeke v. Goeke."'8
Here, the court held that a guardian, with the approval of the court, has the
statutory power, pursuant to section 744.441 of the Florida Statutes, to
establish and modify IRA trusts or IRA custodial accounts for the ward.'89
This includes the authority to designate the ward's estate or family members
as beneficiaries for the IRA contract. The court noted that designation of
a beneficiary in an IRA agreement is not equivalent to writing or amending
a will for the ward. The guardian's exercise of this power must be
appropriate for, and in the best interest of, the ward.' 9°
VII. ELECTIVE SHARE
The elective share of a surviving spouse continues to plague the courts
in their attempt to follow the Florida Statutes.' 9' The manner of election
was the focus in Harmon v. Williams.92 In Harmon, the surviving
spouse's attorney had, within the elective share time limits, signed and filed
a "Notice of Intention to Petition for Elective Share" but no formal election
was ever filed. In holding the purported elective share election invalid, the
court stated that it was not signed either by the surviving spouse or by her
guardian, as required by the statute.' 93  The court conceded that an
attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney may be authorized to
make such election; however, that factual situation was not presented before
the court.'94 Furthermore, the election was held to be invalid because the
petition was merely a notice that a petition to determine the elective share
would be filed later, without stating any statutory grounds for the delay.'95
In In re Estate of Palmer,96 the court held that the "surviving spouse
is entitled to interest on [the] elective share from the date of the order
187. Id.
188. 613 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
189. Id. at 1347.
190. Id.
191. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-732.215 (1991).
192. 596 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
193. Id. at 1142.
194. Id. at 1143.
195. Id. at 1142.
196. 600 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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directing the personal representative to make payment."' 97 The personal
representative of the estate had withheld payment of the elective share
because of additional estate taxes from the decreased marital deduction
resulting from the election. In the previous related case of Tarbox v.
Palmer,9t the court had held that the election of the elective share by the
surviving spouse had not increased estate taxes but merely accelerated their
time for payment by the residuary beneficiaries of the QTIP trust for the
spouse; therefore, the surviving spouse was not to bear any additional
tax. 199
This elective share and burden of estate taxes issue has arisen again in
the controversy over the estate of Joe Robbie. In his estate plan, Joe Robbie
left assets in a QTIP trust for his wife. The assets included the Miami
Dolphin football team and part of Joe Robbie Stadium. Elizabeth Robbie,
Joe Robbie's surviving spouse, and mother of his eleven children, filed for
an elective share, which could result in accelerating approximately twenty-
five million dollars in estate taxes. If the entire QTIP trust principal had
been held at her death, the estate taxes would have been deferred until that
time. As of the writing of this article, the issue is unresolved. A literal
reading of section 732.215 of the Florida Statutes could, in some cases if
not this one, eliminate the spouse's entire elective share if the present
increase in estate taxes is charged against it. Also unresolved at this time
is whether a surviving spouse (in this case Elizabeth Robbie) who files for
an elective share would forfeit his or her right to benefits from the
remaining estate assets which pour over into a revocable trust created by the
deceased spouse which names the surviving spouse as an income and/or
principal beneficiary. Florida law may be clarified if the Robbie case is
resolved by a court rather than settled out of court. In any event, it should
prompt more attorneys to provide appropriate language in revocable trusts
as to the effect of a spouse filing an elective share.2 ° °
197. Id, at 538 (citing Price v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 419 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
198. 564 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
199. Id. at 1108.
200. For a discussion of the Robbie litigation, see Barry A. Nelson, Litigation in the Joe
Robbie Estate Illustrates Elective Share/Revocable Trust Traps, 66 FLA. B.J. 38 (Jan. 1993).
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VIII. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Creditors' Claims Post-Pope
In the last two years, the Florida Legislature has responded to state and
national case law and consumer concerns by adopting specific legislation.
Chapters 731 through 733 are considered the "Florida Probate Code" and
chapter 737 includes the limited Florida statutes on trusts.
A significant case decided by the United States Supreme Court, Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope2°' dealt with the proper
notice required for creditors of a probate estate under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In that
case, the widow of a decedent was appointed by an Oklahoma probate court
to be the executrix of her husband's estate. Under Oklahoma law, with
which she complied, she was required to publish notice in a local legal
newspaper and to give creditors of her husband's estate up to sixty days
within which to file claims against the estate. The collection company had
been assigned the claim for decedent's hospital expenses from the hospital
in which Mr. Pope died. The company claimed that they should have
received actual notice of the claim period since, certainly under the
circumstances of this case, the hospital was a known or ascertainable
creditor. The Supreme Court left it to the various states to make specific
provisions for creditors' claims periods and the procedures to be followed.
As a result, Florida modified section 733.212 of the Florida Statutes.
In Florida, the personal representative of the estate is now obliged to
send notice to known and ascertainable creditors of the decedent, 2 ' An
affidavit of the mailing must be signed and filed with the court by the
personal representative, who must make a diligent search for creditors.0 3
The search usually includes a review of the preceding two or three years of
check registers, tax returns, and finally, the mail arriving after the death.
B. House Bill 1295
A composite bill changing several unrelated provisions of trust and
probate statutory law was passed by the 1993 Florida Legislature and, by a
201. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
202. See FLA. STAT. § 733.212(4)(a) (1991).
203. Id.
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whisker, became law absent the Governor's signature. House Bill 1295
covered four topics: creditors' rights and revocable living trusts; fees for
attorneys and personal representatives in the event of disputes; changes in
the prudent investor rule; and the application of certain rules of construction
found in the Probate Code to-trust agreements.2 °4
One of the efforts of the bill was to make trust administration more
similar to probate administration. There has not been a reported case on the
specific obligation of a trustee holding assets of a decedent to notify the
decedent's creditors of the existence of the trust nor any case requiring
payment from trust corpus to a decedent's creditors. This is in contrast to
specific probate statutes and case law.20 5 While a trustee taking over as
trustee from a grantor/decedent has always had the obligation to notify
beneficiaries of a change of trustee,0 6 this author believes that only
professional trustees commonly carry out this notice requirement. Under the
most recent law passed, a trustee has an obligation to publish a notice to
creditors in a local newspaper for two consecutive weeks and consequently
delay distributing trust assets until the three month creditor period has
elapsed.2 7
In addition to the notice for claimants, a trustee is obliged to pay any
administrative expenses and timely filed enforceable creditors' claims from
trust funds upon certification by the personal representative that there are
insufficient funds in the probate estate with which to pay them.208 The
new statute does not address the fairly common situation as to who certifies
if there is no certification. It also does not provide a procedure for creditors
whose claims are denied by a trustee where there is no probate estate.
There is no mention of taxes, either because of an oversight on the part of
the authors or because the Internal Revenue Code already provides that the
tax obligation follows the assets. The various circuit courts and clerks will
need to establish procedures and filing fees for this additional function,
although the clerks may have to steel themselves for the abundance of
individual trustees who will be attempting to do this on their own without
an attorney. This statutory change diminishes the difference between the
revocable living trust and the probate process for many individuals in
Florida, making such trusts less attractive.
204. Ch. 93-257, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 103-31.
206. FLA. STAT. § 737.303 (1991).
207. Ch. 93-257, § 15, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2510 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 737.305701)(a)(c)).
208. Id. § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2509 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(1)).
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Another change contained in this composite bill addresses the old
"prudent investor" rule enunciated many years ago by Justice Putnam in
Harvard College v. Amory.2"9 As modem portfolio theory evolved, more
investment options became available, and this new world had trouble fitting
in with the quaint language. The new law amends sections 518.11, 660.43 1,
733.212, 733.607, 733.617, 733.707, and 737.302 and creates section
518.112 of the Florida Statutes.2" °
There are two main parts to the changes adopted in the prudent investor
rule. The first is that the fiduciary (trustee, personal representative,
guardian) is obliged to consider not just the individual investments in a
vacuum, but rather the entire portfolio taken as a whole. The fiduciary must
consider the needs of the beneficiaries, wards, and the goal of the trust
agreement. Diversification is specifically encouraged.21'
The second major change applicable to investment duties of fiduciaries
is that for the first time under Florida statutory law, the investment function
can be delegated. If a fiduciary wishes to assign both the duty and the
responsibility of investments in a particular fiduciary account to anyone else,
including an investment manager or a bank, the trustee can do so without
fully resigning as trustee. There is a specific procedure to be followed of
notifying the beneficiaries of any trust or seeking court approval in the case
of a guardianship and then delegating. Many current trust agreements allow
for the hiring of investment advisors by the trustee, but the trustee is
expected to retain full power and responsibility in such a situation.2" 2
Chapter 737 is the part of the Florida Statutes that addresses trusts in
Florida. There is very little statutory law contained therein. Some rules of
construction which have been found in the Florida Probate Code will now
be found in the chapter on trusts.213 For example, a willful slayer, that is
one who kills the grantor or another person upon whose death such
beneficiary's interest depends, cannot recover anything as a beneficiary of
a trust. The language is not identical to the language in the existing probate
statute on killers not being entitled to revenue from an estate. 2 4 Appar-
209. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Aloisi, 481 N.E.2d 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(citing Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830)).
210. Ch. 93-257, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500.
211. Id. § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2501 (amending FLA. STAT. § 518.11 (1991), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(a)(c)).
212. Id.
213. Id. §§ 15-16, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2510-12 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§
733.3057, 737.621).
214. See FLA. STAT § 732.802 (1991).
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ently, if you intend to kill someone and expect to be convicted of intentional
murder, make sure your victim has a revocable trust. Another section
adopted in the trust law is the assumption that any distribution is on a "per
stirpes" basis.2"' It would have been more useful if the "antilapse"
statute.16 had been adopted as part of the 1993 amendments to chapter
737.
IX. JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The question of how joint bank accounts are held has been the subject
of several cases and a new statute passed by the 1992 Florida Legislature.
Prior to July 3, 1992, the ownership of joint bank accounts depended on the
type of financial institution in which the account was opened. For savings
banks and savings and loan associations, there was a conclusive presumption
that, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, a savings account held in
the names of two or more people constituted a joint tenancy with rights of
survivorship. However, for commercial banks and credit unions, in the
absence of fraud or undue influence, there was a rebuttable presumption of
survivorship rights by proving contrary intent by "clear and convincing
evidence." Many cases introduced clear and convincing evidence of such
contrary intent: (1) the form and the language on the account card itself and
signature cards; (2) the age and physical condition of an owner; (3) the
relationship of the parties; (4) the use of the account; (5) the knowledge of
the surviving tenants; (6) the source of the deposits; (7) the control of any
passbook; and (8) the relationship of the account to the owner's estate plan.
If the action involving ownership was brought by a co-tenant rather than a
survivor, the statutory presumptions did not apply.
In a leading case, In re Estate of Combee,2" 7 the Second District
Court of Appeal applied the statutory presumption to joint commercial bank
accounts opened by the decedent with two other persons as signatories. The
contractual language on the bank's signature contract card clearly expressed
a right of survivorship. The trial court had allowed parol evidence but
excluded the testimony of the surviving tenants as self-serving. In the
absence of clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent to rebut the
215. Ch. 93-257, § 16, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2511 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.624).
216. FLA. STAT. § 732.603 (1991).
217. 58.3 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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statutory presumption, the bank accounts were held to be survivorship
accounts and the surviving co-tenants became the account owners."'
The distinction between financial institutions holding joint bank
accounts was abolished by chapter 655 of the Florida Statutes in July,
1992.219 "Unless otherwise expressly provided in a contract, . . . signature
card, . . . [or the like], a deposit account in the names of two or more
persons shall be presumed to have been intended by such persons to provide
that, upon death of any one of them, all rights ... vest in the survivor.,
221
The rebuttable presumption may be overcome by proof of fraud or undue
influence or by clear and convincing proof of a contrary intent. 221 True
convenience accounts are excepted from this rule, and Totten trust accounts
are still recognized. As a practical matter, a customer must aggressively
demand a convenience account if that is desired.
Between husband and wife, jointly held real property is presumed to be
held as tenancy by the entireties, but the presumption does not apply to
personal property owned by a husband and wife together. "[T]he intention
of the parties must be proven unless the instrument creating the tenancy
clearly bears an express designation that the tenancy is one held by the
entireties. 222 The distinction is important since creditors wishing to attach
the joint bank accounts of a husband and wife to satisfy the debt of one
spouse may reach the account if held as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship but not if held as tenants by the entireties. 23  The Florida
courts have been concerned with ascertaining the spouses' intent in
establishing and using ajoint bank account. Bank signature cards have been
examined, although they typically refer to such accounts as joint with right
of survivorship and do not mention a tenancy by the entirety. Also, whether
the joint bank account was created from jointly owned funds and whether
it was used for the spouses' joint expenses were other considerations in the
courts' attempts to ascertain the spouses' intentions.
In Terrace Bank of Florida v. Brady,224 the court seemed to shift its
focus from the intent of the depositor-spouses to an examination of the
218. Id. at 712-13.
219. FLA. STAT. §§ 655.001-655.954 (Supp. 1992).
220. Id. § 655.79(1) (emphasis added).
221. Id. § 655.79(2).
222. First Nat'l Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla.
1971).
223. See Terrace Bank of Florida v. Brady, 598 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
224. 598 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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bank's policies and regulations as to joint bank accounts being held as
tenants by the entireties, including whether the bank offered such accounts
and whether they were specifically requested by the spouses upon cre-
ation.225 The court also stated that the burden of proof required of a
married couple attempting to shield their bank account from the claims of
a spouse's creditor meet the "clear and convincing" standard of evi-
dence. 6 The Florida Statutes now impose the same standard to all joint
bank accounts. Consequently, husbands and wives desiring protection from
individual liability should take appropriate action to clearly and convincingly
designate and treat their joint bank accounts as "tenancy by the entirety"
accounts.
X. CONCLUSION
Probate and trust law in Florida continues to evolve. The Florida
Legislature has attempted to codify many aspects, particularly in the trust
law area. However, it is certain that the most recent statute will be amended
in the next legislative session and we will see additional codification in this
area. Also certain will be the continued plethora of cases as the parties and
courts attempt to deal with these new statutes as well as aspects not covered
by them. It is such activity that makes the attorney's practice in probate and
trust law interesting and (hopefully) rewarding.
225. Id. at 228.
226. Id
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey presents recent developments in the law that should be of
particular interest to the real estate lawyer or real estate professional.' It
includes decisions of the Florida Supreme Court, the district courts of
appeal, and statutes, from the period of August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993.
II. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Attorney's Fees
Ganz v. HZJ, Inc.2 Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Grimes, Kogan, and Harding concurred in this per curiam decision. Justice
McDonald dissented without an opinion.
A delinquent taxpayer, HZJ, Inc., had sued to prevent the sale of tax
certificates on its land by the Dade County tax collector.' After the trial
court found the suit to be without merit, the tax collector filed a motion for
attorney's fees based upon section 57.105(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provided: "The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee ... in any
civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a
justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of
the losing party . . . .' Because the tax collector had not specifically
pleaded that he was entitled to attorney's fees in his answer to the complaint
as required by the supreme court's 1991 opinion in Stockman v. Downs,5
the motion was denied.
The supreme court, however, ruled that a claim for attorney's fees need
not be pleaded specifically.6 Such a requirement would make little sense
because:
[i]t is only after the case has been terminated that a sensible judgment
can be made by a party as to whether the adverse party raised nothing
but frivolous issues in the cause, and, if so, to file an appropriate mo-
1. This article does not include a discussion of family law issues, such as the distribution
of property upon divorce, of probate and trust law issues, or of the significant legislative
amendments to the planning and growth management process encompassed in Chapter 93-206
of the Florida Laws.
2. 605 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1992).
3. Id. at 872.
4. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(I) (1991).
5. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
6. Ganz, 605 So. 2d at 872-73.
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tion . . . seeking an entitlement to said attorney's fees under Section
57.015 .... .
B. Condominiums
Falk v. Beard.8 This unanimous per curiam decision involved review
of a final order of the Florida Public Service Commission ("PSC").9
A condominium management company was contractually obligated to
provide, inter alia, for electric service to the common areas of a condo-
minium community. The contract provided that if the electric rate charged
by the local electric company increased by at least five percent, the manage-
ment company was then entitled to distribute that additional cost to the unit
owners. A condominium unit owner challenged the increase by complaining
to the PSC that the management company was involved in the sale of
electricity.
The PSC made a preliminary finding that it had jurisdiction to
investigate the complaint.'" When the management company sought to
enjoin the PSC, the supreme court held that the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction." After completing its investigation, the PSC concluded that
the management company was not in the business of selling electricity and,
therefore, it had no regulatory role over the management fee.' 2 The condo-
minium owner challenged the PSC conclusion as arbitrary and capricious
based upon the contention that it contradicted the original finding of
jurisdiction.' 3 The supreme court gave short shrift to this argument. It
was one matter to conclude that the PSC had jurisdiction because a sale of
electricity might be involved and a completely different matter to decide
after a full investigation whether a sale of electricity was in fact involved. 4
The unit owner further challenged the conclusion based upon the
evidence. The supreme court pointed out that its role in reviewing findings
of the PSC was to simply determine if the order was supported by compe-
tent, substantial evidence.' 5 The record included evidence that: (1) the
7. Id. (quoting Autorico, Inc. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 485, 487-
88 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
8. 614 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1993).
9. Id. at 1087.
10. Id. at 1089.
II. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Bryson, 569 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 1990).
12. Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1087.
13. Id. at 1089.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1088.
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management company had to absorb any rate increase that was less than the
triggering five percent; 6 (2) there was no separate charge for the use of the
recreational facilities; 17 (3) there was no separate charge for electricity
consumed in using the recreational facilities; 8 and (4) the maintenance fee
increase was related to an electric rate increase rather than a consumption
increase." The fact that the increase was due to a rising electric rate and
not a consumption increase made this case easily distinguishable from
Fletcher Properties, Inc. v. Florida Public Service Commission. 20  In
Fletcher, the manager wanted to charge tenants for water based on their
individual consumptions as determined by meters.
In addition, in Falk, the unit owner claimed that the Florida Admin-
istrative Code21 required a contrary finding. The supreme court reiterated
that the court's role in reviewing a PSC interpretation of rules that apply to
the PSC is merely to determine if the interpretation was clearly erroneous.
Without going into a detailed analysis, the court simply stated that under the
circumstances, the court could not rule that the PSC's interpretation was
erroneous or unauthorized.22
C. Eminent Domain
City of Ocala v. Nye." This was a per curiam opinion. Justice
Kogan dissented without writing an opinion.
In order to widen a street, the city brought a condemnation action to
acquire part of a tract of land. The tenants of the property made a claim for
the special damages to their business. Pursuant to section 73.071(3)(b) of
the Florida Statutes, these damages would be available only if part of a
landowner's property is condemned, not if the entire tract had been con-
demned. After determining that paying the business damages was more
expensive than taking the entire property, the city amended its petition to
seek condemnation of the entire property. The Fifth District Court of
16. Id. at 1087.
17. Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1088.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 356 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1978).
21. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.049 (1993).
22. Falk, 614 So. 2d at 1089.
23. 608 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1992). The facts are all taken from the Florida Supreme Court
opinion.
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Appeal held that condemning the entire property when only part is needed
exceeded the city's condemnation authority.24
The Florida Supreme Court reached a different conclusion. The court
observed that the Florida Constitution expressly granted every municipality
authority "to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions
and render municipal services . *. .."25 Except when that power is ex-
pressly limited by law,26 the only requirement is that the powers be used
solely in the furtherance of "municipal purposes."27 Section 166.021(2) of
the Florida Statutes defines municipal purpose as "any activity or power
which may be exercised by the state or its political subdivisions., 2' The
Department of Transportation had been expressly granted the power to
acquire entire tracts of land for the purpose of minimizing acquisition
costs29 and the counties had been expressly given similar powers of
eminent domain.3" Logically, saving the taxpayers money was also a valid
municipal purpose.3 Thus, the lack of statutory authorization for the city
to take more property than it needed for this project did not prohibit it from
doing so in order to minimize the costs.
Florida Department of Revenue v. Orange County.3 2 Justice Kogan
wrote the unanimous decision. Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton,
McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred.
Threatened with condemnation proceedings, a landowner agreed to sell
its property to the county. Under the sale agreement, the county was to pay
any documentary stamp tax that might be owed, although both parties
believed the transaction was immune from such tax. The Department of
Revenue disagreed and claimed the tax with interest and penalties.
The district court certified a question that narrowly focused upon the
facts of this case, i.e., it included the contractual provision that the county
was obligated to pay the tax if one was owed.33 The supreme court
24. Nye v. City of Ocala, 559 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
25. Nye, 608 So. 2d at 16 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b)).
26. Id. at 17 (relying upon FLA. STAT. § 166.021(1) (1991)).
27. Id. (quoting State v. City of Sunrise, 354 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla. 1978)).
28. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(2) (1989).
29. Id. § 337.27(2).
30. See id. § 127.01(b).
31. Nye, 608 So. 2d at 17.
32. 620 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1993).
33. Orange County v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 605 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992). The Fifth District certified the following question:
1993]
393
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
rephrased the question to be: "Is a property transfer immune from the
documentary stamp tax if it occurs as a result of an out-of-court settlement
in a condemnation proceeding?"34  The supreme court answered this
rephrased question affirmatively.
The court noted that in the absence of a contrary contractual provision,
the seller would be obligated to pay the tax.3" However, if the seller must
pay the tax out of its sale proceeds, then the seller would not be fully
compensated for the lost land as is required by the Florida Constitution.36
That logic had led earlier to an administrative rule that the documentary
stamp tax could not be assessed when the transfer was pursuant to a
condemnation judgment.37 The public policy of encouraging parties to
settle rather than to litigate would be defeated if settlement was subject to
a tax that would not be imposed on a judgment. Consequently, the court
prohibited the assessment of the documentary stamp tax on a conveyance
made under threat of condemnation proceedings.3"
D. Ethics
The Florida Bar v. St. Laurent.39 This was an unanimous per curiam
opinion.
St. Laurent, an attorney, was the president, director, and sole sharehold-
er of a company that developed and marketed a time share condominium.
The Florida Bar filed two complaints against St. Laurent, alleging that he
WHEN A PROPERTY OWNER CONVEYS PROPERTY TO A COUNTY
UNDER THREAT OF CONDEMNATION AND IN LIEU OF EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS AND THE COUNTY IS CONTRACTUALLY
BOUND TO PAY ANY DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX ASSESSED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ON THE TRANSACTION, IS THE TRANS-
ACTION IMMUNE FROM SUCH TAXATION EVEN THOUGH THE
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE IMPOSES THE TAX DIRECTLY UPON THE
PROPERTY OWNER?
Id at 1335.
34. Florida Dep 't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992.
35. Id.
36. Id (relying on FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6). Article X, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution provides: "(a) No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose
and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by deposit in the registry
of the court and available to the owner." FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a) (emphasis added).
37. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992; see FLA. ADMIN. CODE-ANN. r. 12B-
4.014(14) (1993).
38. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 620 So. 2d at 992.
39. 617 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1993).
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prepared and executed time-share warranty deeds purporting to transfer clear
titles to properties that were actually encumbered, that he misused escrow
funds, and that he failed to use the funds received to pay off the underlying
mortgages. He pleaded "no contest" to the allegations and the referee
recommended he be given a public reprimand and a forty-five day
suspension, followed by two years of probation. The Bar wanted him
disbarred and appealed.
The conduct at issue did not involve the practice of law. However,
because he was a member of the bar at the time, he was subject to discipline
for violating the rules of professional responsibility." Because the attorney
had no experience in real estate law, had no previous disciplinary record,
had suffered severely during the pendency of the proceeding, which had
taken four years, had shown remorse, and the misconduct was based, at least
in part, on an honest mistake, the supreme court decided on a ninety-one
day suspension followed by probation, rather than disbarment. 4I
E. Homestead
Butterworth v. Caggiano 2 Chief Justice Barkett wrote the majority
opinion in which Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Kogan, and Harding
joined. Justice Grimes wrote a dissenting opinion.
After Mr. Caggiano was convicted of racketeering, the state initiated
forfeiture proceedings against his residence. Caggiano's defense was that
the property was his homestead and thus was exempt from forfeiture
because article X, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution provides that
homestead property:
shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the
payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the
purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for
house, field or other labor performed on the realty ....
Although the trial court rejected this argument, the Second District Court of
Appeal reversed in Caggiano's favor. The appellate court certified the
question, "Whether forfeiture of homestead under the RICO Act is forbidden
40. Id. at 1055.
41. Id. at 1056, 1057.
42. 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
43. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
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by article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution?"'4" The supreme court
agreed with the appellate court that the question should be answered in the
affirmative and approved the district court's decision.4"
Because the constitutional provision does not deal explicitly with
forfeiture, the court applied the tools of statutory and constitutional
construction to reach its conclusions. First, words are to be given their
usual and obvious meaning unless the text suggests they have been used in
a technical sense.46 The language used in the homestead exemption
appeared to be broad and nonlegal. Therefore, the term "forced sale" should
not be used in a narrow, technical sense. Moreover, by statute, all forfeited
property is sold by the state, so forfeiture does result in a forced sale.47
Second, the homestead provision is to be liberally construed, leading
to the conclusion that forfeiture should be included, in the event of doubt,
within the term "forced sale." Third, using the purpose approach, the home-
stead provision was intended to protect the family and to benefit the public
by providing families with greater security in their homes.48 This purpose
would best be furthered by protecting the homestead from forfeiture to the
state, as well as from levying creditors. In addition, forfeiture provisions
are to be strictly construed,49 leading to the conclusion that they should not
apply in the event of ambiguity.
Furthermore, article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution provides
three express exceptions to homestead protection from forced sale.
Forfeiture is not included. Invoking the rule, expressio unius est exclusio
alterious,5° the logical conclusion is that forfeiture was not intended to be
one of the exceptions and, therefore, was to be included in the protection.
Accordingly, homestead property cannot be the subject of a RICO forfeiture.
In his dissent, Justice Grimes pointed out that a RICO forfeiture does
not precisely fit the homestead provision because there is "no judgment,
decree, or execution which purports to be a lien on the property."'" The
history of the homestead provision demonstrates a purpose of protection
from economic misfortune. However, forfeiture is not caused by economics,
44. Caggiano v. Butterworth, 583 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
45. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57.
46. Id. at 58 (quoting City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90
(Fla. 1933)).
47. Id. at 59.
48. Id. at 60.
49. Id. at 58.
50. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of others.
51. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 61.
[Vol. 18
396
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Brown
but by misconduct.5" Florida courts have long imposed equitable liens on
homesteads based on the owner's fraud or reprehensible conduct.53
Logically, this protection should not extend to a criminal's homestead that
was being used as an instrument of crime, as occurred in the instant case.
No innocent persons were in need of protection in this case because the
owner did not even have a family.54
Palm Beach Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Fishbein.55  Justice Grimes
wrote the majority opinion with which Justices Overton, McDonald, and
Harding concurred. Justice Shaw wrote a dissenting opinion with which
Chief Justice Barkett and Justice Kogan concurred.
Mr. Fishbein owned a valuable home, which was subject to several
mortgages. Although it knew that the Fishbeins were involved in marriage
dissolution proceedings, Palm Beach Savings & Loan loaned $1,200,000 to
Mr. Fishbein on the security of a mortgage that appeared to have been
executed by both Mr. and Mrs. Fishbein. Although witnessed and ac-
knowledged, Mrs. Fishbein's signature was a forgery. Mr. Fishbein used
$930,000 of the loaned money to pay off the existing mortgages and the
property taxes.
When the bank brought foreclosure proceedings, Mrs. Fishbein claimed
the property as homestead. The circuit court, however, allowed the bank an
equitable lien for the $930,000 which Mr. Fishbein had used to pay the
existing mortgages and property taxes. The circuit court stayed foreclosure
proceedings for six months to allow Mrs. Fishbein to try to effect a sale.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected the equitable lien based upon
Mrs. Fishbein's innocence of any wrongdoing. 6 The supreme court,
finding that the district court failed to look at the constitutional language,
reversed and reinstated the circuit court's order.57
The court reiterated that equitable liens can be imposed upon home-
steads "where equity demands it" even though it is not expressly provided
for by the constitution.58 In this case, equity demanded it, regardless of
Mrs. Fishbein innocence, in order to avoid her being unjustly enriched.
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 61.
54. Id. at 62.
55. 619 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993).
56. Fishbein v. Palm Beach Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 585 So. 2d 1052, 1055 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991),
57. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 270, 271.
58. Id. at 270.
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Allowing an equitable lien to the extent that the money was used to pay
existing mortgage debts and tax burdens would not place Mrs. Fishbein in
a worse position than she had been before Mr. Fishbein acquired the loan.
Conversely, denying the equitable lien would result in Mrs. Fishbein
receiving a windfall of $930,000.
Justice Shaw, in his dissenting opinion, noted that there are three
express exceptions to homestead protection from the imposition of a lien:59
"the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for
the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for
house, field or other labor performed on the realty . ,.0 These must be
strictly construed. A careful analysis of case law revealed that virtually
every precedent was based upon one of the express exceptions.6' Since the
bank could not claim to fit within one of the express exceptions, it should
not have been able to get an equitable lien on the property.62
F. Leases
The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of and
Representation of Landlord in Uncontested Residential Evictions.63 This
was an unanimous per curiam opinion.
A petition presented the following question to The Florida Bar Standing
Committee on the Unlicensed Practice of Law:
Whether it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a property
manager, with or without a power of attorney, to draft and serve a
Three Day Notice, draft and file a Complaint for Eviction and Motion
for Default and obtain a Final Judgment and Writ of Possession for the
landlord in an uncontested residential eviction and, if so, whether the
practice should be authorized.64
When the Committee produced a proposed advisory opinion, the petitioner
objected.
The supreme court concluded that, under current law, a property
manager could draft and serve a three-day eviction notice. It was, however,
unlicensed practice of law for a nonlawyer to draft and to file a complaint
59. Id. at 271.
60. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
61. Fishbein, 619 So. 2d at 271-72.
62. Id. at 272.
63. 605 So. 2d 868 (1992).
64. Id. at 869.
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for eviction or a motion for default, or to obtain a final judgment and writ
of possession. The court decided to conduct an experiment. For one year,
it would allow property managers to do these things, for example file a
complaint, in uncontested residential evictions based upon the nonpayment
of rent if the court-approved forms 65 were used. The court invited
comments on the practice to be filed with its clerk during that year. It will
be interesting to hear the outcome of this experiment. Perhaps allowing
property managers to handle simple uncontested residential evictions will
save money, which will result in a savings to landlords and tenants.
However, this author suspects that the savings will not trickle down very far.
G. Lis Pendens
Chiusolo v. Kennedy.66 This was a per curiam opinion in which Chief
Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, McDonald, Shaw, Grimes, and Kogan
concurred. Justice Harding wrote an opinion expressing his concurrence in
part and his dissent in part.
Louis Chiusolo claimed that he was to have received stock in a
corporation in exchange for having advanced money to the corporation for
the purchase of some land. When the stock was not delivered, Chiusolo
filed suit seeking a resulting and constructive trust on the property." With
the suit, he filed a notice of lis pendens, but the circuit court discharged it.
The district court reversed, quashed and remanded68 and held that the
proponent of the challenged lis pendens has two burdens: (1) demonstrating
that the claim affects the real property; and (2) that there is a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. The second requirement was based upon
section 48.23(3) of the Florida Statutes. Section 48.23(3) provides:
When the initial pleading does not show that the action is founded on
a duly recorded instrument or on a lien claimed under part I of chapter
713 [i.e., a mechanic's or construction lien], the court may control and
discharge the notice of lis pendens as the court may grant and dissolve
injunctions.69
65. See The Florida Bar re Approval of Forms Pursuant to Rule 10-1.1(b) of The Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 591 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1991).
66. 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).
67. Id. at 492.
68. Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 589 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
69. FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (1991).
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The supreme court accepted the case based upon conflict jurisdiction7"
and rejected the second burden. The court pointed out that the doctrine of
lis pendens serves not only to protect a plaintiff from intervening liens, but
also to protect future purchasers and encumbrancers from "buying" a
lawsuit, even a lawsuit that they would win. 7' The court concluded that
the statutory reference to injunctions existed to allow a court to impose a
bond as a condition of a continuation of the lis pendens, just as it could
impose a bond as a condition of granting an injunction.72 Consequently,
"the lis pendens cannot be dissolved if, in the evidentiary hearing on request
for discharge, the proponent can establish a fair nexus between the apparent
legal or equitable ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in the
lawsuit.
73
Justice Harding's point of dissent was with the court's having placed
the burden of proving a fair nexus on the proponent of the lis pendens. 74
He would place the burden of showing the lack of a fair nexus on the one
challenging the lis pendens. However, proving the lack of a connection
means negating all possibilities. This may impose an impossible burden, and
for that reason, this author concludes that the court was correct.
H. P. UD. Litigation
Londono v. Turkey Creek, Inc. 75 Justice Harding wrote the unanimous
decision.
Dissident homeowners in a planned unit development filed an
unsuccessful suit over its operation against the developer who was awarded
its costs in the final judgment. The developer subsequently brought this
action seeking damages for malicious prosecution, tortious interference with
contractual rights, tortious interference with an advantageous business
relationship, civil conspiracy, and slander of title. The questions presented
to the supreme court were: (1) whether the developer's election to tax costs
in the earlier suit barred it from bringing this malicious prosecution suit; (2)
whether the developer's complaint had failed to state a claim for tortious
interference claims or civil conspiracy; and (3) whether the developer's
70. The Fifth District's Chiusolo opinion conflicted with Cacaro v. Swan, 394 So. 2d
538 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed, 402 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1981). Cacaro was
disapproved to the extent that it was in conflict with this supreme court decision.
71. Chiusolo, 614 So. 2d at 492.
72. Id. at 493.
73. Id. at 492.
74. Id. at 493.
75. 609 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1992).
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claim for slander of title was a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier
action.76
The first issue provided the court with its conflict jurisdiction." The
court distinguished its holding in Cate v. Oldham" with the case at bar.
Cate prohibited a state official, who had been sued only in his or her official
capacity and had recovered costs, from bringing a malicious prosecution
suit. That holding would bar the official from a double recovery because
the official could seek no more than the recovery of costs. However, the
situation in Londono was different. The Londono developer was seeking
compensatory and punitive damages, plus interest and costs.79  These
damages were different from and additional to the costs it had recovered in
the first action; therefore, the damages were not barred by the developer's
election to seek costs in the first action.
The tortious interference and civil conspiracy counts were based on
allegations that the homeowners made numerous intentional and malicious
false statements to third parties and local government officials for the
purpose of harming the developer's economic interests. The homeowners,
joined by the Attorney General as amicus curiae, argued that the home-
owners' complaints to zoning officials were protected by the First Amend-
ment and that this suit was an intimidation suit. Because the developer was
a private person, in Nodar v. Galbreath"° the court required the plaintiff
to show that the defendant had acted with express malice. However, the
complaint was facially sufficient when the allegations were accepted as true
and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, which was the appropriate
standard in determining whether the complaint stated a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted."' Consequently, the trial court should not
have dismissed the complaint.
The third issue in Londono was whether the claim was barred under
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure because the slander of title claim was
a compulsory counterclaim in the earlier action.8" The question turned on
76. Id. at 16.
77. The district court decision, Turkey Creek, Inc. v. Londono, 567 So. 2d 943 (Fla. I st
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), was in conflict with Cypher v. Segal, 501 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987), giving the supreme court conflict jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3)
of the Florida Constitution.
78. 450 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1984).
79. Id. at 224.
80. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
81. Id.
82. Londono, 609 So. 2d at 19. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
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the "logical relationship test," but the court pointed out that "stating this test
is far easier than determining if a claim passes [it]."83 The test was:
[A] claim has a logical relationship to the original claim if it arises out
of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim in two
senses: (1) that the same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis
of both claims; or (2) that the aggregate core of facts upon which the
original claim rests activates additional legal rights in a party defendant
that would otherwise remain dormant.84
The claims in the homeowners' initial suit were based upon their allegations
that the developer had mismanaged the development. The claims focused
upon the developer's alleged misconduct. In this suit, the claims were based
upon the developer's allegations that the homeowners had intentionally and
maliciously spread false and defamatory information about the developer
and the development, i.e., it focused upon the homeowners' alleged
misconduct. Consequently, this was not a compulsory counterclaim because
it failed the logical relationship test.
I. Tax Certificates and Deeds
Dawson v. Saada.85 Justice Harding wrote the unanimous opinion.
Following a tax sale, a tax deed to the Saadas' property was issued to
the Dawsons who subsequently brought this action to quiet their title. The
Saadas defended on the basis that the notice of the sale had not been served
by the sheriff, as required by section 197.522(2) of the Florida Statutes.86
The question certified to the supreme court was:
WHETHER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTION 197.522, FLORIDA STATUTES, INVALI-
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, provided it arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FLA R. Civ. P. 1.170(a).
83. Londono, 609 So. 2d at 20.
84. Id. (quoting Neil v. South Fla. Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 198 1) (quoting Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co.,
426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir. 1970))).
85. 608 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 1992).
86. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 197.522 (1987).
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DATES THE ISSUANCE OF A TAX DEED NOTWITHSTANDING
THE LANGUAGE IN SECTIONS 197.404 AND 65.081(3), FLORIDA
STATUTES?"
In Dawson, there had been compliance with section 197.522(1), which
required that the clerk, by certified mail with return receipt requested, notify
all the persons listed in the tax collector's statement twenty days prior to the
tax sale. The court concluded that the notice given to the Saadas was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. 8 Furthermore, the
plain language in section 197.522(2) indicated that the Legislature intended
that its notice provision was to be directory only, not mandatory.89
Consequently, failure to give that notice did not invalidate the tax deed.9"
The court went on to provide some interesting dicta in order to
completely answer the certified question. Both section 197.404 and section
65.081(3) of the Florida Statutes seemed to provide that the tax deed could
not be attacked due to lack of notice. Section 65.081(3) provided:
No defense to the action [in chancery to quiet the title to land included
in a tax deed] or attack upon the tax deed shall be made except the
defense that the taxes assessed against the property had been paid by the
former owner before issuance of the tax deed. 9'
Section 197.404 had provided:
A sale or conveyance of real or personal property for nonpayment shall
not be held invalid except upon proof that: (1) The property was not
subject to taxation; (2) The taxes had been paid before the sale of
personal property; or (3) The tax certificate on the real property had
been redeemed before the execution and delivery of a deed based upon
a certificate issued for nonpayment of taxes.92
The court concluded that these sections must be read in light of the
constitutional requirement of notice. These statutes could not preclude an
attack on a tax deed that was void for lack of notice required by section
197.522(1) because that notice was constitutionally required.
87. Dawson, 608 So. 2d at 807.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 810.
90. Id.
91. FLA. STAT. § 65.081(3) (1987).
92. FLA. STAT. § 197.404 (1989) (repealed 1991).
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As that notice had been provided in this case, the validity of the tax
deed was upheld. Therefore, the certified question would have to be
answered both "yes" and "no." Although failure to comply with the notice
requirements of section 197.522(1) of the Florida Statutes would invalidate
the issuance of a tax deed, notwithstanding the language in sections 197.404
and 65.081, the failure to comply with the notice requirements of section
197.522(2) does not.
Walker v. Palm Beach Commerce Center Associated.93 Justice Kogan
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett, and Justices
Overton, Shaw, Grimes, and Harding concurred. Justice McDonald wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
When Palm Beach Commerce Center contested the 1990 tax assessment
valuation of its property, it sought a temporary injunction against the
issuance of tax certificates. The trial court denied the temporary injunction
on the ground that the Center had failed to establish the likelihood that it
would ultimately succeed on the merits. On appeal, the district court
disagreed. It held that section 194.211 of the Florida Statutes 94 required
only that the taxpayer make a good faith payment of the estimated taxes due
as the taxpayer had done here.
The court rephrased the certified question, breaking it into two parts.
The first part asked:
MAY A TAXPAYER SEEKING TO ENJOIN THE SALE OF TAX
CERTIFICATES PENDING A CHALLENGE TO THE ASSESSED
VALUATION OF ITS PROPERTY PROCEED UNDER SECTION
194.211 ?9'
The Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. The
statute did not explicitly apply to the sale of tax certificates. The tax
appraiser had argued that, based upon the history of the statute, a temporary
93. 614 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1993).
94. Section 194.211, Florida Statutes, provided:
In any tax suit, the court may issue injunctions to restrain the sale of real or
personal property for any tax which shall appear to be contrary to law or equity,
and in no case shall any complaint be dismissed because the tax assessment
complained of, or the injunction asked for, involves personal property only.
FLA. STAT. § 194.211 (1989).
95. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1098.
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injunction should be available only to prevent sale of the property two
years96 after the sale of the tax certificates, and not to prevent the sale of
the tax certificates. The court, however, rejected the tax appraiser's
argument.
Having answered the first part in the affirmative, the court proceeded
to the second part of the question, which was:
WHAT SHOWING IS NECESSARY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
TEMPORARY INJUNCTION? 97
Relying on the plain language of the statute,98 the court concluded that the
traditional requisites for a temporary injunction need not be established
when seeking relief under this statute. A taxpayer is entitled to a temporary
injunction if he has made "a showing of a substantial likelihood of success
in the underlying tax suit" as well as having made a good faith payment of
the taxes due. 99 The unfortunate taxpayer here lost because he had only
done the latter.
In Hotelerama Associates v. Bystrom, 00 the third district had reached
the opposite conclusion. Consequently, it was overruled "to the extent it
conflicts with this decision."' 0 '
Although Justice McDonald concurred in the result, his rationale
differed in the following way.0  First, he pointed out that section 194.211
applied to the sale of property but the issuance of a tax certificate merely
imposed a lien on property. Consequently, this section should not provide
a basis for an injunction against the issuance of a tax certificate. Second,
the Legislature explicitly provided an adequate remedy at law, i.e., the
cancellation of tax certificates under sections 197.443 and 197.444. Third,
the general requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction should apply
because there was nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended otherwise
96. Actually two years after April I of the year of issuance, if the tax certificate has not
been redeemed by the landowner. FLA. STAT. § 197.502(1) (Supp. 1992).
97. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1098.
98. "In any tax suit, the court may issue injunctions to restrain the sale of real or
personal property for any tax which shall appear to be contrary to law or equity ...." FLA.
STAT. § 194.211 (1991).
99. Id.
100. 449 3o. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 458 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1984).
101. Walker, 614 So. 2d at 1100 (quoting Hotelerama Assocs. v. Bystrom, 449 So. 2d
836 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
102. Id.
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and these requirements included, inter alia, the unavailability of an adequate
remedy at law.' 3
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Elliott."4 Justice Shaw wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Overton, Kogan, and Harding
concurred."0 5 Chief Justice Barkett wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices McDonald and Grimes joined.' °6
Charles Elliott tendered tax certificates, endorsed in blank before a
notary public, as collateral for loans. When Elliott's assets were placed in
receivership, the lenders discovered that the tax certificates had been frozen
by court order. The receiver claimed that the lenders were unsecured
creditors because the lenders had not perfected their security interest in the
certificates by filing with the Secretary of State as required for security
interests in general intangibles by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.0 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit posed the
following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does a Florida Tax certificate represent an interest in land for purposes
of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, so that Article 9 does not
govern the creation of a security interest therein by virtue of §
679.104(1 0)?'08
The majority answered the question in the affirmative and held that
Article 9 did not govern. Under section 197.102(3), a tax certificate is a
lien on real property. However, Article 9 does not apply "to the creation or
transfer of a . . . lien on real estate ... ."'09 The plain language of these
sections would seem to exclude the creation of a security interest in a tax
certificate from Article 9. Moreover, section 679.102(2) provides that
Article 9 does not generally apply to statutory liens. The majority rejected
the claim that commercial lenders might be harmed by finding Article 9
inapplicable, because that had not occurred in this case, and any lender
considering the land as collateral would know of the existence of the tax
certificate and its implications.
103. Id.
104. 620 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1993).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.102 (1991).
108. Elliott, 620 So. 2d at 159.
109. FLA. STAT. § 679.104(10) (1991).
[Vol. 18
406
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Brown
The dissent considered that a tax certificate being used to secure a loan
was analogous to a mortgage being used to secure a debt. It relied, as did
the majority, on the official comment to section 679.102 to justify the
conclusion, although the official comment fails to support clearly either the
majority or the dissent.
Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker."0° Justice Grimes wrote
the opinion in which Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Overton, Shaw,
Kogan, and Harding concurred. Justice McDonald was recused.
The court was presented with two certified questions. The first
certified question asked:
IS LAND OWNED BY A MUNICIPALITY EXEMPT FROM REAL
ESTATE TAXATION IF IT WAS LEASED TO A PRIVATE PARTY
PRIOR TO APRIL 15, 1976, AND IS USED FOR NONGOVERN-
MENTAL PURPOSES?"'
The Florida Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. The
golf course was leased from the City of Tallahassee under a ninety-nine year
lease. It was admittedly not being used for public or municipal purposes,
so it did not fit within the tax exemption provided by article VII, section 3
of the Florida Constitution. Nor did the court find that it fit within the
exemption provided by Florida Statute section 196.199(4).'12
The second certified question presented to the court was:
IF THE LAND IS SUBJECT TO REAL ESTATE TAXATION,
SHOULD THE VALUE OF THE LEASEHOLD INTEREST BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE APPRAISAL IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT?"
13
110. 613 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1993).
111. Id. at 450.
112. Section 196.199(4), Florida Statutes, provides:
Property owned by any municipality, agency, authority, or other public body
corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold interest or other
possessory interest of a nongovernmental lessee other than that described in
paragraph (2)(a), after April 14, 1976, shall be subject to ad valorem taxation
unless the lessee is an organization which uses the property exclusively for
literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes.
FLA. STAT. § 196.199(4) (1991).
113. Tucker, 613 So. 2d at 450.
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This was also answered in the negative.'
The taxpayer had argued that failing to subtract the value of the lease
from the valuation of the property to arrive at the real property tax
assessment would subject it to unconstitutional double taxation because it
was also being taxed on the leasehold under the intangible tax. The court
rejected this argument. The intangible tax was imposed upon the lessee's
interest and would be collected by the state. The real estate tax was
imposed on the land itself and would be collected by the county. The only
reason that the lessee was obligated to pay the real estate tax was that it had
contractually obligated itself to make that payment.
III. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DECISIONS
A. Caveat Emptor
Haskell Co., v. Lane Co. "5 The roof of a commercial building
collapsed during a severe rainstorm, injuring two shoppers as well damaging
the property of the tenant. The district court felt required by existing law
to hold that the tenant and the successor landlord could not recover from the
original landlord due to the doctrine of caveat emptor. Noting that caveat
emptor has been abrogated in residential real estate transactions, the court
agreed that a similar change might be due, perhaps by adopting section 353
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts," 6 in the law of commercial real
114. Id. at 452.
115. 612 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Restatement (Second) Torts, section 353, provides:
Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Vendor.
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any
condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to
persons on the land, is subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land
with the consent of the vendee or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the
condition after the vendee has taken possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or
the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes
or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will
not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in
Subsection (1) continues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable
opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability
continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the
[Vol. 18
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estate, but that such a change should come from the Florida Supreme Court.
Accordingly, the court certified the following question:
SHOULD THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
CONTINUE TO APPLY TO COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS; AND, IF NOT, WITH WHAT LEGAL PRIN-
CIPLES SHOULD IT BE REPLACED?"'
This author urges the supreme court to consider the question. It is time
to eliminate the double standard. The same principles of good faith, duty
to disclose, and implied warranties should apply equally to commercial
property transactions.
B. Condominiums
BB Landmark, Inc. v. Haber."8 Under section 718.503(1)(a) of the
Florida Statutes (1989), a buyer could avoid a contract to purchase a new
condominium after receiving notice that the developer has amended the
offering in a way that "materially alters or modifies the offering in a manner
which is adverse to the buyer." In this case, the developer unilaterally
increased the cost of extras from $10,384 to $17,122. In response, the
buyers sent proper written notice of their intent to cancel the contract. The
developer, however, tried to avoid cancellation by announcing that it would
honor the original price.
The court was faced with a case of first impression. It found the
meaning of the statute to be clear and unambiguous and, therefore, the plain
meaning of the terms should govern. A cost increase would be adverse to
the buyer's interest, and a 65% increase in the cost of the extras would be
material. Once the developer had so amended the offering, the buyer had
fifteen days to exercise the right to cancel. That right could not be extin-
guished by the developers taking the unilateral action of abandoning the
proposed modifications. Consequently, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed.
condition and to take such precautions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
117. Haskell, 612 So. 2d at 676.
118. 619 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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Carlandia Corp. v. Rogers & Ford Construction Corp. 9 The district
court was faced with a case of first impression in deciding whether a unit
owner could maintain an action against the developer to recover for
construction defects in the common elements or common areas. Under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a), a real party in interest may sue in
his own name. 2° A unit owner does own an undivided share in the
common elements, so it is a real party in interest. Additionally, there is
nothing in the statute, authorizing the condominium association to bring
suits, that would preclude a unit owner from bringing such a suit.
Recognizing that this conclusion may produce "practical difficulties," the
court certified the following question to the supreme court:
MAY AN INDIVIDUAL CONDOMINIUM UNIT OWNER MAIN-
TAIN AN ACTION FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN THE
COMMON ELEMENTS OR COMMON AREAS OF THE CON-
DOMINIUM?...
However, the practical problems created for the court by such litigation
are probably slight compared to the practical problems encountered by a unit
owner trying to bring such a suit. The lack of precedent reveals how
infrequently this situation arises and indicates that the supreme court's time
is probably better spent on other issues.
C. Construction (Mechanic's) Liens
Coppenbarger Homes, Inc. v. Williamson.'22 A subcontractor is sued
to foreclose on a construction lien. The contractor posted a transfer bond
and the landowner was dropped from the suit. The judgment entered was
greater than the amount of the bond and the court allowed the excess to be
an unsecured judgment against the contractor. The district court agreed,
pointing out that the mechanism for increasing the transfer bond'23 was
not intended to limit the amount of the judgment, but to provide a method
by which a lienholder might preserve the adequacy of its security.
119. 605 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), ajfd sub nom. Rogers & Ford
Constr. Corp. v. Carlandia Corp., No. 80,788, 1993 WL 458843 (Fla. Nov. 10, 1993).
120. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210(a) provides that "[elvery action may be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest .... FLA R. Civ. P. 1.210(a).
121. Carlandia, 605 So. 2d at 1016.
122. 611 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
123. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 713.24(3) (1991).
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Davis Water & Waste Industries Inc. v. Embry Development Corp. '24
A supplier claimed a construction lien on abutting land under Florida Statute
section 713.04 regarding subdivision improvements. However, the
developer's land was not actually contiguous with the land on which the
materials were installed. The court concluded that the meaning of the
statute was plain and that the supplier was not entitled to the lien.'25
Meyerowich v. Carrere General Contractors.'6 In order to protect
against the possibility of multiple suits when the materials are supplied by
a partnership, all the partners are indispensable parties to a construction lien
foreclosure. However, the court concluded that a partner whose claim has
become barred by the statute of limitations is not indispensable. The
contractor had raised nonjoinder of the materialman's partner at the close of
the evidence. In response, the partner sought to intervene, but the trial court
denied the motion even though the partner did not seek to introduce any
new evidence.' 27 Then the trial court dismissed for failure to join an
indispensable party.' The district court held that the trial court had erred
in both decisions.
2 9
Taylor v. T.R. Properties, Inc. 3 ' The court held that a lienholder,
who was defending his priority in foreclosure action brought by another
lienholder, must, in its answer, make a demand for attorney's fees unless the
opposing party has waived such demand. This is a logical extension of the
current train of thought regarding claims for attorney's fees.
D. Covenants
Palm Point Property Owners 'Ass 'n v. Pisarski. '3 The Association's
membership was made up of property owners who individually could have
sued to enforce the restrictive covenants. However, the Association was
apparently riot itself a property owner. It was not a direct successor of the
developer or of any its interests. And its existence was not contemplated in
124. 603 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
125. Id. at 1359.
126. 611 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
127. Id. at 41.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 603 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
131. 608 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approvedby 18 Fla. L. Weekly S547
(Fla. Oct. 21, 1993).
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the development scheme.'32 These are the typical bases for finding that
an association has standing to enforce the deed restrictions, so the Associa-
tion's standing was challenged when it attempted to enforce the covenants
against a landowner.
The district court noted that the Florida Supreme Court had adopted
Rule 1.221,"' to give condominium associations the standing to sue, and
Rule 1.222, '3 to give mobile homeowners' associations the standing to
sue. It would make sense to give a property owners' association similar
standing but, absent such a rule, the district court felt obligated to conclude
that it had no standing. 35 However, the district court invited the supreme
court to consider such a rule by certifying as a question of great public
importance:
ABSENT A SPECIFIC RULE OF PROCEDURE, DOES A PROPER-
TY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION THAT IS NOT A DIRECT SUCCES-
SOR TO THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPER AND PROVISION
FOR WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE GRANTOR'S ORIGI-
NAL SUBDIVISION SCHEME HAVE STANDING TO SUE TO
MAINTAIN AN ACTION TO ENFORCE RESTRICTIVE COVE-
NANTS?
13 6
Denying standing to this homeowners' association accomplished little
other than wasting the time and resources of the litigants and the courts. If
asked, this author would have urged the district court to reach a different
conclusion. The supreme court should adopt a rule giving homeowners'
associations standing where that will promote judicial efficiency and lessen
the obstacles to enforcing valid restrictions.
132. Id. at 538.
133. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.221 provides in pertinent part: "After control
of a condominium association is obtained by unit owners other than the developer, the
association may institute, maintain, settle or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf
of all unit owners concerning matters of common interest .... FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.221.
134. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.222 provides that "[a] mobile homeowners'
association may institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf
of all homeowners concerning matters of common interest .... " FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.222.
135. Palm Point Property Owners'Ass'n, 608 So. 2d at 539.
136. Id.
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E. Developer Liability
Robinson v. Palm Coast Construction, Inc. '37 The purchasers of a
new condominium unit discovered that they could not park two regular sized
automobiles in their garage even though the condominium covenants
required that the garage be big enough to do just that. The garage did,
however, conform to the dimensions on the plans. The court was faced with
the issue of "whether ... purchasers of new condominium units from the
developer, can have any cause of action where the units are built in
accordance with the plans and specifications but violate the construction
standards of the condominium's restrictive covenants."' While the
purchaser could not recover on the theory of negligence under the economic
loss rule, the district court concluded that the condominium developer had
an implied duty to build in compliance with the condominium's restrictive
covenants. Failure to do so would be a breach of contract even if the
condominium never tried to enforce the covenants.
F. Eminent Domain
Patel v. Broward County.'39 The reasonable probability of obtaining
rezoning is a factor that may be considered when the value of condemned
land is being determined. But in this case, the government submitted
evidence that severance damages should be reduced because the condemnee
could relocate and reconstruct its lost parking facilities if it received a
variance. The condemnees argued that based upon two first district
cases, 4 ° the evidence should not have been admitted. The court, however,
noted that the distinction between rezoning and the granting of a variance
has become somewhat clouded, to say the least, and that such evidence
would be admissible in at least two other states. 4 ' Consequently, it
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as being of
great public importance:
MAY THE GOVERNMENT SUBMIT EVIDENCE THAT THE
SEVERANCE DAMAGES OF A CONDEMNEE MAY BE CURED
OR LESSENED BY ALTERATIONS TO THE CONDEMNEE'S
137. 611 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
138. Id. at 1353.
139. 613 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
140. Williams v. State Dep't of Transp., 579 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
and State Dep't of Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So. 2d 836 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
141. Patel, 613 So. 2d at 583. The two states are New York and Connecticut.
19931
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PROPERTY WHEN THOSE ALTERATIONS REQUIRE THE
GRANT OF A VARIANCE FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITY HAVING ZONING JURISDICTION OVER THE
PROPERTY?
141
This author suggests that the question is worthy of the supreme court's
attention. It seems illogical to allow the admission of evidence regarding
the effects of possible rezoning but not similar evidence regarding the
effects of a variance that might be obtained. If the latter should be excluded
because it is based upon speculation, then so should the former. Perhaps the
Legislature can create a means for the government to obtain the rezoning or
variance for the landowner. Absent that, it seems wrong to reduce the
landowner's severance damages based on either rezoning or a variance,
which might not materialize.
G. Licenses and Easements
Tatum v. Dance.'43 In a package deal, Dance bought parcel A from
the architect who designed Dance's car dealership. Even though Dance did
not expressly acquire a drainage easement, the dealership was designed to
drain onto parcel B, which was still owned by the architect. Parcel B was
later sold to Tatum who sold it to Dance. Tatum took back a purchase
money mortgage that was the subject of this foreclosure action in which
Dance sought a declaration recognizing his drainage rights. The district
court affirmed the trial court's holding that an irrevocable license had been
created by the construction of the automobile dealership in such a way that
it drained onto parcel B. The court relied upon Albrecht v. Drake Lumber
Co.' for the propositions that: (1) an irrevocable license is created when
a permanent structure is constructed in reliance upon a parol license; and (2)
an irrevocable license can not be revoked by the licensor's successor who
took title with notice of the licensee's use.' 45
What caused a problem, however, was that Albrecht had also included
the statement that an irrevocable license "becomes an easement."' 46
However, a more recent case, Moorings Ass 'n v. Tortoise Island Communi-
142. Id.
143. 605 So. 2d I 10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted sub nom. Dance v.
Tatum, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1993).
144. 65 So. 98 (Fla. 1914).
145. Id. at 100; Tatum 605 So. 2d at 112.
146. Albrecht, 65 So. at 100.
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ties, Inc."' had held that easements could not be created without a signed
writing. 4 Logically, that would lead to the conclusion that an irrevocable
license could not have been created here, as there was no writing. But the
Tatum court decided that Tortoise Island dealt only with implied easements,
not irrevocable licenses. It reasoned that an irrevocable license is the
product of equitable relief. 49 It is not an easement, although in some
circumstances it may be the functional equivalent of an easement. Because
it is the product of equitable relief which is personal, the benefit of the
license would not be transferred to a vendee of the land, as the trial court
had suggested. However, the district court did certify the following
question:
WHETHER, IN LIGHT OF MOORINGS ASSOCIATION, INC. V.
TORTOISE ISLAND COMMUNITIES.. . THE STATEMENT IN
ALBRECHT V. DRAKE LUMBER CO.,... TO THE EFFECT THAT
AN IRREVOCABLE LICENSE BECOMES AN EASEMENT BASED
ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL, MEANS THAT AN IRREVOCABLE
LICENSE CAN NO LONGER EXIST IN FLORIDA.1 50
Judge Sharp wrote a special concurrence.' 5' She concluded that the
license, which was created upon the construction of the dealership, was
extinguished by merger when Dance acquired the servient land, parcel B.
However, easements by necessity could still be created without a writing
after Albrecht. So, when Tatum later acquired title to parcel B at the
foreclosure sale, his title was subject to a newly created easement by
necessity. Moreover, consistent with Albrecht, an easement could have been
created without a writing by the construction of the dealership because
performance would take that transaction out of the Statute of Frauds.'52
Consequently, she suggested that the certified question should have been:
WHETHER MOORINGS ASSOCIATION, INC. V. TORTOISE ISLAND
COMMUNITIES... EXTINGUISHES THE CREATION OF ORALLY
CREATED EASEMENT RIGHTS IN ALL SITUATIONS OTHER
147. 460 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashedsub nom. Tortoise Island
Communities, Inc. v. Moorings Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1986) (approving the dissent
below).
148. Id. at 969.
149. Tatum, 605 So. 2d at 112.
150. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 114 (Sharp, J., concurring specially).
152. Id. at 115.
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THAN THOSE CREATED BY "NECESSITY" OR WHETHER AN
EASEMENT CAN STILL BE CREATED BY EXECUTION, EXPEN-
DITURES IN IMPROVEMENTS, AND RELIANCE ON AN ORAL
LICENSE GIVEN BY THE SERVIENT LANDOWNER AS IN
ALBRECHT V. DRAKE LUMBER CO...
This author agrees with Judge Sharp's analysis. It would allow
successors in ownership to parcel A to benefit from the drainage easement
unless, of course, they should fall victims to estoppel. However, the
supreme court should consider taking the case to eliminate any confusion
about the continued existence of irrevocable licenses under Florida law.
H. Mortgages
Carteret Savings Bank v. Weiner.'54 This involved the question of
what is the effect of closing a home equity account. A line of credit had
been given to a husband and wife. First the husband closed the account, but
later reopened it and drew money. The wife then asked that the account be
closed. When the account was reopened at the husband's insistence, the
wife drew money. On default, the lender sought foreclosure. The defense
was that reopening the account was a new agreement that could not
encumber entireties property without the participation of both spouses.
The district court pointed out that neither party had pleaded or proved
that a novation had occurred when the account was closed and subsequently
reopened. The bank could not be barred from foreclosing as a matter of law
by allowing the account to be repeatedly closed and reopened by one spouse
because it had not been notified that the husband and wife were experienc-
ing marital difficulties.'55 Consequently, attorneys should advise their co-
borrower clients that, when closing a home equity line of credit, they should
make sure that the lender acknowledges in writing that the closing is
permanent and the account cannot be reopened without the agreement of
both co-borrowers.
Citibank Mortgage Corp. v. Carteret Savings Bank.'56 Citibank's
predecessor in interest obtained a judgment against Omni in 1987 and
recorded a certified copy of the judgment in Palm Beach County. In 1988,
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. 601 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
155. Id. at 1312.
156. 612 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted sub noma. Carteret
Sav. Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp., 18 Fla. L. Weekly 67 (Fla. Sept 22, 1993).
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Omni become a joint venturer in developing a parcel of land acquired with
part of the proceeds of a loan from Carteret. Carteret foreclosed and
claimed priority, as a purchase money lender, over Citibank'sjudgment lien.
The trial court agreed, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
Carteret was entitled to priority as a purchase money lender only to the
extent that the loan proceeds had been used to acquire the property.157
That amount included funds used to pay off what the seller still owed on the
land.
Noting that this was a case of first impression in Florida, the court
certified the following question as being of great public importance:
WHERE A THIRD PARTY MORTGAGE LOAN IS USED NOT
ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASING PROPERTY, BUT IN
ADDITION, FOR CONSTRUCTING IMPROVEMENTS ON THE
PROPERTY, IS THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF THE MORTGAGE
ENTITLED TO PRIORITY AS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE
OVER A GENERAL JUDGMENT CREDITOR OF THE MORTGAG-
OR?'
5 8
The district court was correct in its application of the law and,
therefore, the certified question should be answered in the negative.
However, there is no conflict of authority in Florida, so there is no reason
for the supreme court to consider this case.
Commercial Laundries, Inc. v. Tiffany Square Investors Ltd. Partner-
ship."'59 After the mortgagee bought a large residential complex at a
foreclosure, the operator of the coin operated laundry machines on the
premises tendered a rent check. Seven years were left on its ten year
unrecorded lease of the laundry facilities. To eliminate the lease, the
foreclosure buyer brought this reforeclosure action. The district court
correctly held that leasehold interests were subject to reforeclosure actions,
even if the tenant was innocent of any misconduct and even if the buyer had
notice of the lease's existence. Furthermore, the acceptance of rent by the
buyer did not necessarily preclude the buyer from reforeclosing.
157. d. at 602.
158. Id.
159. 605 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 614 So. 2d 504 (Fla.
1993).
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Howell v. Gaines.160  Three mortgages had a provision for the
appointment of a receiver to collect the rents in the event of the mortgagor's
default. Following the foreclosure sales in which the mortgagees had been
the successful bidders, they sought the rents held by the receiver based upon
the deficiency between the mortgagees' bids and the amounts of the
foreclosure judgments. However, the mortgagor also claimed the rents,
because the fair market value of the properties exceeded the amounts of the
foreclosure judgments. The Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the
mortgagor. The mortgagee was entitled to the rents only to the extent that
it would be entitled to a deficiency judgment and the court may deny a
deficiency judgment when the fair market value of the property exceeds the
debts owed.' 6
Truitt v. Metropolitan Mortgage Co.'62 A borrower sued her mort-
gage broker, alleging that the broker had required her to pay for insurance
and appraisals by companies in which the broker had a substantial
ownership interest. The trial court dismissed the complaint based upon the
statute of limitations, but the district court reversed. The complaint was
based upon the mortgagee's alleged breach of the fiduciary duty by failing
to disclose any information adverse to the mortgagor's interest. That would,
if proved, have amounted to the fraudulent concealment of the information
that would have tolled the statute of limitations. Consequently, the trial
court erred in dismissing the complaint.
Wells Fargo Credit Corp. v. Martin. 63  At a foreclosure sale, an
experienced representative of the mortgagee was given written instructions
to make a bid of $115,500. Unfortunately, the instructions were not written
clearly. She misread them and instead bid only $15,500. The winning bid
was $20,000. After the clerk announced that the property was sold, the
representative realized her mistake and tried, unsuccessfully, to have the sale
stopped. The mortgagee then moved to have the judicial sale set aside.
160. 608 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
161. The Third District Court of Appeal failed to mention section § 702.06, Florida
Statutes, which provides in pertinent part: "In all suits for the foreclosure of mortgages
heretofore or hereafter executed the entry of a deficiency decree for any portion of a
deficiency, should one exist, shall be within the sound judicial discretion of the court ... 
FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (1991).
162. 609 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
163. 605 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The sale was confirmed and the Second District affirmed, holding that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the mortgagee relief
under these circumstances. Furthermore, the court refused to certify that
any conflict existed between the districts, because the decisions of the
Third 64 and Fourth'65 Districts were factually distinguishable. In those
cases, the mortgagees did not even make bids; the winning bids were for
nominal amounts; and, most important, the trial courts had exercised their
discretion to grant the mortgagees relief.'66 The court correctly recognized
that the critical point was the limited role of an appellate court in supervis-
ing the exercise of judicial discretion.
I. Recording
First American Title Insurance Co. v. Dixon.'67 This was a case of
first impression. The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided that a court
clerk, who failed to properly index a document that might affect title to
land, was not protected by sovereign immunity against a negligence claim.
The court reasoned that the clerk had a statutory duty to index every such
document, and the clerk was required by statute to post a bond to cover all
of his or her duties. Consequently, the Legislature must have intended the
purpose of the indexing duty was to protect the limited class of persons who
would rely upon the public records. Therefore, those harmed by the clerk's
negligence could seek redress.' 68
J. Restraints on Alienation
Camino Gardens Ass 'n v. McKim. 169 The declaration of restrictions in
a development provided that: (1) property in the subdivision could not be
purchased or leased by anyone who was not a member in good standing of
the homeowners' association; (2) that the association could, in the event of
mortgage foreclosure, redeem the property from the mortgagee or purchase
at the foreclosure sale for the amount due on the mortgage; and (3) that a
164. Van Delinder v. Albion Realty & Mortgage, Inc., 287 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973).
165. Fernandez v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 489 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
166. Martin, 605 So. 2d at 534.
167. 603 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied sub noma. Dixon v.
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1993).
168. Id. at 566.
169. 612 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 620 So. 2d 760 (Fla.
.1993).
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mortgagee would have to give notice to the association before accepting a
deed in lieu of foreclosure. Therefore, when the mortgagee took a deed in
lieu of foreclosure, and then sold the property to buyers who had yet been
admitted to membership, the association sued. Both the trial court and the
district court had little difficulty recognizing that the first two provisions
were invalid restraints on alienation.
Restraints on alienation are invalid if they are absolute or unreasonable.
The first clause prohibited subsequent transfers without the prior approval
of the association. That amounted to an absolute restraint on alienation.
The second was essentially an option to purchase at the amount of the
defaulted debt, which could be far below the fair market value. Because
that would affect the willingness of lenders to make mortgage loans, it
would affect the ability to develop and to sell the property. Consequently,
it was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The trial court had also held the third provision invalid. The district
court affirmed, although the reason for the affirmance is less clear. The
court stated that "because the trial court declared the provision regarding
purchase rights to be void, the court properly concluded that the declaration
could not require the mortgagee to give any notice to the Association and
its members before accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure."' 0 This seems
only to indicate that the notice provision is inextricably connected to the
other two provisions in this case. That is not a blanket statement that such
a provision would necessarily be void. It is too bad that the court did not
elaborate.
K. Zoning
Jensen Beach Land Co. v. Citizens for Responsible Growth.'' This
case involved a challenge to a zoning order's consistency with the compre-
hensive plan. The district court held that such a challenge must be made to
the entity that entered the order before it could be brought to a court. 72
This implicitly recognized that the agency has primary jurisdiction in such
matters. Moreover, the challenger must exhaust its administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts. The exception would be if the challenger was
merely seeking a temporary restraining order to avoid immediate and
irreparable harm.
170. Id. at 642.
171. 608 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3215 (1991).
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Caliente Partnership v. Johnston.7 3  A developer proposed an
amendment: to the county's comprehensive plan in order to accommodate its
proposed development. The amendment was submitted to the Department
of Community Affairs. It had forty-five days to determine whether to issue
a notice of intent to contest the amendment,'74 but the notice arrived two
days late.' 5 The district court decided that the Department's having
missed the deadline would not result in the amendment being approved by
default. The developer must resort to other remedies. This conclusion
eliminates the possibility of the plan being amended by administrative inac-
tion, which could undermine the concept of comprehensive planning.
Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, //.17 6 A developer had requested
rezoning of land it owned from agricultural to commercial use. The court
concluded that the site-specific, owner-initiated rezoning requests were
quasi-judicial proceedings that could be reviewed by the court. Moreover,
the fact that the rezoning request was consistent with the comprehensive
plan did not necessarily mean that the rezoning request must be granted.
IV. STATUTES
A. Leases
The Legislature appears to have provided tenants with a new remedy
if the premises have become uninhabitable. The tenant may withhold the
rent.'7 7 However, there are an overwhelming number of conditions to be
met before the tenant is entitled to this remedy. The leased premises must
have become "wholly untenantable."' 78 The lease must "affirmatively and
expressly" place the obligation for maintenance and repairs on the land-
lord. "'79 The landlord must have failed to make the needed repairs after
being given at least twenty days written notice of the problem. 8° And the
notice must include the threat to withhold rent.' 8 ' Moreover, if the repairs
173. 604 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
174. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(8)(b) (1991).
175. Johnston, 604 So. 2d at 887.
176. 619 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
177. Ch. 93-70 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 424 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.201).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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ever do get made, the tenant must pay the landlord the entire rent with-
held.' 82 This author predicts that this remedy will be, for all practical
purposes, illusory.
The Legislature also created a procedure for paying the claimed rent
into the registry of the court in any action for eviction.'83 Also, the
landlord's acceptance of the full amount of rent that is past due will
constitute waiver of any claim for eviction based on nonpayment of rent if
the landlord knew of the breach when accepting the payment.'84
Part II of chapter 83 is the Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act. ' 5 Section 83.49(3) governs the rights and responsibilities regarding
the return of security deposits. It has been amended to provide that
enforcement personnel "shall look solely to this subsection to determine
compliance."' 86 This should cut off complaints to the Florida Real Estate
Commission that brokers or salespeople have violated other statutes or rules
by complying with this one.
Section 83.49(3) was also amended to require that landlords give at
least twelve hours notice of the intent to enter and to make repairs and that
such repairs are to be made between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. 8 7 More-
over, tenants with waterbeds will now be required to carry insurance against
personal injury and property damage to the dwelling unit with a loss payable
clause to the building owner.' Perhaps most interesting, the act allows
a landlord, who has given notice of his intent to terminate a tenant's lease,
to petition the county or circuit court for an injunction prohibiting the tenant
from intentional damage or destruction of the property.'89
Part III of chapter 83 is the Self-storage Facility Act, 9 ° which
concerns the lease of space for the storage of personal property. The
Legislature expanded this act to include the lease of a "self-contained
storage unit," which is defined as:
182. Ch. 93-70 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 424 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.201).
183. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 425 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.232).
184. Id. § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 424-25 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.202).
185. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40-83.67 (1991).
186. Ch. 93-255 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2494 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.49(3) (1991)).
187. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2494 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.53(2) (1991)).
188. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2495 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.535 (1991)).
189. Id § 8, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2496 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 83.681). This
required amending section 34.011, Florida Statutes, to give the county court this limited
equity jurisdiction. Id. § 9, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2497 (amending FLA. STAT. § 34.011 (1991)).
190. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.801-83.809 (1991).
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not less than 600 cubic feet in size, including, but not limited to,
a trailer, box, or other shipping container, which is leased by a
tenant primarily for use as storage space whether the unit is
located at a facility owned or operated by the owner or at another
location designated by the tenant.'
The rights and remedies of a lessor and tenant of a self-contained storage
unit are removed from the coverage of Article 2A of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 9 2 which otherwise governs leases of personal property.
B. Mortgages
The statutory procedure for mortgage foreclosure has been modified as
of October 1, 1993.193 The mortgagor's right of redemption has been
clarified by the addition of a new section. It provides that the mortgagor
may redeem the property until the filing of the certificate of sale by the
court clerk or the time specified in the foreclosure decree, whichever is
later. "'94 This should eliminate any suggestion that Florida has any form
of "statutory redemption." That term is commonly used to indicate a right
to redeem during a statutory period that does not begin until the foreclosure
sale is complete.'95
It is, however, unfortunate that the phrase "cure the indebtedness" was
used.' 96 That may cause confusion over whether the Legislature intended
to allow a mortgagor in default to de-accelerate the mortgage debt by curing
the default, i.e., catching up on the missed payments. It is highly unlikely
that the Legislature intended de-acceleration. This would be a significant
change in redemption rights. If intended, this should be accomplished in
unambiguous terms.
Statutes have been amended to add new technical details such as
requiring that the creditor's current address be in a judgment or a recorded
191. Ch. 93-238 § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2409 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.803 (Supp.
1992)).
192. FLA. STAT. ch. 680 (1991) ("Uniform Commercial Code-Leases").
193. Ch. 93-250, 1993 Fla. Laws 2466.
194. Ch. 93-250 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2467-68 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
45.0315).
195. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 307 (2d ed. 1970); see also GRANT S.
NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.4 (2d ed. 1985).
196. Ch. 93-250 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2468 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 45.0315).
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affidavit in order to obtain a judgment lien,'97 and providing details of the
method of obtaining in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over a person
outside the state of Florida.'9" It also appears that a number of amend-
ments are intended to speed up foreclosures. For example, foreclosure sales
are now to be held no later than thirty-five days after the judgment of
foreclosure;' 99 the defendant is to file its written defenses within thirty
days of the first publication of the notice of the foreclosure; °. and notices
of the foreclosure need be published for only two consecutive weeks, rather
than four.2 ' Most important, a mortgagee may now request an order to
show cause why a final judgment of foreclosure should not be entered once
the verified complaint has been filed.202
Two acts deal with modification of the assignment of rents statute.20 3
Only a few different phrases distinguish the two acts. They provide that an
assignment of rents is valid and that it is perfected against third parties when
recorded. The assignee has the right to the rents if the mortgagor defaults
and the mortgagee makes a written demand for the rents. In a foreclosure
action, the court may require the rents deposited into the court registry and
used to pay the mortgage or to operate and to preserve the property. This
should clarify and simplify the law regarding assignment of rents in Florida.
C. Time Shares
A number of amendments were made to chapter 721, the Florida
Vacation Plan and Time-Sharing Act.2 1 "Incidental benefits" have been
defined20" and subjected to statutory regulation.20 6 Most important, the
197. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2471 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 55.10(1)-55.10(3)
(1991)).
198. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2468 (amending FLA. STAT. § 48.194 (1991)).
199. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2467 (amending FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (1991)).
200. Id. § 7, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2470 (amending FLA. STAT. § 49.09 (1991)).
201. Ch. 93-250 § 8, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2470-71 (amending FLA. STAT. § 49.10 (1991)).
202. Id. § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2473 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 702.10).
203. Ch. 93-88, 1993 Fla. Laws at 468-69 (amending FLA, STAT. § 697.07 (1991)); Ch.
93-250 § 13, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2472-73 (amending FLA. STAT. § 697.07 (1991)).
204. FLA. STAT. § 721.01 (1991).
205. The Florida Statutes provide the following definition:
"Incidental benefit" means an accommodation, product, service, discount, or
other benefit which is offered to a prospective purchaser of a time-share plan or
to a purchaser of a time-share plan prior to the exchange of his initial 10-day
voidability period pursuant to s. 721.10; which is not an exchange program as
defined in subsection (15); and which complies with the provisions of s.
721.075. The term shall not include an offer of the use of accommodations and
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act has been expanded by the addition of a Part II, called the "Florida
Vacation Club Act,"2 7 to this chapter to deal with the unique problems of
multi-site plans. It attempts to protect time-share buyers from: (a) the
developer's creditors; (b) misrepresentations of the developer; and (c)
mismanagement (or malfeasance) of the developer. Multi-site time shares
will be governed by both Parts I and II, with the latter controlling in the
event of a conflict."' It appears to be a worthwhile expansion but only
time will tell if this approach is workable.
D. Uniform Land Sales Practices Law
The Florida Uniform Land Sales Practices Law2 9 was designed:
to provide safeguards regulating the disposition of any interest in
subdivided lands, including financial operations entered into by
companies and persons regulated by the Florida Uniform Land Sales
Practices Law, to prevent fraudulent and misleading methods and
unsound financing techniques which could detrimentally affect not only
remote land purchasers, but also the land sales industry, the public, and
the state's economic wellbeiig.2"0
The law covers "subdivisions" and "subdivided lands," which it defines
as having fifty or more "lots, parcels or units which are offered as part of
a common promotional plan," '211 but it also provides that certain acts are
unlawful even in the offering for sale of twenty-five or more lots, units or
interests. The Legislature has added two more types of prohibited conduct
to the list: making or using false, fictitious or fraudulent statements,
representations or documents; or falsifying, concealing or covering up by
trick, scheme or device any material fact.212 The Legislature also added
requirements for obtaining exemptions2"3 and requirements for purchase
contracts.21" 4 The purchaser will now be given a seven day period in
facilities of the time-share plan on a free or discounted one-time basis.
Ch. 93-58 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 349 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.05 (1991)).
206. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 353 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.075).
207. Id. § 12, 1993 Fla. Laws at 360 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.50).
208. Id.
209. FLA. STAT. ch. 498 (1991).
210. Id. § 498.113(3).
211. Id. § 498.005(19).
212. Ch. 93-190 § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 1710 (amending FLA. STAT. § 498.022 (1991)).
213. Id. § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1710-11 (amending FLA. STAT. § 498.025 (1991)).
214. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 1716 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 498.028).
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which to chancel a purchase contract and, in the event of cancellation, all
funds must be refunded to the purchaser within twenty days.215 This is a
right which buyers may actually decide to exercise after reading the contract
carefully because the agreement, if title is not to be conveyed to the buyer
within 180 days, must contain the following ominous warning:
YOU MAY NOT RECEIVE YOUR LAND UNDER THIS CON-
TRACT IF THE SUBDIVIDER FILES FOR BANKRUPTCY PRO-
TECTION OR OTHERWISE IS UNABLE TO PERFORM UNDER
THE TERMS OF THIS CONTRACT PRIOR TO YOUR RECEIVING
A DEED EVEN IF YOU HAVE MADE ALL THE PAYMENTS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CONTRACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF THIS DOCUMENT,
CONSULT AN ATTORNEY.216
Let us hope that prospective buyers take this warning seriously.
V. CONCLUSION
This has been an interesting, if not earth-shattering, year in property
law. The courts and the Legislature have been active. It appears that good
common sense and consumer protection are the prevailing themes.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Workers compensation law is a statutory replacement for tort remedies
between employer and employee.' In exchange for the protection of an
exclusive remedy,2 employers agree to provide benefits to workers injured
during the course and scope of their employment . State statute determines
whether an employer's liability must be covered by insurance, who is
covered under the definition of employee, the benefits to be awarded, the
mechanism for administrative review, and other elements necessary to the
implementation of the workers compensation system.4 When an employer's
liability under workers compensation law may or must be covered by insur-
ance,5 the insurance contract must be filed with and approved by the State.6
At present, forty-two states and the District of Columbia utilize a standard
Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance Policy ("WC-
ELIP").'
I. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1.00-1.20 (1993).
2. See Cartier v. Florida Power & Light Co., 594 So. 2d 755, 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), reviewdenied, 602 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1992). In Cartier, the court held that a provision
of workers compensation insurance, in this case self-insurance on behalf of an independent
contractor, provided the employer with the exclusive remedy of workers compensation law
and precluded a tort action against the employer by the injured employee. See id
3. See id
4. In Florida, workers compensation law is governed by chapter 440 of the Florida
Statutes.
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1991).
6. Id. § 627.410. In most states, filing of workers compensation policy forms and
endorsements is made by a rating or advisory organization on behalf of its members and
subscribers. The National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") acts as such an
organization in thirty-one states and the District of Columbia. Thirteen states have
independent rating bureaus which make filings on behalf of their members and subscribers,
and six states plus Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands provide workers
compensation insurance through monopolistic funds.
7. In its capacity as a licensed rating or advisory organization, NCCI filed a revised
WCELIP to become effective April 1, 1992. Florida, and 29 other states in which NCCI files
policy forms on behalf of its members and subscribers, approved the revised WCELIP. As
of this writing, only one state in which NCCI is the rating or advisory organization has not
approved the 1992 policy revision.
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Florida law provides that jurisdiction for appeals of decisions of the
Judges of Compensation Claims is vested in the First District Court of
Appeal.! This paper will examine the workers compensation decisions of
the First District Court of Appeal issued between January 1992 and October
1993 within the framework of the WCELIP.
The standard WCELIP contains a General Section followed by six
parts:9 Part One (Workers Compensation Insurance) provides statutory
Workers Compensation Coverage; Part Two (Employers Liability Insurance)
provides coverage to employers which is not governed by statute; Part Three
(Other States Insurance) provides the ability to elect coverage in states in
which the employer may have temporary and incidental exposure; Part Four
(Your Duties If Injury Occurs) outlines the insured's duties in the event of
injury; Part Five (Premium) contains the premium provisions; and Part Six
(Conditions) contains the policy conditions not shown elsewhere in the
policy.'0 Also included as part of the policy are the Information Page and
endorsements selected by the insured to exclude or provide specialized
coverages. "
II. GENERAL SECTION
A. The Policy (General Section A)
This policy includes at its effective date the Information Page and all
endorsements and schedules listed there. It is a contract of insurance
between you (the employer named in Item 1 of the Information Page)
and us (the insurer named on the Information Page). The only agree-
ments relating to this insurance are stated in this policy. The terms of
this policy may not be changed or waived except by endorsement issued
by us to be part of this policy. 2
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.271 (1991).
9. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, THE GUIDE TO THE
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY POLICY (1992) [hereinafter GUIDE];
see also FLA. STAT. § 627.413 (1991).
10. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 5-23.
11. Id. at 24. The WCELIP is a contract for the provision of insurance. The
endorsements attached to the policy serve as addenda which modify the basic insuring
contract.
12. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, WORKERS COMPENSATION
AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY-WC 00 00 00 (effective April 1, 1984)
[hereinafter POLICY]. The revised WCELIP-WC 00 00 00 A became effective April 1, 1992
and is not the insuring contract for the cases interpreted by the First District Court of Appeal
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The Information Page of a WCELIP contains the data that determines
who is insured, 3 for what liability, in what states, and for what premium.
General Section A serves to incorporate the data on the Information Page
into the WCELIP. Material misrepresentation of data regarding workers
compensation applications, claims, and premium calculation is grounds in
some jurisdictions for recision of the policy' and/or for civil or criminal
liability. 5 Almost every jurisdiction allows for recalculation of the
premium to meet the actual employer data that should have been report-
ed.' 6  While litigation frequently occurs over the calculation of the
premium and the conditions of coverage, this paper deals with issues
between the employer/carrier and the employee, and generally refrains from
discussing issues between the employer and the carrier under state insurance
laws.
during the time period covered by this paper.
13. The WCELIP names the insured as the business entity insuring its employees.
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 2. Individual officers of the company are not covered when acting
in their personal capacity. Id. In Florida, however, a civil suit may be filed against
corporate officers upon a showing of gross negligence. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(1) (1991). If
found guilty of gross negligence, the WCELIP does not provide coverage or a defense for
these officers. In Langton v. De Cenzo, 592 So. 2d 318,,319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991),
the court determined that the claimant's estate had not established that the corporate officers
were guilty of gross negligence, and thus limited the claimant's estate to a workers
compensation remedy.
14. Recision is an extreme penalty that renders the policy voidable. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 59A-18-11 (Michie 1993),
15. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11760, 11880 (Deering 1993) (civil penalty of not less
than $2,000 and not more than $5,000, plus an assessment of not more than three times the
amount of the medical treatment expenses paid for the willful misrepresentation of facts in
order to obtain compensation insurance, and for knowingly making false or fraudulent oral
or written statements in support of a claim for compensation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290c
(1992) (establishes penalties for the fraudulent claim or receipt of benefits); FLA. STAT. §
440.37 (Supp. 1992) (provides penalties for fraudulent activities and misrepresentation); 1993
LA. ACTS 828 (stipulates that the willful misrepresentation by an employer to an employee
regarding compensation insurance shall be punishable by imprisonment of no less than one
year and not more than 10, or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both); MD. CODE ANN.
§ 10-141 (1993) (stipulates that a person, who knowingly received benefits not entitled to
them, repay the full amount plus interest at a rate of 1.5 percent per month from the date the
commission notifies the individual); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.758 (1991) (provides civil
penalties for misrepresentation, and failure or refusal to keep employment data).
16. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-45-114 (Supp. 1993), which allows recalculation
of premium for misrepresentation. Most other jurisdictions allow recalculation of the
premium in even years after the policy effective period. This is accomplished by means of
a policy provision which permits the final premium to be determined by an audit after the
expiration of the WCELIP. See discussion infra at note 463 and accompanying text.
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The Information Page identifies the employer during a policy term, and
thus determines which employer is responsible for payment of claims found
to be compensable under the policy. In Devilling v. Rimes, Inc.,' 7 the
plaintiff appealed a decision of the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC"),
which held that injuries suffered by the claimant, though compensable, had
occurred while the plaintiff was in the employ of a business other than
Rimes, Inc.'8 The JCC held that Rimes, Inc. and its insurance carrier were
not liable for treatment of the original job-related injury." The claimant's
injury did not occur within the course and scope of employment with Rimes,
Inc. and the court determined that the request for benefits from Rimes, Inc.
was a means by which the claimant could avoid the two-year statute of
limitations for making a claim under the workers compensation statute of
Florida.2° The court examined the medical care provided to the claimant
and held that not all medically recommended care is the type of treatment
that would extend the statute of limitations.2'
The Information Page also determines the policy period for which the
insurer is responsible. In Marriott Hotel v. Restrepo,22 the court examined
carrier responsibility for a compensable injury and determined that further
findings of fact were necessary to determine whether the claimant had
reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI") following the third
incident in a series of three separate industrial accidents.23 Only after the
determination of MMI was made for the third accident, would the JCC be
able to decide the benefits to be paid by the carrier of record as of the date
of each accident.24
By defining the insured, the insurer and the policy period to be
covered, the Information Page serves to clarify the party responsible for the
payments to injured workers. In Entenmann's Bakery v. Nunez,2 5 the court
examined which WCELIP was required to respond to an injured claimant.
The appellants in Nunez were the insurance carriers who provided coverage
for Entenmann's Bakery during different policy periods. 26 The court's
17. 591 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
18. Id. at 305.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 603 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
23. Maximum medical improvement is the threshold that must be reached to determine
the degree of compensation due an employee. Id.
24. Id.
25. 592 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
26. See id.
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determination was based upon consideration of the policy period in relation
to the type and timing of compensable injuries sustained by the claimant.27
Nunez demonstrates the underlying concern for the needs of the injured
worker by providing benefits to the injured worker while placing the burden
on carriers to demonstrate who is responsible for payments under the
workers compensation law.2"
Florida's workers compensation law permits the apportionment of
responsibility for payment of claims for multiple accidents among carriers
who insured the employer for different policy periods.29 The allocation of
responsibility between carriers is based upon the extent to which each
accident contributed to the claimant's need for medical care and disability
benefits." In the event subsequent injuries are determined to be the direct
and natural result of the original industrial injury, the carrier of record at the
time of the original injury will be held responsible for the payment of
benefits to the claimant.3
Apportionment may also be based upon the existence of a preexisting,
nondisabling, and asymptomatic condition. In Tejada v. Collection
Chevrolet, Inc.,32 the court noted that "when a preexisting condition is not
producing any disability at the time of the compensable accident, only that
portion of the claimant's current disability that is attributable to the normal
progress of the preexisting disease and thus would have occurred without
the aggravating accident may be apportioned."33 The court observed that
there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that the claimant
would have suffered a disability based on the preexisting condition,
independent of the compensable heart attack which formed the basis of
claimant's request for benefits.34  The court, therefore, concluded that
apportionment was not appropriate in this case and that compensability for
the entire claim was to be borne by the carrier of record at the time of the
heart attack."
27. Id. at 1161.
28. Florida workers compensation law allows for the application of apportionment
principles as prescribed by statute.
29. FLA. STAT. § 440.42(3) (1991).
30. CNA Ins. Co. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 596 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
31. Id.
32. 594 So. 2d 340 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
33. Id. at 341 (citing Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967)).
34. Id.
35. See id.; see also Wood & Wood v. Dort, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2090 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993); Custom Architectural Metals v. Bradshaw, 623 So. 2d 804 (Fla.
Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993); Hyster Co. v. David, 612 So. 2d 678 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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B. Who Is Insured (General Section B)
You are insured if you are an employer named in Item I of the
Information Page. If that employer is a partnership, and if you are one
of its partners, you are insured, but only in your capacity as an
employer of the partnership's employees.36
The employer named on the Information Page is the insured entitled to
payment to its employees of benefits under the workers compensation law
of Florida should an injury by accident or by disease occur within the course
and scope of employment. 37 The insured is identified by its entity status,
and payment of claims is premised on employment by the entity named in
Item I of the Information Page.38 Multiple business entities may be
insured under the same policy provided they are under common majority
ownership.39
Florida amendments to the workers compensation law have established
a class of employer known as "statutory employer."4 ° Statutory employer
status was denied to a condominium association that entered into a contract
with a professional company to perform certain management and mainte-
nance duties.4 The court noted:
The concept of statutory employer, for worker's [sic] compensation
purposes, is that a contractor who sublets all or any part of its contract
work is the employer not only of its own employees but also of the
employees of any subcontractor to whom all or any part of the principal
contract has been sublet. It is absolutely basic, therefore, that one
cannot be a "contractor" (and thus a statutory employer) within the
meaning of this statute unless the "contractor" has a contractual
obligation, a portion of which is sublet to another.42
Since the condominium association could not demonstrate a contractual
obligation that was sublet to another, statutory employer status was denied
to the condominium association.43
36. POLICY, supra note 12.
37. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1991).
38. See GUIDE, supra note 9, at 24.
39. Id. at 3.
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(i)(b) (1991).
41. Woods v. Carpet Restorations, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
42. Id. at 1304 (citing Jones v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954)).
43. Id. at 1304-05. See also Marco Polo Hotel v. Popielarczyk, 622 So. 2d 104 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Hatch, 617 So. 2d 380 (Fla. ist
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Florida workers compensation law allows corporate officers to exempt
themselves out of the workers compensation law.44 Corporate officers who
elect this exemption are not entitled to benefits should they suffer an
occupational injury or disease. In Weber v. Dobbins,45 the Supreme Court
of Florida affirmed that a corporate officer who makes such an election does
not forfeit the right to exclusive remedy protection.46 The court decision
came in response to a question certified by the First District Court of
Appeal.47 The question affirmed was:
DO THE IMMUNITIES PROVIDED BY SECTION 440.11, FLORIDA
STATUTES (1983), EXTEND TO A CORPORATE OFFICER WHO
ELECTS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 440.05, TO EXEMPT HIMSELF
FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER
440?48
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the intent of the WCELIP to provide
insurance for the employees of the named insured, even when that named
insured is not entitled to workers compensation benefits. 9
1. Exclusive Remedy
Employer status and compliance with the workers compensation law of
a state provides the employer with immunity from civil suit." An
employer may be subject to civil liability if an act of gross negligence led
to the injury.5" The 1988 amendments to the Florida Workers Compensa-
tion Act expanded the concept of statutory employee while raising the level
of intent from gross negligence to culpable negligence.52 The constitution-
ality of the level of intent required to impose immunity is discussed later in
this article.5: The expansion of the statutory employer definition is
examined first.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.05 (1991).
45. 616 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1993).
46. Id. at 957.
47. Dobbins v. Weber, 585 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
48. Weber, 616 So. 2d at 957.
49. Id.
50. See LARSON, supra note I, § 65.11.
51. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(I) (1991).
52. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1988).
53. See discussion infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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In Madaffer v. Managed Logistics Systems, Inc., the court deter-
mined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defen-
dant/appellee, Managed Logistics Systems, Inc. ("MLS"), committed an
intentional tort, thereby removing the applicability of the exclusive remedy
of workers compensation." The court also noted that due to the 1988 law
change, 6 which might offer exclusive remedy protection to managers and
policy makers of MLS, the issue of whether the individual appellees held
those types of positions would need to be addressed on remand. 7 The
determination of the court demonstrates the tension between the statutes
governing workers compensation and the policy contract providing insurance
coverage for liability under such statutes. The policy intent is to cover the
named insured within the scope of its entity status as delineated on the
Information Page' The 1988 Florida law change provides:
The same immunity provisions enjoyed by an employer shall also apply
to any sole proprietor, partner, corporate officer or director, supervisor,
or other person who in the course and scope of his duties acts in a
managerial or policy-making capacity and the conduct which caused the
alleged injury arose within the course and scope of said managerial or
policy-making duties and was not a violation of a law, whether or not
a violation was charged, for which the maximum penalty which may be
imposed exceeds 60 days imprisonment as set forth in s. 775.082.58
Thus, it is possible that the intent of the policy will be overridden by state
law if that section of the statute, which expands the immunity from suit for
individuals who are identified by the statute, passes constitutional muster
without the culpable negligence provisions. Such an expansion of immunity
would limit the recovery of injured workers to the remedy available under
workers compensation law even when the injury is the result of the actions
of individuals who are not named insureds under the policy.
54. 601 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d Dist, Ct. App. 1992).
55. Id. at 1329.
56. The constitutionality of the 1988 law change was challenged in Shova v. Eller, 606
So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), on the basis that it raised the degree of negligence
required to maintain a civil tort action against a co-employee in a supervisory/managerial
position from gross negligence to culpable negligence. The law change was deemed
unconstitutional because it limited an injured employee's access to the courts. An appeal to
the Supreme Court of Florida is expected.
57. Madaffer, 601 So. 2d at 1329.
58. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1988).
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Statutory immunity can be extended to subcontractors when the
contractor sublets part or all of his contract work to a subcontractor or
subcontractors. 9 Under such a circumstance,
all of the employees of such contractor and subcontractor or subcon-
tractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed
in one and the same business or establishment; and the contractor shall
be liable for, and shall secure, the payment of compensation to all such
employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured
such payment.6"
In Walker i. United Steel Works, Inc.,6 the court applied this provision to
preclude a civil remedy to Walker against the subcontractor by whom he
was employed at the time of injury. Walker's claim was found to lie within
the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers compensation law.62
Similarly, the employee of a subcontractor was found to be limited to
the exclusive remedy of workers compensation where the workers compen-
sation coverage of the subcontractor immunized the contractor.63 Absent
a showing that the contractor's conduct was so outrageous as to be
considered an intentional tort, the claimant was limited to a workers
compensation remedy.64
Where a worker was injured while installing a door in a motel which
remained open to the public during renovations, the court determined that
the motel owner was not a "contractor" or "employer" and that the injured
worker was not an employee.65 The motel owner was not statutorily
required to provide workers compensation insurance and, therefore, was not
entitled to the exclusive remedy of workers compensation.66 The court
determined that the motel owner owed an independent duty of care to
persons legitimately on the premises to maintain the premises in a reason-
ably safe condition.67
The exclusive remedy was found to provide immunity where an
employee was killed, during an armed robbery, while employed as a security
59. FLA. STAT. § 440.10(6) (1991).
60. Id.
61. 606 So. 2d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
62. Id.
63. Mathews Corp. v. Peters, 610 So. 2d I1I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Hogan v. Deerfield 21 Corp., 605 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 983.
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guard.68 The court reviewed allegations of intentional tort on the part of
the employer and determined that the employee must show a deliberate
intent to injure or to engage in conduct that is substantially certain to result
in injury or death before the exclusive remedy shield can be broken.69
When, as here, the exclusive remedy of workers compensation is upheld and
narrowly construed, the intent of workers compensation law is accurately
and fairly interpreted to the benefit of all parties. When the exclusive
remedy doctrine is eroded, the workers compensation system fails and
employers are exposed to liability, which was not intended by the no-fault
workers compensation system. The decisions of Florida courts have served
to support the exclusive remedy doctrine while acknowledging the erosion
granted by the Legislature.7"
While the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida have generally
supported the exclusive remedy doctrine, the court found that the exclusive
remedy did not apply in Commercial Coatings of Northwest Florida, Inc. v.
Pensacola Concrete Construction Co.71 However, the court limited its
findings to the unique facts of the case.72 The injured worker had been
awarded workers compensation benefits and then filed a suit in tort against
the company which had loaned his employer a dangerous instrumentality.73
The employee was awarded damages against the third party tortfeasor which
then sought indemnification from the employer.74 The court noted that the
question before it was whether the contractor whose employees used the
instrumentality negligently should pay the judgment, or whether the non-
negligent owner of the instrumentality should pay. 75 The court held the
negligent employer liable for indemnification due to principles of equity and
common law, but noted that under workers compensation principles the
68. Folk v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 611 So. 2d 35, 36-37 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
69. Id. at 37 (citing Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882, 883 (Fla.
1986)). Relying on its decision in Folk, the court affirmed an intentional tort exception to
the exclusive remedy doctrine in Power Plant Maintenance Co. v. Gardner, 617 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) and Florida Power & Light Co. v. Gardner, 617 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
70. See discussion supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
71. 616 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1993).
72. Id. at 963.
73. Id. at 960.
74. Id. at 961; see Pensacola Concrete Constr. Co. v. Commercial Coatings ofN.W. Fla.,
Inc., 595 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 616 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
1993).
75. Commercial Coatings, 616 So. 2d at 963.
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employer should not have been subject to both judgments.76 The unusual
facts in this case and the language of the decision should limit the
applicability of this decision and should not represent a threat to the
exclusive remedy doctrine in Florida.
There are times when a claimant will seek to avoid the exclusive
remedy in order to proceed with a suit against the corporate officers. In
Tomlinson v. Miller,77 claimant sought to establish gross negligence on the
part of the corporate employers. The claimant worked in a convenience
store in a remote area and was abducted and raped. The court determined
that the claimant failed to allege facts which would establish a clear and
present risk of injury, and affirmed the summary judgment entered by the
trial court." In a special concurrence, Judge Cobb noted that precedent
and applicable law at the time of the occurrence led to the summary
judgment fir the defense.79 Accordingly, the claimant could recover under
workers compensation law for the bodily injury by accident, but did not
have a remedy in tort. Recent law changes, however, now place a greater
burden on the employer, and future decisions might therefore be differ-
ent.8" Similarly, a claimant's estate was denied a tort remedy where the
claimant was kidnapped by a former employee and forced to open the
company safe before being stabbed to death.8 The court found that the
injury was the direct result of the employment and was compensable under
workers compensation law.82
Corporate officers, however, do not always escape personal liability
when an injury arises in the course and scope of employment. In Foreman
v. Russo,83 a jury found three of the corporate defendants grossly negligent
and not entitled to the exclusive remedy of workers compensation. Russo
was severely injured when a vehicle ran into his stopped garbage truck. His
complaint of gross negligence included the removal of lights from the truck,
addition of a winch to the truck which necessitated the removal of the lights,
76. Id.
77. 617 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). A claimant may also seek to bring
suit against a co-employee when the co-employee has committed an act of gross-negligence.
Absent such an act, the co-employee has the immunity of the employer. See, e.g., Jones v.
Robinson, 618 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (gross negligence was not
demonstrated and ordinary negligence is insufficient to allow a suit against a co-employee).
78. Tomlinson, 617 So. 2d at 811.
79. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring specially).
80. Id.
81. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Parks, 620 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
82. Id. at 800.
83. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1962 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1993).
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a uniform provided by the company which was the same color as the truck,
failure to provide cones, flares or warning devices to be placed around the
garbage truck and requiring Russo to make known illegal pickups. The
court on appeal affirmed the decision below. 4
Workers compensation while designed as a no-fault system, was not
meant to provide a shelter for employers who show wanton disregard for the
welfare and safety of their employees. The system works when employers
and employees are aware of their responsibilities to each other and each acts
with the intent of providing a safe workplace.
C. Workers Compensation Law (General Section C)
Workers Compensation Law means the workers or workmen's compen-
sation law of each state or territory named in Item 3.A. of the Informa-
tion Page. It includes any amendments to that law which are in effect
during the policy period. It does not include the provisions of law that
provides nonoccupational disability benefits.85
This section of the policy is intended to provide a definition of workers
compensation that limits the coverage of the policy to the workers
compensation laws of the states and that excludes coverage under federal
acts and under acts that provide non-occupational disability benefits.86 The
exclusion of coverage for non-occupational disability benefits is based on
the laws of several states87 which require that employers provide short term
disability benefits to employees who are injured in non-job related accidents
or by non-job related diseases.88
84. Id. at D1963.
85. POLICY, supra note 12.
86. Federal coverages are available by endorsement for the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Act, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, the Defense Base Act, the Federal
Employers Liability Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Act and the Nonappropriated Funds
Instrumentalities Act. Maritime coverage is available, although this is generally limited to
the deductible limits of the P&I Policy. The P&I Policy is the accepted insurance mechanism
for providing maritime coverage.
87. The states are Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. See LARSON,
supra note I, § 65.11.
88. See id § 96.40.
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D. State (General Section D)
State means any of the United States of America, and the District of
Columbia.89
This section of the policy is intended to delineate the geographic
limitations of WCELIP statutory applicability. It is the laws of the states
and the District of Columbia that serve as the statutory basis for the
provision of coverage. Coverage for United States territories is governed
by the laws of those territories. Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin
Islands provide workers compensation by means of monopolistic funds, and
private insurers may not issue policies in these territories. 90 American
Samoa and Guam provide for the issuance of WCELIPs by private
insurers.9 Since state law governs the coverage available by means of the
WCELIP, the applicability of the WCELIP in foreign countries is governed
by the extra-territorial provisions of state workers compensation law.
E. Locations (General Section E)
This policy covers all your workplaces listed in Item I or 4 of the
Information Page; and it covers all other workplaces in Item 3.A. unless
you have other insurance or are self-insured for such workplaces.92
While state statutes vary, most require that the full liability of
employers, under workers compensation laws, be insured under one
policy.93 In Florida, full coverage is based upon the decision in Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ed Soules Construction Co.94 A recent
filing9 by the National Council on Compensation Insurance permits less
89. POLICY, supra note 12.
90. GUIDE, supra note 8, at 4.
91. Id.
92. POLICY, supra note 12.
93. See generally LARSON, supra note I, § 93.00.
94. 397 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
95. The National Council on Compensation Insurance filed Items B-1210 and B-1265
on behalf of its members and subscribers. Florida implemented employee leasing rules in
February 1990. it was the first state to implement such rules. Florida adopted the filing of
the National Council on Compensation Insurance to replace its original rules effective April
1, 1990. To date, no litigation has reached the appellate level of review in regard to the
employee leasing rules.
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than the full liability of the employer to be covered by a WCELIP in those
instances in which employees are leased.96
III. PART ONE-WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part One A)
This workers compensation insurance applies to bodily injury by
accident or bodily injury by disease. Bodily injury includes resulting
death.
1. Bodily injury by accident must occur within the policy period.
2. Bodily injury by disease must be caused or aggravated by the
conditions of your employment. The employee's last day of last expo-
sure to the conditions causing or aggravating such bodily injury by
disease must occur during the policy period.97
This section of the policy sets the period within which the injury must
occur in order for the policy to respond to a claim. While it is fairly clear
that an injury by accident must occur within the term of the policy, and this
is a relatively easy matter to prove, injury by disease poses different
problems. An injury by disease does not necessarily manifest itself within
the policy term. It is, therefore, necessary to establish during which policy
period there was exposure to the conditions that caused or aggravated the
disease.
Benefits under workers compensation law are payable to an employee
involved in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment that
causes disabling injury. In Wright v. Douglas N. Higgins, Inc.,9" the court
determined that where an employee relationship did not exist, the passive
acceptance of workers compensation benefits was not an election of
remedies.99 The injury occurred following a job interview and try-out
96. Employee leasing is a methodology that permits employers to utilize workers who
are employees of a firm that specializes in the placement of workers. The leasing firm
generally hires, fires, and provides benefits for leased workers. Since the workers
compensation premium system is premised on a loss sensitive program, it is important that
the loss experience of the utilizing employer be applied to the base premium. In order to
accomplish this end, while allowing leasing companies to provide services to the utilizing
employer, multiple coordinated policies are used.
97. POLICY, supra note 12.
98. 617 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
99. See id. at 462.
[Vol. 18
442
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
1993]
work period while the claimant was awaiting a hiring decision. 00 During
this time the claimant assisted employees in need of help, but did so
voluntarily and without direction or request.'' The court determined that
an employee relationship was not established (therefore the injury could not
arise out of or occur in the course of employment) and that a civil remedy
was available to the claimant.0 2 The amount paid to the claimant in
workers compensation benefits would be deducted from any award received
by the claimant.'0 3 The employee was not entitled to receive additional
workers compensation benefits while awaiting a civil settlement.
0 4
B. We Will Pay (Part One B)
We will pay promptly when due benefits required of you by the
workers compensation law.' 5
This statement represents the basic insuring agreement. It is this
statement that obligates the insurer to pay the benefits required under the
workers compensation law of each state or territory listed in Item 3.A. of
the Information Page. An examination of the cases adjudicated by the First
District Court of Appeal provides insight into the workers compensation law
of Florida.
1. Rulemaking Authority
Primary to any analysis of a statute is the basis of the rulemaking
authority by which the statute is implemented. The Workers Compensation
Rules of Procedure are established under the rulemaking authority of the
Supreme Court of Florida.'0 6 The rulemaking authority of the Supreme
Court of Florida was challenged in Reddick v. Charles W. Infinger
Construction,'°7 which sought review of Amendments to Florida Rules of
100. Id. at 461.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Wright, 617 So. 2d at 462.
104. Id.
105. PoLICY, supra note 12.
106. See In re Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla.
1979); In re Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1977); In
re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 285 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1973).
107. 617 So. 2d 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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Workers' Compensation Procedure' on the premise that the Supreme
Court of Florida had incorrectly established its rulemaking authority by
means of article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution and that workers
compensation hearings before judges of compensation claims are not
conducted in article V courts.' °9 The First District Court of Appeal noted
that the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court of Florida is based upon
that court's "unequivocal" textual reliance on section 440.29(3) of the
Florida Statutes,"' and therefore found that section 440.13(2)(k) of the
Florida Statutes"'. does not impermissibly encroach upon the supreme
court's rulemaking authority under article V." 2
2. Jurisdiction
In addition to rules by which to function, jurisdiction must be vested
in a tribunal in order for a claim to be heard in that forum. The 1990
amendments to Florida's Workers Compensation law created changes in the
jurisdiction of the judges of compensation claims." 3 In Terners of Miami
Corp. v. Freshwater,"4 the decision of a JCC as to the fees to be paid to
a treating physician was overturned on the basis of the 1990 amend-
ments. 115 Prior to the amendments, jurisdiction to resolve a fee dispute
was vested with the judges of compensation claims." 6 The amendments
vested the authority for resolution of such conflicts in the Division of
Workers Compensation." 7 Although the fee dispute arose and was filed
prior to the amendments to the workers compensation law, the dispute was
not placed before the judge of compensation claims until after jurisdiction
108. 603 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1992), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
109. Reddick, 617 So. 2d at 724.
110. FLA. STAT. § 440.29(3) (1991). "The practice and procedure before the judges of
compensation claims shall be governed by rules adopted by the Supreme Court, except to the
extent that such rules conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Id.
111. Id. § 440.13(2)(k). This section provides that an employer, carrier, self-insurer,
health care provider, or rehabilitation provider shall not refer an injured worker to a facility
in which the entity has an ownership or financial interest unless full disclosure of the interest
has been made in writing to the employer and the injured worker. Id.
112. Reddick, 617 So. 2d at 724.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)(1) (Supp. 1990).
114. 599 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
115. Id at 675.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 674.
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no longer existed."' The JCC, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim.'' 9
Within the jurisdiction of the First District Court of Appeal is the right
to determine the evidence which may be presented to the JCC. In Ogden
Allied Services v. Panesso,2 ° the court addressed the admission of surveil-
lance video tapes made after plaintiff's request for production and following
the employer/carrier's request for a postponement. While the court allowed
the admission of the video tapes, it did so only after examination of the
current Florida Rules of Workers Compensation Procedure. The court noted
that the rules result in "trial by ambush" and requested that the Workers
Compensation Rules Committee of the Florida Bar address the problem.''
In the process of hearing the issue in Ogden, the court was extensively
briefed prior to oral argument.' 2 The court received notices of supple-
mental authority as late as the morning of the oral argument. On its own
motion the court struck the last notice of supplemental authority and noted
that in the future it would take the same action when confronted with an
abuse of the rules of procedure relating to notice of supplemental authori-
ty.
23
Where a claimant does not request a specific type of benefit, and the
benefits awarded were not clearly placed at issue, the court reversed the
order of the JCC. 24 Due process requires that the parties have notice of
the issues to be heard so that they may present an adequate defense. 5
When the issues are not clearly presented, the JCC lacks jurisdiction to hear
the matter and an award cannot be made.
In Wolk v. Jaylen Homes, Inc., 6 the court examined whether the
JCC has the jurisdiction to consider claims for medical benefits when such
benefits have been terminated due to an employer/carrier's determination of
overutilization. The court determined that overutilization is a matter within
the jurisdiction of the JCC and that unilateral termination of treatment
118. Id. at 675; see also Napp-Deady Assocs. v. Ramsey, 599 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1 st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
119. Terners of Miami Corp., 599 So. 2d at 675.
120. 619 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993).
121. Id. at 1026-27.
122. Ogden Allied Servs. v. Panesso, 619 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(per curiam) (the court issued a separate opinion on the issue of supplemental authority).
123. Id.
124. Florida Power Corp. v. Hamilton, 617 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
125. Id. at 334.
126. 593 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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without good cause is a violation of the review procedures of the Florida
Statutes.'27
3. Statute of Limitations
Florida statute provides that a workers compensation claim must be
filed within two years of the time of injury, the date of the last payment of
compensation, or of the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the
employer.'28 In Lee v. City of Jacksonville,'29 a claimant argued that
continued use of a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulator unit to relieve
pain in an injured knee constituted continued remedial treatment by the
employer, sufficient to allow continued benefits. 3 ° The court noted that
decisions in other cases appeared to place the burden on the claimant to
prove that the employer had knowledge of the claimant's use of a prescribed
medical device in order to toll the statute of limitations.' 3' Based upon
prior decisions, the court affirmed the JCC's dismissal of the claim on the
ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 32  The court
certified the following question as being of great public importance:
WHETHER THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD OF SECTION 440.19
(1)(A), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS TOLLED BY THE CLAIMANT'S
ROUTINE USE OF A DEPENDENCY-INDUCING MEDICAL
DEVICE FURNISHED BY THE EMPLOYER AND PRESCRIBED
BY THE AUTHORIZED PHYSICIAN FOR AN INDEFINITE PERI-
OD OF TIME WITHOUT SUPERVISION, EVEN THOUGH THE
EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THE CLAI-
MANT CONTINUED TO USE THE DEVICE BEYOND THE TIME
THE PHYSICIAN SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE CLAIMANT
TO DISCONTINUE USE OF THE DEVICE, AND NO SUCH
INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN.'33
127. Id. at 1060.
128. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(I)(a) (1991).
129. 598 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla.
1993).
130. Id. at 296.
131. Id. at 297. The court relied on its decisions in Devilling v. Rimes, Inc., 591 So.
2d 304 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), and Taylor v. Metropolitan Dade County, 596 So. 2d
798 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992), to support its holding in Lee.
132. Lee, 598 So. 2d at 296.
133. Id. at 297.
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The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
negative and approved the decision of the district court.134 Effectively, the
supreme court determined that actual knowledge on the part of the employer
is essential to the establishment of treatment "furnished by the employ-
er."
1 35
In Bell v. Commercial Carriers,'36 the court examined whether an
employer has to voluntarily intend remedial treatment in order to revive the
statute of limitations. 37 The claimant had suffered a 1981 back injury and
was receiving ongoing treatment when a second back injury occurred in
1989.138 The JCC accepted the treatment as remedial to the 1989 injury,
but not remedial to the 1981 injury, thus barring the claim.' 39 The court
reversed the findings of the JCC and requested that the claim be heard on
its merits.40
In another case, the court reversed the decision of the JCC, which had
ordered the employer/carrier to provide remedial attention for replacement
or removal of a surgical staple in the claimant's right shoulder.' 4' The
court determined that the staple was not a prosthetic device, and that the two
year statute of limitations had therefore run.' 42 The court, however,
certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WAS THE FIXATION STAPLE INSERTED INTO CLAIMANT'S
SHOULDER A "PROSTHETIC DEVICE," AS THAT TERM IS USED
IN SECTION 440.19(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985)?141
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
negative, thus affirming the decision of the district court.' 44 This decision
barred the workers compensation remedy since the statute of limitations had
run. 145
134. Lee v. City of Jacksonville, 616 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1993).
135. Id. at 38.
136. 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. Ist. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
137. Id. at 685.
138. Id. at 684.
139. Id. at 685.
140. Id.
141. Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App 1992),
approved, 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993).
142. Id. at 158.
143. Id.
144. Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1993).
145. Id. at 448.
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The court also addressed the statute of limitations in Timmeny v.
Tropical Botanicals Corp. 14 6 The Timmeny court determined that where
the employer/carrier had failed to notify the claimant of an entitlement to
benefits the employer/carrier was estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations as a defense.'47 The court took the view that the conduct of
the employer/carrier severely prejudiced the claimant. The employer/carrier
was aware that the employee was exposed to pesticides which were among
the possible causes of the claimant's aplastic anemia.'48 Nonetheless, the
employer/carrier did not share this information with the claimant. The
employer/carrier's breach of its statutory duty requires that the statute be
tolled until the claimant received actual notice that his disease was
compensable.' 49
4. Standard of Review
Review of workers compensation cases by the First District Court of
Appeal is generally based upon a standard of competent substantial
evidence. 5 ° The court in Lagenfelder v. Regina 5' utilized this standard
to find that a claimant was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and
costs. At the same time, the court determined there was a lack of competent
substantial evidence to support an award for attendant care benefits.'
The court found that there was no need for lengthy presentation of the facts
in the case, as these would be of little precedential value.'53 In essence,
the court implied that it knows competent substantial evidence when it sees
it. 154
The decision of the JCC, as to a good faith work search by a claimant
and the award of permanent total disability benefits, was found to be lacking
for want of competent substantial evidence where the court found the
146. 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
147. Id. at 816.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 817.
150. See, e.g., Vista Manor Nursing Home v. Yeager, 605 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vice, 601 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Collins v.
Catalytic, Inc., 597 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
151. 601 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Allied Bendix Galactic v. AI-Hafiz, 596 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1992).
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evidence to be "vague and general."' 5  Although the court reviews the
facts of the case, it does not examine or explain what constitutes competent
substantial evidence. Thus, the decision typically turns on the whim of the
court, with no true standard to guide the practitioner in determining the
evidence that should be entered into the record." 6
In some instances the court provides somewhat more insight into what
constitutes competent substantial evidence. Where the JCC failed to
determine that medical treatment was of an emergency nature, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further findings." 7
Even though the carrier may control the medical treatment of the injured
employee by the selection of the treating physician, an injured worker may
not be denied compensation for medical treatment which, although
unauthorized, is of an emergency nature.'
In another instance, however, the court upheld an average weekly wage
("AWW") award which included fringe benefits of pass flights to the
employee where the court found competent substantial evidence in the
record to establish the value of this benefit.5 9 The JCC found that the
pass flights could be valued at 8.1 cents per mile and thus included the
value of the pass in the AWW calculation. In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Miner took issue with the analysis of the certified public accountant who
presented the testimony as to this benefit. 6° The majority accepted the
validity of the evidence as presented to and reported by the JCC, while the
dissent attempted to reevaluate the evidence. Reevaluation of the evidence
is outside the scope of review of competent substantial evidence.'
61
155. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Challis, 609 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
156. The court is somewhat more prone to offer explanation of what is not competent,
substantial evidence then it is to provide an affirmative guideline. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Columbia Pictures, 610 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Townsend & Bottom v.
Bonds, 610 So. 2d 619 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Jackson Manor Nursing Home v. Ortiz,
606 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
157. Machacon v. Velda Farms Dairy, 619 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
158. Id. at 382.
159. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Michaelis, 619 So. 2d 383 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
160. Id. at 383-84. (Miner, J., dissenting).
161. Other cases in which the First District Court of Appeal reviewed findings of the
JCC on the basis of competent substantial evidence include: UlIman v. City of Tampa Parks
Dep't, 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2043 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1993) (affirming that there
was competent substantial evidence that there was no industrial accident); WPOM Partners
v. Lovell, 623 So. 2d 823 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming wage loss award because
record contains competent substantial evidence of claimant's loss of earnings and his
compensable injury); Orange County Sch. Bd. v. Perkins, 619 So. 2d I (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
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In the event that a JCC has departed from the essential requirements of
law, and a party will suffer an injury that cannot be remedied by appeal, a
petition for certiorari may be filed with the court. In Spaulding v.
Albertson's, Inc.,' 62 the court reviewed the evidence necessary to deter-
mine whether the JCC had complied with the essential requirements of law
for the purpose of establishing attorney's fees.'63 The court held that the
JCC erred in finding that the statutory fee guidelines in section 440.34(1) of
the Florida Statutes was the appropriate place to begin the determination of
appellate attorney's fees in workers compensation cases.'64 While the
court noted that an award of appellate attorney's fees does not lend itself to
any hard and fast rule, it took pains to note that claimant's attorney's fees
should not be governed by evidence of the hourly rate charged by defense
App. 1993) (en banc) (affirming the JCC's refusal to dismiss for lack of prosecution); T.E.
James Constr. Co. v. Hartley, 616 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding there
was insufficient competent substantial evidence to support the award of temporary total
disability benefits, but there was sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish
statutory employer status); Metropolitan Dade County v. Pope, 615 So. 2d 856 (Fla. I st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (reversing an award of palliative chiropractic care where there was no
competent substantial evidence to support the award); Rodriguez v. Albertson's, 614 So. 2d
678 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding where there was no competent
substantial evidence to sustain the denial of wage loss benefits); Perkins v. A. Perkins
Drywall 615 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a denial of compensation
claim where there was competent substantial evidence that the parties had stipulated to
employment status and the JCC found no coverage under the policy due to misrepresentation
of the employment status); Hewett v. Town of Mayo, 614 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (reversed and remanded where there were internal inconsistencies in the evidence);
Solinsky v. Goody Bake Shop, 622 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming JCC's
finding concerning social security offset); Charles v. Suwannee Swifly, 622 So. 2d 114 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding where JCC rejected unrefuted medical
testimony); Alford v. G. Pierce Woods Memorial Hosp., 621 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming denial of authorization for chiropractic treatment); Farm Stores, Inc.
v. Fletcher, 621 So. 2d 706 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming in part, reversing in
part, and remanding where JCC failed to order an independent dental examination and
wrongly found the claimant to be permanently totally disabled); Espinal v. Victor Herrera
Drywall Stockers, Inc., 610 So. 2d 660 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing and
remanding a decision on MMI where there was evidence that further improvement could take
place); and City of West Palm Beach v. Dahl, 610 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing and remanding the wage loss benefit determination of the JCC where the JCC
overlooked or ignored evidence that claimant was offered a position within his physical
restrictions).
162. 610 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
163. Id. at 722.
164. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (1989).
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lawyers. 6 :  The court also noted that there are inherent differences
between the practice of the defense bar, which begin with fixed hourly rates
for defense counsel based upon repetitive employment and virtual guarantees
of payment from solvent insurance companies, and handling appeals for
workers compensation employers.'66 The court's comments appear at odds
with recent changes to the legislative intent of the workers compensation
law, which is now to be construed in a fair and balanced manner in regard
to application to employee and employer.'67
The court also accepted a petition for a writ of certiorari in All Weather
Control, Inc. v. Wawerczyk. 68 Here the court examined an order for out-
of-state medical care and determined that the petition should be granted
since, once the fee for out-of-state medical care was paid, there was no
statutory method for reimbursement.'69 Thus, the petitioner would suffer
an injury that could not be remedied by an appeal from the final order. 7°
The court also found a departure from the essential requirements of law
in a petition for a writ of certiorari where there was no evidence presented
to the JCC. 7' The petition for a writ of certiorari sought review of an
order of a JCC which granted the employer/carrier's motion to compel
treatment with a medical representative of the employer/carrier, and denied
a motion to require the presence of claimant's attorney at all meetings be-
tween the medical representative and the claimant.'72
An order compelling disclosure of a company's workers compensation
file on two employees was found to depart "from the essential requirements
of law," and to present a possibility of "irreparable harm that cannot be
remedied by way of appeal" in Adjustco, Inc. v. Sibley.'73 The court
determined that the party seeking production failed to show that there was
no other means to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials without
undue hardship.'74 In the remand instructions, respondent was given the
165. Id. at 723-24.
166. Id. at 724.
167. See FLA. STAT. § 440.01 (1991).
168. 600 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
169. Id. at 518.
170. Id.
171. Martinez v. Purdue Frederick Co., 599 So. 2d 772, 773 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
172. Id.
173. 611 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
174. Id.
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opportunity to present evidence that the material was not available by other
means without undue hardship.'
In a consolidated case, the court denied petitioner's request for a writ
of certiorari, which tested the provisions of Florida law pertaining to
disclosure of medical records.'76 The court applied the provisions of the
1991 amendments to the Act because the statutory disclosure provisions
related to matters that did not alter or amend the parties substantive
rights.'77 Additionally, the court noted that the language of the 1989,
1990, and 1991 amendments was not significantly different. 7  The
petitions sought review of an order of the JCC prohibiting petitioners or
their representatives from exparte communication with respondents' medical
providers. 79 The court determined that petitioners had not met their
burden of proving that the order departed from the essential requirements of
law, and that they would suffer material harm that could not be remedied
on appeal. 80
In Fuentes v. Caribbean Electric,'8' the First District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of unrebutted medical testimony. The court noted that
a JCC may not reject unrebutted medical testimony without a reasonable
explanation.'82 Here, no explanation for the rejection was offered and,
therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case for proceed-
ings consistent with its opinion." 3
Amendments to Florida Rules of Workers' Compensation Proce-
dure"'84 provides for discretionary review of non-final venue orders in
workers compensation cases.'85 A petition for a writ of certiorari was
granted in regard to a venue order of the JCC in Lockheed Space Operations
v. Pham.8 6 Procedurally, the court received this case as an appeal of a
non-final order. The court determined that, although it did not have
jurisdiction to hear such an appeal, it was within the power of the court to
175. Id.
176. Adelman Steel Corp. v. Winter, 610 So. 2d 494, 496-97 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
177. Id. at 497.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 496.
180. Id. at 496-97.
181. 596 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
182. Id. at 1229.
183. Id.
184. 603 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1992).
185. Id.
186. 600 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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view the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari.' 87 The court then
proceeded to vacate the order of the JCC transferring venue."'8
In Florida Mining & Materials v. Perkins,'89 the court found that the
JCC utilized the wrong evidentiary standard to determine that there was a
lack of evidence to support a finding of reliance upon a misrepresentation
in the hiring process. The employer asserted that there was a direct causal
relationship between the injury and the misrepresentation on the part of the
claimant.
The court was asked to accept a petition for a writ of certiorari in
regard to a non-final order on venue in Hines Electric v. McClure.9 ° The
court determined that the non-final order was appealable and exercised its
jurisdiction by accepting the jurisdiction and determining that the answers
it had received were answer briefs.' The appellant was subsequently
given twenly days to forward a reply brief to the court.
5. Arising Out Of, And In the Course
and Scope of, Employment
The payment of workers compensation benefits is dependent on an
injury arising out of, and in the course and scope of, employment.' 92 In
Darling v. Conley Buick, Inc.,93 the court reversed an order of the JCC,
finding that injuries sustained in an automobile accident were not compensa-
ble under workers compensation.' 94 The employee, a used car salesman,
was delivering vehicle documents to a customer at the employer's request
when the accident occurred. 195 Although the JCC found these actions to
be within the course and scope of employment, the JCC determined that by
driving five miles beyond the destination of the customer's residence, the
claimant had substantially deviated from the course and scope of employ-
ment.'96  The JCC concluded the claim was not compensable.' 97  The
appellate court held that the JCC's determination was not supported by
187. Id. at 1261-62.
188. Id. at 1262.
189. 612 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
190. 616 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1993).
191. Id. at 137.
192. See generally LARSON supra note 1, § 1.00.
193. 594 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
194. Id. at 816.
195. Id. at 815.
196. Id. at 816.
197. Id.
Baig
453
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
competent and substantial evidence, and reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.' 98
The finding that the claimant was in a position unique to employment
and that the injury was not the result of an idiopathic condition was upheld
in City of Plantation v. Seaman.'99 Although the claimant passed the
necessary threshold of establishing that the injury was compensable because
it arose out of and occurred within the course and scope of employment, the
case was remanded to the JCC for review of compliance with statutory
procedures relating to reporting requirements."'
In the case of individuals who are municipal or other specified
employees, statutory presumptions may apply. 0' In State of Florida,
Department of Corrections v. Clark,"2 the court determined that a fireman
did not show that he was a fireman for a "fire control district" within the
meaning of the Florida Statutes.20 3 The claimant asserted he was entitled
to the presumption of compensability contained in section 112.18(1) of the
Florida Statutes. 24 The presumption states:
Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal,
county, port authority, special tax district or fire control district fireman
caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total
or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental
and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless contrary be shown
by competent evidence.2"5
Workers compensation law has long recognized that injuries which
occur during travel to and from work do not arise out of, and in the course
and scope of, employment. Over the years, exceptions have been carved out
of the going and coming rule which would allow recovery in those instances
in which a "special hazard" exists. In Florida, the "special hazard" rule was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal
Farms."6 The rule states that "(w)here there is a special hazard on a
198. Darling, 594 So. 2d at 816.
199. 590 So. 2d I (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
200. Id. at 1-2; see also FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1991) (for billing and reporting require-
ments).
201. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.18 (1991).
202. 593 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
203. Id. at 586.
204. Id. (citing Fla. Stat. § 112.18(1) (1991)).
205. FLA. STAT. § 112.18(1) (1991).
206. 74 So. 2d 282, 286 (Fla. 1954).
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normal route used by the employee as a means of entry to and exit from his
place of work, the hazards of that route under appropriate circumstances
become hazards of the employment."2 °7  The special hazard rule was
found not to apply where an employee slipped and fell in a parking lot on
her way to work.2"' The court noted that for a claimant to be entitled to
compensation under the special hazard rule, the "claimant must demonstrate
the existence of a special hazard at a particular off-premises location which
is on the usual or expected means of access to the claimant's place of
employment., 2 9 The claimant in the instant case was unable to make
such a showing.2"'
Similarly, a "travelling employee" exception has been established which
provides that when an employee is away from home, injuries may be
compensable for daily living events. 21 ' However, the court declined to
extend workers compensation benefits to employees who were injured while
being transported by a co-employee who was voluntarily transporting the
other employees in a privately owned vehicle, between the employees' place
of work and their temporary residence, while working for the employer
away from their normal place of residence.' The court thus restricted its
decision to the original intent of workers compensation law, which was to
provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course and scope
of employment.
6. Employee v. Independent Contractor
Workers compensation law is designed to provide medical and wage
replacement benefits to injured employees.2"3 The common law test
applicable to master/servant law is traditionally the "control test."2 4  In
Buncy v. Certified Grocers,2"5 the court determined that a claimant's
wages should include compensation as a confidential informant. The court
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. Kash-N-Karry v. Johnson, 617 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
209. Id. at 793.
210. Id. at 793-94.
211. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (1991).
212. Fierro v. Crom Corp., 617 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
213. See generally LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.00.
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958). In determining whether
an individual is an independent contractor or employee, "the extent of control which, by
agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work" is one factor considered.
Id.
215. 592 So. 2d 336 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
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noted that the degree of control exercised over appellant's activities was re-
flected in the record and constituted competent substantial evidence that
claimant was an employee, even when working as a confidential infor-
mant.2" 6
In Fleitas v. Today Trucking, Inc.,217 the court affirmed a JCC's
decision that the claimant was an independent contractor who was entitled
to limited benefits under a contractual relationship with Today Trucking,
Inc. The claimant was injured in an automobile accident while driving for
the defendant, Today Trucking, Inc. The claimant had entered into an
agreement with the company, which agreement established that the claimant
was not an employee, but would be entitled to workers compensation
payments in the amount of $240.00 per week. The court found that
Florida's workers compensation statute prohibits contractual limitation of the
benefits due an employee."' At the same time, there is no statutory
prohibition in regard to establishing limits for benefits to be paid to
individuals who are not employees, yet are extended voluntary benefits by
the employer.2"9 Thus, the claimant in the instant case was only entitled
to limited benefits. 2 °
7. Causal Relationship
Compensability for an injury is premised on the understanding that the
employment was causally related to the injury.22' In Finney v. Agrico
Chemical Co.,222 the court reversed a determination of noncompensability
and remanded for further proceedings where the testimony of two doctors
was improperly rejected by the JCC. 2 23  The claimant in Finney was
working as an electrical technician trainee when he slipped and fell on his
back, striking his head on the floor.224 The claimant filed a timely report,
but did not immediately seek medical treatment. 225 The court determined
216. Id. at 337-38.
217. 598 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
218. Id. at 254.
219. Id.; see also Fort Pierce Tribune v. Williams, 622 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
220. Fleitas, 598 So. 2d at 254.
221. See generally LARSON, supra note 1, at § 20.00.
222. 599 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
223. Id. at 1361.
224. Id at 1360.
225. Id
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that reversal was necessary where the rejected medical evidence, if accepted,
would provide legally sufficient grounds for establishing the claim.226
The court also reversed and remanded for further findings the decision
of the JCC as to a causal relationship where there was uncontradicted
testimony that the condition was causally related to the employment.227
In addition to rejecting the uncontradicted medical testimony of two doctors,
the JCC used the claimant's failure to conduct an adequate job search as the
basis for finding lack of causation.228 The court, however, did not
comment on the use of an inadequate work search as the basis for finding
lack of a causal relationship.229 The court did note that the claimant had
not been informed by the carrier of the need to perform a work search and,
thus, the claimant was excused from the need to have made such a
search .230
The court also reversed and remanded the decision of a JCC in regard
to causal relationship where the claimant worked as a night auditor for a
motel chain and filed a claim in connection with a hand and wrist inju-
ry.231  The court determined that, in order to rule against the causal
connection, the JCC had to find as uncontested the testimony of medical
experts. The court found, however, that the testimony was clearly conflict-
ing.232  During claimant's delivery of a baby, claimant's wrists were
strapped. Medical testimony indicated that the strapping "could be
something of significance to cause carpal tunnel" and that subsequent lifting
of the child "could cause tenosynovitis." '233 Since this testimony was in
226. Id. at 1361.
227. Cozzens v. St. Joe Container Co., 596 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992). See also Phillips v. Hague Water Conditioning, 616 So. 2d 507 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (.CC reversed where there was unrefuted testimony that current condition was
work related).
228. Cozzens, 596 So. 2d at 137.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Fritz v. Courtyard By Marriott, 592 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
See also Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Schmitt, 597 So. 2d 938 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming the decision of the JCC finding Aetna responsible for the claimant's treatment, but
determining that the reason for the liability was Aetna's provision of insurance during the
time in which claimant suffered her last repeated action which led to the need for remedial
treatment); Schafrath v. Marco Bay Resort, Ltd., 608 So. 2d 97 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(JCC was reversed and the cause remanded where the claimant suffered an injury to her
elbow as the result of being hit by a swinging door and the JCC applied an incorrect burden
of proof to establish claimant's right to benefits).
232. Fritz, 592 So. 2d at 1168.
233. Id. at 1171.
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conflict with that of other doctors who testified that claimant's work
activities were the source of the injury, the JCC's decision was not
upheld.234
The determination of a JCC that a claimant's injury was not causally
related to employment was upheld by the court in Molnar v. Bob Evans
Restaurants.235 The claimant presented evidence of a slip and partial fall
while working as a waitress.236 Claimant experienced back pain and
numbness in the legs, and was admitted to the hospital. 37 Conflicting
testimony was presented as to whether the claimant's injuries resulted from
the slip and fall or from an infection, transverse myelitis.23 The court af-
firmed that the JCC had competent substantial evidence to support the
finding that the infection was a logical cause of the claimant's injury and
that the injury was not causally related to employment.239
A determination of causal relationship was rejected by the court where
the JCC based the determination on the doctor's statement that the claimant
said the injury occurred at work and the claimant suffered from a neck
injury.2 4' The court pointed out that it is up to the claimant to prove the
causal relationship between the employment and the injury.24' Here, the
court determined that the testifying doctor did not present evidence of a
relationship and that the finding below should be reversed.242
In Body Works, Inc. v. Chavez,243 the court accepted the finding of
causality in relation to medical treatment and attendant care for a cardiac
problem, but rejected the finding of causality in relation to a hearing
loss.244 The rejection of a causal relationship between the work and the
hearing loss was premised on the testimony of a doctor responding to a
hypothetical question regarding causal relationship. 45 Timely objection
was made to the hypothetical and to the response. Since, however, no other
234. Id. at 1170.
235. 592 So. 2d 742 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 742-43.
238. Id. at 743-44.
239. Id. at 744.
240. Olympic Assocs. v. Kimmel, 590 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 606 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
244. Id. at 1274.
245. Id.
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evidence relating to the hearing loss was presented, the court reversed the
order as to the compensability of the hearing loss.246
The court noted in Fincannon v. Eastern Airlines,47 that "[a]
claimant seeking workers compensation benefits is not required to show her
compensable injury was the sole cause of her disability." '248 In Fincannon,
the claimant was an airline reservationist who developed hoarseness,
laryngitis and trouble talking, which was diagnosed to be the result of
polyps on the vocal chords. The claimant was fifty-nine years of age, a
heavy smoker, and subject to severe allergies.249 The court commented:
There is no real dispute that immediately after claimant's surgery, she
ceased smoking until January 8, 1987. When claimant's surgery and
voice therapy and cessation of smoking failed to prevent the return of
nodules on her voice chords, it was recommended that she not return to
employment that required much voice usage. She had previously
attempted to return to Eastern but that resulted in voice failure. She
subsequently attempted retraining and reentry into the labor market but
her efforts, to date, have failed. This evidence restricting claimant's
employment to jobs which require very little voice usage supports a
finding of permanent impairment.2"'
Thus, the court is willing to find permanent disability, causally related to
employment, even where there are intervening factors that may impact on
the claimant's disability. It is the initial causal relationship that provides the
claimant with the right to compensation.
Where the parties have stipulated that an injury is causally related to
the work and is, therefore, compensable, the JCC must make specific
findings as to the continued viability of the stipulation prior to overturning
the stipulation.25' During a hearing the JCC determined that the claimant
had committed fraud and misrepresentation by working and earning money
while he was allegedly unable to work.252 The court noted that a JCC is
not required to follow a stipulation that is refuted by competent substantial
246. Id.
247. 611 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
248. Id. at 30.
249. Id. at 29.
250. Id. at 30-31 (citing Dayron Corp. v. Morehead, 509 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1987);
Jackson v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 520 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
251. Jacobs v. Volker Stevin Constr., 609 So. 2d 132, 133 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
252. Id.
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evidence. However, the JCC must give notice to the parties that the JCC is
considering rejecting the stipulation. The failure to give due notice requires
that the case be remanded for further findings in regard to entitlement for
benefits.253
Where a claimant's hepatitis was found not to be causally related to the
industrial accident, a subsequent medical opinion to establish causation was
found not to be reasonably required.254 The claimant was originally in-
jured when he fell from a scaffold in the course and scope of employment.
The claimant developed hepatitis following surgery for the original injury.
Competent substantial evidence supported the finding that claimant had a
prior history of hepatitis and of alcohol consumption. The claimant's doctor
stated that there was a low probability of a causal connection between the
hepatitis and the industrial accident. That portion of the claimant's injury
which related to the industrial accident was compensable, while that part of
claimant's condition that was not causally related was not subject to cover-
age under the policy.255
8. Compensability/Benefits
The JCC examines each claim presented to determine whether a
compensable injury has occurred, and if so, what benefits should be paid.
The determination of the JCC must be based on an analysis of the law and
supported by competent substantial evidence.
In Whiskey Creek Country Club v. Rizer,25 6 the JCC found, and the
court upheld, an award of benefits for an employee's illness and subsequent
death by determining that there was competent substantial evidence from the
testifying doctors. 7 At the same, time the court reversed the award for
penalties and interest on the funeral expenses awarded by the JCC.258 The
court based its determination on section 440.20 of the Florida Statutes,
which provides penalties and interest for the late payment of compensa-
tion."' The court reasoned that funeral and medical expenses are not
compensation, and therefore, are not subject to penalties and interest. 26°
253. Id.
254. White v. Seminole Plastering, 609 So. 2d 761, 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
255. Id.
256. 599 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id. at 735.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.20(7), (9) (1991)).
260. Id.
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A claimant's appeal from an order denying temporary disability wage
loss benefits, alternative medical care, penalties, and interest arising out of
a knee injury that aggravated a preexisting arthritic condition was reversed
on all three points raised on appeal.26' The claimant first contended that
the JCC erred in establishing the date of maximum medical improvement.
All parties had stipulated to the date and the court found no basis upon
which to overturn the stipulation.262 The claimant also contended that the
record lacked competent substantial evidence to support the JCC's finding
that the claimant's medical symptoms were solely the result of the preexist-
ing medical condition. The court agreed with this contention based upon the
deposition of claimant's doctor indicating that, taken as a whole, a twisting
accident constituted an aggravating cause of claimant's condition.263 The
claimant's third contention was that the order denying temporary wage-loss
and partial disability benefits based upon a failure to conduct a good faith
work search was in error. The court found that the employer/carrier failed
to notify the claimant of the need to make a good faith work search.264
The claimant's request that the court find internal cardiovascular
conditions compensable absent a finding of preexisting condition was denied
based on earlier case law decisions.265 Although there are instances in
which heart attacks are compensable,266 the claimant was requesting that
a new standard be established.26 The court found no legal support that
would permit it to make the changes suggested by claimant. 6 '
An award of temporary partial disability benefits for a three year period
was reversed by the court where the claimant appeared to have exaggerated
the extent of disability following an incident in which claimant's employ-
ment was terminated.269 The claimant was terminated from his position
for refusal to clean-up frozen turkeys, which fell after being stacked too
high.27" There was a difference of opinion as to whether the claimant had
261. Michael v. National Indus., Inc., 599 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. Id. at 243-44.
263. Id. at 244.
264. Id.
265. Zundell v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 609 So. 2d 1367, 1369 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review granted, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993).
266. See, e.g., Popiel v. Broward County Sch. Bd., 432 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 438 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1983).
267. Zundell, 609 So. 2d at 1368.
268. Id.
269. Publix Supermarket, Inc. v. Hart, 609 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
270. Id. at 1344.
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been terminated because of his back problem or because of insubordination.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the JCC for further findings on the
question of whether claimant voluntarily limited his income. Should the
JCC find that the claimant was terminated for insubordination, the claimant
will have failed to satisfy his burden of showing that his change in
employment status was the result of a compensable injury.27 '
Where an order of the JCC ignored or overlooked evidence that the
claimant voluntarily limited his income, the court reversed an award for
wage-loss benefits and remanded the case for further findings.272 The
claimant rejected the city's offer of sedentary employment following an
injury within the course and scope of employment.27 3 On remand, the
JCC will have the option of accepting further evidence in order to make a
determination on wage loss benefits. 74
The court found that a JCC erred in finding a hernia repair noncompen-
sable where the claimant had a preexisting hernia.275 The claimant was
diagnosed as having an inguinal hernia in 1987 and declined surgery. The
hernia did not interfere with claimant's ability to perform his job. In 1989,
the claimant was involved in an altercation with one of his employers, and
was taken to the hospital with a fractured hip and an inguinal hernia.2 76
The court determined that since the claimant was not "disabled" from
working until the time of his work-related accident, the aggravation to the
preexisting condition made that condition compensable.2 77
The court affirmed the principle that where a claimant suffers from an
idiopathic condition that is not aggravated by the work situation, no
compensation is due the employee.2 78  The claimant in Hillsborough
County School Board v. Williams,279 suffered from a preexisting L5-S 1
bulge, and claimed that bending to pick up a paper on the school bus floor
aggravated the back problem. The court upheld the decision of the JCC,
which found that the claimant suffered injury solely as the result of normal
271. Id. at 1345.
272. City of West Palm Beach v. Dahl, 610 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
273. Id. at 458.
274. See id.
275. Delgado v. Blanco & Sons Catering, 606 So. 2d 658, 661 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 661.
278. See Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 1977)
(establishing the principle that an idiopathic condition that is not aggravated by the work
situation does not "arise out of' the employment).
279. 601 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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movement. ::' ° Based upon this finding, the injury was not compensa-
ble.28
In Gilreath v. Charlotte County Board of County Commissioners,282
the court found that where an employee was injured while charging the
battery of his car, the injury arose out of the employment and was,
therefore, compensable.283 The employer/carrier presented no evidence
that the claimant had deviated from his duties. The court rejected the
employer/carrier's contention that section 440.091 of the Florida Statutes
requires affirmance that the claimant was acting within the course of
employment. 284 The statutory section referenced by the court establishes
that an employee of a municipality, state, or political subdivision is deemed
an employee acting within the course of employment so long as the
employee "was not engaged in service for which he was paid by a private
employer, and he and his public employer had no agreement providing
workers compensation coverage for that private employment." '285 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that a claimant's status as a law enforcement officer
does not diminish the claimant's rights under the workers compensation
law.
286
In City of Holmes Beach v. Grace,28 7 the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985),
DEFINING "ACCIDENT"' EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS
INJURY WHERE THE INJURY SUFFERED BY THE CLAIMANT
RESULTS IN ONLY MINOR PHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES?2 8
The court chose to reword the question to:
WHETHER SECTION 440.02(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985),
DEFINING "ACCIDENT," EXCLUDES A MENTAL OR NERVOUS
INJURY WHERE THE PHYSICAL INJURY SUFFERED BY THE
280. Id. at 625.
281. Id.
282. 610 So. 2d 88 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 89.
284. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.091 (1991)).
285. FLA. STAT. § 440.091(3) (1991).
286. Gilreath, 610 So. 2d at 89.
287. 598 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1992).
288. Id. at 72.
Baig
463
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
CLAIMANT WAS NOT A CAUSE OF THE MENTAL OF NER-
VOUS INJURY?28 9
The supreme court answered the latter question in the affirmative and
quashed the decision of the court below, which had found that where a
policeman was struck by the elbow of a suspect, the subsequent psychiatric
illness of the policeman was compensable.2 9 The need to create a direct
link between a physical injury and a psychiatric illness limits the scope of
mental illness and stress claims to those based upon a physical injury. This
limitation serves to reduce the number and severity of stress and psychiatric
claims that are filed.
In Nationwide Insurance v. McGee, 9 the court determined that a
JCC erred in finding that the claimant suffered a compensable injury.29 2
The court noted that the record clearly established that all of claimant's
injuries were psychiatric.2 93 Section 440.02(1) of the Florida Statutes has
been construed as precluding compensation for mental or emotional injury,
unless the claimant establishes that such mental or emotional injury was the
direct and immediate result of a physical injury.9
Where a claimant's case was dismissed with prejudice for failure to
attend an independent medical examination ("IME"), the court reversed the
finding of the JCC. 295 The court based its decision on the fact that the
IME was not ordered by the JCC and that dismissal with prejudice was too
harsh a sanction for failure to attend an IME not ordered by the JCC.2 96
Where a carrier limited a claimant's award of hydrotherapy to
membership in a health club, the court reversed the finding of the JCC. 297
The court found that the claimant was entitled to payment for ajacuzzi hot
tub and for the balance of the purchase price of claimant's first hot tub.298
The claimant's first hot tub had suffered a crack and was not usable, thus
289. Id. at 74.
290. Id.
291. 597 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
292. Id. at 358.
293. Id.
294. Id. (interpreting section 440.02(1) of the Florida Statutes, 1989, which provides,
"A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright or excitement only ... shall be deemed not
to be an injury by accident arising out of the employment.").
295. McConnell v. Florida Furniture Ctr., 611 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
296. Id.
297. Kubber v. Max Davis Assocs., 603 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Id. at 138-39.
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necessitating the need for the jacuzzi hot tub. The court noted that there
was competent substantial evidence that the claimant did not have a public
facility available to him, and the employer/carrier did not introduce any
evidence to the contrary.299
The scope of benefits available to an injured employee may range from
lifetime medical care, prosthetic devices, wage-loss benefits, attendant care,
homes, and vehicles to accommodate disabilities. Many of the benefits,
while necessary to ensure a quality of life for the injured work, are so costly
they serve to drive up the cost of workers compensation insurance."'
299. Id. at 138.
300. See Edenfield v. B&I Contractors, Inc., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2105 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1993) (reversing a summary judgment which denied a claim for wrongful
termination based upon the filing of a workers compensation claim); Meek v. Layne-Western
Co., 18 Fla. L, Weekly D2041 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993) (reversing where the
JCC utilized the incorrect formula for the calculation of wage loss); Robinson v. Shands
Teaching Hosp., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2029 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993) (affirming
an award of psychiatric treatment by a physician selected by the employer); Belcher v. Dade
County Sch. Bd., 623 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1993) (reversing where claimant was
denied certain household items, the cost of a maid and bathtub rails); Jones v. Petland
Orlando S., 622 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a determination that
Rogaine treatment was experimental); Fawaz v. Florida Polymers, 622 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App.) (reversing where the JCC erred in applying the misrepresentation defense and
claimant was denied temporary partial disability benefits); Tumberry Assocs., Inc. v. Pierre,
618 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing an award of psychiatric treatment
where no claim for such treatment was made); Turner v. Rinker Materials, 622 So. 2d 80
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing the denial of temporary partial disability and wage
loss benefits where the claimant was not made aware of reporting requirements); Deep South
Products v. Beach, 616 So. 2d 156 (Fla 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming an award of
temporary partial disability, wage-loss, attendant care benefits, costs and attorneys fees
following claimant's incarceration for DUI); Arizona Chemical Corp. v. Hanlon, 605 So. 2d
938 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding the claimant biodetoxification treatment, both
past and future, travelling expenses to obtain treatment and an in-home hot tub); Town &
Country Farms v. Peck, 611 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of
a hospital bed and acupuncture treatments); Rodriguez v. Prestress Decking Corp., 611 So.
2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the denial of death benefits where the
claimant was over the statutory age at the time of her brother's death); Bristol Myers Co. v.
Clark, 599 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order denying attendant
care and making the award retroactive); Value Rent A Car v. Liccardo, 603 So. 2d 680 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an order to include gratuities in the calculation of AWW
even though the employer had no policy in regard to the reporting of gratuities and the
employee failed to provide the employer with a contemporaneous written report ofgratuities);
Maranje v. Brinks of Florida, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding
the claimant a two bedroom home with an in-ground heated pool and, because he was denied
this home during a fifteen month appeal, he was entitled to monetary damages which would
make him whole for the period he was without the home); Southeast Environmental
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Many of the reform measures proposed for the workers compensation
system relate to limitations on benefits. Labor activists object to reform
efforts which concentrate on the reduction of benefits and highlight those
instances where there is employee claim fraud and employer fraud in
relation to proper premium as the real cost drivers in workers compensa-
tion."'
9. Occupational Disease
Section 440.151 of the Florida Statutes provides for several alternative
theories in relation to occupational disease.30 2 If a disease is classified as
an occupational disease, rather than one fitting the prolonged exposure
theory, the carrier of record at the time of the last exposure is liable for all
benefits payable to the claimant. 3  If, on the other hand, prolonged
exposure theory is found to be the basis of the claim, carriers are entitled to
contribution from each carrier of record for the period of time the carrier
issued the policy.3"4 The claimant is entitled to the same benefits under
either theory of recovery, however, the source of the benefits may vary.
Contractors, Inc. v. Cayasso, 611 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order
on wage-loss indicating that the statutory 80/80 formula should have been applied regardless
of whether the claimant had such earnings); Carroll Steel Erectors v. Alderman, 599 So. 2d
181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of death benefits to parents in spite
of erroneous standard of proof with respect to the issue of dependency); Martin County Bd.
of County Comm'rs v. Jones, 595 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an
award of psychiatric care and wage-loss benefits); Gilley Trucking Co. v. Morrell, 591 So.
2d 302 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming an award of the cost of a conventional home
to the claimant, a quadriplegic, in lieu of a pre-fabricated home for the disabled); University
of Florida v. Massie, 602 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1992) (reversing the district court award of
modified benefits where an employee had a preexisting condition which was aggravated and
for which benefits were awarded); Nickolls v. University of Florida, 606 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (claimant's physical condition appeared to no longer restrict the capacity
to work, however, the JCC's determination that the claimant was required to do a work
search was not supported by competent substantial evidence and therefore reversal was
required).
301. On November 10, 1993, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 12C, which
reforms workers compensation by reducing certain benefits and providing premium reduction
credits for employers. In response to this legislation, "Labor unions, trial lawyers, and some
legislators say that some of the most seriously injured workers are big losers." Tim Nickens,
Scoring Workers'Comp, Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 1993, at IC, 3C.
302. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.151 (1991).
303. Id. § 440.151(5); see also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Crittenden, 596 So. 2d 112 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
304. Crittenden, 596 So. 2d at 113.
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The court addressed a repeated trauma claim in the case of a worker
who cut, chopped, stirred and lifted in the role of oriental chef.3"5 The
court determined that exposure and repeated trauma cases should be
governed by the same principles as "repeated accidents. 3 °6  It is the
combination of the repeated accidents that leads to a compensable inju-
ry.307 In Tokyo House, Inc., the court found that a repeated trauma oc-
curred during the two year period before the claim was filed and found that
the compensation to the employee was due from the carrier of record during
that time.30 8
There are times when the link between industrial accident and a
separate normally noncompensable disease interact to create the need for
greater benefits to the employee. In Urban v. Morris Drywall Spray,309
the court determined that the claimant's compensable injury was aggravated
by preexisting diabetes. The court's determination was based upon an
earlier decision, which established the principle that where a preexisting
condition is aggravated by a compensable accident, the exacerbation of the
preexisting condition is itself compensable. 3t0 The court also found that
it was necessary to treat claimant's diabetic condition in order to render
effective treatment of claimant's compensable injuries.3 '
In Martin County School Board v. McIntosh,3"2 the court examined
the medical testimony supplied to the JCC and determined that there was
competent substantial evidence to support a finding of disabling occupational
disease without the need for further medical tests. The court found that the
claimant suffered from an occupational disease within the meaning of
Florida law3 t 3 by exhibiting the symptoms of chromate sensitivity and
resulting allergic reactions caused by concrete during the course of his
employment. 3 4  The court determined that a claimant need not "present
evidence of a positive patch test to satisfy the requirements of section
305. Tokyo House, Inc. v. Hsin Chu, 597 So. 2d 348, 349 n.I (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992); see also Festa v. Teleflex, Inc., 382 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (discussing
the exposure and repeated trauma theory), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1980).
306. Hsin Chu, 597 So. 2d at 351.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 352.
309. 595 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
310. Id. at 61 (citing Castro v. Florida Juice Division, 400 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. (1981)).
311. Id.
312. 605 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1992).
313. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.151 (1991) (concerning occupational diseases).
314. McIntosh, 605 So. 2d at 166.
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440.151 [of the Florida Statutes] so long as the medical evidence is
otherwise legally sufficient to establish causation . .. . '
In another case, a claim for occupational disease benefits by a claimant
who developed pneumonia was reversed by the court.316 The claimant
was employed to wash buses and claimed that he developed pneumonia
from washing buses in inclement weather. The employer/carrier took the
deposition of an expert witness to challenge the causal relationship." 7
The doctor, however, was paid more than the statutory rate3 8 and the
claimant moved to strike the doctor's testimony.3"9 The JCC and those
present at the hearing on the merits engaged in dialogue that called into
question the veracity of the doctor and that indicated a bias on the part of
the JCC against .the doctor's testimony.320 The court vacated the order of
the JCC and remanded the case for a new hearing on the merits.12  The
dissent noted that, even though the JCC's comments lacked judicial
decorum, there was no evidence of bias and the findings of the JCC could
be upheld because they were supported by competent substantial evi-
dence.322
10. Average Weekly Wage
Under the 1989 provisions relating to the determination of average
weekly wage ("AWW"), the JCC found, and the First District Court of
Appeal affirmed, that a claimant injured while working as a camp counselor
was not entitled to an average weekly wage calculation, which included
earnings from a newspaper delivery route.323 The court stated that the
315. ld. at 167.
316. Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Phillips, 613 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
317. Id.
318. The Florida Statutes limits the fee payable to a health care provider as compensa-
tion for a deposition to $200. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(1) (1991).
319. Phillips, 613 So. 2d at 57.
320. Id. at 57-58.
321. ld
322. ld
323. City of Port Saint Lucie v. Chambers, 606 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1993). The 1991 Amendments to chapter 440
eliminate the concurrent earnings provisions and limit the claimant to recovery from the
employment ongoing at the time of injury. FLA. STAT. ch 440 (1991). The constitutionality
of this provision is currently on appeal before the First District Court of Appeal. But see
Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, 616 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(claimant failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing that the provision is unconstitutional
and the denial of benefits for concurrent wages is affirmed).
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wages from concurrent earnings are generally included (prior to the 1991
amendments) in the calculation of average weekly wage, but that the wages
of independent contractors were specifically excluded because such
contractors are not included in the definition of employee under section
440.02(12)(d)(1 ), Florida Statutes.324
Florida statute provides that where a claimant voluntarily limits
earnings, a JCC may apply a deemed earnings provision to the calculation
of average weekly wage.325 In Avellino v. Pantry Pride Enterprises,
Inc.,326 the court overturned a JCC's determination that the employer
should be allowed an offset because the claimant voluntarily limited
earnings. The court noted that the application of section 440.15(3)(b)(2)
involves the shifting of burdens of proof.327 Once the compensability of
the injury is established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the claimant voluntarily limited his or her earnings.328
In this case, the employer/carrier failed to meet its burden and to establish,
by competent substantial evidence, that the claimant voluntarily limited
earnings. Therefore, the findings of the JCC were reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings.329
In PLM Florida Hotels, Inc. v. DeMarseul,330 the court reversed a
modification of the AWW award to a claimant who sustained a slip and fall
accident in the course and scope of employment. The claimant was awarded
a modification in AWW and the court found this error on the part of the
JCC.33" ' A modification is granted where the claimant makes a showing
of mistake of fact or where material evidence becomes available after the
order.332 The court determined that no new evidence was presented and,
therefore, the claimant was not entitled to a modification of AWW.333
Average weekly wage awards are determined by statutory dictate.334
In Stanley Steemer International v. Prescott,335 the court found that the
324. Chambers, 606 So. 2d at 451 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991)).
325. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991).
326. 597 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
327. Id. at 348 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)(2) (1991)).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. 611 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 620 So. 2d 760 (Fla.
1993).
331. Id. at 1362.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1362-63.
334. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1991).
335. 615 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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JCC erred in selecting the section of the statute applicable to the determina-
tion of AWW. The claimant was employed as a "piece worker" delivering
subpoenas. The JCC determined that the statute would "punish" the
claimant "for demonstrating perseverance, motivation, and initiative." '336
The court withheld comment on whether there was a punishing effect in the
statute, but noted that the claimant's salary was most analogous to a
commission and this was the basis upon which the AWW calculation should
be made.337
11. Special Disability Trust Fund
Special disability trust funds are designed to assist in the hiring of
workers who are disabled whether or not the disablement occurred as the
result of an industrial accident.338 In Florida, a second injury or disease
that merges with previous permanent physical impairment and results in
substantially greater disability than from the second injury alone entitles the
employer to reimbursement for sixty percent of impairment benefits, sixty
percent of wage loss benefits during the first five years after maximum
medical improvement and seventy-five percent thereafter.339
In Special Disability Trust Fund v. Stephens, Lynn, Chernay &
Klein,34 the court upheld an order awarding the employers, in a consoli-
dated case, reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for
supplemental permanent total disability benefits paid pursuant to section
336. Id.
337. Id. Other cases discussing AWW include: Efficient Sys., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Labor & Employment Sec., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2035 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993)
(remanding for recalculation of AWW where the JCC calculated the AWW based on prior
employment); Waldorf v. Jefferson County Sch. Bd., 622 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1 st Dist Ct. App.
1993) (affirming the selection of methodology for calculating AWW where the ]CC
determined the claimant's AWW should be based solely on the number of weeks he actually
worked during the term of his contract); Pishotta v. Pishotta Tile & Marble, Inc., 613 So. 2d
1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (claimant was an active partner in the business enterprise
and sought an AWW award based upon the duties performed); Brownell v. Hillsborough
County, 617 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the JCC's award of AWW
minus the cost of uniforms supplied to the claimant); and Cardinal Indus. v. Pauley, 610 So.
2d 93 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding for explanation from the JCC of factors used
to calculate the AWW).
338. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION
LAWS 41 (1993).
339. Id. The Second Injury Fund is based on a pro rata annual assessment of net
premiums of insurers and self-insurers. The assessments must equal the sum of the
immediate past three years' disbursements. Id.
340. 595 So. 2d 206 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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440.15(1)(e)(1) of the Florida Statutes.14' The court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the statute to reach its conclusion, but noted that the
Legislature may not have accomplished its objective in the 1984 amendment
process.3 42 The court, therefore, certified the following question as one
of great public importance:
IS THE SPECIAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 440.49(2)(C), FLORIDA STATUTES, REQUIRED TO
REIMBURSE EMPLOYERS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS PAID PURSUANT TO SECTION
440.15(1)(E)(1), FLORIDA STATUTES? 343
In Hillsborough County School Board v. Special Disability Trust
Fund,344 the court reversed a finding of the JCC denying reimbursement
from the Special Disability Trust Fund, thereby affirming its decision in
Avellino, and again certified the same question as one of great public
importance.345
The court also reversed the finding of the JCC in regard to reimburse-
ment from the special disability fund in Breakers Hotel v. Special Disability
Trust Fund.346 The court found that there was no collusion between the
employee and the carrier as to the settlement for attorney's fees and that the
employer should be entitled to reimbursement for an appropriate percentage
of the total settlement amount.347
In Florida Employers Insurance Service Corp. v. Special Disability
Trust Fund,3 41 the Florida Employers Insurance Service Corporation
("FEISCO") sought a declaratory statement from the court as to its right to
reimbursement from the special disability trust fund. FEISCO was prepared
to separate its payment of benefits into two checks, one for attorneys fees
and one payable to the claimant. The court determined that FEISCO did not
341. Id. at 209 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(i)(e)(!)
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. 596 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
345. Id.
346. 620 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
347. Id. at 1133. The Special Disability Trust Fund
and here the settlement did not separate the attorney's fc
claimant.
348. 615 So. 2d 859 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
(1991)).
does not reimburse attorney fees,
ees from the benefits paid to the
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jeopardize its right to reimbursement by issuing two checks in the manner
specified.349
12. Payment of Compensation Premiums
Among the basic principles of workers compensation law is the
payment of premiums by the employer for benefits to be paid to the
employee. In 1989, the Supreme Court of Florida consolidated and
addressed the common issue presented in the cases of Barragan v. City of
Miami and Giordano v. City of Miami,35° both involving a City of Miami
ordinance that permitted the city to collect contributions from employees for
the payment of workers compensation benefits.35' Since 1989, there have
been numerous cases that have tested the retroactivity of the supreme court's
decision in Barragan.352 The First District Court of Appeal has firmly
349. Id. at 861.
350. Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989) (consolidating on review
and quashing the decisions below in the cases of City of Miami v. Barragan, 517 So. 2d 99
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1987) and Giordano v. City of Miami, 526 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1988)).
351. Id. at 254.
352. See City of Miami v. Bell, 606 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. (1992), review
granted, 621 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1993). In Bell, the First District affirmed the JCC's award of
additional benefits and certified the following question as one of great public importance:
IS SECTION 440.20(7) APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE, AND IF SO, CAN THE CITY OF MIAMI, BE LEGALLY
EXCUSED FROM PAYING A PENALTY PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION
ON THE AMOUNT OF PENSION OFFSET MONIES WITHHELD IN THE
PAST BECAUSE THE CITY DID SO IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE PENSION
OFFSET IN VIEW OF THE APPELLATE DECISIONS APPROVING ITS
VALIDITY?
Id. at 1189. The following cases certified the same question, and have been consolidated for
review to the Florida Supreme Court with Bell: City of Miami v. Arostegui, 606 So. 2d
1192 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1992) (award of additional benefits upheld); City of Miami v.
Hickey, 614 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding the award of additional
benefits); City of Miami v. McLean, 605 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In
addition to recertifying the question above, the court in McLean also certified the following
questions as one of great public importance:
Whether an increase in workers' compensation benefits, awarded pursuant to
section 440.21 to offset illegal deductions from an employee's pension fund, in
accordance with Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1989),
constitutes "compensation" for purposes of section 440.20, Florida Statutes?
Id. at 954; see also City of Miami v. Paredes, 614 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.)
(certifying the same question as certified in Bell, but not consolidated for review), review
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held to the position of retroactive application and has sought guidance from
the Supreme Court of Florida in regard to several questions certified as
being of great public importance. The position of the First District Court
of Appeal supports the long held premise that payments of workers
compensation premiums are the responsibility of the employer.
13. Attorney's Fees
In Leather Shop v. Mills, 353 the court reviewed an award of attor-
ney's fees made after an accident in 1986. 3" The pertinent Florida statute
provides: "A claimant shall be responsible for the payment of his own
attorney's fees, except that a claimant shall be entitled to recover a
reasonable attorney's fee from a carrier or employer., 355  The two issues
presented were whether the JCC erred in awarding attorney's fees absent a
showing of bad faith and whether the JCC erred in awarding attorney's fees
based on temporary total disability.3 56 The court noted that it requires the
order of a JCC to specifically state whether an award of attorney's fees is
based on bad faith. 57 In the instant case, the order from the JCC was
silent on this matter. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the decision for
entry of the particular grounds upon which fees were awarded.3"8
granted, _ So. 2d (1993).
See also City of Miami v. Daugherty, 614 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
City of Miami v. Hammond, 614 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (award of
additional benefits upheld based upon a distinction between workers compensation benefits
for disability occurring in the course and scope of employment and pension disability benefits
which could accrue for any reason and did not need to be job related); City of North Bay
Village v. Cook, 617 So. 2d 753 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing and remanding for
inclusion in the offset determination of the amount of benefits paid to the claimant as
compensation on the authority of Barragan); Barber v. City of Daytona Beach, 614 So. 2d
669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming an award of additional compensation to offset
illegal deductions of pension benefits when pension benefits have been reduced to the extent
of workers compensation payments); City of Miami v. Burnett, 596 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App.), review denied sub nom. City of Miami v. Ogle, 606 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1992)
(Barragan has retroactive application to July 1, 1973); City of Miami v. Beall, 610 So. 2d
631 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (claim for additional benefits denied based upon statute
of limitations); City of Miami v. Smith, 602 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(pension offset benefits were awarded for the period specified in the order).
353. 592 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
354. Id. at 745.
355. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3) (1991).
356. Leather Shop, 592 So. 2d at 745.
357. Id. at 746.
358. Id
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In Sawyer v. Dover Cylinder Head Co.,"' the court reversed an
award of attorney's fees with instruction to calculate the attorney's fee on
the total stipulated amount of permanent total disability benefits and supple-
mental benefits obtained for claimant by virtue of his attorney's effort.36 °
The court noted that the attorney had expended time and effort on behalf of
the claimant in order to establish the right to permanent total disability
benefits and was, therefore, entitled to a fee based on these efforts.361
In Royal Services, Inc. v. Smith,362 the court reversed and remanded
an award of $25,000 in attorney's fees. The award was reversed due to the
failure of the JCC to establish the basis upon which the JCC departed from
the statutory fee formula.363 Although the JCC may depart from the
statutory fee formula, an analysis of the factors that led to the departure
must be included in the order.364
C. We Will Defend (Part One C)
We have the right and duty to defend at our expense any claim,
proceeding or suit against you for benefits payable by this insurance.
We have the right to investigate and settle these claims, proceedings or
suits. We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not
covered by this insurance.36
Each workers compensation claim brought before the JCC is brought
in the name of the injured employee and the employer/carrier. The carrier
provides defense from the moment of notification of the claim and may
have established procedures for the employer to follow to ensure timely
reporting and payment. In the event that the employer/carrier does not
respond as required, a claimant may proceed with an additional claim for
bad faith.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed the following question
certified as being of great public importance:
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE CLAIMS INJURY ARISING FROM THE
ALLEGED FRAUDULENT ACT OF AN EMPLOYER/CARRIER
359. 593 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
360. Id. at 282.
361. Id. at 281.
362. 605 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
363. Id. at 589.
364. See id.
365. POLICY, supra note 12.
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COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A PROCEEDING INITIATED
PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 440 [OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES] IS
A CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION OF GUILT PRESCRIBED IN
SECTION 440.37 A CONDITION TO THE MAINTENANCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT TORT ACTION? 36
6
The court answered the question in the negative and quashed the decision
of the district court.3 6 7 To reach this conclusion, the Supreme Court of
Florida noted that the Florida Workers Compensation Act was not meant to
bar recovery for intentional tortious conduct.36  Intentional tortious
conduct is also excluded from coverage under the Employers Liability
Insurance portion of the policy. As a matter of public policy, employers are
held liable for their own intentional acts and the WCELIP does not provide
coverage or a defense for such acts.
In Wackenhut Corp. v. Schisler,369 the court found that an admission
of bad faith in regard to payment of one claim did not constitute an
admission of bad faith in regard to subsequent claims. 370 To reach this
conclusion, the court examined the facts and decided that the employ-
er/carrier timely paid the claim for permanent disability benefits when
notified of the claim.37' The court cited to prior decisions in which it had
enunciated the principle that the nonpayment of claims immediately upon
the taking of the claimant's doctor's deposition was not grounds for a bad
faith award of attorney's fees. 72
Even when an award of attorney's fees for bad faith handling of a
claim is upheld, the court has determined that the fees awarded should
follow the statutory fee formula unless there are compelling reasons for
departure from this standard.373 The court specifically noted, however,
366. Sibley v. Adjustco, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1048, 1049 (Fla. 1992).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. 606 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (involving a wrap-up policy
between Wackenhut and Florida Power and Light). A wrap-up policy is used to provide
coverage for individuals who might otherwise "slip through the cracks" on large projects.
Generally, the wrap-up policy is the policy of last resort for a workers compensation
claimant. The policy is used when there is overlapping or no coverage for an individual who
has performed work for the parties but who may not be able to establish employee status.
370. Id. at 1253.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1252 (citing Doctor's Hosp. of Sarasota v. Taylor, 576 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
373. See Regal Woods Prods. v. Baschansci, 603 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
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that where warranted and supported by competent substantial evidence the
JCC would be justified in departing from the statutory fee formula.374
In Woolworth's Restaurant v. Cubillos, 375 the court reversed an award
of penalties.376 The court noted:
Penalties should not be imposed where the e/c [employer/carrier] timely
file a notice to controvert .... Although the record in the instant case
does not contain a notice to controvert, a portion of the JCC's order
states that "[t]his claim was totally controverted." Because no explana-
tion is offered, we must reverse the award of penalties and remand the
case for clarification of the JCC's order . . . . On remand, the JCC
should state explicitly whether the e/c sufficiently controverted the
claim, or, if the claim was not timely controverted, whether the e/c have
a valid excuse for not doing So1 7
7
The decision continues a chain of cases in which the court requires a
determination by the JCC that the employer/carrier has failed to meet its
obligations before an award of penalties or attorney's fees will be made for
bad faith.37
The court reversed an order denying bad faith attorney's fees where the
record showed that the employer/carrier had never sought to take the
deposition of the doctor whose testimony was essential to establishing the
claim.379 The claim for attorney's fees was made on the ground that the
employer/carrier acted in bad faith by not timely accepting the claimant as
permanently totally disabled." The employer/carrier testified that
permanent total disability benefits were awarded when claimant's doctor's
deposition was taken.3 1' The court's position was that the deposition was
scheduled by claimant's counsel, and that the employer/carrier had not
sought the information, which could have resolved the claim seventeen
months earlier. 32  Accordingly, the evidence used to deny bad faith
374. See id at 553.
375. 608 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Ist Dist Ct. App. 1992).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Glades Gen. Hosp. v. Sullenger, 584 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Four Quarters Habitat, Inc. v. Miller, 405 So. 2d 475 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Central Maintenance & Welding v. Simmons; 621 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
379. Kirkland v. Northwest Fla. Regional Hous. Auth., 596 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
380. Id. at 1260.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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attorney's fees was not competent to justify the delay in the carrier's
response.383
Where a carrier accepted an injury as compensable and began
compensation payments that were later reduced, the court reasoned that an
award of penalties, interest, and costs was required. 384  The carrier had
reduced payments in order to recoup what it believed were overpayments to
the claimant. In doing so, however, it recouped more than the amount it
believed the claimant owed. The claimant prevailed on many of her claims
in the proceedings below and the court remanded the case for the entry of
an award of penalties, interest, costs, and attorney's fees.3"5
D. We Will Also Pay (Part One D)
We will also pay these costs, in addition to other amounts payable as
insurance, as part of any claim, proceeding or suit we defend:
1. reasonable expenses incurred at our request, but not loss of
earnings;
2. premiums for bonds to release attachments and for appeal bonds in
bond amounts up to the amount payable under this insurance;
3. litigation costs taxed against you;
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we offer the
amount due under this insurance; and
5. expenses we incur.386
This is a listing of various costs and expenses that the insurer is
obligated to pay in connection with the defense of any claim made against
the insured. These costs are in addition to any costs that the insurer is
required to pay pursuant to other sections of the policy.38
E. Other Insurance (Part One E)
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by
this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. Subject to any
limits of liability that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss
383. Id. at 1261.
384. See McClure v. Goldman, Klasfeld, Horkey & Ferraro, 594 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
385. Id. at 354.
386. POLICY, supra note 12.
387. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 6.
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is paid. If any insurance or self-insurance is exhausted, the shares of all
remaining insurance will be equal until the loss is paid. 8
As noted previously, it is possible that more than one policy and/or
insurer may be liable for the benefits to claimant. This section of the policy
provides that only the portion of the claim that is tied to the policy under
which the claim is made will be paid by that policy. This section is
becoming more significant as a greater number of insureds retain a portion
of the responsibility (deductible plans) or self-insure for part or all of their
liability.389 The National Council on Compensation Insurance has filed a
Benefits Deductible Endorsement-WC 00 06 03,390 which has been ap-
proved for use in Florida. Individual carriers may also file large deductible
plans with state regulators.
F. Payments You Must Make (Part One F)
You are responsible for any payments in excess of the benefits regularly
provided by the workers compensation law including those required be-
cause:
I. of your serious and willful misconduct;
2. you knowingly employ an employee in violation of law;
3. you fail to comply with a health or safety regulation; or
4. you discharge, coerce or otherwise discriminate against any
employee in violation of the workers compensation law.
If we make any payments in excess of the benefits regularly provided
by the workers compensation law on your behalf, you will reimburse us
promptly."'
This section gives notice to the insured of the payments that .are not
insured or insurable under the policy contract.392 In some states, not
including Florida, benefit payments may be doubled if the employer know-
ingly hires a minor child.393 In such an instance, the carrier would make
the payment on behalf of the employer but would retain the right to reclaim
the excess payment from the employer.394
388. POLICY, supra note 12.
389. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 7.
390. POLICY, supra note 12.
391. Id.
392. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 7.
393. Id. at 8.
394. Id.
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G. Recovery From Others (Part One G)
We have your rights, and the rights of persons entitled to the benefits
of this insurance, to recover our payments from anyone liable for the
injury. You will do everything necessary to protect those rights for us
and to help us enforce them.395
This provision of the policy provides for subrogation against another
person or policy which may be responsible for all or part of the claim. An
employer may elect to waive the right of subrogation by requesting that the
carrier attach the Waiver of Our Right to Recover From Others Endorse-
ment--WC 00 03 13396 to the policy. This endorsement was filed as an
advisory endorsement, which means that each carrier using the endorsement
must file it with the state regulator and gain approval in accordance with the
laws of the state. The endorsement has limited use in the assigned risk
market, since it will only be reinsurable if attached to a policy for which
waiver of subrogation is required by contract. 97
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Fallen,9 ' a case of first
impression, the Fifth District Court of Appeal considered section 440.39(3)-
(a) of the Florida Statutes to determine whether an award of post-judgment
interest was proper on a judgment against a third-party tortfeasor. 99 The
case arose following the payment of workers compensation benefits to two
employees who had successfully pursued claims against third parties. The
insurer, however, held subrogation liens on the judgment."° The issue
before the court was whether Florida statute required that post-judgment
interest be paid on the pro rata share to the insurance company.40 1 The
court found that the statute does not directly address the issue of post-
judgment interest, but stated that both logic and equity dictate that the
395. POLICY, supra note 12.
396. NCCI, POLICY FORMS MANUAL, 1984.
397. FLORIDA WORKERS COMPENSATION INSURANCE PLAN (1984) ("FWCIP"). The
FWCIP contains the rules which govern workers compensation assigned risk policies in
Florida. The Plan is filed with the state regulator and is applied to all employers who are
unable to obtain voluntary insurance or who do not qualify for self insurance. On November
10, 1993, the Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 12C, which abolishes the FWICP and
its reinsuring mechanism. The bill will become effective December 31, 1993 provided that
it is signed by the governor. The Florida Join Underwriting Association ("JUA") will come
into effect on January 1, 1994, and will assume the insurance and reinsurance responsibilities.
398. 603 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
399. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3)(a) (1991)).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 612.
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insurer is entitled to its pro rata share of the post-judgment interest collected
from the tortfeasors. °2
In Tarmac of Florida v. Gwaltney, °3 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal considered whether a trial court has the discretion to limit a carrier's
lien on future benefits to indemnity benefits, to the exclusion of medical
benefits. 4 4  The appellate court noted the literal wording of section
440.39(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which expressly states that the term
"benefits" includes both compensation and medical benefits and provides
that the carrier's pro rata recovery applies against each. 4 5  The court
concluded that the pro rata recovery applies to future, as well as past,
benefits. While the court reversed the decision of the trial court in this
matter, it acknowledged a conflict with an opinion the Second District Court
of Appeal issued on the same matter.4 6
H. Statutory Provisions (Part One H)
These statements apply where they are required by law:
I. As between an injured worker and us, we have notice of the injury
when you have notice.
2. Your default or the bankruptcy or insolvency of you or your estate
will not relieve us of our duties under this insurance after an injury
occurs.
3. We are directly and primarily liable to any person entitled to the
benefits payable by this insurance. Those persons may enforce our
duties; so may an agency authorized by law. Enforcement may be
against us or against you and us.
4. Jurisdiction over you is jurisdiction over us for the purposes of the
workers compensation law. We are bound by decisions against
you under that law, subject to the provisions of this policy that are
not in conflict with that law.
5. This insurance conforms to the parts of the workers compensation
law that apply to:
a. benefits payable by this insurance;
b. special taxes, payments into security or other special funds,
and assessments payable by us under that law.
6. Terms of this insurance that conflict with the workers compensa-
tion law are changed by this statement to conform to that law.
402. Id.
403. 604 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 908 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3)(a) (1991)).
406. Id. (citing Payless Oil v. Reynolds, 565 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct, App. 1990)).
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Nothing in these paragraphs relieves you of your duties under this
policy.4"7
This section of the policy lists provisions which may be required by
one or more workers compensation laws. This provision allows the policy
contract to be adapted to the law of the state in which the insurance is
issued.
IV. PART Two-EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part Two A)
This employers liability insurance applies to bodily injury by accident
or bodily injury by disease. Bodily injury includes resulting death.
I. The bodily injury must arise out of and in the course and scope of
the injured employee's employment by you.
2. The employment must be necessary or incidental to your work in
a state or territory listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page.
3. Bodily injury by accident must occur during the policy period.
4. Bodily injury by disease must be caused or aggravated by the
conditions of your employment. The employee's last day of last
exposure to the conditions causing or aggravating such bodily
injury by disease must occur during the policy period.
5. If you are sued, the original suit and any related legal actions for
damages for bodily injury by accident or by disease must be
brought in the United States of America, its territories or posses-
sions, or Canada. °8
The employers liability section of the WCELIP is applicable to
common law or other damages payable by the insured.4"9 This provision
differs from Part A which involves the statutory coverage mandated by a
state's workers compensation law. In Florida, the jurisdiction for claims
made under Part Two of the policy lies in the circuit court. Claims under
this section of the policy arise from common law torts that fall outside the
scope of the workers compensation laws. At the same time, the coverage
407. POLICY, supra note 12.
408. Id.
409. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 9.
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provided relates to bodily injury by accident or bodily injury by disease that
arises out of, and in the course and scope of, employment.41°
B. We Will Pay (Part Two B)
We will pay all sums you legally must pay as damages because of
bodily injury to your employees, provided the bodily injury is covered
by this Employers Liability insurance.
The damages we will pay, where recovery is permitted by law, include
damages:
1. for which you are liable to a third party by reason of a claim or
suit against you by that third party to recover the damages claimed
against such third party as a result of injury to your employee;
2. for care and loss of services; and
3. for consequential bodily injury to a spouse, child, parent, brother
or sister of the injured employee; and
provided that these damages are the direct consequence of bodily injury
that arises out of and in the course of the injured employee's employ-
ment by you; and
4. because of bodily injury to your employee that arises out of and in
the course of employment, claimed against you in a capacity other
than as the employer.41'
This is the basic indemnity provision of the employers liability section
of the policy. This insurance generally provides for "damages" in contrast
to "benefits." Damages are "[a] pecuniary compensation or indemnity,
which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, through the
unlawful act or omission or negligence of another." '412 While workers
compensation is a no-fault system, employer's liability insurance is payable
as the result of ajudgment or settlement for damages. The damages payable
fall into three general categories.
1. Third Party Over
A "third party over" suit involves an employer who must pay workers
compensation benefits and who impleads a third party whose negligence was
responsible for the injury to the worker. A third party over suit may occur
410. Id.
411. POLICY, supra note 12.
412. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (6th ed. 1990).
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on a large construction project where the employee of one contractor is
injured due to the negligence of another contractor. The first contractor is
responsible for workers compensation payments to the injured worker, but
may implead the second contractor for contribution or indemnification. 13
2. Familial Suits
Some states permit a cause of action for close relatives of the injured
worker. Such actions would be outside the jurisdiction of the JCC and
would fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Familial suits may be
brought on the basis of loss of consortium414 or where a family member
has been injured in the course of caring for an injured employee. While
attendant care by a family member caring for a disabled worker is covered
by Florida's Workers Compensation Law, 15 and is covered, therefore,
under Part One of the policy, an injury to the family member while caring
for the injured worker would fall under Part Two of the policy.
413. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 10. See, e.g., Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts,
Inc., 18 Fla. L. Weekly D2022 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1993); Barbosa v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
414. FelTiter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980) (forming
the basis for inclusion of this coverage within the WCELIP).
415. See, e.g., Attitudes & Trends v. Arsuaga, 616 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App.
1993) (affirming an award of attendant care rendered prior to a physician's prescription for
such care); Frederick Electronics v. Pettijohn; 619 So. 2d 14 (Fla. Ist. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(partially affirming and reversing an award of attendant care by limiting the hours required
to meet the claimant's needs); Southern Indus. v. Chumney, 613 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (affirming an award of maid service where claimant suffered respiratory problems
and required a dust free environment); Timothy Bowser Constr. Co. v. Kowalski, 605 So. 2d
885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of attendant care by claimant's
parents); Buena Vida Townhouse Ass'n v. Parciak, 603 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (affirming the award of attendant care by family member, and examining the
appropriate rate of pay); Bojangles v. Kuring, 598 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing and remanding an award of attendant care to claimant's husband where award was
a "blanket award"); Standard Blasting & Coating v. Hayman, 597 So. 2d 392 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing an order denying a motion to reduce attendant care benefits to
injured employee's wife based upon the "nonprofessional status" of the wife); Gator Tire v.
Casteel, 595 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of attendant care
and noting that failure of the employer/carrier to raise the applicability of statutory changes
in regard to attendant care in the court below precluded the issue from being raised on
appeal); Merritt Sea Wall v. Revels, 594 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming
an award of attendant care by claimant's wife, but reversing the payment for attendant care
at prevailing wage and establishing that the wage should be federal minimum wage).
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3. Dual Capacity Doctrine
The dual capacity doctrine allows recovery, in some states, where the
employer may have two roles in the injury to the employee.416 This
situation arises when the employer is also the manufacturer of equipment
that was involved in the injury to the employee. The employee may then
be entitled to workers compensation benefits and may be able to make a
claim against the employer as the manufacturer of a defective product.41'
True no-fault compensation laws, such as the Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act"'8 and the Black Lung Benefits Act,4" 9 are
not covered by Part Two of the policy because of their no-fault nature.
Coverage for compensation under the various federal acts is obtained by
endorsement to Part One of the policy. 2°
C. Exclusions (Part Two C)
This insurance does not cover:
1. liability assumed under a contract. This exclusion does not apply
to a warranty that your work will be done in a workmanlike
manner;
2. punitive or exemplary damages because of bodily injury to an
employee employed in violation of law;
3. bodily injury to an employee while employed in violation of law
with your actual knowledge or the actual knowledge of any of your
executive officers;
4. any obligation imposed by a workers compensation, occupational
disease, unemployment compensation, or disability benefits, or any
similar law;
5. bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by you;
6. bodily injury occurring outside the United States of America, its
territories or possessions, and Canada. This exclusion does not
apply to bodily injury to a citizen or resident of the United States
of America or Canada who is temporarily outside these countries;
7. damages arising out of coercion of any employee. 2
416. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 11.
417. See LARSON, supra note 1, § 72.00.
418. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
419. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
420. GUIDE, supra note 9, at II.
421. POLICY, supra note 12.
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This section of the policy lists the exclusions from coverage. It is
applicable only to Part Two of the policy since Part One coverage is
governed by statutory mandate. Exclusions are a common part of insurance
policies since the insurer is attempting to clarify what is and what is not
covered. The Fourth District Court of Appeal cited, with favor, to a
Minnesota appellate decision interpreting a policy exclusion, which stated:
"[u]nless ambiguous, the language used in an insurance contract must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning." '4 22 At the same time, it is an
established principle of law that an insurance contract will be liberally
construed in favor of the insured.42 3
D. We Will Defend (Part Two D)
We have the right and duty to defend, at our expense, any claim,
proceeding or suit against you for damages payable by this insurance.
We have the right to investigate and settle these claims, proceedings and
suits.
We have no duty to defend a claim, proceeding or suit that is not
covered by this insurance. We have no duty to defend or continue
defending after we have paid our applicable limit of liability under this
insurance."'
This provision is similar to the duty to defend provision discussed
under Part One. The main difference in the duty to defend under Part Two
is that employers liability insurance is subject to a policy limit (workers
compensation insurance is not so limited by statute) and, therefore, the duty
to defend under Part Two will exist to the point where the insurer has paid
the applicable limit of liability under the insurance.425
E. We Will Also Pay (Part Two E)
We will also pay these costs, in addition to other amounts payable under
this insurance, as part of any claim, proceeding, or suit we defend:
422. Great Global Assurance Co. v. Shoemaker, 599 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Alexandra House, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 419
N.W.2d 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)).
423. See LARSON, supra note I, § 93.00-93.10. Conflicts as to the meaning of policy
terms fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court and require separate examination from
the issue of workers compensation law.
424. POLICY, supra note 12.
425. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
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I. reasonable expenses incurred at our request, but not loss of
earnings;
2. premiums for bonds to release attachments and for appeal bonds in
bond amounts up to the limit of our liability under this insurance;
3. litigation costs taxed against you;
4. interest on a judgment as required by law until we off the amount
due under this insurance; and
4265. expenses we incur.
This is an explanatory section of the policy which outlines the costs
which will be borne by an insurer in defending an employer's liability
action. These costs and expenses are not necessarily part of the de-
fense.
4 27
F. Other Insurance (Part Two F)
We will pay no more than our share of damages and costs covered by
this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance. Subject to any
limits of liability that apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is
paid. If any insurance or self-insurance is exhausted, the shares of all
remaining insurance and self-insurance will be equal until the loss is
paid.428
This section mimics the rights of the insurer to pay only its fair share
of any claim that is found in Part One E of the policy. The difference in
language is indicative of the payment of damages under Part Two and
benefits under Part One.429
G. Limits of Liability (Part Two G)
Our liability to pay for damages is limited. Our limits of liability are
shown in Item 3.B. of the Information Page. They apply as explained
below.
I. Bodily Injury by Accident. The limit shown for "bodily injury by
accident-each accident" is the most we will pay for all the damages
covered by this insurance because of bodily injury to one or more
employees in any one accident.
426. POLICY, supra note 12.
427. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
428. POLICY, supra note 12.
429. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
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A disease is not bodily injury by accident unless it results directly
fi'om bodily injury by accident.
2. Bodily Injury by Disease. The limit shown for "bodily injury by
disease-policy limit" is the most we will pay for all damages
covered by this insurance and arising out of bodily injury by
disease, regardless of the number of employees who sustain bodily
injury by disease. The limit shown for "bodily injury by disease-
each employee" is the most we will pay for all damages because
of bodily injury by disease to any one employee.
Bodily injury by disease does not include disease that results
directly from a bodily injury by accident.
3. We will not pay any claims for damages after we have paid the
applicable limit of our liability under this insurance.430
Unlike workers compensation insurance, employer's liability insurance
is subject to limits of liability.4 3' The standard limits of liability are
$100,000 for bodily injury by accident, $100,000 for bodily injury by
disease, and an aggregate of $500,000 for the policy.4 32 It is possible for
employers to purchase additional coverage under this section of the policy
or obtain coverage by means of an excess or "umbrella policy. 4 33 Some
states, not including Florida, provide for unlimited employers liability under
the WCELIP.4 34
H. Recovery From Others (Part Two H)
We have your rights to recover our payment from anyone liable for an
injury covered by this insurance. You will do everything necessary to
protect those rights for us and to help us enforce them.43
This section of the policy is similar to the subrogation section of the
workers compensation portion of the policy (Part One C). It provides that
the insurer has the right to step into the shoes of the insured to recover from
a third party when possible.
430. POLICY, supra note 12.
431. GuIDE, supra note 9, at 13.
432. Id.
433. Id
434. Id. at 14.
435. POLICY, supra note 12.
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I. Action Against Us (Part Two I)
There will be no right of action against us under this insurance unless:
I. You have complied with all the terms of this policy; and
2. The amount you owe has been determined with our consent or by
actual trial and final judgment.
This insurance does not give anyone the right to add us as a defendant
in an action against you to determine your liability.436
This section is the opposite of the provision in Part One H.3., which
allows a party to join the insurer in any suit for workers compensation
benefits. Under this section of the policy, there is no right of direct action
until the insurer's liability has become fixed by judgment or settlement.4 37
V. PART THREE-OTHER STATES INSURANCE
A. How This Insurance Applies (Part Three A)
1. This other states insurance applies only if one or more states are
shown in Item 3.C. of the Information Page.
2. If you begin work in any one of those states and are not insured or
are not self-insured for such work, the policy will apply as though
that state were listed in Item 3.A. of the Information Page.
3. We will reimburse you for the benefits required by the workers
compensation law of that state if we are not permitted to pay the
benefits directly to persons entitled to them.438
B. Notice (Part Three B)
Tell us at once if you begin work in any state listed in Item 3.C. of the
Information Page.439
Part Three of the policy provides for extraterritorial coverage for
workers compensation benefits. The coverage may be extended to any state
in which the employer has no ongoing work at policy inception, but for
436. Id.
437. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 14.
438. POLICY, supra note 12.
439. Id.
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which temporary and incidental exposure may occur during the policy
term.44° Other states' insurance presents one of the most contentious
sections of the policy. High mobility of workers has created a situation in
which workers travel frequently and wish to elect the higher paying benefits
of the state of injury to those of the state of employment. Florida has dealt
with the issue of travelling employees through amendment to-the workers
compensation law.44' The Legislature has also left intact the extraterrito-
rial provisions of Florida's workers compensation law, which provides:
Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere
than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to
compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his
dependents shall be entitled to compensation if the contract of employ-
ment -was made in this state, or the employment was principally
localized in this state. However, if the employee shall receive compen-
sation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein
contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the
same injury greater than provided herein.442
The First District Court of Appeal reviewed one case, deciding whether
a worker injured in another state could claim Florida workers compensation
benefits.443 The court determined that the worker was not within the
jurisdiction of the Florida workers compensation law by analyzing the
employment contract and determining that the union official who negotiated
the contract in Florida was without hiring authority.444 Since the contract
of hire was not entered into in Florida, Florida did not have jurisdiction over
the claim for benefits.4 5
VI. PART FOUR-YOUR DUTIES IF INJURY OCCURS
Tell us at once if injury occurs that may be covered by this policy.
Your other duties are listed here.
440. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 15-16.
441. See FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (1991).
442. Id. § 440.09(1).
443. Nelson v. McAbee Constr., Inc., 591 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
444. Id. at 1017.
445. Id. at 1018.
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I. Provide for immediate medical and other services required by the
workers compensation law.
2. Give us or our agent the names and addresses of the injured
persons and of witnesses, and other information we may need.
3. Promptly give us all notices, demands and legal papers related to
the injury, claim, proceeding or suit.
4. Cooperate with us and assist us, as we may request, in the
investigation, settlement or defense of any claim, proceeding or
suit.
5. Do nothing after an injury occurs that would interfere with our
right to recover from others.
6. Do not voluntarily make payments, assume obligations or incur
expenses, except at your own cost.
446
This section of the policy outlines the duties of the employer in the
case of injury. The primary obligation of the employer is to provide for
immediate medical and other services needed by the injured employee. The
employer is then required to give notice to the insurer of the injury and to
cooperate in the investigation, defense, and settlement of any claim,
proceeding, or suit.
VII. PART FIVE-PREMIUM
A. Our Manuals (Part Five A)
All premium for this policy will be determined by our manuals of rules,
rates, rating plans and classifications. We may change our manuals and
apply the changes to this policy as authorized by law or a governmental
agency regulating this insurance.447
Each insurance carrier.. or rate service organization449 is required
to file its manual of classifications, rates, every rating plan, and every
modification of these that it proposes to use. Members of a rate service
organization may fulfill their filing requirements through the filings of the
rate service organization.45  Once approved by the regulator, these
446. POLICY, supra note 12.
447. Id.
448. See FLA. STAT. § 627.091(1) (1991).
449. See id. § 627.091(4).
450. see id.
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manuals establish the method for determining the rates for each employer
within the state.45' In addition to the filing of rates for each of the
employment classification codes, employers are subject to having their rates
modified by their loss experience expressed as an experience modification
factor. '2
B. Classifications (Part Five B)
Item 4 of the Information Page shows the rate and premium basis for
certain business or work classifications. These classifications were
assigned based on an estimate of the exposures you would have during
the policy period. If your actual exposures are not properly described
by those classifications, we will assign proper classifications, rates and
premium basis by endorsement to this policy. 53
Classification codes are filed by the rate service organization or by the
insurer in order to establish fairness in the rating process. The classification
codes allow for similar employments to be placed within the same rating
structure. Each classification code carries a detailed description, allowing
the employer to review the codes assigned to his business. 54 The purpose
of classification is to reflect the actual exposure of the employer.
C. Remuneration (Part Five C)
Premium for each work classification is determined by multiplying a
rate times a premium basis. Remuneration is the most common premi-
um basis. This Premium basis includes payroll and all other remunera-
tion paid or payable during the policy period for the services of:
1. all your officers and employees engaged in work covered by this
policy; and
2. all other persons engaged in work that could make us liable under
Part One (Workers Compensation Insurance) of this policy. If you
do not have payroll records for these persons, the contract price for
their services and materials may be used as the premium basis.
451. See id. § 627.101.
452. See id. § 627.291. This section of the statute establishes an aggrieved person
remedy for any employer who seeks review of the rates or rating plans used to develop that
employer's rates. Among the factors that may be reviewed is the experience modification
factor, which is calculated based upon a filing by the rate service organization or the carrier.
453. POLICY, supra note 12.
454. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, SCOPES MANUAL OF
WORKERS COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYERS LIABILITY INSURANCE (1984).
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This paragraph 2 will not apply if you give us proof that the
employers of these persons lawfully secured their workers compen-
sation obligations.455
Remuneration is determined by rules filed and approved by the
regulator.456 The purpose of determining remuneration is to establish the
amount of payroll, which forms the basis for the calculation of premi-
um 457
D. Premium Payments (Part Five D)
You will pay all premium when due. You will pay the premium even
if part or all of a workers compensation law is not valid.458
This provision of the policy establishes that all premiums are due and
payable by the insured. Historically, this provision remains from a time
when part or all of workers compensation laws were found to be unconstitu-
tional takings or a denial of access to the courts. 459 Today, reform of
workers compensation laws reopens the challenge to the constitutionality of
such laws. In both Florida and Texas, recent reform efforts have met with
determinations of unconstitutionality.
460
E. Final Premium (Part Five E)
The premium shown on the Information Page, schedules, and endorse-
ments is an estimate. The final premium will be determined after this
policy ends by using the actual, not the estimated, premium basis and
the proper classifications and rates that lawfully apply to the business
and work covered by this policy. If the final premium is more than you
paid to us, you must pay us the balance. If it is less, we will refund the
balance to you. The final premium will not be less than the highest
minimum premium for the classifications covered by this policy.
If this policy is canceled, final premium will be determined in the
following way unless our manuals provide otherwise.
455. POLICY, supra note 12.
456. See FLA. STAT. §627.091 (1991).
457. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON COMPENSATION INSURANCE, BASIC MANUAL OF WORKERS
COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY INSURANCE (1984) [hereafter BASIC MANUAL].
458. POLICY, supra note 12.
459. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 20.
460. Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991); Texas Workers' Compensation
Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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1. If we cancel, final premium will be calculated pro rata based on
the time this policy was in force. Final premium will not be less
than the pro rata share of the minimum premium.
2. If you cancel, final premium will be more than pro rata; it will be
based on the time this policy was in force, and increased by our
short-rate cancellation table and procedure. Final premium will not
be less than the minimum premium.46 '
The policy language establishes that the premiums for workers
compensation are an estimate. The actual premium will be determined on
audit following the policy term. This permits the calculation of premiums
to be based on the actual payroll of the employer.
F. Record (Part Five F)
You will keep records of information needed to compute premium.
You will provide us with copies of those records when we ask for
them. 4
62
By the terms of the policy contract, the insured has the obligation of
keeping records which will enable the carrier to establish a final premium.
The insured is also obligated to provide the insurer with copies of the
information upon request.
G. Audit (Part Five G)
You will let us examine and audit all your records that relate to this
policy. These records include ledgers, journals, registers, vouchers,
contracts, tax reports, payroll and disbursement records, and programs
for storing and retrieving data. We may conduct the audits during
regular business hours during the policy period and within three years
after the policy period ends. Information developed by audit will be
used to determine final premium. Insurance rate service organizations
have the same rights we have under this provision.463
This section of the policy establishes the insurer's right to audit the
employer's records for a period up to three years following the policy term.
461. POLICY, supra note 12.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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The right to audit is also extended to the rate service organization by this
provision.
VIII. PART SIX-CONDITIONS
A. Inspection (Part Six A)
We have the right, but are not obliged to inspect your workplaces
at any time. Our inspections are not safety inspections. They relate
only to the insurability of the workplaces and the premiums to be
charged. We may also recommend changes. While they may help
reduce losses, we do not undertake to perform the duty of any person
to provide for the health or safety of your employees or the public. We
do not warrant that your workplaces are safe or healthful or that they
comply with laws, regulations, codes or standards. Insurance rate
service organizations have the same rights we have under this provi-
sion.464
The insurer, by this provision, retains the right to inspect the employ-
er's premises. The inspection may be part of the audit process or may be
conducted for other reasons. Liability for a warranty of safety is specifically
disclaimed.465
B. Long Term Policy (Part Six B)
If the policy period is longer than one year and sixteen days, all
provisions of this policy will apply as though a new policy were issued
on each annual anniversary that this policy is in force.466
This provision relates to a rule in one of the filed and approved
manuals.467 This rule states that a policy may be issued for any period not
longer than three years. If the policy is issued for a period not longer than
one year and sixteen days, it is treated as a one year policy. For any term
464. Id.
465. See James v. State, 457 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 1983); Viducich v. Greater New York
Mut. Ins. Co., 192 A.2d 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 195 A.2d 21 (N.J.
1963).
466. POLICY, supra note 12.
467. BASIC MANUAL, supra note 457, at Rule III.C.
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longer than this, the policy is divided into one year units and a unit less than
twelve months is treated as a short term policy.468
C. Transfer of your Rights and Duties (Part Six C)
Your rights or duties under this policy may not be transferred without
our written consent. If you die and we receive notice within thirty days
after your death, we will cover your legal representative as insured.469
This provision prevents the assignment of the policy without the
consent of the insurer. A minor exception is made in the event the insured
dies. In that instance, the policy may be held for thirty days by the executor
or administrator of the insured's estate provided the insurer is given notice
within thirty days of the death. Nonassignability is essential to ensure that
the liability and exposure under the policy is not changed.
D. Cancellation (Part Six D)
I. You may cancel this policy. You must mail or deliver advance
written notice to us stating when the cancellation is to take effect.
2. We may cancel this policy. We must mail or deliver to you not
less than ten days advance written notice stating when the cancella-
tion is to take effect. Mailing that notice to you at your mailing
address shown in Item 1 of the Information Page will be sufficient
to prove notice.
3. The policy period will end on the day and hour stated in the
cancellation notice.
4. Any of these provisions that conflict with a law that controls the
cancellation of the insurance in this policy is changed by this state-
ment to comply with the law.470
Cancellation of a workers compensation policy is subject to the policy
terms and to statutory requirements.47 ' In Curtis-Hale, Inc. v. Gelt,
472
the court examined whether cancellation of a policy had been accomplished
with due regard for the requirements of law. The original policy issued to
Geltz was through the assigned risk plan and was assigned by the plan
468. GUIDE, supra note 8, at 22.
469. POLICY, supra note 12.
470. Id.
471. See FLA. STAT. § 627.4133(l) (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. § 440.42(2) (1991).
472. 610 So. 2d 558 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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administrator to Aetna Casualty Company in August 1987.47' By Novem-
ber 1987, Aetna had notified the insured of its intent to cancel for non-
payment of premium. The policy was reinstated on receipt of payment, and
was canceled when later payments did not clear the bank. Aetna requested
assistance from the Division of Insurance as to how to proceed with
cancellation and was advised that thirty days notice was required. The
policy was canceled on May 14, 1988 and the claim for which Geltz sought
coverage occurred in September of 1988. Geltz sought coverage from
another carrier two days after the occurrence of the industrial accident. The
court construed these facts as competent substantial evidence that the policy
had been canceled in accordance with law, and that the employer had been
provided with the notice that was the intent behind the law.474 In the
event the policy had not been properly canceled, the insurer would have had
an obligation to provide coverage for the industrial accident.
E. Sole Representative (Part Six E)
The insured first named in Item I of the Information Page will act on
behalf of all insureds to change this policy, receive return premium, and
give or receive notice of cancellation.475
This provision is intended to allow the first named insured on the
information page to act on behalf of any other named insured. This
provision is necessary when there is more than one named insured since
only one legal entity at a time may carry out transactions with the carri-
er.
4 76
IX. CONCLUSION
The Workers Compensation and Employers Liability Insurance
Policy-WC 00 00 00 is the basic insuring contract for workers compen-
sation and employers liability during the survey period. The revisions to the
policy are unlikely to impact any of the decisions rendered by the JCC's, the
First District Court of Appeal, or the Supreme Court of Florida in the
immediate future.
473. Id. at 559.
474. Id. at 562.
475. POLICY, supra note 12.
476. GUIDE, supra note 9, at 23.
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Of great significance to the adjudicatory decisions, however, are the
legislative amendments to the workers compensation laws. At this time,
many legislatures are reforming workers compensation systems. Nonethe-
less, the workers compensation and employers liability insurance policy is
a stable contract capable of accommodating the reform legislation and the
changing requirements of the workplace.
Workers compensation law is at a crossroads. The costs of maintaining
a no-fault insurance system for a highly mobile and diversified workforce
increases exponentially each year.477 Industrial accident costs for medical
and indemnity benefits have risen significantly and an already overburdened
system struggles to respond. Clearly, the introduction of reform legislation
has been directed at driving down the cost of workers compensation insur-
ance in order to ensure that a remedy that has provided benefits to injured
workers for over ninety years continues to do so into the next century.
477. UNrrED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION
LAWS (1993).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991 and 1992, the Florida Legislature enacted over 130 pages of
amendments to the Florida Condominium Act' and made comparable
changes to the Florida Cooperative Act.2 In 1992, the Florida Legislature
also enacted a short addition to the Florida "Corporations Not for Profit"
Statute3 which for the first time provided a regulatory framework, albeit of
limited applicability, for so-called homeowner associations.
Because of the difficulty of assimilating the sheer volume of these
changes and perhaps in part, out of sheer exhaustion, the 1993 Florida
Legislature made no further direct changes to either the Condominium Act
or the Cooperative Act. It also failed to adopt proposals by various groups
to correct technical errors in the fledgling Homeowners Association Act.4
While the 1993 legislative session did make significant changes to other
related substantive areas affecting the operation of all types of community
associations, the main developments in community association law during
1993 occurred in the administrative and judicial forums. These changes
perpetuate the turbulence and confusion that surrounds common ownership
and common use communities in Florida.
I. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 718.101-718.622 (Supp. 1990) with ch. 91-103, 1991 Fla.
Laws 772 (containing more than 90 pages of text relating to condominiums).
2. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 719.101-719.622 (Supp. 1990) with Ch. 92-49, 1992 Fla.
Laws (containing more than 60 pages of new additions to the Florida Cooperative Act, most
of them mirroring the new condominium provisions).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.101-617.2101 (1991).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 617.301-617.306 (Supp. 1992). See, e.g., H.B. 1351 (1993),
created by The Florida Bar and supported by several other groups, including Florida
Legislative Alliance, an arm of the Community Association Institute.
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II. SIGNIFICANT LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND INACTION
A. Timeshare and Interval Ownership
One area of legislative activity in 1993 was passage of substantial
additions to an already complicated Florida Vacation and Time-Share Act.5
The changes introduce new concepts into the Act and provide greater
protection for unwary consumers while giving developers, associations, and
managers needed flexibility in such areas as promotions, exchange programs,
and amenities.6 For example, section 721.03 of the Florida Statutes was
amended to give the Act effect outside the state of Florida when time-share
interests are offered for sale outside the state. 7 However, as long as speci-
fied disclosures are made, the Act does not apply to sales offerings made
outside the United States.8 Additionally, the Act does not apply when the
total financial obligations of a purchaser will not exceed $1,000 during the
life of the plan.9
The Act now defines an "incidental benefit"'" and excludes such
benefits from most regulations in the Act." This allows developers and
other sellers to offer perks, such as free use of the facilities on a one-time
basis, as sales tools without having such usage regulated as part of the time-
share estate. The definitions of both "developer" and "seller" have been
changed to exclude parties dealing in blocks of eight or more time-share
periods.' 2 The Act further requires developers to structure the allocation
of common expenses so that all interests, including those retained by the
developer, pay a proportionate share and allow collection of an admin-
istrative late fee on delinquent assessments."
The Legislature also enacted an adjunct to the Florida Vacation and
Time-Share Act called the Florida Vacation Club Act.' 4 This new Act
5. See Ch. 93-58, 1993 Fla. Laws 345.
6. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 345 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.03(6) (1991)); id. § 7,
1993 Fla. Laws at 357 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.11(5)(a) (1991)).
7. Ch. 93-58, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 345 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.03(6) (1991)). See
also id. § 7, 1993 Fla. Laws at 357 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.11(5)(a) (1991)).
8. Ch. 93-58, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 345 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.03(8)).
9. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.03(9)).
10. Id. § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 346 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.05(17)).
II. Id.
12. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.05(9)(c) (1991)); Ch. 93-58, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws
197 (amending FLA. STAT. 721.05(23) (1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 721.05(26)).
13. Ch. 93-58, § 9, 1993 Fla. Laws at 358 (amending FLA. STAT. § 721.15 (1991)).
14. Id. § 12, 1993 Fla. Laws at 360 (creating FLA. STAT. §§ 721.50-721.58).
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regulates exchange programs and other multiple site time-share plans and
sets forth required disclosures and provisions governing the operation and
management of reservations systems. 5
B. Other Significant Actions
1. Removal of Applicability of Chapter 607
In a deceptively simple but obscure move, the Legislature also amended
section 617.1908 of the Florida Statutes.16 This short provision changes
established law by preventing the provisions of chapter 607, the Florida
Business Corporations Act,'7 from supplementing those of chapter 617, the
Corporations Not for Profit Statute.'" In the past, a practitioner looked to
chapter 607 to supply the rule of law in the frequent instances when chapter
617 was silent. This change may leave homeowner associations in doubt as
to many issues; it certainly creates confusion in condominiums and coopera-
tives. In fact, the Florida Condominium Act continues to provide: "The
powers and duties of the association include those set forth in this section
and, except as expressly limited or restricted in this chapter, those set forth
in the declaration and bylaws and chapters 607 and 617, as applicable."' 9
The extent to which chapter 607 continues to apply, if at all, to condo-
miniums and cooperatives remains unclear.
2. Modifications to Lien Foreclosure Procedures
The Legislature also made substantial changes to the method by which
mortgage foreclosures are conducted in Florida.20  Because section
15. Id.
16. Ch. 93-281, § 76, 1993 Fla. Laws 2670 (amending FLA. STAT. § 617.1908 (1991)).
The provision in its entirety now reads: "The provisions of chapter 607, the Florida Business
Corporation Act, shall not apply to any corporations not for profit." Id. This section was
enacted as part of a large package of amendments that included many new sections to fill in
the gaps left by removal of chapter 607. Only time will tell how many unanticipated gaps
remain.
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.0101-607.1907 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
18. Id. §§ 617.001-617.306.
19. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). In 1992, the Florida
Legislature inserted an almost identical provision into the Florida Cooperative Act. See id.
§ 719.104(9).
20. See Ch. 93-88, 1993 Fla. Laws 294 (amending Chapter 697 (1991 & Supp. 1992)).
Discussion of the substantive changes made by this enactment, however, is beyond the scope
of this article.
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718.116(6)(a) of the Condominium Act provides that liens for unpaid
assessments are foreclosed "in the manner a mortgage of real property is
foreclosed," these changes will also apply to lien foreclosures.2'
C. Significant Inaction-Failure to Approve "Glitch Bill"
The main area of legislative inaction in 1993 was the failure to enact
a so-called glitch bill, such as the one proposed by The Florida Bar
Association.22 This bill would correct technical errors and omissions in the
operation of the homeowner association provisions that were engrafted into
chapter 617 in 1992.23
III. SIGNIFICANT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
A. Procedures of Electing, Removing, and Replacing Directors
The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile
Homes ("Division") is the primary administrative agency regulating both
condominiums and cooperatives. 24  The 1993 Legislature transferred the
Division to the newly consolidated Department of Business and Professional
Regulation. 2' This resulted in a wholesale renumbering and relocation of
21. SeeFLA. STAT. § 718.116(6)(a) (Supp. 1992). For cooperatives, section 719.108(5)
provides that liens for unpaid rents and assessments are foreclosed "in like manner as a
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property." FLA. STAT. § 719.108(5) (1991). The exact
effect of these changes on homeowners' associations is unclear. Often the governing
documents of such associations reference the provisions of the Construction Liens Statute,
chapter 713, as governing lien foreclosures. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.01-713.3471 (1991 & Supp.
1992). Often there is no reference to any controlling law.
22. Fla. H.B. 1351 (1992).
23. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.301-617.306 (Supp. 1992). The confusing procedure for electing
directors is the principle difficulty with section 617.301 to section 617.306. See id. Section
617.306(4) indicates that proxies may not be used to elect directors. See id. § 617.306(3).
Instead, a separate ballot must be cast by the homeowner, either at the meeting or on an
absentee basis, See id. However, the statute fails to prescribe a method for establishing the
identity of all candidates in advance of the annual meeting. See id. §§ 617.301-617.306. Nor
does it prohibit nomination of additional candidates from the floor at the annual meeting.
FLA. STAT. §§ 617.301-617.306 (Supp. 1992). Thus, members voting by absentee ballot are
not given any guarantee they are considering all candidates when voting. Id. §§ 617.301-
617.306.
24. See id. §§ 718.501, 719.501.
25. Ch. 93-220, § 2(3), 1993 Fla. Laws 2312.
1993]
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the Division's administrative regulations within the Florida Administrative
Code.26
Starting in 1992 and continuing throughout 1993, the Division
embarked on an ambitious campaign to rewrite and update existing
administrative regulations and to add new, more detailed regulations
covering heretofore unregulated areas.27 New regulations effective on
December 20, 1992, revised administrative rules adopted earlier in 1992
governing the complicated procedure for electing directors to condominium
boards of administration. 2' Also effective at that time were new rules
governing two separate procedures for recalling the same directors. 29 The
election procedure contained in the rule supplements the statute" by
delineating such matters as how, when, and by whom election ballots may
be processed in advance of the election, and under what circumstances
ballots must be disregarded."
The two recall processes set out in the rules also supplement the
statutory provisions3 2 and address several likely scenarios, such as how to
recall and replace a developer representative on the board when both unit
owner and developer representatives are on the board. 3 There are two
separate and distinct methods of recalling unit owner directors: first, by
vote of the members at a recall meeting,34 and second, by written joinder
or agreement of the members without a meeting.35 A comparative review
of the two provisions leaves the clear impression that action by written
agreement without a meeting is the least complicated procedure and is to be
26. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61 B-23.001-23.0028 (1993) (changing chapter
designation from 70 to 61B but retaining the same numbering).
27. See, e.g., id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d) (Supp. 1992).
31. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.002I (It0)(b) (1993). The rule provides for the
following: (1) when all candidates are not listed on the official ballot; (2) when the exterior
envelope (containing a smaller ballot envelope and the completed election ballot) is not
signed by the "eligible" voter (for example, the voter may be specified on a voting certificate
previously supplied to the association, if required by the governing documents of the
association); and (3) when the inner ballot envelope is found to contain more than one ballot.
Id. Although not stated in the rule, a ballot must also be disregarded if it contains more
votes than the number of available seats. Id.
32. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(k) (Supp. 1992).
33. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-23.0026 (1993).
34. id. r. 61B-23.0027.
35. Id. r. 61B-23.0028.
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recommended. It also has the advantage of avoiding the need for a stormy
and emotionally charged recall meeting.
The recall rules also distinguish instances when less than a majority of
the unit owner board is recalled (in which case replacement directors are
appointed by the remaining board members) from instances when all or a
majority of the board is recalled (in which event a slate of replacement
candidates is proposed and voted on by the members in an expedited
fashion, without benefit of the double envelope procedures). 6
B. Evolving Arbitration Procedures
On January 17, 1993, the Division also issued a set of rules governing
arbitration of disputes arising from recalls.3 7 These rules are separate and
distinct from other extensive procedural rules adopted by the Division on
April 1, 1992, to govern mandatory, non-binding arbitration of "disputes""
between unit owners and the association under the authority of section
718.1255 of the Florida Statutes. 9
C. Financial, Accounting, Budgeting, and Reserve Rules
On July 11, 1993, the Division adopted a series of revised, relocated,
and expanded financial rules.4 ° These rules place greater emphasis on the
proper operation and financial record-keeping of multiple condominiums and
36. Id r. 61B-23.0027, 61B-23.0028.
37. See id. r. 61B-50.101-61B-50.141. Although some of the provisions of this rule
previously existed, the rule has been substantially rewritten with many new provisions.
38. Section 718.1255(I) defines "disputes" subject to arbitration as:
(a) The authority of the board of directors, under any law or association
document to:
I. Require any owner to take any action, or not to take any action,
involving that owner's unit.
2. Alter or add to a common area or element.
(b) The failure of a governing body, when required by law or an association
document, to:
1. Properly conduct elections.
2. Give adequate notice of meetings or other actions.
3. Properly conduct meetings.
4. Allow inspection of books and records.
FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(I) (Supp. 1992).
39. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-45.001-45.048 (1993). While these rules were
originally adopted on April 1, 1992, they were amended on February 2, 1993.
40. Id. r. 61B-15.0001, 61B-17.006, 61B-18.005-18.006, 611B-22.001-22.0062, 61B-
23.003-23.004 (1993).
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the associations that operate them. Multiple condominiums are communities
which are composed of more than one condominium, though they are all
operated by a single corporate association.4' The rules make it clear that
accounting records must be separately kept for each condominium and each
association.42 Moreover, certain actions related to financial matters, such
as waiving or reducing reserve funding, must be accomplished by a vote of
each condominium for which separate reserves are kept.43 The rules
further require that separate records be kept for each "ancillary operation"
conducted by a condominium association. 4 Such operations include rental
programs, laundry facilities, vending machines, convenience markets, golf
courses and the like.45
Another area of expanded regulation is reserve funding. The Condo-
minium Act defines certain types of deferred maintenance and capital
improvement accounts as so-called statutory reserves. 46 The rules continue
to require that funds for each category of statutory reserve be the subject of
separate financial records. 47 However, new rules expand upon the statutory
definition of "reserves" by including all funds for deferred maintenance or
capital improvements which are restricted as to use by either the Condo-
minium Act, the associations' governing documents, or the associations'
actual administrative practices. 48 This means that the stringent accounting
requirements and budgetary disclosure requirements for reserves now apply
to an expanded group of funds.49 The same is true for reserve disclosures
contained in annual financial reports. Both the budget and the financial
report must give certain reserve disclosures, now calculated as of the starting
date of the budgetary period covered.5 Rule 61B-22.001(4) of the Florida
Administrative Code also creates a new category of funds that are not
subject to the same stringent requirements governing other reserves.5 2 This
new category is termed "contingency reserves" and is, by definition, not a
41. Id. r. 61B-15.001 (1993).
42. Id. r. 61B-22.002(2)(a).
43. Id. r. 61B-22.0053(l).
44. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.002(c) (1993).
45. Id.; see, e.g., id. r. 61B-22.001.
46. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
47. Id.
48. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.001(4) (1993).
49. See id r. 61B-22.002(I)(b); see also id. r. 61B-22.003(l)(e).
50. See id. r. 61B-22.006(3).
51. Id. r. 61B-22.003(t)(e), r. 61B-22.006(3)(a).
52. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61B-22.001(4) (1993).
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reserve.13 Any deferred maintenance or capital improvement funds that are
not restricted as to use fall within this new category. 4 Such contingency
funds are not subject to the reserve requirements otherwise imposed by the
rules. Furt:hermore, the rules revise existing practices related to developer
guarantees of assessments55 and to turnover of control of the association
from the developer to the owners. 6
D. Cooperatives Governed by Separate, Specific Rules
The Division has also embarked on an attempt to codify the operation
of cooperatives as well. In addition to administrative regulations promulgat-
ed by the Department of Legal Affairs,57 the Division has started adopting
cooperative rules comparable to the rules for condominiums.5
IV. SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
A. Determining Circuit and County Court Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion in Lien Foreclosure and Covenant Enforcement Matters
The two cases decided during 1993 having the greatest daily impact on
community associations and their attorneys are Nachon Enterprises v.
Alexdex Corp.59 and Spradley v. Doe.60 These cases are the first to
address the changes made in 1990 by the Florida Legislature to section
34.01 of the Florida Statutes.6' That section grants county court judges
equitable powers over all matters within the monetary limits of the county
courts' jurisdiction.62 The Legislature's failure to simultaneously amend
existing section 26.012 of the Florida Statutes created a conflict between
them because the latter recites that the circuit court jurisdiction in equity
cases is "exclusive. "63 Neither the Nachon nor the Spradley court had
53. Id. r. 61B-22.001(4).
54. Id.
55. Id. r. 6113-22.004.
56. Id. r. 61B-22.003.
57. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2-16.001-2-16.004 (1993).
58. Id. r. 61B-75.005-61B-75.008.
59. 615 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, So. 2d (Fla.
1993).
60. 612 So. 2d 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
61. See FLA. STAT. § 34.01 (1991).
62. Id.
63. ld. §26.012 (1991).
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difficulty in determining that the Legislature's actions were effective to
grant equitable powers to the county courts. The Nachon case, which
involved the foreclosure of a small construction lien, determined that such
actions did not involve "the title and boundaries of real property."64  A
contrary finding would have kept subject matter jurisdiction over lien
foreclosures within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts.
Based on these decisions, most judicial circuits have issued administra-
tive orders either transferring assessment lien foreclosure cases to county
court or retaining them in circuit court. Attorneys and clients alike have
been frustrated by time delays and redundancies caused by this caseload
migration. Questions have also arisen over how to determine whether other
matters sounding in equity, such as covenant enforcement matters, fall
within the jurisdictional amount of the county court.65
B. Applicability of Section 718.116(1)(A) to Existing Mortgages
On the subject of liens, a continuing battle is being waged between first
mortgagees and condominium associations over whether the 1992 amend-
ments to section 718.116(1 )(a) of the Florida Statutes apply to pre-existing
mortgages.66 Because the amounts in controversy are usually small, there
have been no reported appellate decisions on the issue, though there are
64. Nachon, 615 So. 2d at 247; see also FLA. STAT. § 26.012(2)(g) (1991).
65. FLA. STAT. § 34.01(I)(c) (1991). This statute provides that the jurisdictional amount
for county courts is $15,000 or less for all actions accruing on or after July 1, 1992. Id. It
has been suggested by my colleague (and Nova Law graduate), Michael R. Whitt, Esq., that
community associations can find a new benefit to using their available fining powers to
establish a monetary value with some certainty in an otherwise purely equitable matter.
66. Id. § 718.116(I)(a) (Supp. 1992). This statute provides in relevant part:
A first mortgagee who acquires title to the unit by foreclosure or by deed in lieu
of foreclosure is liable for the unpaid assessments that become due prior to the
mortgagee's receipt of the deed. However, the mortgagee's liability is limited
to a period not exceeding 6 months, but in no event does the first mortgagee's
liability exceed 1 percent of the original mortgage debt. The first mortgagee's
liability for such expenses or assessments does not commence until 30 days after
the date the first mortgagee received the last payment of principal or interest.
In no event shall the mortgagee be liable for more than 6 months of the unit's
unpaid common expenses or assessments accrued before the acquisition of the
title to the unit by the mortgagee or I percent of the original mortgage debt,
whichever amount is less.
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some written circuit courts opinions that have found no impairment to
existing first mortgages when enforcing the current version of the Act.67
C. Limits on Associations' Ability to Assess Members
On the subject of administration of community associations, a new and
disturbing case is Mead v. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass 'n,68 limiting the
ability of an association to assess unit owners to correct errors made by the
board of directors.69 In a very convoluted set of facts, the association had
originally assessed its owners to purchase adjoining property.7" When
some of the owners brought suit, the court ruled that purchase of the
property was outside the powers of the board.' After recovering funds
paid to the seller and settling with its own insurance carrier, the association
still found itself short of funds to repay the original assessment to all the
owners, the costs and fees due the prevailing owners, and its own defense
costs.72 Therefore, using the only fundraising source available to it, the
association again assessed its owners and was again sued by the owners
challenging the new assessment. The Fourth District Court of Appeal also
found this assessment to be improper as the "direct product of the first
unauthorized act."73 The court went on to state:
It is immaterial that this second assessment was not used to make the
purchase itself, but instead merely to pay costs and expenses directly
related to the fact of the purchase. It was a natural and entirely
foreseeable consequence of the directors' folly. Directors cannot be at
once unauthorized to do some act and at the same time authorized to
impose assessments to pay for the consequences of the unauthorized act.
... To state it as simply and directly as we can, an association's power
to impose assessments on unit owners for common expenses is limited
to authorized expenses, and does not extend, as is the case here, to
unauthorized acts by the directors."
67. See, e.g., Home Sav. of Am. v. Stango, No. 92-8393 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1992);
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Craig, No. 92-6358 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 1992). But see
Citibank v. Torres, No. 92-9617 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. 1992).
68. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1993).
69. See Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n v. Levy, 489 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1986), for the underlying decision.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Mead, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D464.
74. id.
1993]
508
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
It is indeed unfortunate that the court neglected to consider section
718.111(3) of the Florida Statutes, which grants condominium associations
the power to sue and be sued, and section 718.115(1), which provides that
common expenses include the costs of carrying out the powers and duties
of the association.75 While the court correctly stated that the propriety of
an assessment is tied to the purposes for which it is made,76 the court
failed to appreciate the difference between an assessment for an ultra vires
purpose and an assessment in furtherance of the association's statutory
power to defend itself. As a result, this decision leaves an association board
with no source of funds to protect itself beyond available insurance, thereby
both unduly limiting the exercise of business judgment and making the
volunteer directors insurers of last resort of association actions.77
D. Limits on Recovery of Attorney's Fees
Another unsettling result came from a later decision in the same
litigation. In Ziontz v. Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass'n, 8 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal considered the amount of the attorney's fee
awarded by the trial court in this litigation. The court, seemingly in
derogation of existing precedent,7 9 stated:
This obsession with hours and rates has apparently caused judges and
lawyers to lose sight of a truth they formerly accepted almost universal-
ly: viz., that there is an economic relationship to almost every legal
service in the market place.... Trial judges and lawyers used to accept
a priori the idea that, no matter how much time was spent or how good
the advocate, the fair price of some legal victories simply could not
exceed-or, conversely, should not be less than-some relevant sum not
determined alone by hours or rates. Since Rowe, that all seems
lamentably forgotten."0
The court applied the "manifest justice rule" as expressed by Miller v.
First American Bank & Trust8' to determine that the fees awarded by the
trial court were too disproportionate to the economic value of the right
75. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.111(3), 718.115(1) (Supp. 1992).
76. Mead, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at D464.
77. See id.
78. 18 Fla. L. Weekly D1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1993).
79. See Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985);
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
80. Ziontz, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at Dl 147.
81. 607 So. 2d 483, 484 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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sought to be vindicated. The limits of this standard are, at best, vague and
overly subjective.
E. Construction Defect Claims
1. Date that Statute of Limitations Commences to Run
Three: significant cases were decided in late 1992 and 1993 in the area
of construction defects litigation. The first, Seawatch at Marathon
Condominium Ass 'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,82 addressed the
relationship between sections 718.124 and 718.203 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 3 While the Third District Court of Appeal ultimately certified the
question8 4 to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance,
it held that the former section operates to toll any statute of limitations time
period created by the latter section until such time as non-developer unit
owners assume control of the condominium association. 5 While the result
is both logical and favorable to condominium associations, one is neverthe-
less prompted to question the court's treatment of section 718.203 of the
Florida Statutes, as a statute of limitations. That section is entitled
"Warranties," and all time periods referred to in that section appear to be
warranty periods. Generally, warranty periods and statutes of limitation are
not equivalent: the warranty period is the maximum time during which a
cause of action may accrue (by discovery or reasonable opportunity to
discover the defect),86 while statutes of limitations set the time during
82. 610 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 472. Section 718.203 of the Florida Statutes sets forth the maximum time that
warranties exist on various components of the condominium, including three years on the
roof and structural components, as measured from the date of issuance of the certificate of
occupancy. FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (Supp. 1992). Section 718.124 provides:
The statute of limitations for any actions in law or equity which a condominium
association or a cooperative association may have shall not begin to run until the
unit owners have elected a majority of the board of administration.
FLA. STAT. § 718.124 (1991).
84. Seawatch, 610 So. 2d at 471, The court certified the following issue:
Does section 718.124, Florida Statutes ( 991), grant a condominium association
an extended period of time in which it may assert a cause of action for damage
to common elements in condominium buildings, beyond the time granted in
section 718.203, Florida Statutes (1991), after unit owners have elected a
majority of the members of the board of administration?
Id.
85. Id.
86. 35 FLA. JUR. 2D Limitations and Laches § 56 (1982).
Wean
510
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
which an accrued cause must be asserted.87 For example, actions based
upon breach of warranty under section 718.203(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes
may accrue during the three year period after issuance of the certificate of
occupancy, and the condominium association would then have four years88
from the date the owners assume control of the association to assert their
claim for breach of warranty.
2. Standing of Unit Owners to Bring Claims
The second case in this substantive area is Carlandia Corp. v. Rogers
& Ford Construction Corp.89 Once again, a district court of appeal
certified the question raised by this case as being of great public importance,
this time after holding that an individual condominium unit owner has
standing to assert a claim for construction defects against a party involved
in the construction process.9" The court's decision relied on the fact that
a unit owner, though analogous to a shareholder in a business corporation,
also owns an undivided portion of the common elements and as an owner
is deemed a real party in interest under Rule 1.210(a) of the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure. 9' Additionally, though condominiums are purely
creatures of statute, section 718.111(3) of the Florida Statutes specifically
reserves to each owner all statutory and common law rights they may
have.92 The court recognized that its ruling could easily create quagmires
in many areas, such as valuation of damages to a single owner and the
possibility of multiple and inconsistent adjudications, and accordingly chose
to certify the question.93
87. Id. § 3.
88. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (Supp. 1992).
89. 605 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 618 So. 2d 1369
(Fla.), affd, 1993 WL 458443 (Fla. Nov. 10, 1993).
90. Id. at 1015.
91. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1016. The certified question was as follows:
MAYAN INDIVIDUAL CONDOMINIUM OWNER MAINTAIN AN ACTION
FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN THE COMMON ELEMENTS OR
COMMON AREAS OF THE CONDOMINIUM?
Carlandia, 605 So. 2d at 1016.
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3. Economic Loss Rule
The landmark case of Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n v. Charley
Toppino & Sons, Inc.94 represents the extension of the "Economic Loss
Rule"95  into the area of condominium construction defect cases. The
owners in this condominium had brought suit against many parties involved
in building their condominium, including the concrete supplier.96  The
concrete used to build the structures contained too high a salt content,
causing the reinforcing steel bars to prematurely corrode, allowing the
concrete to crumble away.97 The suits brought by the owners sounded
inter alia in common law warranty, negligence and products liability. The
Florida Supreme Court followed a very strict interpretation of the rule, so
much so that it neglected to look at whether the plaintiffs had a contractual
remedy available. In fact they did not, since they were neither in privity
with the concrete supplier nor third party beneficiaries to the contract
between the developer and the supplier. The effect of this application of the
Economic Loss Rule was to deprive innocent third party owners of a tort
remedy based on defective products.98 As a result, the "Economic Loss
Rule" drastically limits negligence claims in many typical construction
litigation cases where the main developer is not available or viable.
F. Fair Housing Act Decisions
Finally, additional cases have further clarified the impact of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act of 198899 on community associations.' O In
Seniors Civil Liberties Ass 'n v. Kemp,'0' the provisions of the Act banning
94. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
95. Id. at 1245. The Economic Loss Rule is the principle that distinguishes claims in
tort from claims in contract and holds that there can be no recovery in tort for a defective
product unless there exists either personal injuries or damage to property other than to the
defective product itself. In instances where a purchased product is defective and damages
itself only, the interest to be compensated is the contractually bargained-for expectation
interest, and remedies for harm to life, health, and property are not involved. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619) (1988)). See also FLA. STAT. ch. 760 (1991) (Florida counterpart to the federal
statute).
100. See Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030 (11 th Cir. 1992).
101. Id.
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discrimination based on "familial status '  were found constitutional
against arguments that they were constitutionally vague, that they violated
First Amendment rights of freedom of association, and that they violated
rights of privacy.0 3 Furthermore, the provisions of the Act were found
constitutional against arguments that they violated Fifth Amendment rights
by both discriminating against the plaintiffs and depriving them of contract
and property rights without due process0 4 and that they violated the Tenth
Amendment sovereignty of Florida.'°5
In HUD v. Paradise Gardens, °6 a condominium association's rules
prohibited children under the age of five from using the swimming pool and
also limited the hours of pool use of children between ages five and
sixteen.0 7 Although the condominium cited health and safety concerns
as the justification for both rules, the presiding administrative law judge
found that the proof adduced failed to support these concerns."' Associa-
tions desiring to adopt and enforce this common type of rule should seek
expert guidance before doing so.
V. CONCLUSION
Ownership of a home is a traditional and primary indicia of the
American dream. As the most recent legislative waves wash ashore and
subsidiary waves of administrative and judicial "clarification" begin to crest,
many citizens fortunate enough to own a home are quickly finding
themselves inundated. The tide engendered by complicated and constantly
increasing regulation has turned many forms of home ownership into a very
bad dream.
102. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3607 (1988).
103. Seniors, 965 F.2d at 1036.
104. Id. at 1035.
105. Id. at 1034.
106. 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 25,037 (No. HUDALJ 04-90-0321-1, Oct. 15,
1992). The Act allows administrative law judges to hold evidentiary hearings and award
damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1988).
107. 2 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) at 25,037.
108. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "elder law" came into vogue in 1989 when the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys ("NAELA") was founded. The term is
not widely understood. Traditional estate planning involved only the
provision for the orderly disposition of assets after death through the use of
trusts, wills and other mechanisms. Elder law attorneys broaden the
definition of estate planning.
Elder law practitioners believe that the main focus of estate planning
should be to meet one's lifetime needs and, once those needs are properly
addressed, to utilize the more traditional estate planning methods.' Lifetime
needs of the elderly include the following: access to and the ability to
refuse health care; access to insurance and government benefits; freedom
from physical, emotional, and financial abuse; freedom from age discrimina-
tion; access to public facilities and courts; preservation of privacy, indepen-
dence, control, autonomy, lifestyle, and wealth; and financial security.
A holistic approach is requisite to the practice of elder law. The
attorney acts not only as a preparer of documents but truly as a "counselor
at law." Often, the services of experts in other disciplines such as geriatric
care managers, gerontologists, social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists
and family counselors are utilized.
Thus, elder law attorneys concern themselves with a broad range of
issues. With that in mind, this article now turns to four areas of the practice
that have undergone significant changes in the past year. These develop-
ments are in the areas of probate matters, trust administration, powers of
attorney, and Medicaid.
II. PROBATE MATTERS
A. Attorneys'Fees
The Florida Supreme Court decision, In re Estate of Platt,2 radically
changed the determination of attorneys' fees in probate matters. Prior to
this decision, courts had consistently upheld judicial awards of attorneys'
I. For a more detailed treatment of the emerging field of Elder Law, see Jerome 1.
Solkoff, Elder Law: Coming ofAge, NEW CONNECTIONS FOR ELDERS: LAW AND SOCIAL
SERVICES 1 (1992) (available from The Florida Bar).
2. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
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fees based on percentages of the probate estate.3 In Platt, however, the
Florida Supreme Court found the use of a sliding percentage scale not to
comport with section 733.617(1) of the Florida Statutes in its call for
"reasonable" fees based upon certain enumerated factors.4 The decision left
many unanswered questions and even more disturbing results. For example,
probate attorneys could no longer precisely estimate their legal fees for the
purpose of the estate's deductibility on the Federal Estate Tax Return. 5
Even more damaging was the potential for obscenely high fees resulting
from the mandated "lode-star" approach. 6
In response to the difficulties implied by Platt, the Florida Legislature
enacted section 733.6171, which became effective October 1, 1993.7
Computations and collection of attorneys' fees on or after that date will be
strictly governed by the new legislation.8 While reasonable compensation
may be payable from the assets of the estate without court order, the
determination of what is "reasonable" is based on new criteria. Such
compensation may now be determined under several formulas:
1. Based on agreement between the attorney, personal representative and
heirs; or
2. Based on a manner disclosed in a petition for discharge or final
accounting provided there is no objection filed thereon pursuant to
existing section 733.901; or
3. As set by a court after hearing; or
4. Based on written agreement between the attorney and decedent
disclosed to the personal representative prior to engagement of the
attorney and served on all interested persons. (Such agreement may
not mandate that the personal representative engage such attorney.); or
5. Based on the following statutory prescription for "ordinary" services:
3. See, e.g., In re Estate of Platt, 546 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989),
quashed, 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991); see also In re Estate of Warwick, 543 So. 2d 449 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), quashed, 586 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1991).
4. In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d at 335-36; see FLA. STAT. § 733.617(1) (1989).
5. See In re Estate of Platt, 586 So. 2d at 328.
6. Id. at 329-30.
7. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2503 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.6171(4)).
8. See generally Senator Fred R. Dudley, Platt Fees Revisited: The Statutory Response,
Lecture at The Florida Bar Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section's Legislative Update
and Case Review Seminar (July 14, 1993) (lecture outline on file with The Florida Bar).
1993]
516
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
a) For "professional responsibility"-two percent of the monetary
value of the estate assets plus one percent of the balance of the gross
estate as finally determined for federal estate tax provisions; plus
b) For "professional time expended"-by multiplying the "reasonable
hours" expended by a "reasonable" hourly rate.9
These means of determining fees are flexible. Any interested person
may seek an increase or decrease in the "ordinary" compensation by court
petition and hearing, and, of course, agreements may change the prescrip-
tion.'" In addition, no expert testimony will be required by the court to
determine "reasonable compensation," but persons can offer such testimony
after notice to interested persons." Costs of such expert witness fees and
attorneys fees, including that of the personal representative, are to be paid
out of the estate assets as determined by the court.' 2
The prescription of "ordinary" fee computations has caused much
controversy among attorneys. Some attorneys fear that the courts will use
the prescription to impose an unreasonable "cap" on fees, despite the fact
that other ways to determine fees are set forth in the statute. The outcome
of the legislation certainly would be to force attorneys to give special heed
when preparing retainer agreements. Perhaps explicit provisions as to
attorneys' fees will become more common in wills.
B. Personal Representatives' Fees
In addition to the above changes, Florida Statutes section 733.617 has
been substantially revised as to computations of personal representatives'
fees.' 3 The new provisions affect estates of decedents who die on or after
October 1, 1993.4
Florida Statutes section 733.617, as revised, provides that ordinary
service fees may be payable from estate assets without a court order, and are
to be determined in one of several ways:
9. Ch. 93-257, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2504 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.6171(4)).
10. Id. § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2504 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(4), (5)).
11. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2507 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(5)).
12. Id.
13. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991)).
14. Id. § 18, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2512.
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1. Based on will provisions which will act as a "cap" on fees paid; 5 or
2. Based on written contract with the decedent; 6 or
3. Based on percentages set forth in the statute, with leeway for the court
to award greater compensation for extraordinary services such as for
sale of realty, litigation, tax proceedings and conduct of the decedent's
business.'7 The statute prescribes percentage fee formulas for "ordi-
nary" services unless there is agreement otherwise. The prescriptions
are:
a) Three percent of the first $1 million;"
b) Two and one-half percent of the next $4 million; 9
c) Two percent of the next $5 million;2" and
d) One and one-half percent of the excess over $10 million.2'
Obviously, the fees earned by the personal representative can be much
more than that earned by the attorney for the estate. If there are two
personal representatives, each is entitled to full commissions unless the
estate is worth less than $100,000.22 In such smaller estates, only one
commission is to be paid, "apportioned" between the two personal
representatives based on services rendered by each.2 If there are more
than two personal representatives, two full commissions are to be paid and
apportioned amongst them.2 However, the one who had "possession of
and primary responsibility for administration of assets" can receive one of
the two full shares.25 If the estate is worth less than $100,000, only one
15. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617(3) (1991), to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(4)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617(1) (1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.617(3)).
18. Ch. 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. 733.617(2)(a)).
19. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. § 733.617-
(2)(b) (1993)).
20. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617(1991), appearing FLA. STAT. § 733.611(2)(c)
(1993)).
21. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. § 733.617-
(2)(d) (1993)).
22. Id. at 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. §
733.617(5) (1993)).
23. Ch, 93-257, § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617
(1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(5)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
1993]
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full commission is to be paid and apportioned amongst the multiple personal
representatives based on the services that each render.26 A member of The
Florida Bar who serves the dual function of personal representative and
attorney for the estate can receive both attorney and personal representative
fees.27
III. TRUST ADMINISTRATION
Sweeping changes in the administration of ordinary living trusts were
made this past year by the Florida Legislature. The changes effect trusts of
decedents who die on or after October 1, 1993,28 but provisions as to pay-
ment of estate expenses and obligations by trusts do not become effective
until January 1, 1994.29
A. Personal Representative May Claim Trust Assets
Section 733.607(2) of the Florida Statutes was enacted to allow
personal representatives of an estate to reach trust assets when the probate
estate is insufficient to pay expenses of administration and proper creditor
claims. 30 To do so, the personal representative must certify in writing to
the trustee that the probate estate is insufficient, and serve a copy of the
notice of administration on the trustee of the trust.3'
B. Some Trusts are Exempt from Claims
Not all trusts are subject to the claims of personal representatives
and/or creditors. Only personal living trusts, which are revocable and are
created to benefit the settlor during his or her lifetime, and which upon
revocation would revert to the settlor, are subject to such claims.32 Claims
of a personal representative do not apply to: (1) insurance proceeds payable
26. Id.
27. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
733.617(6)).
28. Ch. 93-257, § 18, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2512.
29. Id. § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2509 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056).
30. Id. § 9, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2507 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.607 (1991), appearing
at FLA. STAT. § 733.607(2) (1993)).
31. Id.
32. Id. § I!, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2508 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.707 (1991), appearing
at FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3) (1993)).
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directly to a trust;33 (2) a trust in which the settlor had provided that the
assets would go to another upon revocation;34 (3) retirement plans;35 or
(4) to Qualified Domestic Relations Orders described in section 414(p) of
the Internal Revenue Code.36
C. Trustees' Duties as to Claims
Florida Statutes section 737.3056 expressly states that the duty of the
trustee is to pay estate administration expenses and claims. 37 If there is a
probate proceeding, the trustee must be served with a copy of the notice of
administration before trust assets will be subject to the claim of a personal
representative. 3' However, if there is no probate proceeding, the trustee
must pay creditors directly.39
Contribution from others cannot be demanded by the trustee unless the
settlor expressly so provided in the trust agreement. 40  For example, the
settlor may provide that a summer home go to A, and may state that A
should pay all claims and expenses arising out of the existence, care,
management, mortgage and taxes of such home. The settlor also may direct
which trust assets are to be used to pay such claims; the direction can be
made in the settlor's will or trust document.
If no express direction is made, claims are to be paid out of the trust
assets in the following order: 1) out of the trust residuary; 4' 2) out of
assets not to be distributed as specified property; 42 and, 3) out of assets
distributed as specified property.43 Specified property, barring a directive
otherwise, is not to be utilized to pay claims unless the other assets are
33. Ch. 93-257, § 1I, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2509 (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.707
(1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. § 733.707(3)(c)).
34. Id.
35. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.707 (1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. 733.707(3)(a)
(1993)).
36. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. 733.707 (1991), appearing at FLA. STAT. 733.707(3)(b)
(1993)).
37. Id 14, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2509 (appearing at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056).
38. Ch. 93-257, § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2509 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.3056(1)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(2)(a)).
42. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(2)(b)).
43. Ch. 93-257, § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2510 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.3056(2)(c)).
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insufficient." The shares of all persons in a class of trust beneficiaries are
to be used to satisfy claims so as to treat all equally. 5
For example, a trust may provide that XYZ corporate stock is to go to
the daughter, each grandchild is to receive five thousand dollars, and the
remainder of the trust estate is to go to the son. Barring a directive
otherwise, the son's share will be accessed first to pay claims. If the son's
share is exhausted, then the grandchildren's shares will be accessed. Only
when those shares are exhausted will the stock be used to pay claims.
Obviously, this may be contrary to the settlor's intent of leaving the bulk of
the estate to the son while providing less to the daughter.
Prior to payment of claims and expenses of probate administration from
trust assets, all costs and expenses of trust administration, including trustee
fees and attorneys' fees, are to be paid. 6 This poses the question of
whether a trustee may hold back anything to cover additional anticipated
trustee and attorneys' fees.
D. Notice to Creditor
Section 737.3057 of the Florida Statutes states that a trustee must notify
creditors when there is no probate administration. The notice provisions are
similar to those presently used when there is probate administration. 7
Moreover, a trustee, like a personal representative, must make diligent
efforts to discover creditors and to notify them.48
One reason why persons enter into trust agreements is to avoid the time
and expense of probate proceedings, and to avoid the need to pay attorneys'
fees in the future. This new legislation will add time and expense to trust
administration and may force a trustee to consult with attorneys more often.
Perhaps another reason persons enter into trust agreements is to avoid
creditors' claims. However, this no longer seems a valid reason for the
creation of trusts. Creditors will have claim rights and are to be paid by
trustees. Depending upon one's point of view, Florida Statutes section
737.3057 may be either a boon or a bane in that settlors may not so easily
hide their assets from creditors.
44. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(3)).
45. Id.
46. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3056(4)).
47. Id. § 15, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2510 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.3057).
48. Ch. 93-257, § 15, 1993 Fla. Laws 2500, 2511 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
737.3057(1)(c)).
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IV. POWERS OF ATTORNEY
Two significant events will impact powers of attorney in the near
future. The first change, one leading toward a greater efficiency of powers
of attorney, has nothing to do with new case law or legislative law. Rather,
the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar
recently modified Uniform Title Standard 18.4. Under the modification,
homestead property can be conveyed or encumbered through the use of a
power of attorney, durable or otherwise."0 Moreover, the homestead
property does not have to be described in the power."
The change is important to elder law attorneys because durable powers
of attorney can now be more acceptable tools to alienate real estate interests
of a disabled elderly client. This will give more leeway for families to sell
property, to raise funds for the health care of the elderly client, and/or to
prepare for Medicaid planning. No longer shall the family be burdened with
on-going homestead expenses while the elder disabled client is institutional-
ized.
Second, and on the horizon, extensive changes in the powers of
attorney law52 are being drafted by the Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law Section of The Florida Bar. 3 Many banks and other third parties fear
the liabilities that may arise by honoring the use of powers of attorney.
Thus, many banks currently do not permit their use. This proposed legisla-
tion would free third parties from liability in certain circumstances. 4
Significantly, the proposal would also subject third parties to suits for
attorneys' fees should they unreasonably refuse acceptance of a power of
attorney.5 While putting the "power" back in powers of attorney, such
legislation could, however, also portend the increased financial exploitation
of the elderly population. Any legislation, no matter how necessary, that
makes it easier for others to interpose their decisions for those of the
elderly, has inherent dangers.
49. REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW SECTION, FLORIDA BAR, UNIFORM TITLE
STANDARDS 18.4 (1992).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 709.01-709.11 (1991).
53. REAL PROPERTY. PROBATE & TRUST LAW SECTION, FLORIDA BAR, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LITIGATION § 709.08 (on file with author); see also REAL PROPERTY,
PROBATE & TRUST LAW SECTION, FLORIDA BAR, UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS (1992).
54. REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW SECTION, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED LITIGATION § 709.08(4)(d) (on file with author).
55. Id. § 709.08(l11).
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V. MEDICAID
Perhaps the most important new legislation affecting the elder law
practice is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA"),56
enacted and signed into law on August 10, 1993. Far-reaching changes
were made in the Medicaid law by OBRA.
A. History
Medicaid is a federal and state program that, among other things,
provides nursing home costs for persons sixty-five years of age or older.
Prior to OBRA, in order to qualify for those benefits in Florida, one must
have met at least five tests:
1) The applicant must be over sixty-five years of age and "medically
needy;"
2) The applicant must be a United States and Florida citizen or reside in
Florida under color of law;
3) The applicant's income from all but a few sources must be $1302 or
less per month ("income cap"); and,
4) The applicant can only have $2000 or less in assets, excluding certain
types of assets.
5) For married persons, the "community spouse" of the Medicaid
applicant can only hold $70,740 in assets, excluding certain assets
("community spousal resource allowance").5 7
The "income gap" and the "community spousal resource allowance" figures
were adjusted each January due to cost of living increases or decreases.
Therefore, to qualify for Medicaid benefits as early as possible, one needed
to plan ahead to meet the income and assets cap requirements. Three
principal methods had been employed in Florida for one to plan ahead to
meet those requirements.
First, a person could have "spent down" funds on health care, a home,
furnishings, a car, and/or prepaid funeral arrangements.58 Under certain
56. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
57. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Manual 165-22: Integrated
Public Assistance Policy § 1610 (1993) [hereinafter Manual 165-22]; Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, Transmittal Notice of Jan. 1, 1993, at X.
58. See Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Hari, Estate Planning for the Elderly and
Disabled: Organizing the Estate to Qualifyfor Federal Medical Extended Care Assistance,
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circumstances those assets would not have been counted to determine
Medicaid eligibility. Second, one could have invested funds in non-
countable assets such as specially designed annuities. 9 Third, and most
common, a person could have transferred assets to family, friends, or an
irrevocable, carefully worded trust. Federal and state laws, rules, and
regulations, differing widely from state to state, provide guidelines for such
transfers. For any uncompensated transfer, there is a disqualification period
involved before the one who transfers could qualify for Medicaid bene-
fits.6 0
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 ("MECCA"),6
stated that the maximum disqualification period is thirty months from the
date of transfer.62 Federal and state regulations have modified procedures
whereby one may reduce that waiting time with the use of certain transfer
procedures. In Florida, there were four principal methods of accomplishing
uncompensated transfers to qualify a person for Medicaid benefits. The
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") set forth
the regulations allowing the transfers in Manual HRS:165-22.
First, one could transfer assets thirty-one months ahead of time.63
Second, a lesser disqualification period was allowed by dividing the
uncompensated value by a factor set by HRS that was purported to reflect
the average monthly costs of a nursing home.64 The factor in Florida is an
unrealistically low $2,400.65 As a practical matter, the author cannot
provide the name of a single nursing home that will charge such a low
monthly rental. Thus, if one were to transfer $60,000 in assets, dividing
that amount by $2,400 would mean a twenty-five month disqualification
period beginning the first day of the month of transfer.
A third method was to do transfers in stages. For example, Ella Der
needs to transfer $45,600 in assets to qualify for Medicaid benefits. If Ella
does the transaction in one lump sum, she must wait nineteen months before
Medicaid entitlement.66 However, if Ella were to transfer $24,000 in one
24 IND. L. REV. 1379, 1398 (1990).
59. Manual 165-22, supra note 58, §§ 1625.65.00, 1625.65.10.
60. Id. § 1630.30.10.
61. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683
(1988).
62. Id.
63. Manual 165-22, supra note 58, §§ 1630.20.00-1630.20.25.
64. Id. § 1630.30.10.
65. Id.
66. $45,600 divided by $2400 = 19 months.
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month,6" and then transfer another $21,600 the next month,68 she would
cut the waiting period from nineteen months to ten months. Such a cut in
the waiting period would occur because each transaction would stand on its
own, and the separate disqualification periods would run concurrently.
However, the most common method of transfers in Florida has been the
"joint account route" in which each person whose name is on a joint
account, is deemed to own one hundred percent of that account. Therefore,
if a son, as a joint account holder, withdrew the funds, he is deemed to have
withdrawn his own monies. Thus, there would be no disqualification period
because the Medicaid applicant or spouse did not make the transfer.
Once transfers were made, it was most common to have the funds or
assets held in an irrevocable special needs trust created by persons other
than the Medicaid applicant and his or her spouse. The trust would protect
the elders from possible financial abuse, provide strict standards for the
trustees to follow, avoid some tax problems, and avoid claims of the
children's (or others') creditors.
B. The New Law
Most of the methods of doing uncompensated transfers are now disal-
lowed.69 No longer is there a thirty month "look back" period.7" Any
transaction done within thirty-six months will trigger a disqualification
period.7' Moreover, if one's assets were put into a trust, under some
circumstances, the "look back" period is sixty months.7 2 The "look back"
period ends when the individual is institutionalized and applies for Medicaid
benefits.73 Thus, if one were to enter a nursing home January 1, 1994 and
apply for benefits that day, the authorities would check for transactions
going back to January 1, 1991. If one transfers assets thirty-seven months
prior to institutionalization and applies for Medicaid benefits without a
prohibited trust involved, there will be no disqualification period.
67. $24,000 divided by $2400 = 10.
68. $21,600 divided by $2400 = 9.
69. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107 Stat.
312. 622 (1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988)).
70. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(l)(A) (1988), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c)(7)(B)(i) (1993)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c)(1)(B)(ii)(1) (1993)).
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Unlike the old law, the disqualification period under OBRA is open-
ended and can be longer than the previous thirty month cap.74 The
disqualification period is computed by dividing the value of the uncompen-
sated transfer by the $2,400 factor.7" Thus, similar to the old law, if one
transfers assets worth $60,000, the disqualification period would still be
twenty-five: months.7 6 But if one transfers $120,000 in assets, the period
will be fifty months, not thirty.77 Furthermore, the disqualification period
commences on the first day of the month the uncompensated transfer is
made."
Trusts that were created by the Medicaid applicant or were funded with
the assets of the applicant or his or her spouse would be governed by the
new stringent rules.79 The assets would be counted as available to the
individual if the trust were revocable. If irrevocable, the income or corpus
used to generate that income would be counted if any portion of income
and/or principal could be used for that individual.
Certain trusts created for someone under sixty-five and disabled, or
which consist of only pension monies, and in which provisions are made for
the State to receive full reimbursement for benefits paid after the death of
the applicant, will not be counted as available to an individual.8° Annuities
can be considered trusts.8 The "joint account route" and transactions
whereby others change ownership or control of the Medicaid applicant's
assets are now treated as transfers made by the applicant or spouse, and
trigger a disqualification period.82
The new legislation also mandates strict recovery procedures whereby
states are to be reimbursed for benefits paid, after the death of the Medicaid
74. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107
Stat. 312, 622 (1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(I) (1988)).
75. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1) (1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c)(l)(E)(ii) (1993)).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p-
(c)(I)(D) (1993)).
79. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Actof 1993, A.G.C. No. 103-66, § 13611, 107 Stat.
312, 122-25 (1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C §
1396p(d)(3)(A) (1993)).
80. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A)
(1993)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(3) (1988), appearing at 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c)(2)(E) (1993)).
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recipient, out of certain insurance proceeds, probate assets, and other
assets.83
C. Outcome
The result of OBRA 1993 is the elimination of many options persons
can use to plan ahead for Medicaid qualifications. The following options
are still allowed: (1) transfers thirty-seven months in advance of need; (2)
transfers of some assets triggering a disqualification period while holding
back funds sufficient to cover the nursing home costs during the disqualifi-
cation period; and (3) the implementation of "spend-down" theories. New
trusts must be carefully drafted to provide no income or principal allowances
to the Medicaid applicant or spouse and must be funded with assets of other
persons.
The true and complete meaning of OBRA cannot be determined until
the United States Health Care Finance Administration and Florida's
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services have promulgated rules
and regulations interpreting the law. Regardless, OBRA provides ample
latitude for many interpretations of its provisions, which will create
controversy in the future. OBRA awaits many tests in the courts.
83. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
While the Florida Legislature has made no significant or earth
shattering modification to the Florida Evidence Code in 1993, there have
been at least two recent evidentiary cases which the trial practitioner should
find important. This article will review these two cases and examine their
impact upon the trial lawyer.
II. THE EROSION OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION:
LOVE V. GARCIA'
On April 3, 1986, sometime after 11:00 p.m., a woman was walking
along Sunset Strip in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.' The woman, who was
wearing dark clothing, was spotted by a City of Sunrise Police Officer who,
after being flagged down by the woman, drove up along side of her. The
woman, who was noticeably upset and appeared to have been crying,
requested that the police officer give her a ride to a local gas station from
where she could make a telephone call. The police officer obliged and
dropped her off at the station.3
Shortly after being dropped off at the gas station, the woman was seen
walking in the median strip near the intersection of University Drive and
Sunset Strip by another pedestrian. The pedestrian noted that the woman
had hesitated in the median and then began to cross the intersection against
the red light.4
At the same time, an orthopedic surgeon was travelling along
University Drive on his way home from the hospital. Upon seeing the
doctor's vehicle approaching, the pedestrian shouted to the woman in an
attempt to warn her of the oncoming vehicle. When he yelled to her, the
1. 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1993).
2. Initial Brief of Appellant at 3, Love (No. 89-3259).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 4.
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woman looked at him, put her head down, and continued walking into the
intersection.' Needless to say, the woman was struck by the doctor's
vehicle and suffered significant and extensive injuries.' She required more
than seven weeks of hospitalization, including more than two weeks of
intensive care, as well as several surgeries.'
On September 23, 1986, the woman, Luz Maria Garcia Rennes, filed
a complaint against the doctor, Douglas J. Love. Rennes claimed the doctor
negligently operated his automobile causing it to strike her, resulting in her
injuries and damages.' The doctor's key defense was that the woman was
intoxicated at the time of the accident, and that her intoxication caused or
contributed to her injuries.9
To support his defense, the doctor sought to introduce the results of
two blood alcohol tests which suggested the woman was intoxicated."0 The
first blood alcohol test was taken at the request of the police officer who
accompanied the woman to the hospital; it was taken shortly after the
accident and was analyzed by SmithKline Laboratory.ii The blood test
revealed that the woman had a blood alcohol level of .23, more than twice
the legal limit.'2 The second blood test was taken a couple of hours after
the woman was admitted to Florida Medical Center.'3 That blood sample
was evaluated by the hospital's laboratory and revealed that the woman had
a blood alcohol level of. 14. "
The driver properly disclosed his intentions to introduce these blood
alcohol tests in his pretrial exhibit list."S The doctor also disclosed his
intention to call the records custodians from the SmithKline Laboratory and
the Florida Medical Center to authenticate these documents under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.' 6 Through a pretrial motion
in limine, the plaintiff sought to exclude this evidence on the grounds that
the doctor had failed to disclose any witnesses who could "lay a proper
predicate" to establish a chain of custody from the collection of the blood
5. Id.
6. Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Love (No. 89-3259).
7. Id.
8. Initial Brief of Appellant at 1, Love (No. 89-3259).
9. Id.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Love (No. 89-3259).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id. at 6; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
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sample through the testing procedure and creation of the document.' 7
Apparently, the trial court granted the motion in limine, excluding the test
results because the driver did not disclose witnesses who could establish this
chain of custody.'"
The case proceeded to trial and resulted in a jury verdict for the
plaintiff for two million dollars in damages, which was reduced to one
million dollars after finding each party to be fifty percent (50%) at fault.' 9
The doctor appealed the exclusion of the blood alcohol tests to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the exclusion.2" The case is
presently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.2'
A. Erosion of the Business Records Exception in Medical Records
Cases
The Florida Business Records Exception to the hearsay rule states:
90.803 Hearsay Exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. -
The provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the
following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(6) RECORDS OF REGULARLY CONDUCTED BUSINESS
ACTIVITY.-
I (a) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,
if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes a business,
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every
kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(b) No evidence in the form of an opinion or diagnosis is admissible
under paragraph (a) unless such opinion or diagnosis would be
17. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1272.
18. Id. at 1271.
19. Appellee's Answer Brief at I, Love (No. 89-3259).
20. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1270.
21. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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admissible under ss. 90.701-90.705 if the person whose opinion is
recorded were to testify to the opinion directly.22
When seeking to introduce documents pursuant to the Business Records
Exception, one typically solicits the testimony of the records custodian to
authenticate the document pursuant to the requirements of section 90.803(6).
However, the Love decision places a severe restraint upon a practitioner
seeking to introduce medical records through a records custodian.
The Love majority explained that the rationale behind the Business
Records Exception is the inherent trustworthiness of such documents.23
However, with regard to medical records, the court stated that such records
are inherently trustworthy only if the records were actually used by a
physician to aid in diagnosis or treatment of the patient.24 Thus, a party
seeking to introduce a particular medical document would necessarily have
to provide testimony of the treating physician, who would state that he
relied on the particular document sought to be introduced in his treatment
of the patient. Of course, there may be numerous routine documents in a
patient's medical file that are not directly relevant to the patient's particular
ailment and that may not necessarily be relied upon in the treatment of that
patient. Under Love, it would seem impossible to introduce routinely
prepared documents that were not relied upon for a patient's treatment since
they would not be inherently trustworthy. As the court stated, "[i]n a
medical records case, the trustworthiness element-the only basis for
business records admissibility- relates to whether the health care providers
relied on the test result in the course of treatment."25
In Love, the plaintiff's two blood tests indicated a blood alcohol level
in excess of the legal limit.26 The first blood test was ordered by the
police officer who accompanied the woman to the hospital, and that test was
examined by a laboratory outside of the hospital.27 The second blood test
was taken after the woman was admitted to the Florida Medical Center and
that test was evaluated by the hospital's laboratory several hours later. 8
However, after being hit by the doctor's car, the woman had massive
injuries requiring seven weeks of hospitalization, had six surgeries requiring
22. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
23. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1272.
24. Id at 1275.
25. Id.
26. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Love (No. 89-3259).
27. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1275.
28. Id.
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general anesthesia, and was required to wear a cast on her right leg for
almost two years.29 When this woman was admitted to the hospital, it may
not have been the emergency room physician's most immediate concern as
to whether the patient had an elevated blood alcohol level. Therefore, the
physician may not have relied upon that elevated blood alcohol level in
forming his or her diagnosis when rendering emergency treatment. The fact
that the doctor may not have relied upon that particular blood test should
not prohibit its introduction pursuant to section 90.803(6),3" but rather that
reliance or lack of reliance should be admissible on cross-examination to
attack the credibility of the report.3'
In Love, there was apparently no physician to testify regarding his
reliance on the blood alcohol tests and, in the absence of such testimony, the
plaintiff's objection was that the defendant did not list any witnesses who
could document the chain of custody of the blood samples, the testing
procedures, and the test results. 32 There was apparently no other grounds
for objection established or set forth during the trial.33 Again, and as the
court noted, "gaps in the chain of custody or other uncertain circumstances
in the administration or interpretation of a test result are ordinarily thought
to go to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not its admissibility. 34
However, for blood alcohol tests, the court makes an exception to the
business records rule set forth in section 90.803(6) of the Florida Stat-
utes.35 Keeping in mind that the objection in this case was to the "chain
of custbdy," the court rendered the following ruling:
[We] now hold that when medical record entries are sought to be
admitted under FEC [Florida Evidence Code] section 90.803(6), if
properly challenged by the opponent with a sufficient showing that
relates to the accuracy, reliability or trustworthiness of the entry, the
trial court may in its discretion decline to admit them unless the
proponent of the evidence lays the proper predicate for the entry. By
a proper predicate, we mean evidence as to the drawing of the blood,
29. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 4, Love (No. 89-3259).
30. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
31. See Love, 611 So. 2d at 1276 (citing Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 361 (4th Cir.
1962)).
32. Id. at 1272.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1276 (citing Thomas, 308 F.2d at 361)).
35. Id.
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the chain of custody, the administration of the test, and the interpreta-
tion and reporting of the test result.
36
Pursuant to this holding, in the absence of expert medical testimony,
when challenging the trustworthiness of the document, an opponent of the
medical record need only object to "chain of custody," or question the
testing procedure, or any other aspect of the method of formulating the
document sought to be introduced to place a severe hurdle in the path of the
proponent of the document. Thereafter, the proponent would be required to
produce the testimony of each person involved in the test procedure, from
the nurse or technician who drew the blood, to the person interpreting the
test. This is quite a heavy burden in light of the fact that section 90.803(6)
of the Florida Statutes merely requires the testimony of a records custodi-
an.37 Thus, at least in the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the business
records exception has been severely limited in its application to the
introduction of medical record evidence.
B. Love's Impact on the Trial Lawyer
A trial lawyer who anticipates the entry of certain medical records must
prepare his; or her pre-trial case adequately, and must list properly each
person involved in the "chain of custody" in the pretrial witness list if the
attorney intends to introduce such documents. Of course, this will increase
the time and costs of preparation of a case involving medical records. If the
case is a contingency fee case, and if it is document-intensive, these added
requirements may affect an attorney's decision to take the case.
The case is currently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.3" As
of the date of this article, the Appellant's Initial Brief has been filed with
the Supreme Court of Florida.39
III. MEETING THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT IN AUTOMOBILE
NEGLIGENCE CASES: THE EASKOLD DECISION
A. The Threshold Requirement
To recover damages for pain, suffering, or mental anguish arising from
36. Love, 611 So. 2d at 1276.
37. See FLA. STAT. § 90.803(6) (1991).
38. See Love v. Garcia, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1993).
39. Love v. Garcia, No. 81478 (Fla. filed June 29, 1993).
1993]
534
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
the negligent operation of an automobile, section 627.737(2) of the Florida
Statutes requires the plaintiff to prove that his or her pain, suffering, and
mental anguish is the result of permanent injury. n  More specifically,
section 627.73 7(2) states that such damages are appropriate only in the event
that the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of:
(a) Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function;
(b) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probabil-
ity, other than scarring or disfigurement;
(c) Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement;
(d) Death.4'
The most common and controverted cases involve subsection (b), which
concerns permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probabili-
ty, other than scarring or disfigurement. A determination of whether a party
has sustained permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical
probability requires a medical diagnosis and, therefore, medical expert
testimony in order to establish that such permanent injury does exist. Under
these circumstances, parties typically present a battle of the experts. In such
cases, it is no stretch of the imagination to understand that the jury is free
to render its verdict upon the expert testimony that it deems the most
credible. However, where the plaintiff establishes permanent injury within
a reasonable degree of medical probability through uncontradicted expert
testimony, may the jury disregard the expert testimony and find that the
plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement? Surprisingly, the
answer may be yes.
B. The Easkold Decision
The Florida Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to consider this
issue in the case of Easkold v. Rhodes.42 Following an automobile
accident that occurred in July, 1988, the Rhodes' filed suit against Donna
Easkold seeking damages as a result of Easkold's negligent operation of her
automobile.43 The case was tried before a jury in 1990.4 ' To establish
that she sustained a permanent injury as defined in section 627.737(2) of the
40. FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (Supp. 1992).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 614 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).
43. Id. at 495.
44. Id. at 496.
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Florida Statutes, the plaintiff presented the depositions of three medical
experts.45
The first expert, an orthopedic surgeon, examined the plaintiff shortly
after the accident.46 He testified that the plaintiff had sustained permanent
injuries to her left knee, back, and neck and that such injuries were related
to the automobile accident, since the plaintiff denied having any pre-existing
injuries.47
The second medical expert performed an independent medical
examination ("IME") of the plaintiff.4' After taking a history from the
plaintiff, wherein she essentially denied any prior injuries, the doctor
performed an IME on Rhodes and testified that the plaintiff had sustained
permanent injuries to her neck, lower back, and left knee as a result of the
July, 1988, automobile accident.
49
The third and final physician was the plaintiffs "regular physician."5
This doctor's medical chart revealed that on several occasions between 1975
and 1986, prior to the July, 1988 automobile accident, the plaintiff had been
examined by him for "various conditions, including numbness in her left leg
and toes, pain in her back, numbness and pain on the left side of her head
and neck, left leg pain, and pain in the ears and back."'"
The supreme court's opinion also indicates that the plaintiff had
admitted to being injured prior to the accident after being "hit in the leg
with a buffer," in the course of her employment.52 The defendant,
Easkold, presented no medical testimony to contradict that which was
presented by the plaintiff.53 Furthermore, the defendant did not establish
that the infbrmation concerning the plaintiff's pre-existing injuries would
have affected the physicians' medical opinions regarding the permanency of
the plaintiffs injuries.54
Following a jury trial, a verdict was rendered finding the defendant,
Easkold, negligent and awarding the plaintiff, Rhodes, $37,000 for medical
expenses, both past and future, and for loss of earning ability.55 The jury,
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 496.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 496.
53. Id. at 497.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 496.
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however, found that the plaintiff did not sustain permanent injuries as a
result of the July, 1988 accident and, therefore, awarded no damages for
pain and suffering.56 The verdict was reversed by the First District Court
of Appeal upon the authority of Morey v. Harper.57
In Morey, the First District Court of Appeal considered a similar factual
situation. 8 There, the plaintiff failed to disclose preexisting injuries to her
medical experts, who testified at trial that the plaintiff sustained permanent
injuries as a result of the accident. 59 The defendant presented no expert
medical testimony to contradict or rebut the plaintiffs evidence.6 ° Further,
neither of the plaintiff's experts testified that the undisclosed information
concerning preexisting injuries would have affected their opinion concerning
the plaintiffs permanent injuries.6 Thus, the court found that the expert's
opinions were materially uncontradicted.62 The court, in reversing the
jury's verdict that the plaintiff did not sustain permanent injuries, reasoned
that since the determination as to what constitutes a permanent injury
necessarily requires expert medical testimony, the jury cannot disregard the
uncontradicted medical evidence.63
Without expressly overruling Morey, the Florida Supreme Court in
Easkold concluded that "the jury is free to 'accept or reject the testimony
of a medical expert just as it may accept or reject that of any other
expert. '"'6  However, the Easkold court also recognized that a jury's
discretion in disregarding uncontroverted expert testimony is limited, as
some basis for disregarding the evidence must appear in the record.65 The
court stated:
As we explained in Shaw, "even though the facts testified to by [the
medical expert] were not within the ordinary experience of the members
of the jury, the jury was still free to determine their credibility and to
56. Id.
57. 541 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 551 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
1989).
58. See id. at 1286.
59. Id. at 1286-87.
60. Id. at 1288.
61. Id.
62. Morey, 541 So. 2d at 1288.
63. Id.
64. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 497 (quoting Shaw v. Puelo, 159 So. 2d 641, 644 (Fla.
1964)).
65. Id.
[Vol. 18
537
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Beverly / Clarfield
decide: the weight to be ascribed to them in the face of conflicting lay
evidence."66
Thus, even though a plaintiff presents uncontradicted medical expert
testimony establishing the threshold required by section 627.737 of the
Florida Statutes, that testimony may not satisfy a jury that the plaintiff has
sustained a permanent injury.
In Easkold, the court held that the jury was "justified in determining
that the opinion testimony was flawed by reason of the materially untruthful
history given [to the doctors] by the claimant., 67 The court reached this
conclusion even though none of the medical experts testified that the
information they had not been provided would have affected their opin-
ion.68  Thus, the medical expert testimony was uncontroverted in this
case.
69
While the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Easkold may have
provided a just result, one can only ponder the potential effects that this
ruling may have on other cases in which a plaintiff fails to provide his
doctor with information concerning prior injuries thought to be unconnected
with the damages sought through the lawsuit. Under a strict interpretation
of the Easkold decision, it may be that a jury can disregard uncontroverted
medical testimony that the plaintiff's injury is permanent based solely upon
an omission in the plaintiff's history of injuries unconnected with those at
issue and without the defendant having to present medical testimony in
rebuttal.
C. Easkold's Impact Upon the Trial Lawyer
Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court decision in Easkold, it appears
that while it is not within the province of a lay person to determine whether
a party has sustained permanent injuries to a reasonable degree of medical
probability., a jury has considerable discretion in either accepting or rejecting
the required medical expert testimony.70 Therefore, apparently, it is no
longer necessary in all automobile negligence cases to have a "battle of
experts." If the defendant can establish some grounds from which a lay
person could conclude that the jury should not accept the expert testimony
66. Id. (quoting Shaw, 159 So. 2d at 644).
67. Id. at 498 (citing Rhodes v. Easkold, 588 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (Wolf, J., dissenting)).
68. Id.
69. Easkold, 614 So. 2d at 497.
70. Id. at 498.
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of a physician, whether or not those grounds would affect the physician's
opinion, then a jury verdict finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the
threshold requirement will be permitted to stand, notwithstanding the lack
of contradictory medical testimony.
In deciding whether to accept an automobile negligence case, in light
of the Easkold decision, the attorney should consider a review of the
potential client's medical records and should discuss those records with the
plaintiffs physicians prior to accepting the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
While 1993 has seen no significant modification to the Florida
Evidence Code, it as been a year of significant cases in the evidence arena.
In Love v. Garcia,7 the Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered an
opinion that significantly erodes the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, at least in cases which are medical records intensive. The
Love decision is one which both the plaintiff's lawyer, as well as the defense
attorney, will want to keep an eye on as it is currently on appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court.
In Easkold v. Rhodes,72 the Florida Supreme Court has given greater
deference to the jury in an auto negligence case in determining whether a
plaintiff has met the threshold requirement of permanent injury or scaring.
Easkold apparently stands for the proposition that a jury may accept or
reject the testimony of an expert witness, even though that expert's
testimony is uncontradicted and unrebutted, just as the jury may do with any
other witness.
71. 611 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1993).
72. 614 So. 2d at 495.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida courts have recently made significant decisions on major
issues involving the rights of children. During the past year, the Kimberly
Mays' case in Sarasota and the Gregory K.2 case in Orlando generated
national interest.3 In the Mays case, the trial court ruled that the fourteen-
year-old youngster's natural parents, Ernest and Regina Twigg, could have
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., Colgate
University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970. The author thanks Elizabeth
Zsakany for her assistance in the preparation of this article. This article will cover cases
decided through September 30, 1993.
1. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Aug. 18,
1993).
2. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
3. See Ellen Goodman, The Changing Form-and Often Conflicting Views-of the
Family, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 1993, at 19.
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no visitation with the child.4 An appeal is pending. In the Gregory K.
case, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal recently ruled on the
procedural question of the youngster's right to proceed on his own behalf
in a termination of parental rights case. While the court found that he could
not, it upheld the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights on other
grounds.5 The Gregory K. case is fully discussed later in this article.6
These cases follow on the heels of several Florida Supreme Court
decisions which demonstrate a pattern of attention to the rights of children.
The supreme court cases include: Padgett v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,7 which established the doctrine of prospective
neglect; A.A. v. Rolle,8 which limited the use of secure detention for
contempt; In re T W.,9 which supported a minor's right to privacy in an
abortion situation; and Hermanson v. State,' ° which upheld the defense of
religious practices against the charge of criminal child abuse.
The Florida appellate courts continued a tradition described in earlier
survey articles in which they manifested assiduous attention to careful
interpretation of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (Florida's Juvenile
Code), and maintained a long standing policy of holding trial courts
accountable for strict compliance with the mandates of Chapter 39."
This survey reviews the major case law for the past year, focusing on
dependency, delinquency, and termination of parental rights cases, together
with a detailed discussion of the Gregory K. case.
4. Mays, 1993 WL 330624, at *6; see also Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The trial court, on remand from the Second District Court of Appeal,
found that any forced visitation or contact between the Twiggs and Kimberly Mays would
be detrimental to Kimberly, and therefore the Twiggs had no legal interest in or right to visit
Kimberly Mays. Mays, 1993 WL 330624, at *6.
5. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 780.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 25-47.
7. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
8. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
9. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
10. 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
11. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
335 (1992); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV.
333 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REV.
1169 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859 (1990); Michael J. Dale,
Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159 (1989).
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II. DEPENDENCY
A. Trial Issues
Issues of confidentiality in dependency proceedings, contrasting with
the public's right to know, continue to arise in proceedings in Florida. Last
year's Survey of Juvenile Law briefly discussed Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services v. A.N.,' 2 a notorious case regularly covered by the
South Florida media.' 3 In A.N., the parents and the guardian ad litem of
A.N. agreed to allow the media full access to the dependency proceedings
and records. The Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ("HRS")
appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that Florida law
does not prohibit a guardian ad litem from waiving the benefit of sections
39.411(3) and (4) of the Florida Statutes. 4 The appellate court thus found
that the circuit court was acting within its discretion when it decided that
disclosure would correct speculation, rumor, or innuendo about the family
that was the subject of the proceedings, as well as serve the best interests of
12. 604 So. 2d I I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 375 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Liz Balmaseda, It's Best to Settle Nogues Casefor Children's Sake, MIAMI
HERALD, May 16, 1992, at IB; Andres Viglucci, Dade Judge Recuses Himself From Tragic
Child-Abuse Case, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 1992, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, Children Paying
Highest Price As Case Drags On, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1992, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, A
Mother's Unwavering Commitment, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 1992, at I B.
14. A.N., 604 So. 2d at 11. Section 39.411(3) of the Florida Statutes provides in
relevant pan:
All court records required by this part shall not be open to inspection by the
public. All records shall be inspected only upon order of the court by persons
deemed by the court to have a proper interest therein, except that, subject to the
provisions of s. 63.162, a child and the parents or legal custodians of the child
and their attorneys, law enforcement agencies, and the department and its
designees shall always have the right to inspect and copy any official record
pertaining to the child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.411(3) (1991). Section 39.411(4) provides in relevant part:
All information obtained pursuant to this part in the discharge of official duty
by any judge, employee of the court, authorized agent of the department,
correctional probation officer, or law enforcement agent shall be confidential and
exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and shall not be disclosed to anyone
other than the authorized personnel of the court, the department and its
designees, correctional probation officers, law enforcement agents, and others
entitled under this chapter to receive the information, except upon order of the
court.
Id. § 39.411(4).
Dale
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the children at the same time."' As a result of this ruling, the case made
front page news throughout the spring and summer of 1993.6
A very different kind of confidentiality issue arose in Jett v. State.
17
The defendant argued on appeal in this criminal case that he was denied the
ability to question a psychotherapist and psychologist concerning their
communications with the child victims whom he allegedly assaulted. The
Fifth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, held that Florida Statutes
section 415.512, which governs waivers of privileged communications, is
available to an alleged perpetrator in a criminal case.'" The significance
of the waiver is that it not only applies in any situation involving known or
suspected child abuse or neglect (typically dependency proceedings), but
also in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.' 9 The
appellate court's view was expansive in this regard by including criminal
cases within the definition of judicial proceedings relating to child abuse and
neglect.20
The four dissenters argued that the section does not apply as extensive-
ly as the majority would allow. 2' At the heart of the difference between
the judges is the question of what particular effect an expansive waiver of
privilege will have. For example, Judge Sharp, in his dissent, commented
that children may not speak freely to therapists, resulting in the loss of
diagnosis and treatment, whereas child abusers and rapists will benefit from
the interpretation. 2 Not discussed in the opinion is the question of
balancing the child's right to privacy and to privileged communication with
medical providers against the criminal defendant's right to confrontation.
The issue of standing in termination of parental rights cases was the
subject of two recent appellate decisions. The first is the well-known
Gregory K. case which is actually entitled Kingsley v. Kingsley.23 The
15. A.N., 604 So. 2d at 11.
16. See, e.g., Liz Balmaseda, Child Advocates Became Enemy of the Family, MIAMI
HERALD, June 26, 1993, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, Nogues Case Kids Abused by the System,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1993, at I B; Andres Viglucci, Judge Sends Nogues Children Home
for Immediate Reunion, MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 1993, at I B; Andres Viglucci, Family Torn
by Allegations of Abuse Ordered Reunited, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 1993, at IA.
17. 605 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 1993 WL 458840 (Fla.
Nov. 10, 1993).
18. Id. at 928.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 929-33.
22. Jett, 605 So. 2d at 930 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
23. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 780.
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second case is In re C.G.2 4 In the Gregory K. case, the child appealed the
trial court's order denying the child's motion for summary judgment
regarding the applicable burden of proof.25 The mother of the child also
appealed, challenging the trial court's order that terminated her parental
rights and granted an adoption petition filed by the child's foster parents.
The case originated in June, 1992 when Gregory, then eleven years old,
filed a petition for termination of parental rights in the juvenile division of
the circuit court. His foster parents filed a separate complaint for declara-
tion of rights and adoption in the civil division of the circuit court. The
latter matter was transferred to the juvenile division. The trial court ruled
that Gregory had standing to initiate the action for termination of parental
rights. 26  Subsequent to the initial filings, which the trial court accepted,
the court appointed one of the child's attorneys as his attorney ad litem.27
Thereafter, the child's foster parents filed a petition for adoption. The foster
father, the guardian ad litem, HRS, and the foster mother filed four
additional petitions for termination of parental rights on the child's behalf.
The matter proceeded to trial in September, 1992. Over the mother's
objection, the trial court simultaneously tried the termination of parental
rights proceeding and the adoption proceeding. After the parties presented
their evidence, the trial court orally terminated parental rights and proceeded
immediately to grant the adoption petition, also from the bench.2 1 It
subsequently filed a nunc pro tunc written judgment.
The district court of appeal found first and emphatically that the child
lacked the capacity to bring a termination of parental rights case himself.29
Because Gregory was an unemancipated minor, he could not sue in his own
right pursuant to Rule 1.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.3"
24. 612 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
25. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782.
26. Id.
27. The trial court observed that the roles of guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem
were distinct. Id.
28. Id. at 783.
29. Id.
30. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 783. Rule 1.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or incompetent person has a
representative, such as a guardian or other like fiduciary, the representative may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or
incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue
by next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem fir an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action
or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant
Dale
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The court held that representation by counsel in and of itself was not
sufficient.31 Rather, a guardian ad litem or next friend must represent the
child." According to Florida state law, which tracks the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a next friend can bring the suit with the minor as the real
party in interest.33
The appellate court recognized that within the dependency provisions
of Chapter 39, a number of persons can commence a dependency or
termination of parental rights proceeding.34 The court stated that an
attorney may commence the proceeding by filing the termination petition;
however, the attorney must do so as next friend of the child. The court
concluded that the error made below in allowing Gregory to bring a
termination of parental rights suit was procedural and not jurisdictional.35
Thus, the continuation of the proceedings through a next friend or guardian
ad litem rectified the trial court's error and rendered it harmless.36
Gregory and his foster father appealed, arguing that the burden of proof
should be by a preponderance of the evidence and not a clear and convinc-
ing standard. They argued that the child had a fundamental liberty interest
equal to that of the parent. Therefore, the standard of clear and convincing
evidence should not apply when the action is brought on behalf of the child.
The appellate court simply and expediently disposed of this incongruous
argument in light of the 1982 United States Supreme Court ruling in
Santosky v. Kramer,37 and held that the standard must be clear and
convincing evidence as a matter of procedural due process.38
or incompetent person.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(b).
31. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court defended the capacity to sue as being "the right to come into court
which exists if one is free of general disability, such as infancy or insanity." Id. at 783
(citing Earls v. King, 785 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
17(c).
34. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784; see FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (Supp. 1992); see also
Lupinek v. Firth, 619 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a child's
guardian ad litem has authority to file a petition to terminate parental rights).
35. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785.
36. Id.
37. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Among the problems with the child's (Gregory) argument is
that it fails to take into account the situation that arises when the child wishes to remain with
the parent and claims a protected liberty interest in staying with the natural parent. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47
(1977).
38. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785.
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Finally, the court dealt with the natural mother's claim that the trial
court erred in trying the termination of parental rights and adoption cases
simultaneously, which violated her procedural due process rights. The court
agreed and reversed the trial court's decision.3 9 The appellate court relied
upon Rule 8.275(a) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and section
39.473(3) of the Florida Statutes, both of which obviously contemplate
trying the matters separately.4" The appellate court recognized that trying
both matters together might cause "an impermissible comparison between
the natural parent's parenting skills and those of the prospective parents,"
which is violative of the natural parent's fundamental interest in the care and
custody of the child.4' However, because there was no emphasis on such
comparisons at the trial level, the appellate court held that the error was
harmless under the facts of the case. On the other hand, the appellate court
found that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to grant the
foster parents' petition for adoption. According to the appellate court, this
was reversible error, and the matter was remanded for further proceed-
ings.42
Chief Judge Harris concurred in part and dissented in part. He found
the intermixing of the adoption proceeding with the termination case to be
reversible error.4 3 He reasoned that mixing the issue in the adoption case,
establishing the manifest best interests of the child,44 with the standard for
termination of parental rights unfairly prejudiced the mother because the
standard in the case at bar required that there be a finding of abandonment
before the best interests of the child were taken into account.45 In his
view, the trial strategy employed by the attorneys for the child caused the
39. Id.
40. Id. Rule 8.275(a) states:
Termination of Parental Rights. The taking of an appeal shall operate as a
supersedeas in cases involving a petition for termination of parental rights, but
the child shall continue in the custody of the agency under the order until the
appeal is decided.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.275(a). Section 39.473(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that:
[A] termination of parental rights order with placement of the child with a
licensed child-placing agency or the department for subsequent adoption shall
be suspended while the appeal is pending, but the child shall continue in custody
under the order until the appeal is decided.
FLA. STAT. § 39.473(3) (Supp. 1992).
41. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 788.
42. Id. at 789.
43. Id. at 792.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2) (Supp. 1992).
45. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 790.
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trial court to fail to keep the two-step process separate. As Chief Judge
Harris stated, "[c]learly the adoption testimony was presented along with the
testimony relating to the termination proceedings when the only relevant
issue was whether the mother's conduct justified termination."46 He also
perceptively stated:
This rather ordinary termination of parental rights case was transformed
into a cause celebre by artful representation and the glare of klieg lights.
It is the judge's obligation, however, to look beyond the images created
by light and shadow and concentrate on the real-life drama being played
out on center stage. Florida recognizes no cause of action that permits
a child to divorce his parents.47
Contrasted with the notoriety of the Gregory K. case is In re C.G.,4"
another important opinion that deals with the issue of standing in the
dependency area. In C.G., the adoptive parents of a child wished to
intervene in a dependency proceeding involving the child's natural half sister
and to become the foster parents of the half sister. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal ruled that adoptive parents had standing to petition to
intervene in the dependency proceeding.49 The court held that the adoptive
parents of the half-sibling had standing to petition for modification of
placement under section 39.41(1)(a)7 of the Florida Statutes.5" The
appellate court read sections 39.41 and 30.45 of the Florida Statutes,
together with section 63.022(1) of the Florida Adoption Act, to conclude
that sibling groups should be kept together; thus, persons who have an
interest in causing that to occur should be able to intervene.5' By inter-
preting the various statutes in combination, the court found that the
Legislature had intended to allow such persons to participate in placement
proceedings.2
B. Appellate Issues
The Florida Supreme Court addressed two important issues of appellate
46. Id at 791.
47. Id. at 790.
48. 612 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
49. Id at 604.
50. Id. at 603.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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practice in dependency proceedings in late 1992. The question in In re
E.H.3 was whether a parent is entitled to a belated appeal in a termination
of parental rights case based upon the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to timely file the notice of appeal. In an opinion written
by Justice McDonald, the court allowed the belated appeal, asserting that it
was not deciding the case on precedent but rather "on the significant policy
interest in ensuring that a parent and child are not separated without a
thorough review of the merits of the case."54 In E.H., the mother's lawyer
had filed a notice of appeal one day after the deadline for filing appeals.
The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.55
The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that Florida has a strong public
policy of protecting parent/child relationships, that termination of parental
rights permanently severs the relationship, and that the lawyer in the
particular case had been appointed to represent the parent at both the trial
and appellate levels.56 The court held that the mistake should not be
imputed to the mother when the consequence was the permanent loss of the
children. 7 The court concluded that there were extenuating circumstances
to allow the appeal. 8
The supreme court went to great lengths to justify the non-precedential
value of its opinion. Nevertheless, it appears to have failed. By recognizing
the significant public interest in allowing these appeals, it has set out a test
of "exceptionality" wherein belated appeals will be allowed. Finally, the
court ruled on the proper procedure for handling such appeals. 9 It ruled
that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedural vehicle
for seeking the appeal, and that the petition should be filed with the trial
court.6 0
In its second opinion on appellate practice in dependency cases,
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Honeycutt,61 the court
defined limitations on appeals from non-final orders. Honeycutt involved
an appeal by HRS from a trial court order in a dependency proceeding. The
trial court had denied a motion to extend the time of shelter placement,
53. 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
54. Id. at 1291.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1290.
57. Id.
58. E.H., 609 So. 2d at 1290.
59. Id. at 1290-91.
60. Id.
61. 609 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1992).
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pending the completion of the adjudicatory hearing.6" HRS argued to the
supreme court that a Chapter 39 child dependency proceeding falls within
the definition of domestic relations matters for purposes of appeals from
non-final orders under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i-
ii).63 The supreme court held that dependency proceedings under Chapter
39 do not fall within the traditional definition of domestic relations
matters.64 Although there is a concern for the expeditious resolution of
child placement issues, the court was unwilling to expand the definition of
domestic relations to include dependency proceedings. Oddly, it included
as part of its rationale the fact that to expand the definition would place a
severe burden on the case load of the district courts of appeal.63 This
failure to open the doors of the appellate courts seems somewhat inconsis-
tent given the supreme court's clear interest in protecting children in
substantive contexts.66
In In re T.M,67 the First District Court of Appeal ruled on the
question of what is a final order in a dependency proceeding. The father
had appealed from an adjudicatory order reaffirming a prior dependency
finding that had terminated his parental rights. He did not appeal from a
subsequent disposition order in the same case, which reaffirmed the
dependency adjudications and the termination of parental rights. The district
court rejected HRS' motion to dismiss the appeal. The court held that
orders in Chapter 39 proceedings do not always fit neatly into the traditional
categories of final and non-final orders.68 It held that the initial order of
reaffirmation of dependency and termination of parental rights was
sufficiently final on the question of the father's parental rights to be
appealable.69
62. Id.
63. Id. at 597. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii) states that
reviews from final orders may be heard if they involve the "right to immediate monetary
relief or child custody in domestic relations matters." FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).
64. Honeycutt, 609 So. 2d at 597.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992); Padgett v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
67. 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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C. Child Abuse Reporting Issues
Section 415.504 of the Florida Statutes governs mandatory reporting of
abuse and neglect cases.70  The statute contains reporting requirements,
establishes a central abuse registry and tracking system, and provides for due
process protection for alleged perpetrators.71  Cases dealing with the
reporting system regularly come before the appellate courts. 2
In A.S. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,73 the appel-
late court reversed a final order of HRS denying a request to expunge an
individual's name from a confirmed report of child neglect. 74 The Second
District Court of Appeal determined that the facts agreed to by the parties
did not constitute child abuse or neglect as defined by section 415.503 of
the Florida Statutes." The court thus reversed on the facts. In dictum,
however, it raised the much more serious question of the constitutionality
of section 415.503(9)(e), which defines abuse or neglect for purposes of
reporting to include the situation where "the parent or other person responsi-
ble for the child's welfare; . . .(e) [f]ails to provide the child with super-
vision or guardianship by specific acts or omissions of a serious nature
requiring the intervention of the department or the court ....
The court was unable to determine what words like "serious nature" or
"requiring the intervention of the department or the court" mean.77
Similarly, the court stated that while it understood the term to mean more
than "mere investigation of reports," it was nonetheless vague because the
court was unable to determine what more was required. 78  Lacking any
definitive standards, the court would have held the statute unconstitutional
70. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1991); see generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991
Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 336-38 (1991).
71. See FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4) (1991).
72. For a discussion of cases decided in prior years, see Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 366-68 (1991).
73. 616 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
74. Id. at 1203.
75. Id. at 1207. Child abuse or neglect is defined by that section as, "[hiarm or
threatened harm to a child's physical or mental health or welfare by the acts or omissions of
a parent . I..." d. (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503 (1991)).
76. Id. at 1206 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(e) (1991)).
77. A.S., 616 So. 2d at 1206.
78. Id.
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as against a challenge to its facial validity.79 Because the issue was not
raised, it reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.8"
III. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Because substantial numbers of children are placed in secure detention
in Florida, significant issues of the conditions of confinement as well as
proper interpretation of the legislation related to detention arise."' Cases
involving detention regularly reach the appellate courts.82 In H.L. v.
Woolsey,83 for example, a juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge predispositional hearing detention on the grounds that
the child failed to meet detention criteria and that detention was not indicat-
ed by the risk assessment instrument as required by Florida Statutes, sections
39.044(2) and 39.044(3). The appellate court rejected the child's argument,
determining that sections 39.044(2) and 39.044(5)(c), provisions not relied
upon by the state, must be read to allow the trial court to detain a child for
a limited time after adjudication but before a dispositional hearing is
held. 4 Without any explanation, the court simply cited to language in
section 39.044(5)(c), which states:
No child shall be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for
more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication
79. Id
80. Id. at 1206-07. For more technical issues decided by the appellate courts this year,
see R.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 617 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that HRS must review the record of a hearing officer before
rejecting the officer's factual findings that support expunction of a child abuse report); E.V.
v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 615 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an imprisoned parent who refuses to sign papers to have a child placed
in the care of a responsible adult because he legitimately questioned his paternity cannot be
found to have abandoned a child under section 415.503(9)(d)); Kelly v. Department of Health
& Rehabilitative Services, 610 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
conviction of child abuse without more is not conclusive proof as a matter of law that the
alleged abuse actually took place).
81. See generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA
L. REV. 335, 348-53 (1992).
82. See id; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 333, 339-43 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15
NOVA L REV. 1169, 1171-73 (1990).
83. 618 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
84. Id. at 269.
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unless an order of disposition pursuant to s. 39.054 has been entered by
the court or unless a continuance, which shall not exceed 15 days, has
been granted for cause. 5
Apparently, the appellate court was suggesting that the detention
criteria do not apply during the fifteen day period after adjudication and
before disposition. The court's argument seems to be that the earlier section
does not apply. However, both provisions are contained within the larger
sub-division entitled "Detention." More significantly, the grounds for
detention contain no limitation. The court's opinion is, therefore, lacking
an analytic foundation.
The issue of juvenile contempt continues to frustrate the Florida
juvenile courts in light of the supreme court's decision in A.A. v. Rolle, 6
in which the court limited the punishment for contempt by precluding secure
detention facilities as a place to hold children for contempt. In ML.B. v.
State, 7 the First District Court of Appeal held that a juvenile arraignment
citation does not constitute a court order for purposes of holding a child in
criminal contempt. The court concluded that the arraignment citation is not
the same as a notice to appear, which is issued pursuant to Rule 8.045 of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 8 Because that document provides a
space for the child's signature and promise to appear in court at the
appointed time, it is thus enforceable. 9  Most significant to the court's
ruling was the fact that there was no order for the child to violate because
there was never any way to prove that the child received notice.9"
In a separate detention-related case, C.J. v. Rolle,9' a juvenile brought
a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he could not be held in detention
under the detention statute. The child had been charged with a second
degree felony while on release status after having been charged with a prior
second degree felony. Pursuant to section 39.044(2)(d)3 of the Florida
Statutes, a child may be held in secure detention when charged with a
second degree felony involving a violation of Chapter 893 (the charge in the
case at hand) and where he had already been detained or released and was
awaiting final disposition of his case.92 The crucial issue was the defini-
85. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(c) (1991)).
86. 604 :So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
87. 604 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id. at 1259-60.
89. Id. at 1259.
90. Id. at 1260.
91. 608 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
92. Id. al. 118 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.044(2)(d)(3) (1991)).
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tion of the word final disposition. The child argued that final disposition
meant a disposition hearing. The appellate court rejected this contention
indicating that final disposition meant from the time of being charged with
a crime to final disposition of the case.93 It therefore upheld the deten-
tion.94
The appellate frustration with the A.A. v. Rolle95 case is further
evidenced in T.R.A. v. State.96 In T.R.A., a child contemptuously told the
trial court judge to "screw off," whereupon the judge placed the child in
secure detention. Reluctantly relying on Rolle, the appellate court granted
the petition but referred to Justice Overton's dissent by suggesting that the
Legislature overrule the supreme court opinion in Rolle.97
B. Appellate Issues
The issue of the appealability of an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction
and certifying a juvenile for trial as an adult came before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in In re D. W.9 The appellate court ruled that an order
of involuntary waiver by the trial court is not a final order from which an
appeal will lie.99 The court looked to the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Although a petition for a common law writ of certiorari was a
possibility, under the facts of the case, the court could find no essential
departure from the law, nor irreparable harm from that final order, and no
complete and adequate relief that would not result from the final order, so
as to allow the interim order to be otherwise appealable.' °
In State v. D. V.S.,' °' the state brought a petition for writ of certiorari
challenging the trial court's order that appointed the public defender to
represent a juvenile in an appeal from a delinquency disposition. The state
argued that the trial court had not obtained an affidavit of indigency from
the child's father. The trial court also failed to make a determination of
probable expense and burden of defending the case as required by Florida
Statutes sections 27.52 and 27.56. While the child and his mother filed
affidavits of insolvency, the father did not file one. Nor was there any
93. Id.
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. 604 So. 2d at 813.
96. 605 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
97. Id. at 552.
98. 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 617 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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indication that he refused to furnish necessary legal services. Thus, on the
facts the appellate court reversed. °2
C. Dispositional Issues
The Florida Juvenile Justice Act,0 3 passed in 1990, provides a variety
of dispositional alternatives that contain elements of rehabilitation, deter-
rence, and punishment. The dispositional alternatives include commitment
to HRS and community control, which are known in most jurisdictions as
probation and restitution. Interpreting the powers of the trial court in the
dispositional context remains a focus for a substantial number of appellate
court rulings.
A question of First Amendment freedom of religion arose recently in
the second reported opinion in L.M v. State. 4 L.M involved an appeal
from a remand and subsequent decision by the trial court imposing a
condition of community control that required the child to obey all lawful
and reasonable demands of his mother including participation in church
youth programs. In a split decision, the majority first held that it was not
an improper delegation of judicial authority to L.M.'s mother to determine
which particular programs or activities the child must attend.0 5 The court
distinguished between complying with lawful demands of a probation officer
delegated with judicial authority and requiring a child to obey parental
directions.'0 6 The court added that if the mother's demands were not
lawful or were unreasonable, the matter could be decided when a dispute
arose between the mother and child resulting in a violation of the condi-
tion. 07
The court also concluded that the condition requiring participation in
church programs chosen by the parent did not violate the child's First
Amendment right of free exercise of religion.' The child argued that
this order directly violated the appellate court's prior holding in L.M v.
State."9  The court appeared to skirt this issue by indicating that the
102. Id. at 1164.
103. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(l) (1991).
104. 610 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id. at 1317-18.
106. Id. at 1318.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1319.
109. L.M., 610 So. 2d at 1318. The prior holding in L.M. v. State held that an order
requiring a juvenile placed under community control to submit to a course of religious
instruction violates the First Amendment. L.M. v. State, 587 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist.
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extent to which a court can or should have authority to enforce parental
directions when the child refuses to obey, as in the case of religious training,
need not be decided because that issue was not yet present." ' The court
appeared to avoid this issue, indicating that the extent of its authority to
enforce parental directions is limited to when the child refuses to obey the
parental order. In the L.M v. State case, no violation had as yet oc-
curred."' Thus, the issue of whether the condition of religious training
was violative of the youth's constitutional rights was not before the court.
The court determined that such community control provisions are presump-
tively valid and that it may decide this issue when raised by the child in
response to a violation of the community control petition.'' 2 Judge Allen
dissented, finding that the court's ruling was a matter of a "game of
semantics to accomplish the very result which was disapproved in In re L.M
v. State."''3
Two other dispositional matters-restitution and specific written
findings-determining whether a child shall be treated as an adult or juvenile
for dispositional purposes, require brief analysis. Florida's provision for
restitution in juvenile delinquency cases has been the subject of substantial
appellate review based upon the generally inexplicable failure of the trial
courts to comply with the restitution requirements of Florida law." 4 For
example, in C.S. v. State,"5 the appellate court affirmed the adjudication
but vacated the restitution order on the grounds that the state had failed to
carry its burden of proving the amount of restitution." 6 The state neglect-
ed to present testimony of a witness with knowledge of the amount of
damages in repairs or to present uncontested documentary evidence. Under
Ct. App. 1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17
NOVA L. REV. 335, 358 (1992).
110. L.M, 610 So. 2d at 1319.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (Allen, J., dissenting). Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent raised
the issues discussed by the United States Supreme Court in both Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (the dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas specifically addresses childrens'
independent First Amendment rights to freedom of religion) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (which dealt with the child's independent
First Amendment constitutional rights to freedom of religion and speech).
114. See FLA.. STAT. § 39.052(3)(f) (1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 359-60 (1992) (discussing other
restitution cases).
115. 617 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Id at 864.
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the facts of the case, the state attorney simply stood up and advised the
court of the amount involved. Incredibly, the trial court accepted this over
the defense's objection, but the appellate court vacated the order and
remanded for a new restitution hearing.' 17
In F.A. v. State,"8 the appellate court vacated the order because the
trial court ordered restitution and payment for services of the public
defender but failed to provide the appellant notice or an opportunity to be
heard." 9  The trial court also failed to make an inquiry as to the
appellant's ability to pay.
20
In In re EP.,2 ' the state's attorney conceded error when the trial
court ordered the appellant to pay $730 in restitution for losses caused by
a burglary for which the appellant was not charged.
22
In LAD. v. State, 23 the mother of the child appealed from an order
directing her to pay restitution in the event that the child failed to do so and
ordering her to pay attorney's fees for court appointed counsel. 24 The
state conceded that the victim's damages were caused by a collision with the
child's car and were not in any way attributable to the child's act of leaving
the scene of the accident for which the child had been charged. Thus, the
court vacated the portion of the order directing the mother to pay restitution.
Further, the court reversed the assessment of the attorney's fee lien because
the mother was not afforded prior notice, nor notice of the right to a hearing
to contest the amount.'25
Finally, in In re B.S, 126 the state again conceded. The appellate court
modified the trial court's order of restitution to provide that the children,
because they were presently unemployed, would be obligated to begin
paying restitution only upon obtaining earnings from employment that would
permit them to comply with the condition.'27
The inability of the trial courts to comply with state law is even more
evident in the context of the requirement that the trial court make specific
117. Id.
118. 616 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
119. Id. at 1093.
120. Id.
121. 615 So. 2d 214 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id.
123. 616 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d 268 (Fla.
1993).
124. Id at 107.
125. Id.
126. 616 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
127. Id.
Dale
556
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
written findings and reasons for the imposition of an adult sentence, as
opposed to a juvenile sentence, pursuant to Florida Statutes, section
39.059(7)(d). 2 8 Recent cases demonstrating the trial court's failure to do
just this include Mathews v. State,129 Kelly v. State,'3" Hill v. State,'
Trueblood v. State, 32 Petithomme v. State,'33 and Orange v. State.134
For years, this problem has reoccurred.
Similarly, trial courts regularly fail to determine whether there was a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the child's right to findings under section
39.059(7).' In the absence of such a knowing and intelligent waiver, it is
reversible error for the trial court to impose adult sanctions on the youngster
without making the required statutory findings.'36
The more difficult question is whether a child who enters a negotiated
plea agreement that allows the court to consider the imposition of adult or
juvenile sanctions necessarily waives his or her right to have the court make
findings and give reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions. The
supreme court held recently, in Pittman v. State, that without an intelligent
and knowing waiver that is "manifest on the record," a youngster who enters
a negotiated plea agreement does not waive any rights under section
39.111.1'7
IV. FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES
Part IV of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes was passed in 1987 and
governs families in need of services and children in need of services. 3 '
Its purpose is to provide families "with an array of services designed to
128. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1991).
129. 614 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
130. 605 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
131. 605 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
132. 610 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
133. 610 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
134. 619 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
135. Rollins v. State, 610 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Pittman v. State,
620 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1993).
136. See Hill v. State, 596 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing
sentence for failure of record to reflect manifest waiver by juvenile or written findings of fact
to support adult sanctions).
137. Pittman, 620 So. 2d at 1232.
138. For a brief summary of the statutory provisions governing families and children in
need of services, see Michael J. Dale, Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L.
REV. 1159, 1190-93 (1989).
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preserve the unity and the integrity of their family."1"9 Prior to this year
there had only been one reported opinion interpreting the statute since its
passage in 1987.140 This year, a second reported opinion interpreted the
statute.
In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Superintendent
of Schools for Seminole County,14 1 the state welfare department appealed
a trial court adjudication of a child in need of services, arguing that the
school board lacked standing to commence a child in need of services
proceeding. The school board had filed a petition alleging a second grader
was chronically truant. The court rejected HRS's argument and relied upon
Florida Statutes, section 232.19(3)(a), which provides that in the case of
habitual truancy, the school administration may file a child in need of
services complaint. 142 HRS argued that the 1987 changes in Chapter 39,
which created the child in need of services classification, preempted section
232(19)3.43 While recognizing that the coordination of the two laws "is
certainly no model of clarity,"', 44 the court held that the legislative intent
was to have section 232 continue to be in force since the Legislature revised
section 232 after the passage of the 1987 amendments to Chapter 39
governing children in need of services. 145
V. CONCLUSION
The appellate courts in Florida decided a number of important cases
during the survey period. While the Gregory K. case may be more
titillating to the public and the media than it is to practitioners, the
intermediate appellate court's decision nonetheless clarifies some important
procedural issues. In addition, the supreme court clarified some issues of
appellate practice this year and the lower appellate courts continued to
139. FLA. STAT. § 39.42(1) (1991).
140. See Wolf v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 588 So. 2d 335 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also, Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida
Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 336, 383-84 (1992) (discussing the Wolf case).
141. 618 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
142. Id. at 332-33. Section 232.19(3)(a) ofthe Florida Statutes provides in relevant part,
"[i]n case a child becomes a habitual truant the school administration shall file with the
circuit court a complaint alleging the facts and the child shall be dealt with as a child in need
of services .... FLA. STAT. § 232.19(3)(a) (1991).
143. Superintendent of Sch. for Seminole County, 618 So. 2d at 332.
144. Id. The decision is correct although the court's syntax isn't.
145. Id. at 332-33.
Dale
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carefully interpret Chapter 39 and hold the trial courts responsible for strict
compliance with the 1990 juvenile code.
559
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Local Government: 1993 Survey of Florida Law
John J. Copelan, Jr.:
Barbara S. Monahan "
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 561
II. ELECTION LAW ........................... 562
III. POLICE POWERS .......................... 562
A. Public Health, Safety, and Welfare .......... 563
B. Land Use Regulation .................... 567
C. Environmental Law ..................... 571
IV. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN .................. 574
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ......................... 576
VI. CONCLUSION-A LOOK TO THE FUTURE ......... 579
I. INTRODUCTION
While Hurricane Andrew occupied much of South Florida's attention
during the survey period, with the exception of case law affecting elections
held in the aftermath of such a natural disaster, the litigation it generated has
yet to hit the appellate courts. Because of Florida's burgeoning and
unfettered growth over the past several decades, local government regulation
for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of its residents intensi-
fied. This article discusses decisions of the Florida courts, as well as a
decision of the United States Supreme Court, during the survey period of
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July 1992 through July 1993. These decisions relate to increased regulation
which impacts local governments in the area of election law, police powers,
eminent domain, and sovereign immunity.
II. ELECTION LAW
In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, elections for state and local
offices had not yet been held. Because of the impossibility of operating
many of the polling places due to the destruction and devastation caused by
Andrew, the Dade County Attorney's Office sought an emergency injunction
from the state circuit court in order to postpone the election, as well as to
enjoin the state from announcing results of statewide races until Dade's
elections were held.' On expedited appeal, the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the postponement of the election, but reversed enjoining the
announcement of the results from the rest of the state.2
III. POLICE POWERS
The ability of local governments to regulate through its police powers
is frequently defined as that power of government, inherent in sovereignty,
to provide for the public order, peace, health, safety, welfare, and morals.'
The police power enables a local government to regulate anything that it
deems reasonably necessary and appropriate in the best interest of the public
to secure not only the public order and peace, but for the prosperity,
comfort, and quiet convenience of the general public.'
A local government's power to regulate through its police powers is
also derived from the Florida Constitution.' Non-charter counties have all
the powers of self-government as provided by general or special state law.6
Non-charter counties may also enact ordinances that are not inconsistent
with general or special law, but if such an ordinance conflicts with a
municipal ordinance, the ordinance is not effective within the municipality
1. Dade County v. State, Nos. 92-19086, 92-19087, 92-19088 (Fla. I Ith Cir. Ct. Aug.
31, 1992).
2. State v. Dade County, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Aug. 31, 1992).
3. 6A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.04 (3d ed.
1988).
4. 10 FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 191 (1979).
5. FLA. CONST. art. VIII.
6. Id. § 1(f).
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to the extent that the ordinances conflict.7 On the other hand, charter
counties have all the powers of local self-government not inconsistent with
general or special law approved by the vote of the electors or enacted by
their governing body.' A charter county can designate in its charter which
shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal
ordinances.9
Under the Florida Constitution, a municipality may be established by
charter, and is thereby granted the authority to "exercise any power for
municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law."'" Although the
powers residing in local governments are extensive, the courts are the final
arbiters of what is the proper subject of the police powers, and whether the
exercise of such power is within constitutional limits."
A. Public Health, Safety, and Welfare
Some important cases in the area of local government law arose out of
the enactment of ordinances regulating adult oriented uses of land and
inhibiting religious practice. Undoubtedly, one of the most interesting cases
of the survey period arose out of the enactment of four ordinances by the
City of Hialeah. The City of Hialeah attempted to prohibit, among other
things, the unnecessary killing of animals in a public or private ritual or
ceremony, unless the primary purpose was for consumption.' The United
States Supreme Court held that the ordinances were void because they were
contrary to the principles of the Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution. 3
Although the city claimed that the purpose of the ordinances was to
protect the public health and prevent cruelty to animals, the Court found that
7. Id.
8. Id. § 1(g).
9. Id.
10. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a), (b).
11. 10 FIA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 201 (1979).
12. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2223
(1993). The following ordinances were enacted: (1) Ordinance 87-40 incorporates the
Florida animal cruelty laws and punishes anyone who kills an animal unnecessarily or cruelly;
(2) Ordinance 87-52 defines sacrifice and prohibits the possession or slaughter or sacrifice
of an animal if killed in a ritual and where there is no intent to use the animal for food (the
ordinance goes on to exempt licensed food establishments); (3) Ordinance 87-71 prohibits the
sacrifice of animals; and, (4) Ordinance 87-52 defines the term "slaughter" and prohibits
slaughtering animals outside areas zoned for slaughterhouses, but then exempts small numbers
of hogs and/or cattle if exempt by state law. Id. at 2224.
13. Id. at 2231.
1993]
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the ordinances were underinclusive to meet those ends in that they failed to
prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangered those same interests. 4 The
Court determined that the city's only interest was to regulate conduct
motivated by religious belief and that:
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general
application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the
commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious
practice must advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.' 5
The Court found that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to
accomplish their purpose and held that all four of the ordinances were
overbroad or underinclusive because they were all aimed at limiting the
religious practices of the Santeria religion. 16 In so holding, the Court
stated that the ordinances seek "not to effectuate the stated governmental
interests, but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation."' 7
The Court went on to state that if the city's intent was to address the
improper disposal of animals, the city should have enacted an ordinance
regulating the disposal of organic garbage; however, the ordinances were
aimed at the sacrifice itself as the "harm to be prevented."' 8
Any restrictions or regulations proffered by a local government must
be narrowly tailored to meet the required ends.' 9 When and if those
regulations infringe on constitutional rights, the courts may determine the
regulations to be of no force and effect.
In the area of regulation of adult-oriented uses, the courts have been
more deferential to local governments and the ability to regulate those uses
through their police powers in order to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their residents."0
14. Id. at 2232. The Court pointed out that the ordinances did not prohibit the killing
of fish, the extermination of mice and rats, nor the euthanasia of stray or abandoned animals
and was, therefore, underinclusive. Id.
15. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 628 (1978)).
16. Id. Santeria means "the way of the saints." The Santeria faith teaches that each
individual has a destiny that is handed down from God. In order to fulfill that destiny, one
needs the aid of the Orishas, which are spirits. The followers of Santeria believe the Orishas,
although powerful, are not immortal, and therefore require sacrifices for survival. Id.
17. Id. at 2229.
18. Id. at 2220.
19. See Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
20. Many local governments began enacting ordinances regulating the distance between
adult-oriented establishments and licensing (i.e. time, place, and manner) of adult-oriented
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During the survey period, ordinances regulating adult-oriented
establishments have withstood numerous challenges. For instance, in TJ.R.
Holding Co. v. Alachua County,2' the owner of Cafe Risque sought to
enjoin enforcement of an Alachua County ordinance that banned nudity and
sexual conduct where alcoholic beverages were served. The challenge to the
ordinance was based on the allegation that the ordinance affected the use of
land and should have been enacted in accordance with section 125.66(6) of
the Florida Statutes.22 The First District Court of Appeal determined that
the ordinance was "intended to regulate ... specifically described conduct
within establishments serving alcoholic beverages" and did not affect the
"owner's 'use of the land' on which the establishment was located," and
therefore did not require the enactment to be in accordance with section
125.66(6)."
In T-Marc, Inc. v. Pinellas County,24 the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida upheld the validity of an ordinance that:
(1) relied on the studies conducted by other cities;25 (2) required patrons
and entertainers to maintain a three foot distance from each other;26 (3)
implemented a one year amortization period;2 ' and, (4) established
licensing and recordkeeping requirements. 28 However, the court issued an
injunction enjoining the enforcement of a provision requiring the disclosure
of anything beyond the names, aliases, and dates of birth of employees of
such an establishment.29
uses in 1976, when the United States Supreme Court found that such ordinances were not
violative of the Constitution of the United States so long as the ordinances were content-
neutral and not aimed at suppressing any First Amendment rights. See Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., I I I S. Ct.
2456 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). But see
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (ordinance will not be upheld if
unbridled discretion is given to licensing authority and there is no limit on the time within
which the local government must issue the license).
21. 617 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
22. Id. at 799. The ordinance was enacted as a general ordinance under Florida Statutes,
section 125.66(1) and (2), with one public hearing. Florida Statutes, section 125.66(6),
requires that any ordinance which affects the "use of land" must be adopted at two public
hearings to be held approximately two weeks apart after 5:00 p.m. Id. at 800 n.l.
23. Id.
24. 804 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
25. Id. at 1503.
26. Id. at 1506.
27. Id. at 1504.
28. Id. at 1505.
29. T-Marc, 804 F. Supp. at 1505.
19931
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The court also stated conclusively that a city does not have to actually
experience the detrimental effects it is attempting to avoid before regulating
establishments which have nude entertainment, but "may rely on the
secondary effects suffered by other cities."3
Due to the proliferation of adult-oriented establishments, local
governments all across the United States will continue to enact ordinances
regulating these establishments in order to attempt to diminish the secondary
effects 3' that consistently flow from such uses.32
Recently, local governments have been regulating in the area of health
warnings. In Hillsborough County v. Florida Restaurant Ass'n,33 the
Second District Court of Appeal upheld the county's enactment of an
ordinance requiring vendors of alcoholic beverages to post health warning
signs that included warnings about birth defects, addiction and intoxication,
not drinking before driving or operating machinery, and not mixing alcohol
with other drugs.3" A complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was
filed by the Florida Restaurant Association, a statewide association with 154
members in Hillsborough County, on behalf of thirty-seven members that
serve alcoholic beverages on the premises of their public food establish-
ments.35 On summary judgment, the trial court entered a permanent
injunction finding the ordinance unconstitutional.36
On appeal, the court addressed the issues raised by the county, such as
standing, preemption (both express and implied), and inconsistency with
general law. In determining that the Association had standing to challenge
the ordinance, the court granted relief based on the three-prong test for
standing enunciated in Florida Home Builders Ass 'n v. Department of Labor
& Employment Security.37 This test requires: (1) a substantial number of
the association's members, although not necessarily a majority, to be
substantially affected by the challenged rule; (2) the subject matter of the
rule to be within the association's general scope of interest and activity; and,
30. Id. at 1504.
31. Whereas clauses prefacing these ordinances cite the secondary effects as crime,
drugs, prostitution, and the spread of communicable diseases.
32. See, e.g., Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2456; FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 215; Playtime Theaters,
475 U.S. at 41; Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
33. 603 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 589.
36. Id. at 588.
37. Id. at 588-89 (citing Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor &
Employment Sec., 412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982)).
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(3) the relief requested to be the type appropriate for a trade association to
receive on behalf of its members.38
On the issue of express preemption, the court found that the state
regulating scheme 39 was not so pervasive that the county could not enact
such an ordinance under its police powers and that there was no express
preemption relating to consumer warning signs." Likewise, as to implied
preemption, the court found that the state's interest in the conduct,
management, and operation of the manufacturing, packaging, distribution,
and sale of alcoholic beverages was not so pervasive as to preclude
consumer warning signs.4' In determining there was no implied preemp-
tion, the court indicated that no danger of conflict existed between the action
of the junior and senior legislative bodies and that the legislative scheme of
the Florida statutes did not completely occupy the field.42
The last argument asserted by the Association to be rejected by the
court was that the county, pursuant to its charter, enacted an ordinance
inconsistent with general law.43 The court applied the rationale in State ex
rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, where it was held that an ordinance is
inconsistent with general law if it is "contradictory in the sense of legislative
provisions which cannot coexist., 44 The court found, after applying this
rationale, that Hillsborough County's warnings were a proper exercise of the
county's broad residual power of self-government granted to it by article
VIII, section l(g) of the Florida Constitution.45  Thus, it appears that
regulations enacted pursuant to a local government's police powers will be
upheld if a local government can show that it has a substantial interest in
protecting its residents' health, safety, and welfare.
B. Land Use Regulation
The courts have faced many different issues in the domain of land use
38. Hillsborough County, 603 So. 2d at 589 n.i.
39. See FLA. STAT. § 381.061(9) (1989). Subsequently, this section of the statute was
repealed and the provisions transferred to section 381.0072. Hillsborough County, 603 So.
2d at 590.
40. Hillsborough County, 603 So. 2d at 589.
41. Id. at 591.
42. Id. (citing Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 1984), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Desperte v. Tribune Co., 471 U.S. 1096 (1985)).
43. Id. at 592.
44. Id. at 591 (quoting State ex rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, 224 So. 2d 688, 692
(Fla. 1969)).
45. Hillsborough County, 603 So. 2d at 592.
1993]
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regulation. These issues relate to granting variances, adopting com-
prehensive plans, interpreting zoning regulations, and determining whether
land use issues should be resolved through quasi-judicial or legislative
proceedings.
In Herrera v. City of Miami,46 the court concluded that the trial court
erred in affirming the granting of a variance where there were no findings
that, without the variance, it would be virtually impossible to use the land
as it had been presently zoned 7.4  The property developer sought a variance
from the City of Miami in order to construct a 100-unit federally sponsored
project for the elderly. The appellants, owners of single-family residential
properties located across the street, argued that the project would create
overflow parking with "unsightly clutter and congestion. 48  The city
zoning ordinances provided for the granting of a variance under certain
conditions. 9 While the city staff and Zoning Board opposed the granting
of the variance, the City Commission, in a three-to-two vote, rejected the
staff's recommendation and reversed the denial of the variance."0 The
circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, reviewed the record and found
"there was competent and substantial evidence to support the City Commis-
sion's finding . ... .""
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the appellate court, with one
judge dissenting, offered three reasons why the variance was inappropriate:
(1) the petitioner for the variance [was] the developer; the landowner
made no claim or demonstration of hardship; (2) the only argument of
hardship was that the specific 100-unit federally sponsored project for
the elderly might not qualify for financing without the variance; and (3)
there was no showing whatever that the project could not be reduced in
size to satisfy zoning conditions or that the land could not yield a
reasonable return if used as authorized by present zoning restrictions for
another project. 2
46. 600 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
47. Id at 562-63.
48. Id. at 562.
49. Section 1901 of the City of Miami Zoning ordinance provides:
A variance is relaxation of the terms of the ordinance where such action not be
contrary to the public interest and where, owing to conditions peculiar to the
property and not the result of actions of the applicant, a literal enforcement of
this ordinance would result in unnecessary and undue hardship on the property.
Id. at 563 n.1 (quoting MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 1901 (1992)).
50. Herrera, 600 So. 2d at 562.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 563.
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Under existing land use case law, a variance seeker must demonstrate an
exceptional and unique hardship to the individual landowner not shared by
other property owners in the area,13 and a variance is not justified unless
no reasonable use can be made of the land without the variance.5"
Applying these principles, the court quashed the order granting the variance
because the factual findings made by the circuit court for the record did not
satisfy the legal requirements for a variance.5
In another case, Joynt v. Orange County,56 the court concluded that
the circuit court and the county's Code Enforcement Board applied the
wrong law in finding that the Joynts, doing business as "Don's Auto
Recycling Company," violated the Orange County Zoning Code57 because
access to their property was by "ingress and egress through a residentially
zoned area . . . ."" The record of the code enforcement hearing showed
that there was access to the property by an easement that the Joynts used for
their vehicles, but that their customers, who brought scrap metal to the yard
for recycling, were using the residential streets.59 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that the circuit court erred in applying the code in this
instance because the zoning code did not prohibit the use of residential
streets, it only required industrial zoning to have access to a major street
through nonresidential districts, and the facts indicated that access to a major
street was available.60
On a different note, several cases pertaining to comprehensive land use
planning were decided in 1992. In B & H Travel Corp. v. Department of
Community Affairs,6" the court held that the Department of Community
Affairs acted within its discretion in finding the Town of Redington Beach's
comprehensive plan in compliance, notwithstanding the Town's Local
Planning Board's failure to recommend the plan's adoption to the City
53. Nance v. Town of Indialantic, 419 So. 2d 1041, 1041 (Fla. 1982).
54. Bernard v. Town Council of Palm Beach, 569 So. 2d 853, 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990).
55. Herrera, 600 So. 2d at 563.
56. 603 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
57. Section 38-1004 of the Orange County Zoning Code provides: "Each 1-4 general
industrial district shall be located on a major street as designated on the major street plan of
the county, or shall have access to a major street by a public street without passing through
or alongside any residential district . I..." ld. at 569 (quoting ORANGE COUNTY, FLA., CODE
§ 38-1004 (1992)).
58. Id. at 569-70.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 570.
61. 602 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992).
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Commission.62 Citing Florida Statutes, section 163.3 184(9)(a),63 the court
found that the plan "shall be determined to be in compliance if the . . .
determination of compliance is fairly debatable. 64 The standard applied
by the court is a "deferential one that requires affirmance of the local
government's action if reasonable persons could differ as to its propri-
ety.
65
The court rejected the appellant's argument that "the planning board's
failure to formally recommend the proposed plan to the Commissioners
renders the plan finally adopted by that body inconsistent with Rule 9J-
5.005(8)(b) & (c) [of the Florida Administrative Code] . . . because a plan
must be 'consistent with' Rule 9J-5 in order to be in compliance with the
[Growth Management] Act ... ,66 The court found that there was a "de
facto recommendation of the plan" because, in fact, the planning board and
the public had an active role in the adoption process and "local government
bodies 'often proceed in an informal, free-form manner."' 67
One of the more important issues facing local governments in the area
of land use is whether the site specific modifications to comprehensive
plans, 6 rezonings, 69 and proposed site plans,7° are quasi-judicial or
legislative in nature. If such plans are quasi-judicial in nature, any
determination of the governing body would have to be through hearings that
afford all parties the opportunity to present evidence, take sworn testimony,
62. Id. at 1363.
63. Once the state land planning agency issues a notice of intent to find the comprehen-
sive plan in compliance, then any affected person has 21 days from the date of publication
to file a formal protest. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(9)(a) (1991).
64. B & H Travel, 602 So. 2d at 1365.
65. Id. (quoting Environmental Coalition of Fla., Inc. v. Broward County, 586 So. 2d
1212, 1215 n.4 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
66. Id. at 1366;seeFLA. STAT. § 163.3184 (1991); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.005
(1992).
67. B & H Travel, 602 So. 2d at 1366 (quoting Leon County v. Parker, 566 So. 2d 1315
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
68. See City of Melbourne v. Puma, 616 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), juris
accepted, 624 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1993) (holding that site specific amendments to a comprehen-
sive plan are quasi-judicial).
69. See Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 74-75 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 199 1),juris. accepted,605 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1992) (holding that site specific rezonings
are a quasi-judicial function).
70. See Park of Commerce v. City of Delray Beach, 606 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (holding that proposed site plans for development of owner's property are not
legislative in nature).
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and cross-examine witnesses. If the plans are legislative, then no formalized
evidentiary proceedings would be necessary.
Until 1991, when the Fifth District Court of Appeal issued its opinion
in Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners,7' most local governments in
Florida made legislative determinations on whether to approve or reject site
specific modifications to comprehensive plans, rezonings, and site plans.
The Snyder decision, thus far, has led to disparate opinions among the
district courts of appeal within the state. 7' Therefore, the Florida Supreme
Court's ruling in the next survey period will be significant.73
C. Environmental Law
In some instances, the actions of one governmental body are challenged
by another governmental body, especially when a location within its
jurisdiction may be jeopardized. The Department of Environmental
Regulation faced a number of challenges to its decisions affecting local
governments. Two of those decisions, one affecting Dade County and
another affecting Monroe County, are examined in this survey.
In one case, Metropolitan Dade County intervened in an administrative
action in order to challenge the findings of a hearing officer of the Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER").74 In this instance, the
hearing officer granted a dredge and fill permit to a developer in North
Dade to expand an existing marina from 99 slips to 346 slips.75
71. 595 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The appellate court also adopted a
higher standard of review that has never been a requirement in previous zoning cases. This
higher standard forces a local government to substantiate its zoning determination by clear
and convincing evidence. Therefore, supreme court approval of this higher standard could
severely impact how a local government conducts its day-to-day activities. Moreover, if
Snyder is read in conjunction with Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 199 1), which prohibits exparte communications in quasi-judicial proceedings,
applicants and residents will have limited access to their elected officials. In addition, those
same applicants and residents will bear the burden of conducting costly quasi-judicial
proceedings.
72. See Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d 996, 1007 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding site specific rezoning is quasi-judicial, requiring a local government to show
by substantial competent evidence that the zoning was enacted in furtherance of some
legitimate public purpose); Board of County Comm'rs v. Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d
361, 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (rezoning is a legislative action which should be
reviewed under the traditional "fairly debatable" standard of review).
73. Snyder was argued before the Florida Supreme Court in March of 1993.
74. Metropolitan Dade County v. Coscan Fla., Inc., 609 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
75. Id. at 644-45.
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In Coscan, DER and Coscan entered into a settlement stipulation
requiring phased construction with specific conditions to protect water
quality and the manatees.76 The county opposed the granting of the
permit, stating that the terms of the stipulated settlement agreement would
not protect the already degraded water quality and the granting of the permit
violated section 403.918 of the Florida Statutes,77 which requires that (1)
there be reasonable assurances that the water quality standards will not be
violated, and (2) the project is not contrary to the public interest.78
First, the applicant was required to show that the activities would not
materially aggravate an existing problem. Second, the project could not be
contrary to the public interest.79 In this instance, the court agreed with the
county that because the settlement agreement stated the developer's
proposed system had only a "sufficient possibility of operating successfully,"
the agreement was clearly not reasonable assurance as required by the statute
which "contemplates . . . a substantial likelihood that the project be
successfully implemented.""°
The court also agreed with the county's argument that the hearing
officer failed to fully consider the significant impact the additional boat
traffic from the expanded marina would have on manatees, since the project
would bring boats into the marina across a manatee migratory area.8 In
its analysis, the court found the hearing officer erred by applying the weaker
federal standard rather than the more stringent state standard, which affords
greater protection to endangered species in determining whether the project
would adversely affect manatees.82
In reversing and remanding the case, the court placed the burden on the
applicant to "show entitlement to the permit" and suggested that the hearing
76. Id. at 645.
77. Id. at 646.
78. Id.
79. Coscan, 609 So. 2d at 646.
80. Id. at 648.
81. Id. at 649. The court, recognizing that the manatee is an endangered species, cited
Florida Statutes, section 403.918(2)(a)(2) (requiring consideration be given as to "[w]hether
the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered
or threatened species or their habitats .... ). Id.
82. Id. at 650. The hearing officer relied on a "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service report
[which determined] that the project will not jeopardize the continued existence of the
manatee" as "persuasive evidence that any incremental impact of the project on the manatee
is acceptable." Coscan, 609 So. 2d at 650 (emphasis added).
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officer consider more stringent conditions to avoid further adverse impact
to an already declining area.83
In a different scenario, Monroe County challenged DER's denial of a
permit to trim mangroves at the Key West International Airport in order to
comply with Federal Aviation Administration regulations requiring "clear
zones" adjacent to airport runways." The county filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that its actions were exempt under
the Florida statute as a "governmental function." 5 After the court granted
the county's motion for temporary relief, DER entered into a stipulation
with the county allowing it to trim the mangroves to the same extent as they
had been trimmed previously. 6 Subsequently, DER filed an answer and
counterclaim, stating that the trimming by the county was "far in excess" of
what was agreed upon and "what was required to protect the public safety,"
and further alleging that the wetlands had been filled without a permit as the
county did not remove the mangrove cuttings in the wetlands.87
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the county,
finding the county was exempt from obtaining a dredge and fill permit as
required by the statute. On appeal, the court agreed that the county is
exempt from DER's jurisdiction when performing a governmental func-
tion;89 however, the court correctly found summary judgment improper
since questions of fact had not been addressed by the lower court, specifical-
ly, whether the trimming was, in fact, accomplished in compliance with
federal regulations or whether it was excessive; and whether the cuttings
were placed on dry land as the county alleged or onto protected wetlands.9°
83. Id. at 650-5 1. The court suggested that limiting the marina expansion to sailboats
might be a suitable alternative. Id. at 651.
84. State of Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Monroe County, 610 So. 2d 697 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
85. Id. at 698. Section 403.932(1) of the Florida Statutes permits the "alteration of
mangrove trees by ... a federal, state, county, or municipal agency .... when such
alteration is done as a governmental function of such agency." FLA. STAT. § 403.932(1)
(1991).
86. Monroe, 610 So. 2d at 698.
87. Id. DER asserted that the filling of wetlands without a permit was a violation of
Florida Statules, section 403.913(1). This section provides: "[N]o person shall dredge or fill
... without a permit .. .unless exempted by [state] statute." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Monroe, 610 So. 2d at 698-99.
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IV. POWERS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The power of eminent domain is "the power of a sovereign to take
private property, or to authorize its taking, for a public use or purpose
without the owner's consent, on the payment of just compensation."'" The
power to take private property without compensation is limited by article I,
section 9 of the Florida Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The state, its agencies, and political
subdivisions may exercise its power of eminent domain through powers
derived from the Florida Constitution.92
The power of eminent domain is clearly distinguishable from a local
government's police power. Under the power of eminent domain, after
payment of compensation, the physical possession and use of property is
taken from a private owner for the use and benefit of the public or a public
agency.93 Under the police powers, the government may destroy or
regulate the use of private property in the interest of the public welfare
without compensation.94
In 1990, in the case of Joint Ventures, Inc. vs. Department of
Transportation,95 the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida Statutes,
section 337.241, which prohibited the construction of any improvements on
future rights-of-way once a surveyed map of reservation was recorded, was
simply a means of preventing increases in the cost of property earmarked
for condemnation under the state's eminent domain powers. 96 Consequent-
ly, the court invalidated the maps of reservation.97
Since Joint Ventures, there has been much confusion among the district
courts of appeal as to whether property owners with property inside the
boundaries of the invalidated maps of reservation are entitled to per se
declarations of taking and jury trials to determine just compensation.9"
91. 21 FLA. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 1 (1979).
92. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
93. 10 FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 269 (1979).
94. Id.
95. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
96. Id. at 626.
97. Id.
98. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So. 2d 52
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (certified question to the Florida Supreme Court as to
"[w]hether all landowners with property inside the boundaries of invalidated maps of
reservation under subsections 337.241(2) and (3) . . .are legally entitled to receive per se
declarations of taking and jury trials to determine just compensation"), review granted, 621
So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993); Department of Transp. v. DiGerlando, 609 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 624 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1993); Department of Transp. v.
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More important for local governments, based on the holding in Joint
Ventures invalidating the maps of reservation, is the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's invalidation of Palm Beach County's thoroughfare map, 99
which was created pursuant to the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act ("Growth Management
Act").' The court found trafficways maps indistinguishable from the
maps of reservation in Joint Ventures. 101
Palm Beach countered that trafficways maps are merely utilized as
long-range planning tools and, historically, the ability of a community to
plan for orderly development through the implementation of such regulations
is within its police powers. Palm Beach asserted that, unlike Joint Ventures,
the trafficways map does not involve a situation in which a property owner
is prevented from selling or developing property.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal erred by applying the analysis
used in Joint Ventures, since, in that case, once the property was surveyed
and a map of reservation was recorded, the statute imposed a moratorium
which, in effect, prevented a property owner from initiating any new
construction or renovating an existing structure. However, a trafficways
map is part of the planning process required not only as an element of the
Growth Management Act, but as a common sense approach to efficient and
systematic. development. Because the preparation of a trafficways ele-
ment"0 2 is a requirement of the Growth Management Act, and not an issue
Miccosukee Village Shopping Ctr., 621 So. 2d 516 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Department of Transp. v. Weisenfeld, 617 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
99. Palm Beach County v. Wright, 612 So. 2d 709, 710 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
100. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (1991).
101. Wright, 612 So. 2d at 710. The court, recognizing that the "decision passes on a
question of great public importance," certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court
whether a county thoroughfare map designating corridors for future roadways, and "WHICH
FORBIDS LAND USE ACTIVITY THAT WOULD IMPEDE FUTURE CONSTRUCTION
OF A ROADWAY, ADOPTED INCIDENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTY LAND
USE PLAN ENACTED UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION ACT, FACIALLY UNCON-
STITUTIONAL UNDER JOINT VENTURES ..... Id.
102. The Traffic Circulation Element is a required element set forth in the Florida
Administrative Code:
[T]o establish the desired and projected transportation system in the jurisdiction
and particularly to plan for future motorized and non-motorized traffic
circulation systems.., and.., depicted on the proposed traffic circulation map
or map series within the element.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.007 (1992).
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of eminent domain, many local governments are concerned with the
outcome of this case.
In a recent Broward County case, Test v. Broward County,"°3 because
the county did not condemn adjacent industrial or commercial properties, the
plaintiffs challenged the county's condemnation of their residential property
in connection with expansion of the airport. The county presented evidence
that while the property was not needed for immediate expansion, the county
wanted to limit residential use of the property because of the noise
problem." 4 In affirming the trial court's order approving the condemna-
tion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the decision should not
be disturbed on appeal if the "taking is supported by good faith consider-
ations of cost, safety, environmental protection, and long-term plan-
ning.'
10 5
The court also determined that, pursuant to Florida Statutes, section
333.02,1"6 certain types of activities would not be compatible with airport
operations and would adversely affect residents within the vicinity of the
airport. Since an incompatible use in a residential area is a raised noise
level as defined by statute, 0 7 the court determined the condemnation was
a valid public purpose that met the incompatible use test.'0 8
V. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity arises out of the concept that "the
king can do no wrong," a concept which has never been completely
accepted by the courts." 9 The doctrine of governmental immunity, which
holds that a local government is not liable for some or all of its tortious acts
is, more often than not, deemed to be contrary to the fundamental theory of
103. 616 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
104. Id. at 113.
105. Id. (citing School Bd. of Broward County v. Viele, 459 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 467 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1985)).
106. Section 333.02 provides that local governments can expend public funds to acquire
land or property interests in the immediate vicinity of the airport when it is in the best
interest of the public health, safety, and general welfare of its residents. FLA. STAT. § 333.02
(1991).
107. See id. Noise level defined in the statute exceeding "part 150" is incompatible as
a residential use. Id. § 333.03(2)(c).
108. Test, 616 So. 2d at 114.
109. CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 1042-43
(1980).
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tort law that liability follows negligence, and that every person is entitled to
a legal remedy for injuries incurred."' In keeping with the spirit of the
ideology of the constitution, that each person has a right to redress, the
Florida Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act,"' which waives sover-
eign immunity in tort actions on behalf of the state and its agencies or
subdivisions."' The Tort Claims Act permits a private individual to
impose liability on the state, and its agencies and subdivisions, for tort
claims, both negligent and intentional, if committed within the scope of the
employee's office or employment, but only to the extent permitted under the
act. "3  The following cases represent the distinct ways in which the
appellate courts have applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity during the
survey period.
In Birge v. City of Eagle Lake,"4 the Second District Court of Appeal
was asked whether damages could be assessed by the plaintiffs against the
City of Eagle Lake. The facts indicated that sewage had backed up into the
plaintiffs' home when lightning struck the transformer that powered the
city's sewage pumping station.' The plaintiffs alleged the city had a
duty to install a warning system at the pumping station in the event of a
power failure." 6 The court, basing its decision on Trianon Park Condo-
minium Ass 'n v. City of Hialeah,"7 held the city was not liable for failing
I10. Id.
S111. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1991) (effective July 1, 1974).
112. Id, Section 768.28 reads, in pertinent part:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for itself and
for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability
for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act ....
(2) As used in this act, "state agencies or subdivisions" include the executive
depariments, the Legislature, the judicial branch . . . and the independent
establishments of the state; counties and municipalities ....
Id.
113. Id, § 768.28(1).
114. 614 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 623 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1993).
115. Id, at 551.
116. Id,
117. 468 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1985). In this case, the district court certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court, which answered in the negative:
Whether a governmental entity may be liable in tort to individual property
owners for the negligent actions of its building inspectors in enforcing provisions
of a building code enacted pursuant to the police powers vested in that
governmental entity.
Id. at 914. In a lengthy opinion, the Florida Supreme Court clarified in what functions or
activities a local government engages and placed the activities in four categories: "(I)
legislative, permitting, licensing, and executive officer functions; (II) enforcement of laws and
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to install the warning system because it is a judgmental, planning-level
function for which no duty exists and which is, therefore, not action-
able."'
In another case, Nanz v. Southwest Florida Water Management
District,"9 the court took a different view of the provision of services to
a resident by a local government. Southwest Florida Water Management
District ("SWFWMD") issued permits to Hillsborough County for the
construction and maintenance of a drainage system. Plaintiffs sued
SWFWMD and Hillsborough County. 2 ° The court dismissed SWFWMD,
holding that it was immune from suit based on the Florida Statutes.' 2 '
However, the court held the county liable because, although the county had
no duty to provide such a service, once it assumed such a responsibility, it
had a duty to act with reasonable care.'22
The case of Hill v. City of North Miami Beach'23 addresses the issue
of sovereign immunity in another context. In Hill, the plaintiff went to a
recreational facility owned by the city to play ping-pong with other people
also visiting the park. When one of the games was over, the plaintiff asked
another visitor at the park, Dailey, who lost the game, if he could have the
paddle so that he could challenge the winner. Dailey, seemingly without
provocation, attacked the plaintiff and broke his jaw.'24
The plaintiff sued the city, claiming the city owed a duty to invitees to
keep the park safe from known dangerous conditions. The city's records
indicated that Dailey, a known troublemaker, previously attacked a park
employee and had to be ejected by the police.'25 The city stated it had no
duty to protect the plaintiff; however, the court determined the opposite was
true-the city did owe a duty to the plaintiff because, as a landowner, it has
the protection of public safety; (III) capital improvements and property control operations;
and (IV) providing professional, educational, and general services for the health and welfare
of the citizens." Id. at 919. The court went on to distinguish when and which activities the
waiver of sovereign immunity was intended to address. Id.
118. Birge, 614 So. 2d at 551.
119. 617 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 736; see also FLA. STAT. § 373.443 (1991). Section 373.443 provides, in
pertinent part: "No action shall be brought against the state or district ... for the recovery
of damages caused by partial or total failure of any stormwater management system ... by
virtue of ... approval of the permit for construction or alteration ...... Id.
122. Nanz, 617 So. 2d at 736.
123. 613 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
124. Id. at 1357.
125. Id.
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a duty to protect an invitee from criminal attack that is reasonably
foreseeable. '26
In a personal injury case, Frawley v. City of Lake Worth,'27 the
plaintiff was injured when he was extricated from an overturned truck by a
paramedic, and a police officer from another jurisdiction, who was on
administrative assignment in the city in which the accident occurred. The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village of Palm
Springs, where the police officer was employed, based on the Good
Samaritan Act which the Village asserted entitled it to immunity.'28
Because the police officer was acting in his individual capacity and not
within the scope of his employment, the Village alleged it should not be
held liable. The court agreed with the Village and determined the police
officer did not have a duty to stop and render assistance and when he did
so, "he was acting in his individual capacity and not within the scope of his
employment ... ,,29
VI. CONCLUSION-A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
The foregoing is just a sampling of case law that affected local
government operations during this past year. Although there were no
dramatic decisions during the survey period, the coming year should bring
a final determination of the Snyder and Palm Beach v. Wright cases which,
depending on the outcome, will undoubtedly impact day-to-day activities in
the area of local government land use regulation.
126. Id. at 1357-58.
127. 603 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 1327-28 (citing section 768.13(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which
states that a person who "gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment
at the scene of an emergency" shall not be held liable. FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (1991)).
129. Frawley, 603 So. 2d at 1329.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Effective January 1, 1993, the Florida Legislature revised the law in
Florida relating to negotiable instruments by replacing former Florida
Statutes, chapter 673,' with a new chapter 673 of the Florida Statutes,
* Solo Practitioner whose practice concentrates in the area of banking and commercial
law in St. Petersburg, Florida. B.S. from the University of Florida, a J.D. from Stetson
University College of Law, and an LL.M. in Banking Law Studies from Boston University
School of Law. Portions of this article were published in the November 1993 FLORIDA BAR
JOURNAL.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.101-673.805 (1991) (formerly entitled "Uniform Commercial
Code: Commercial Paper") (generally referred to as the "former" law).
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entitled "Negotiable Instruments."2 Revised chapter 673 incorporates re-
vised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code within the Florida
Statutes. Further, the law also amended, renumbered, and repealed parts
of former chapter 674 of the Florida Statutes pertaining to bank deposits and
collections ("amended chapter 674"), 4 as well as various other Florida
Uniform Commercial Code sections. Because the revisions apply to
transactions entered on or after January 1, 1993, no Florida appellate court
as of the time this article was submitted had interpreted the revisions.
Moreover, there were no amendments to the revised chapters during the
1993 Florida Legislative Session.
II. BACKGROUND
The revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code were originally
promulgated by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1990 for adoption by the various
states to modernize the law of negotiable instruments. The American Bar
Association, as well as twenty-three states, including Florida, had approved
the revisions by August 1993.6
Former Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code on commercial
paper and former Article 4 on bank deposits and collections were both
drafted in the early 1950s, and were written largely for a paper-based
system. These former sections were essentially a revision of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. In turn, the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law was based primarily upon the British Bill of Exchange Act of 1882,
which was a codification of case law from the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Thus, former Articles 3 and 4 were very old law in substance,
and were created when business transactions were fewer in number and
often conducted on a face-to-face basis. No major revisions of either
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.101-673.805 (Supp. 1992) (repealed existing sections and created
new sections within, designated parts to, and retitled Florida Statutes, chapter 673).
3. Id.
4. Id. §§ 674.101-674.504; chapter 674 incorporates Revised Article 4 of the Uniform
Commercial Code within the Florida Statutes.
5. U.C.C. § 3 (1990).
6. States that have enacted the Article 3 and 4 Uniform Commercial Code Revisions as
of the date this article was submitted include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming.
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articles have been undertaken since their inceptions. Changes in technology,
in business and financial practices, in federal responses to the consumer
protection movement, and in interpretive ambiguities in the various sections
of the existing law have created difficulties in the application of the original
code. The revisions do not radically change the basic rules of negotiable
instruments law contained in former Articles 3 and 4, but do modify that
law in several significant respects. The revisions attempt to make the
substance of both Article 3 and 4 more relevant to the way in which
business is done today.
For example, former chapter 674 was prepared at the beginning of the
automated processing for the collection of checks. As a result, banks and
other institutions faced many problems that did not have clear answers under
Florida law. An example is the Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
("MICR") process which is now in universal use. In this process, a check's
face amount is magnetically encoded so that it can be "read" by a computer.
Often, banks were precluded from recovery if they made an error in the
encoding processing. Revised chapter 674 accommodates the realities of the
automated processing system to provide for encoding warranties to give
banks a basis for recovery, and takes into account check truncation 7 in its
scheme for distributing rights and liabilities.
The revisions also attempt to clarify the language and rules by
removing ambiguous and confusing language found in former Article 3. An
example is the deletion of the phrase "with whom the holder has not dealt"
in section 673.3051(2) of the Florida Statutes which states the defenses of
any party to the instrument from which a holder in due course took free.8
Federal law, in some instances, preempts revised chapter 674 of the
Florida Statutes. For example, the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987,9 and Regulation CC,"0 control all aspects of the check collection
system and supersede many state law check collection provisions.
7. Check truncation refers to the process of check collection whereby items are not
physically returned to the payor bank from the collecting bank.
8. FLA. STAT. § 673.3051(2) (Supp. 1992).
9. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 60, 101 Stat. 552,
635 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 4007 (1988)).
10. Regulation CC of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, located
at 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1990), implements the Expedited Funds Availability Act. The Expedited
Funds Availability Act was passed by Congress in 1987 and is designed to limit the hold
periods depositary banks can impose on customer accounts with respect to checks deposited
in those accounts and grants the Federal Reserve Board extensive regulatory powers over any
aspect of the payment system. See FLA. STAT. § 673.3051(2) (Supp. 1992).
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This article addresses the revisions' impact on Florida law, and briefly
discusses various details of their provisions and underlying policy.
III. SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF REVISIONS
Both former and revised chapter 673 cover negotiable instruments. The
former chapter had no provision stating its scope, while revised chapter 673
affirmatively states that it applies to "negotiable instruments."'" Although
they have many forms, there are only two types of negotiable instruments:
drafts, 2 which include checks, and notes, 3 which include certificates of
deposit. 4 One of the aims that the drafters hoped to accomplish was to
recognize that notes and drafts have different functions meriting different
treatment.
Nearly all of the instruments that were negotiable remain negotiable
under revised chapter 673, thus allowing the transferee of the negotiable
instrument to become a holder in due course.' 5 However, a few items that
were not neg6tiable under the former chapter will become so under the
11. FLA. STAT. § 673.1021(1) (Supp. 1992). The chief effect of an instrument being
negotiable is that one who takes such paper for value, in good faith, and without notice that
it is overdue, or contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered or that there is a claim
or defense, becomes the owner of the paper free of the defenses and equities that exist
between the original parties to the contract.
12. Id. § 673.1041(5). Comment 4 of this section provides that a "draft is an instrument
that is an order." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993). An "order" is
defined in section 673.1031(1)(f) (Supp. 1992).
13. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(5) (Supp. 1992). Comment 4 of this section provides that
"a note is an instrument that is a promise." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041 cmt. 4 (West Supp.
1993). The statute also defines the term "promise." FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(1)(i) (Supp.
1992).
14. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(10) (Supp. 1992).
15. Id. § 673.3021. To become a holder in due course under section 673.3021 a party
must meet a two-pronged requirement. First, an instrument, when issued or negotiated to the
holder, must not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so
irregular or incomplete so as to call it into question. Second, the holder must take the
instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of four matters: (a) that the
instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect
to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series; (b) that the instrument
contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered; (c) of any claim to the instrument
described in section 673.3061 (which includes a right to rescind a negotiation); and (4) that
any party has a defense or claim in recoupment described in section 673.3051(1). Id. A
holder in due course is a super-plaintiff who takes the negotiable instrument free of most of
the ordinary contract defenses and claims to that instrument. See id.
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revision. In recent years, lenders have used notes containing variable
interest rates to evidence their loans. Courts have held that these notes are
not negotiable instruments because such notes are not considered to contain
an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, which is required in order
for former chapter 673 to apply. 6 As a result, banks and other holders of
such instruments discovered that they could be subject to defenses to
payment arising out of the transaction that generated the note, and about
which the bank may know little. The revised section rejects this approach
and allows variable interest rate notes to be considered promises to pay a
sum certain and therefore negotiable. 7 Under revised chapter 673 the
requirement of a "fixed amount of money" applies only to the principal
amount.18
Under the former law, if a check lacked words of negotiability such as
"order" or "bearer," there could be no holder in due course. Under the
revision, the definition of a check deletes the provisions that it must be
payable to "bearer" or to "order" and thus checks that omit words of
negotiability are treated as fully negotiable.' 9 The rationale for this change
is that it is good policy to treat checks, which are payment instruments, as
negotiable instruments whether or not they contain words of negotiability,
especially since these words are almost always preprinted on the check
form.2" All other instruments, however, require words of negotiability.
Ordinary money orders now are classified in the revision as checks
rather than bank obligations, so as to preserve the right to stop payment if
the instrument is lost or there is a problem in the transaction.2 Therefore,
in Florida, ordinary money orders are subject to dishonor, overruling Unger
v. NCNB National Bank.22 Further, revised Florida Statutes, section
673.4111 improves the acceptability of bank obligations like cashier's
checks and teller's checks23 as cash equivalents by discouraging wrongful
dishonor of these items. Subsection three provides that if an obligated bank
wrongfully refuses to pay, it may be liable for consequential damages.24
16. Doyle v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 558 (10th Cir. 1989).
17. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.1121, 673.1041 (Supp. 1992).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1121(1) cmt. 1. (West Supp. 1993).
19. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(4) (Supp. 1992).
20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1041(2) cmt. 2. (West Supp. 1993).
21. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(6) (Supp. 1992).
22. 540 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (money orders are akin to
cashier's checks and not subject to dishonor).
23. Section 673.1041(8), Florida Statutes defines a "teller's check" as a draft drawn by
a bank and is usually drawn on another bank. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041(8) (Supp. 1992).
24. Id. § 673.4111(3).
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One of the most important changes from existing law under revised
section 673.1041 is that all non-negotiable instruments (other than checks)
are excluded from chapter 673.25 Thus, a promise or order (other than a
check) which includes a conspicuous statement that it is not negotiable or
is not covered by chapter 673 will be excluded from this chapter. However,
the official comments to revised section 673.1041 provide that parties to an
instrument that are not included in chapter 673 may agree to apply its rules
to their contract.26
A. Definitional Changes
The revisions make several significant changes in definitions. The first
is "good faith." Under former law, "good faith" was defined as "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. 27 Revised chapter 673
redefines it, for both chapters 673 and 674 purposes, to include both honesty
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. 28 The latter phrase refers to the fairness of conduct, not the care
with which an act is performed. 29 Thus, the so-called pure heart, empty
head test doctrine is displaced. The change brings the chapter 673 definition
in accord with the prevailing standard under chapter 672-Sales with respect
to merchants, which prevails in Article 2A-Leases, and which has been
incorporated in Article 4A-Funds Transfers. The drafters provide no
guidance for interpreting fairness of conduct or what might constitute
reasonable commercial standards.
The definition of "ordinary care" is another change in the revisions.
It is defined in amended chapter 674, without substantive change from
former chapter 674, and is further defined in revised chapter 673 (and
applicable to amended chapter 674) to mean
in the case of a person engaged in business, . . . observance of
reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which the
person is located, with respect to the business in which the person is
engaged. In the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing
for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial
standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the
failure to examine does not violate the bank's prescribed procedures and
25. Id. § 673.102(1).
26. FLA. STAT. § 673.1041 cmt. 2 (West Supp. 1993).
27. FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1991).
28. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.1031(l)(d), 674.104(3) (Supp. 1992).
29. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4. (West Supp. 1993).
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the bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking
usage not disapproved by this chapter or chapter 674.30
The latter phrase attempts to facilitate the automated processing of checks
on a risk/benefit analysis, that is, it does not require signature review until
the point at or just before which it is economically prudent to do so.
Further, the revisions make the issue of ordinary care one of fact.
The definition of "bank" for purposes of chapters 673 and 674 is
expanded to include savings banks, savings and loans associations, credit
unions, and trust companies. 3' The question of whether an institution is
or is not a "bank" is an important one because it determines whether the
institution is subject to the provisions of chapter 674. The aforementioned
institutions had been omitted from the definition of a bank in the past
because they had not been permitted to offer checking services and thus did
not qualify under state or federal banking law as a bank. However, as a
consequence of recent federal legislation, savings and loan associations, and
other institutions are now engaged in the check collection process much like
traditional banks. Moreover, with this new expanded definition of "bank,"
chapter 674 now conforms to Regulation CC 3" which includes these
institutions within the definition of banks.
IV. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Accord and satisfaction deals with an informal method of dispute
resolution carried out by use of a negotiable instrument. In the typical case,
there is a dispute concerning the amount that is owed on a claim. For
example, if the drawer 33 includes a legend on an instrument stating that
payment of the check constitutes full satisfaction of the underlying
obligation, the payee 34 runs the risk that the drawer's obligation will be
satisfied if it voluntarily cashes or presents the check and is paid. Many
payees attempted to legend their indorsement with the words "reservation of
rights" or "under protest" or "without prejudice" in an effort to counter the
30. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(g) (Supp. 1992).
31. Id. §§ 673.1031(3), 674.104(2), 674.105(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4
(West Supp. 1993).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(E)(4), (5) (Supp. 1990).
33. A drawer is defined in section 673.1031(l)(c), as "a person who signs or is
identified in a draft as a person ordering payment." FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(1)(c) (Supp.
1992).
34. The payee is the person to whom a draft or note is made payable.
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drawer's "full payment" legend. Because the former law did not include
specific language concerning accord and satisfaction, there was an enormous
amount of confusion and litigation regarding the "full payment" checks.
Many courts relied on the common law to hold that if the payee cashed the
check, the consumer's obligation was satisfied. However, some courts have
held that the language of former UCC section 1-207 supports the payee's
argument that the debt was not discharged if the payee indicated he or she
had taken the instrument under protest. Florida courts were split on this
issue.35 Now, the revisions clarify the rules pertaining to accord and
satisfaction.
First, as part of the revision of chapter 673, revised section 671.207 has
been amended to add subsection two which provides that section 671.207
"does not apply to an accord and satisfaction. 36 Second, the revisions add
a section entitled "Accord and satisfaction by use of instrument."3 This
section contains provisions concerning satisfaction of disputed claims
through tendering of "instruments." It sets out the specific requirements that
must be met for payment of an instrument to constitute accord and
satisfaction.3" Thus, if the person seeking the accord and satisfaction
proves that the requirements of subsection (a) are met and the "conspicuous"
statements are given, the claim is discharged unless revised section
673.3111(3) applies. This subsection is intended to address the problems
faced by entities that receive and process a large number of checks.39
Under subsection three such entities can avoid an inadvertent accord and
satisfaction if they both notify the debtor that any full satisfaction check
must be sent to a designated location, and are able to prove the instrument
in question was not sent to that location.
V. SIGNATURES BY AGENTS
Under former law, if an agent failed to sign a note in a manner that
fully disclosed both his representative capacity and the name of his
principal, the agent could personally be liable even though the principal was
not. The former law provided that no person is liable on an instrument
35. See Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
36. FLA. STAT. § 671.207(2) (Supp. 1992).
37. Id. § 673.3111.
38. Id. § 673.3111(l), (2).
39. Id. § 673.3111(3).
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unless his or her signature appeared,4" which had been interpreted to mean
that an undisclosed principal was not liable on a negotiable instrument."'
This was an exception to the general principle of agency law that binds an
undisclosed principal on a contract.42 Revised section 673.4021 returns to
general agency principles and states that "the represented person would be
bound if the signature were on a simple contract. '43  However, under
673.4021(2)(b) of this section, both the agent and the principal are liable on
such an instrument to a holder in due course that took the instrument
without notice that the agent was not intended to be liable on the instru-
ment.44
Subsection three, however, changes the law and provides that an agent
who has signed an instrument without adequate indication of representative
status may show that the parties did not intend individual liability. 5 This
rule is not effective against a holder in due course. Moreover, under
subsection three, an authorized representative will not be personally liable,
even if the signature does not indicate agency status as long as the check is
drawn on the corporate account and the corporation is identified on the
check.46 Therefore, in Florida, the agent does not have to disclose his or
her capacity on a preprinted check bearing the principal's name to avoid
liability. Section 673.4031(2) makes it clear that a signature of an
organization is considered unauthorized if more than one signature is
required and a signature is missing.47
VI. ALLOCATION OF Loss
A. Comparative Negligence Standard is Adopted
A major issue in negotiable instruments law is the proper balance
between imposing loss on the employer, drawer or maker, and imposing loss
on third parties, including payor or depositary banks, for theft, forgery, and
unauthorized signatures. Much of the former statute's common theme was
to allocate the loss to the party that was in the best position to avoid the
40. FLA. STAT. § 673.401 (1991).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4021 cmt. I (West Supp. 1993).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 673.4021(2)(b).
45. Id. § 673.4021(3).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4021(3) (West Supp. 1993).
47. Id. § 673.4031(2).
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loss. However, determining which party is in the best position to prevent
the loss was a difficult and uncertain process, especially in complex fact-
sensitive settings. As a result, no provisions of the former law were more
heavily litigated than the fraud allocation rules, particularly with respect to
forged drawer's signatures and forged indorsements. The revisions adopt
a balancing rationale to allocating loss. All parties in the payment and
collection process have a responsibility to exercise ordinary care. Failure
by any party to fulfill that responsibility should result in that party bearing
an appropriate share of the resulting loss. For instance, under the former
code, a payor bank, which in good faith paid a forged check, could shift the
loss to the customer if the customer's "negligence" substantially contributed
to the forgery, unless the bank was contributorily negligent.4"
The prior negligence preclusion rule, now phrased in terms of failure
to exercise ordinary care, is continued in revised section 673.4061(1).
However, contrary to the prior rule stated above, the negligence of a bank
will not prevent it from asserting the negligence of the customer that
substantially contributed to a forged signature or to an alteration. In the
case where both the bank's customer and the bank are negligent, the loss
will be allocated proportionately according to the degree of failure of each
to exercise ordinary care.49 The intent of the drafters in moving to this
comparative fault is that it will reduce litigation and settlements will be
encouraged by parties who realize that the jury may find both the customer
and bank are both to blame in allowing the malefactor to succeed in his or
her wrongdoing.
B. Fraudulent Indorsements Made by Employees
Another policy issue that was unclear under the former statute is the
extent to which an employer, rather than a depositary or payor bank, should
bear the loss caused by a dishonest employee who misappropriates
negotiable instruments payable to, or drawn by, the employer. The revision
imposes more responsibility on the employer for employee wrongdoing than
former chapter 673. Former section 673.405 dealt only with certain limited
frauds practiced by dishonest employees of drawers. The former section did
not specifically address a situation where the malefactor is an employee not
of the drawer but instead, is employed by the payee.5" Fraudulent indorse-
ments by an employee of the payee are now effective under the revisions
48. FLA. STAT. § 673.406 (1991).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4061(2) (West Supp. 1993).
50. FLA. STAT. § 673.405 (1991).
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against the payee as long as the employee had the requisite responsibility
with respect to the instrument. Revised section 673.4051, titled "Employer's
responsibility for fraudulent indorsement by employee," adopts the principle
that the risk of loss for "responsible" employee fraud in connection with the
employer's checks should fall on the employer, because "the employer is in
a far better position to avoid the loss by care in choosing employees, in
supervising them, and in adopting other measures to prevent forged
endorsement on instruments payable to the employer or fraud in the issuance
of instruments in the name of the employer."'
Under this new statute, the loss is shifted to employers by making the
endorsement of the employer's name effective if made by an employee
"entrusted . . . with responsibility with respect to the instrument."'52 The
term "responsibility" is defined to include the authority to sign or indorse
instruments, to process instruments received, to process or prepare
instruments to be issued, to supply names or address of payees, to control
the disposition of instruments or to act in a responsible capacity.53 Thus,
if an employee, who has authority to process incoming checks for bookkeep-
ing purposes, steals a check, forges his or her employer's endorsement, and
absconds with the proceeds, the employer is per se negligent and assigned
the loss because it has been defrauded by a "responsible employee."
However, the revised statute allows the employer to "shift the loss to the
bank" to the extent the bank's failure to use ordinary care contributed to the
loss. 4
C. Direct Suits on Forged Indorsements
Revised section 673.4201 clarifies several issues with respect to a
forged indorsement. Under the former law, the owner of a check was
denied the right to hold a depositary bank liable for conversion when it
collected a check with a forged indorsement and paid the proceeds to a
person not entitled to them.55 The revised section changes the law in this
area by permitting the owner of an instrument to proceed in a direct action
against either the depositary or payor bank on a forged indorsement.56
Thus, this section eliminates the requirement that the owner of the check
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4051 cmt. I. (West Supp. 1993).
52. FLA. STAT. § 673.4051(2) (Supp. 1992).
53. Id. § 673.4051(1)(c).
54. Id. § 673.4051(2).
55. FLA. STAT. § 673.419 (1991); Knesz v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 477 A.2d
806 (N.J. 1984).
56. FLA. STAT. § 673.4201 (Supp. 1992).
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bring multiple actions against the various payor banks and that those banks
then assert warranty rights against the depositary bank.57
However, a depositary bank is not subject to a direct suit by a drawer
on a forged indorsement. Under former law the courts were divided on
whether the drawer of a check with a forged indorsement could assert rights
against a depositary bank that took the check." Revised section 673.4201
(])(a) resolves the conflict by providing that the drawer of a check cannot
sue the depositary bank in conversion, since the check represents the
obligation of the drawer rather than the drawer's property.59 The drawer
retains its remedy against the payor bank for recredit of the drawer's
account based on unauthorized payment.60
Moreover, the revised section clarifies the rights of the payee in a
situation in which a thief steals or obtains possession of an instrument in an
unauthorized manner and forges the payee's indorsement so the thief can
obtain payment at a depositary or drawee bank.6' Section 673.4201(1)(b)
provides that a payee who did not receive either direct delivery of the
instrument or indirect delivery through an agent or co-payee may not bring
an action for conversion. The rationale behind this is that until the payee
has possession of the instrument, the instrument does not belong to the
payee such that a conversion action is proper.61
VII. CUSTOMER'S DUTY TO DISCOVER UNAUTHORIZED
SIGNATURE OR ALTERATION
Revised section 674.406 extends duties to customers to examine their
bank statements and to promptly report reasonably discoverable unauthorized
signatures or alterations.63 Under former section 674.406, a bank normally
sent its customers the statement of account accompanied by a paid or
canceled check.64  After the bank made the statement and the checks
available, the customers had a duty to discover any unauthorized signature
57. See id.
58. Compare Jett v. Lewis State Bank, 277 So. 2d 37 (Fla. ist Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(drawer has no basis for suit) with Wymore State Bank v. Johnson Int'l Co., 873 F.2d 1082
(8th Cir. 1989) (drawer may sue).
59. See FLA. STAT. § 673.4201(1)(a) (Supp. 1992).
60. See id. § 673.4201(3).
61. See id. § 673.4201(1)(b).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.4201 cmt. I. (West Supp. 1993).
63. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(3) (Supp. 1992).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 674.406(l) (1991).
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or alteration and promptly notify the bank of this discovery.6" To facilitate
truncation and the existing state of technology, revised section 674.406
extends to the customer the responsibility to discover alterations and
unauthorized signatures even when the customer only receives the statement
and not the checks.66 However, the statement must contain "sufficient
information" to allow the customer to reasonably identify the items paid.67
"Sufficient information" can be as little as information concerning the item
number, amount, and date of payment.68 Thus, under this revised defini-
tion, a bank is not required to provide the customer with the name of the
payee or the date the check was written. While this rule may appear fair on
its face and may result in reduced processing costs for the bank, consumers
may suffer. Many consumers do not keep meticulous records; if the
consumer receives only the check number, amount, and date of payment, it
may be difficult to determine whether a check has been misdirected to an
improper payee or has been altered.
Revised section 674.406 changes the allocation of loss between the
parties. 69 Under former section 674.406, customers could be held responsi-
ble for an unauthorized signature if they failed to promptly examine the
statement and checks, and such failure to examine and notify caused the
loss.7" Under the former section, the customer would not be responsible if
the customer successfully established that the bank failed to exercise
ordinary care in paying the check.7 Under the revised Florida Uniform
Commercial Code, if the customer fails to promptly notify the bank of
"relevant facts," the customer not only must prove the bank failed to
exercise ordinary care, but he or she also must prove that "the failure
substantially contributed to the loss."72 Even if the customer provides the
necessary proof, the bank may not bear the entire loss because revised
section 674.406(5) provides a comparative negligence test for allocating loss
between the customer and bank.73 However, this subsection also provides
that if the customer proves the bank did not pay the check in good faith, the
65. Id.
66. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(3) (Supp. 1992).
67. Id. § 674.406(1).
68. Id.
69. See id. § 674.406(4), (5).
70. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(2) (1991).
71. Id. § 674.406(3).
72. FLA. STAT. § 674.406(5) (Supp. 1992).
73. Id.
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preclusion does not apply, and the customer may demand that the bank
credit his or her account.74
The new definitions of good faith and ordinary care may also prove a
major change in the operation of this section." Under former law, good
faith was defined as "honesty in fact., 76 The definition of "good faith" is
expanded under revised section 673.1031(l)(d) to require both honesty in
fact and "observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.,
77
The official comment to revised section 673.1031 attempts to clarify the
meaning of observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
by expressing concern for fairness of conduct rather than the care with
which an act is performed.7" One must determine fair dealing "in light of
reasonable commercial standards., 79 The drafters provide no guidance for
interpreting fairness of conduct or what might constitute reasonable
commercial standards. This new definition of good faith, however, should
impose a higher duty upon banks, and should benefit consumers by making
it clear that banks have an obligation to observe objective standards of
fairness and commercial reasonableness in handling consumer accounts.
The term "ordinary care" used in the revision specifically provides that
sight examination by a payor bank is not required if its procedure is
reasonable and is commonly followed by other comparable banks in the
area.8° The official comment states the intent is to reject those cases that
hold failure to use sight reviews constitutes lack of ordinary care as a matter
of law."1 Therefore, this new provision for ordinary care under section
674.406 should benefit banks because the determination of whether a bank
has failed to exercise ordinary care will now be left to the jury who will
measure the bank's conduct against what its peers do in its market area.82
This section also increases the maximum time from fourteen days to thirty
days for a customer to report successive forgeries or alterations.83 Further,
revised section 674.406(2) states a new rule whereby a bank truncating
74. Id. § 674.406(5).
75. Id. § 673.1031(I)(d).
76. See FLA. STAT. § 671.201(19) (1991).
77. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(I)(d) (Supp. 1992).
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993).
79. Id.
80. FLA. STAT. § 673.1031(I)(g) (Supp. 1992).
81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.1031 cmt. 4 (West Supp. 1993).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 674.406 (Supp. 1992).
83. Id. § 674.406(4)(b).
[Vol. 18
592
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Golden
checks must retain the item or have the capacity to furnish legible copies for
seven years.
84
VIII. CONCLUSION
The amendments to Florida Statutes, chapters 673 and 674 should
lower costs to banks by providing for modem technologies such as check
truncation and automated processing. Further, the amendments should help
provide certainty for the financial community and its users by removing the
numerous ambiguities that existed in the former provisions. Moreover, by
clarification of troublesome issues, and by the provisions of sections
673.4041 to 673.4061, which reform rules for allocation of loss from forger-
ies and alterations, the revisions should reduce litigation. Consumers receive
some added protections and benefits from the revisions, including an
expanded statutory obligation for banks to act in good faith. However,
consumers will now be confronted with extra duties placed on them in
connection with unauthorized signatures or alterations of checks.
84. Id. § 674.406(2).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Supreme Court's adoption of amendments to the Rules of
Professional Conduct from 1991 to date significantly impact the manner in
which Florida lawyers practice the business of law. The scope of this article
will address those amendments adopted by the Florida Supreme Court relat-
ing to chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, known as the
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Rules").
Reported cases during this same time period are replete with decisions
imposing discipline on lawyers who deviate from these Rules. Because this
article must be practically limited in its scope and length, it does not seek
to review every appellate case affected by the Rules during the relevant time
period. Rather, the author intends to review those cases that are particularly
noteworthy for their unique (and sometimes outlandish) fact pattern,
departure from historical interpretation of a particular Rule or, in some
cases, for the precedent they set.
* Shareholder of Atkinson, Diner & Stone, P.A., Hollywood, Fla.; Board Certified Real
Estate Lawyer; J.D., University of Miami, 1978; B.A., University of Florida, 1975; Adjunct
Professor, Barr. University Andreas School of Business; member and former Vice-Chairman
of The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee; former Chairman of The Florida Bar
Grievance Committee 17D. Ms. Stone was a recent lecturer at a seminar sponsored by The
Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee entitled "Avoiding Grievance arid Malpractice
Liability."
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II. AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA BAR RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 1991-1993
In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court ruled on The Florida Bar's petition
for an amendment to the Rules relating to professional advertising.' The
court approved The Florida Bar's proposal to amend the Rules regulating
advertising with some modifications.' The decision was based on the
doctrine first espoused in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3 holding that commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.4 This doctrine was
subsequently adopted and made applicable to the practice of law by the
United States Supreme Court in Bates v. State Bar.5 The Florida Supreme
Court also adopted chapter 15 of the Rules, which created The Florida Bar's
Standing Committee on Advertising.6 Prior to the decision, issues of
professional advertising were addressed by The Florida Bar's Professional
Ethics Committee.
The Florida Bar re." Amendment to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar7
approved a new rule, Rule 4-1.17, regarding the sale of a law practice. The
supreme court adopted the Rule as proposed by The Florida Bar. The Rule
delineates the procedures and restrictions for the sale of the practice.8 In
the decision, other Rules were also amended.9
In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-il-3. I (a) and
Rules of Judicial Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid)10 is significant for its
impact on members of The Florida Bar as well as for its giving substance
to the message of Rule 4-6.1 Pro Bono Public Service. In this decision, the
Supreme Court of Florida considered the recommendations contained in the
Report of the Florida Bar/Florida Bar Foundation Joint Commission on the
I. The Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar- Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
2. Id.
3. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4. Id. at 770.
5. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
6. The Fla. Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 455.
7. 605 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1992).
8. Id. at 253, 342-44.
9. Id. at 253-54. Other rules that were amended include: Rule 4-5.4(a) Professional
Independence of a Lawyer; Rule 4-5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice; Rule 4-7.2(n)
Advertising; Rule 4-7.5 Evaluation of Advertisements; and Rule 4-7.8 Lawyer Referral
Services.
10. 598 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1992).
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Delivery of Legal Services to the Indigent in Florida ("Joint Commission"),
filed March 21, 1991." Although the Joint Commission made thirty-one
recommendations, the one controversy and subject of the supreme court's
ruling was Recommendation No. 24, entitled "Voluntary Pro Bono Legal
Services." 12
After a recitation of the importance of legal representation to the
citizens of our state and the role of the lawyer in a free society as a vehicle
for challenge to the constitution, the court recognized that to further this
end, the under represented segments of our society must not only be
represented by government paid lawyers, but by private lawyers as well. 3
The court went on to approve Recommendation No. 24 with modifications
as set forth in the decision. 4 While the court in an earlier decision held
that every lawyer in the State of Florida has an obligation to perform pro
bono services,'" the 1992 decision reaffirmed the court's reluctance to
mandate pro bono services. 6 Several elements of Recommendation No. 24
also directly relate to amending Rule 4-6.1 to incorporate the voluntary pro
bono plan in detail.' 7
As directed by the Florida Supreme Court," the Florida Bar Commis-
sion proposed pro bono rules and, in Amendments to Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar--1-3. l(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration--2.065 (Legal
Aid),'9 the proposed rules were adopted by the supreme court, with
modifications.2" Consistent with its previous ruling, the supreme court
emphasized that "the rules are aspirational rather than mandatory, and the
failure to meet the aspirational standards set forth in the rules will not
constitute an offense subject to discipline."'" However, an attorney's
11. Id. at 41.
12. Id.
13. id. at 43.
14. Id.
15. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar- 1-3. 1 (a) and Rules of Judicial
Admin.-2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1990).
16. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Admin.-2.065 (Legal Aid), 598 So. 2d 41, 47 (Fla. 1992). Both Chief Justice Barkett and
Justice Kogan dissented with opinions favoring mandatory pro bono service. Justice Kogan's
dissent is especially noteworthy for its historical perspective. See id. at 55 (Kogan, J.,
dissenting).
17. Id. at 47.
18. Id. at 44.
19. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S348 (Fla. June 23, 1993).
20. Id.
21. Id.
1993)
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failure to complete the report form provided for in the Rules will constitute
an offense subject to discipline." As a result of this decision, Rule 4-6.1
was deleted and the new Rule 4-6.1 Pro Bono Public Service was adopted
in its place.23 This decision also amended the Comments to Rule 4-6.2 and
added Rule 4-6.5 Voluntary Pro Bono Plan. 24  The reader is urged to
review this historic and controversial decision in detail.
In The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar,25 The Florida Bar and sixty individual practitioners petitioned the
court to amend the Rules to include provisions relating to improper
discrimination.26 The basis for the petition was the study conducted by the
Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission and the
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission (together or
singularly the "Bias Study Commission").27 The Bias Study Commission
found numerous problems faced by minorities and women in the legal
profession. 2' Based upon these findings, The Florida Bar and the individu-
al petitioners jointly recommended to the court an amendment to
Rule 4-8.4(d) to prohibit discriminatory practices by members of the Bar.29
In adopting the amendment to Rule 4-8.4(d), the court recognized that the
proscribed conduct must be limited to the lawyers' practice of law in order
to "ensure that the First Amendment rights of lawyers are not unduly
burdened."3°  The amendment to Rule 4-8.4(d) takes effect January 1,
1994.
The Florida Bar also petitioned for a new rule, Rule 4-8.7, and the
individual petitioners submitted for consideration a new rule, Rule 4-8.4(h),
the thrust of both such proposed rules being the prohibition of discriminato-
22. Id. The court stated that "accurate reporting is essential for evaluating this program
and for determining what services are being provided under the program." Id.
23. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar-l-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial
Administration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 18 Fla. L. Weekly at S351-52.
24. Id. at S352. Rule 4-6.5 authorizes and outlines the requirements and responsibilities
in connection with the development of various Pro Bono Legal Service committees under
Rule 4-6.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. See id.; see also FLA. BAR R. PROF.
CONDUCT 4-6.5 (1993).
25. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S393 (Fla. July 1, 1993).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Fla. Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Fla. Bar, 18 Fla. L. Weekly
at S394.
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ry employment practices by the lawyer.3 Both proposed rules were
rejected by the supreme court on several grounds, including the court's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of employment practices and the fact
that both federal and state laws already provide for adequate protections and
procedures relating to employment discrimination.32
In The Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar,33 the supreme court adopted a new rule, Rule 3-4.8, which requires
a member of The Florida Bar to respond to grievance investigations, subject
to assertion by the attorney of the doctrine of privilege, immunity or
disability, as applicable. 34 The supreme court also approved a new rule,
Rule 3-5. 1(j), known as the Disciplinary Resignation Rule, which provides
that an attorney may resign from The Florida Bar in lieu of defending
against allegations of disciplinary violations.3" Further amendments to
chapter 3 were made to conform the Rules to the Disciplinary Resignation
Rule.36
In the same decision, the supreme court adopted an amendment to
Rule 4-7.2 Advertising with respect to disclosures to be contained within
lawyer referral service advertisements.37 Also, Rule 4-8.4(g) was created
to conform to the new Rule 3-4.8 as the former defines misconduct as a
lawyer's failure to respond in writing to disciplinary proceedings.38
III. OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW
The following review of cases is by no means an exhaustive account
of every reported case dealing with an ethical violation or with the interplay
between the Rules and civil causes of action. This review is intended,
however, to discuss those decisions that provide Florida lawyers with
guidance as to ethical issues that commonly confront them in daily practice.
In Pressley v. Farley,39 the court affirmed previous decisions that held
that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not create legal
31. Id. at S393.
32. Id. at S394.
33. 621 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Bar Amendments].
34. Id. at 1033-34. See FLA. BAR R. DisC. 3-4.8 (1993).
35. 1993 Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1036; see FLA. BARR. DisC. 3-5.10) (1993).
36. 1993 Bar Amendments, 621 So. 2d at 1036-43.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1032.
39. 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
1993]
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duties on lawyers nor do they constitute negligence per se.4" The court did
state, however, that a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct can be
used as evidence of negligence.41 In another case involving the interplay
between professional negligence and the Rules of Professional Conduct, The
Florida Bar v. Morse,4 2 the supreme court, in affirming a referee's
recommended discipline against an attorney, stated that an attorney who
participates in a scheme to hide his partner's malpractice from their client
is guilty of an ethical violation.43 In addition, the opinion cautions that
when an attorney discovers there has been malpractice committed, a conflict
of interest arises and accordingly, the attorney must advise the client to seek
other legal counsel.44 The decision further instructs the lawyer to advise
a client that malpractice has been committed by the lawyer or one within the
lawyer's firm.45
In The Florida Bar v. Littman,46 the court based its holding on a
premise that is the converse of Pressley. In Littman, a disciplinary case, the
supreme court reversed its long-standing line of demarcation between
negligent conduct serving as the basis for a malpractice cause of action and
as a basis for a disciplinary action under the Rules.47 The supreme court
questioned its previous decision of Littman in The Florida Bar v. Neale,48
"in light of present public policy and the black letter rules adopted in 1987,"
and found Littman guilty of a violation of Rule 4-1.1 based upon profes-
sional negligence.49
In the Littman case, the attorney's negligence was the failure to include
an affidavit in his motion to change residential custody in a domestic
40. Id. at 161; Oberon Invs., N.V. v. Angel, Cohen & Rogovin, 492 So. 2d 1113, 1114
n.2 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), quashed on other grounds, 512 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1987).
41. Pressley, 579 So. 2d at 161.
42. 587 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1991).
43. Id. at 1121.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 612 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1993).
47. Id.
48. 384 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1980). In Neale, the court drew a line between negligence
and violation of the then Code of Professional Responsibility on the basis that disciplinary
action could not be used as a substitute for a malpractice action. Id. at 1265.
49. Littman, 612 So. 2d at 582 n.3. The current version of Rule 4-1.1 states:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.1 (1993).
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matter.5" The client dismissed Littman, retained the services of another
attorney, and obtained temporary custody of his daughter.5' Accordingly,
the court noted that the negligent actions of Littman did not result in any
real damages to his client.52 However, in finding that Littman was guilty
of violating Rule 4-1.1, and given his prior disciplinary record,53 the court
affirmed the referee's recommendation of a public reprimand. 4 This case
is especially noteworthy not only for its ruling, but also for the fact that the
negligence of the attorney in question was minor in nature resulting in no
real damage to the client,55 whereas, the previous Neale case involved an
attorney whose negligent conduct resulted in irreparable damage to his
client. 6 While the Littman case was decided under different disciplinary
guidelines than Neale,57 the Littman case is stunning, nonetheless, for its
strict interpretation of Rule 4-1.1 and its willingness to impose discipline for
conduct that, in a malpractice action, may not even yield the client an award
for damages.58
In Halberg v. WM Chanfrau,59 the court provided an interesting
analysis of the application of Rule 4-1.5, the Rule relating to division of
fees between lawyers of different firms.60 The court analyzed the language
of a written fee referral agreement and provided insight into the enforceabil-
ity of referral agreements based upon compliance with the Rule.6'
50. Littmnan, 612 So. 2d at 582.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 583.
53. In a separate matter, the attorney failed to send copies of documents to opposing
counsel before sending them to the trial judge and misrepresented factual matters resulting
in a report of minor misconduct. Id. at 582 n.2.
54. Id. at 583.
55. Littinan, 612 So. 2d at 583.
56. Neale, 384 So. 2d at 1265. In Neale, the attorney, Neale, misinterpreted a statute
of limitations to be longer than it was, took a voluntary non-suit, and thus foreclosed his
client's ability to refile the action. As referred to previously, the supreme court, however,
declined to characterize this act of negligence as a disciplinary violation. Id.
57. The Neale case was decided based upon the previous Code of Professional
Responsibility, disciplinary Rules 6-l0l(A)(2) and 6-l01(A)(3), which stated, "[a] lawyer
shall not: . . . (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him." Id. at 1264 n.I. However, it may be argued
that there is little substantive distinction between the Rules under the former Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Rule 4-1.1, as both seek to address incompetent representation by
a lawyer. See id.
58. Littmnan, 612 So. 2d at 583.
59. 613 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 602.
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In Halberg, the referring attorney brought an action against the
receiving attorney to recover fees.62 The circuit court granted summary
judgment against the referring attorney.63 The district court reversed and
remanded based upon its interpretation of Rule 4-1.5(g).6 4 The subject of
the case was a written agreement that gave the referring attorney twenty-five
percent (25%) and the receiving attorney seventy-five percent (75%) of the
fees.65 In the lower court, the decision turned on an interpretation of this
provision in light of the language of Rule 4-1.5(g)(1). 66 Even though the
attorneys' written agreement did not precisely track the language of
Rule 4-1.5(g)(2)(a), the court decided that the referral agreement constituted
a written agreement with the client where disclosure of the division of fees
was made and that the language of the agreement was sufficient to prove
that the referring attorney had assumed a legal responsibility for the
representation of the client.67 Therefore, because the agreement fell within
the purview of Rule 4-1.5(g)(2)(a), there was no requirement that the
referring lawyer actually perform compensable legal services.68
In Lee v. Florida Department of Insurance & Treasurer,69 the court
adopted the rationale found in Pressley that a violation of the Rules of
62. Id. at 601.
63. Id. at 602.
64. Halberg, 613 So. 2d at 602. The current Rule 4-1.5(g) states:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between
lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is
reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5 (1993).
65. Halberg, 613 So. 2d at 601.
66. The controversial language in the agreement was as follows: "Provided, however,
that said fees 'may' be readjusted between CHANFRAU & CHANFRAU and REFERRING
ATTORNEY based upon the extent of time and services rendered or to be rendered to said
client; . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The lower court interpreted the word "may" to mean
"shall" and therefore concluded that the fee agreement was not enforceable because the
evidence failed to establish that the referring attorney rendered any service to the client. Id.
at 601-02.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 586 So. 2d 1185 (Fla.lst Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Professional Conduct does not create any civil cause of action.7° In Lee,
an appeal from an administrative order, the court disqualified an attorney
representing the Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer. This
disqualification was based upon an agreement signed by the attorney's
former law firm that set forth that the firm could not represent the
Department of Insurance against the petitioner, Lee."
The Department of Insurance argued that the restricting agreement was
against public policy.72 The hearing officer in the administrative proceed-
ing cited Rule 4-5.6 in support of the decision to deny the motion to
disqualify counsel. The court stated that neither Rule 4-5.6"3 nor any other
Rule could be used as a basis for invalidating a private contractual
provision.74 The court determined that the ethical issue was whether the
attorney, who was a former associate of the law firm restricted in its
representation of the Department of Insurance, could ethically (and legally)
represent the Department in light of the presumptively valid agreement
which prevented the law firm from disclosing any confidences it had learned
from its client.75 This issue and its related concern is expressly recognized
and supported by the Rules.76
In rendering its decision, the court moved the focus of its rationale
from Rule 4-5.6 to Rules 4-1.7, 4-1.9 and 4-1.10, all of which deal with
client confidences and the obligations regarding such being imputed to any
employee of a law firm.77 Accordingly, the court enforced the terms of the
agreement based upon the clear intent of such agreement to prevent the use
or disclosure of confidential information gained during the lawyer's previous
employment.7
70. Id. at 1188.
71. Id. at 1187.
72. Id.
73. Presently, Rule 4-5.6 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer
to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning
benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part
of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-5.6 (1993).
74. Lee, 586 So. 2d at 1188.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1189 nn.4-5 (citing FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.6, 4-1.9 (1990)).
77. Id. at 1188-90.
78. Id. at 1190.
1993]
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In Dean v. Dean,79 the issue turned on whether an attorney-client
relationship was established to permit the attorney to invoke the privilege
provided by section 90.502 of the Florida Statutes."° Recognizing that
both section 90.502 and Rule 4-1.6 codify the common law rule of
privilege, the court also considered Rule 4-1.6 in its ruling.8 Finding that
an attorney-client relationship had been established, the court recited a
historical review of the doctrine of privilege and the cases dealing with
same. 2 The court concluded that, notwithstanding that a fee was not paid
79. 607 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 497. See also section 90.502 of the Florida Statutes, which currently provides
in pertinent part:
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to
be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(b) A "client" is any person, public officer, corporation, association, or other
organization or entity, either public or private, who consults a lawyer with the
purpose of obtaining legal services or who is rendered legal services by a
lawyer.
(c) A "communication" between a lawyer and client is "confidential" if it is
not intended to be disclosed to a third person other than:
1. Those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services
to the client.
2. Those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (1991).
81. Dean, 607 So. 2d at 497 n.4. Rule 4-1.6 now sets forth in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
except as stated in subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after
disclosure to the client.
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(I) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary:
(I) to serve the client's interest unless it is information the client specifically
requires not to be disclosed;
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and client;
(3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved;
(4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.6 (1993).
82. Dean, 607 So. 2d at 496-99.
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and that the attorney in question did not use normal procedures in opening
a client file, an attorney-client relationship had been established.83 The
existence of this relationship was based upon the evidence that the client
sought out the attorney for legal advice and that the legal advice was
sufficient to establish the relationship, regardless of whether there was a
controversy or court proceeding. 4
While most practitioners would not countenance an uncooperative
nature in responding to a grievance complaint, at least one attorney in 1992
did so and was disciplined as a result. In The Florida Bar v. Vaughn, 5
Vaughn petitioned for a review of a referee's finding of guilt and sanctions
against him.86 It is interesting to note that the referee recommended that
the attorney be found not guilty as to alleged violations of three substantive
Rule violations, which were the initial subject of the disciplinary proceed-
ings. 7 However, because of the attorney's lack of cooperation in the
disciplinary proceedings, the referee found Vaughn guilty of a violation of
Rule 4-8.1(b). 8  Vaughn argued that unless the referee found him guilty
of the substantive Rule violations, the Bar could not issue sanctions against
him because of his failure to cooperate. 9 Vaughn's failure to cooperate
included failing to respond to the Bar's request to reply to the complaint,
failing to appear at a hearing, failing to communicate with the Bar that he
was involved in a criminal trial during the grievance hearing, and failing to
appear in person for the Referee Trial.9"
83. Id.
84. Id. at 499-500.
85. 608 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1992).
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id. Currently, Rule 4-8.1 states in pertinent part:
An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar
admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the
person to have arisen in the matter or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful
demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that
this nile does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
4-1.6
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.1 (1993).
89. Vaughn, 608 So. 2d at 19.
90. Id. at 20. However, Vaughn did attend the hearing by telephone after he was
contacted by the referee. Id.
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The Vaughn case was one of first impression as the court itself
acknowledged.9' The court held that, based upon the evidence of a
continuing pattern of not cooperating or participating in the disciplinary
proceedings, Vaughn was guilty of a violation of Rule 4-8.1(b).92  The
court did go on to note that the obligation to cooperate is subject to the
guarantees of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but
if an attorney was going to use the Fifth Amendment as a reason for non-
cooperation, then the attorney should do so by way of a response to the
Bar's inquiries.93 In expressing the opinion that an attorney has a "profes-
sional duty to respond courteously and to cooperate with a bar disciplinary
proceeding," the court supports the position that the integrity of the
disciplinary proceedings mandates cooperation by the professional, which in
turn furthers the public's confidence in the self-regulation of the profes-
sion.94 The court did, however, reduce the discipline recommended by the
referee from a suspension to a public reprimand.95
Of course, Vaughn would have been cited for a violation of the new
Rule 4-8.4(g) had the case been decided after the adoption of the new Rule
on July 1, 1993. The adoption of the new Rule makes it unequivocal that
failure to cooperate in disciplinary proceedings is a violation of the Rules.96
There is perhaps no more fertile ground for ethical violations than the
conflict-of-interest Rules. 97 The temptation of representing more than one
client in a transaction or more than one party in litigation is ever present for
many practitioners and, then again, some practitioners are "knee-deep" in a
conflict before it becomes apparent. The number of reported cases
involving conflict issues bears out the fact that these issues are some of the
most frequently litigated. These cases often deal with motions to disqualify
opposing counsel, and may not invoke the Rules in the decision.98
91. Id.
92. Id. at 21; see also FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.1(b) (1993).
93. Vaughn, 608 So. 2d at 20.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id.
96. See FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-8.4(g) (1993).
97. Id. 4-1.7 to 4-1.10 (1993).
98. See, e.g., Spinelli v. Rodes-Roper-Love Ins. Agency, Inc., 613 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (deciding that the law firm that caused the conflict resulting in its
disqualification would not charge a former client for contesting such disqualification because
the law firm itself caused the conflict by hiring a lawyer who had previously worked on the
case for the opposing party); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 611 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (focusing on the issue of when an attorney-client relationship is established for
purposes of disqualification); General Elec. Real Estate Corp. v. S.A. Weisberg, Inc., 605 So.
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However, in another case involving a motion to disqualify a law firm,
Birdsall v. Crowngap, Ltd," the court invoked Rule 4-1.10(b)' in its
decision, quashing the trial court's order, which denied the petitioner's
Motion to Disqualify the respondent's law firm.' The rationale of
Pressley v. Farley is present in Birdsall, as the Rules were referred to for
their guidance in the court's decision involving a civil action motion to
disqualify an attorney. 1 2 The Birdsall case is also interesting to note
because the disqualified attorney was in fact isolated from his new law
firm's representation of the party opposing his previous client.'0 3 The
court analyzed the "wall of isolation," also known as the "Chinese wall,"
exception contained in Rule 4-1.11(a),'0 4 which deals with government
attorneys, and thejustification for the distinction between Rule 4-1.11 (a) and
Rule 4-1.10(b).'0° The court, in following previous decisions, rejected the
theory that the "Chinese wall" employed by the law firm in isolating the
attorney from the action was adequate to prevent the disqualification. 06
2d 955 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (deciding that an attorney cannot be disqualified based
merely on an opponent's subjective thoughts that the attorney's firm had been representing
him).
99. 575 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
100. Rule 4-1.10 currently provides:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
lawyer or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously
represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and
about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 4-1.6 and
4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 (1993).
101. Birdsall, 575 So. 2d at 232.
102. Id.; see Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st Dist Ct. App. 1991).
103. Birdsall, 575 So. 2d at 232.
104. Rule 4-1.11 presently states:
A lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or
employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation.
No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly
undertake or continue to represent in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from participation in the matter and is
directly apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to
enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.11(a) (1993).
105. Birdsall, 575 So. 2d at 232.
106. Id.
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The decision is also consistent with the comment to Rule 4-1.10, which
indicates that application of the Rule must be based on a "functional
analysis" involving issues of confidentiality and adverse positions." 7
Another case in which the court analyzed whether a law firm acquired
confidential information from a new attorney who represented an opposing
party in the same case is Nissan Motor Corp. v. Orozco.'0 8 In Nissan, the
appellate court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari and, in so doing,
deferred to the circuit court's factual determination that the lawyer's firm
did not acquire confidential information from his former law firm's client
that would in turn be imputed to the balance of the lawyer's new firm. °9
After a careful analysis of the distinctions between Rule 4-1.9" and
Rule 4-1.10,"' the court concluded that the irrebuttable presumption that
confidences are disclosed to an attorney during the course of the attorney-
client relationship is applicable only to Rule 4-1.9 and is not applicable to
Rule 4-1.10, which deals with imputed disqualification." 2  The analysis
in Nissan is consistent with both Birdsall and the comment to
Rule 4-1.10.'"3
In The Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of
Living Trusts," 4 the Florida Supreme Court addressed an unauthorized
practice of law issue involving corporations and non-lawyers who draft
107. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 cmt. (1993).
108. 595 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 605 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.
1992).
109. Id. at 241.
110. Rule 4-1.9 now provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or substantially related matter in
which that person's interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as Rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
information has become generally known.
FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.9 (1993).
111. In its present form, Rule 4-1.10 discusses the following topics: (a) "Imputed
Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm;" (b) "Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer;"
(c) "Representing Interests Adverse to Clients of Formerly Associated Lawyer;" and (d)
"Waiver of Conflict." FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 (1993).
112. Nissan Motor Corp., 595 So. 2d at 242.
113. The comment recognizes and dismisses a per se rule of disqualification of a law
firm in the instances when lawyers move between firms, recognizing that the court must
analyze the issues of imputed disqualification based upon the facts of each case. FLA. BAR
R. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.10 cmt. (1993)
114. 613 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1992).
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living trusts. The court recognized that a lawyer who works for the
corporation selling the living trusts may have an inherent conflict of interest
based on Rule 4-1.7(b) and Rule 4-1.8(f)."' Accordingly, the court
admonished that any lawyer who reviews, oversees the execution of, and
funds a living trust document should be independent counsel paid by the
client for whom the trust is prepared and not employed by the corporation
seeking to sell the living trusts.'6
In The Florida Bar v. Kramer,"7 The Florida Bar brought a disciplin-
ary proceeding against an attorney who had loaned his client money to
conclude a purchase at a foreclosure sale." 8 Rather than securing the loan
with a note and mortgage on the property, the attorney had the client
execute a deed. The attorney failed to advise the client of the nature of the
transaction, the client possessed only a limited reading ability and, further,
the client thought that he was giving his attorney a mortgage, not a deed.
The court held that the attorney had violated Rules 4-1.7(b), 4-1.7(c) and
4-1.8(a) and issued a public reprimand." 9 Kramer is important for its
lesson to practitioners that any business dealing between a lawyer and the
lawyer's client is inherently subject to conflict-of-interest problems,
notwithstanding the integrity and best intentions of the lawyer in dealing
with the client. 2 ' A lawyer must be extraordinarily cautious in dealing
with a client in such circumstances.
Perhaps the most telling example of a strict interpretation of the Rules
is found in The Florida Bar v. Belleville.12 1 In this case, Belleville was
the only attorney in a business transaction between his client and another
individual, Mr. Cowan, who was an elderly man with little education.
Belleville's client retained him to close on an agreement for the purchase of
property owned by Mr. Cowan. It was undisputed that the terms of the
115. Id, at 428. The current version of Rule 4-1.7 proscribes the duty of lawyers to
avoid limitations on their independent professional judgment. FLA. BAR R. PROF. CONDUCT
4-1.7(b) (1993). Rule 4-1.8 dictates the conditions under which a lawyer is permitted to
accept compensation for one other than the client. Id. 4-1.8().
116. The Fla. Bar re Advisory Opinion--- Nonlawyer Preparation of Living Trusts, 613
So. 2d at 428; see also Jenkins v. Harris Ins., Inc., 572 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (providing a basic analysis of Rule 4-1.9, the former client conflict of interest rule).
117. 593 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1992). Kramer provides illustrations of the results of a
practitioner's entering into a business agreement with a client and the potential conflict of
interest such an agreement produces.
118. Id at 1040.
119. Id. at 1042.
120. Id. at 1041.
121. 591 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1991).
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agreement overwhelmingly favored Belleville's client. The documents
prepared by Belleville provided for the sale of Mr. Cowan's residence,
notwithstanding the fact that both Belleville's client and Mr. Cowan had
negotiated only for the sale of an apartment building. 2
Belleville is interesting because the trial court was undecided as to
whether Belleville knowingly participated in the egregious actions of his
client or merely followed his client's instructions without question."'
Belleville drafted the documents and included Mr. Cowan's residence in the
sale. The promissory note for payment received by Mr. Cowan of the
purchase price was unsecured by a mortgage. The note also contained other
favorable terms for Belleville's client. Furthermore, the facts substantiated
that the significance of the documents were not explained to Cowan and that
Belleville did not attend the closing, having sent a paralegal in his place.
Subsequent to the closing, Belleville's client attempted to evict Mr. Cowan
from his home. 4
In the disciplinary proceedings, the referee recommended no discipline
because Belleville was not the attorney for Mr. Cowan. 5 The Board of
Governors of The Florida Bar appealed the decision of the referee. 6 In
finding Belleville guilty of an ethical violation, the court made several
analyses that should bode as a warning to all practitioners.' The court
found that Belleville should have been suspicious about the documents
because they were so one-sided and held that when an attorney is the only
attorney in a transaction, the attorney must explain that he is representing
the other party and must further explain the material terms of the documents
that the attorney has drafted. 2' Specifically, the court stated that "[w]hen
the transaction is as one-sided as that of the present case, counsel preparing
the documents is under an ethical duty to make sure that an unrepresented
party understands the possible detrimental effect of the transaction and the
fact that the attorney's loyalty lies with the client alone."'2 9 The court
concluded that Belleville's violations were especially serious in light of the
122. Id. at 171.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Belleville, 591 So. 2d at 171.
127. Id. at 172.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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fact that he had previously been disciplined for an ethical violation and
therefore the court suspended Belleville for thirty days.130
Practitioners may draw some small comfort in the footnote to Belleville
that the court is limiting its decision to the facts of the case and does not
intend to require an attorney who prepares closing documents to be present
to explain documents to the parties.' In Belleville, because the docu-
ments were so favorable to the attorney's client, the court believed it
necessary for the attorney to explain the legal ramifications of the docu-
ments.'32 However, Belleville offers little guidance to the sole practitioner
in a transaction who, in explaining the "possible detrimental effect of the
transaction" to the unrepresented party, may in fact be violating the
attorney's duty of loyalty to his own client. At the very least, the Belleville
case once again illustrates how imperative it is for the attorney to obtain a
written acknowledgment by the unrepresented party that the attorney is only
representing the attorney's own client and that the unrepresented party has
the right to seek independent legal counsel.'33
The foregoing overview of the cases since 1991 is not intended to be
an exhaustive review of each and every case involving a violation of the
Rules. Unfortunately, the published cases involving discipline of Florida
practitioners are far too numerous. The reader is urged to periodically
review the Rules and their comments and the practitioner is cautioned that
when in doubt about one's own actions, guidance may further be delivered
by The Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee and its capable counsel.
130. Id.
131. Belleville, 591 So. 2d at 172 n.2.
132. Id. at 172.
133. See id.
Stone
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea that courts are available to seek redress for injuries for those
who have been wronged is fundamental to American jurisprudence. Most
attorneys are familiar with the legal axiom, "[f]or every wrong, there is a
remedy."1 This principle, so simply and plainly stated, has long been part
of Florida's Constitution. Article I, section 21 states that "[t]he courts shall
be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."2 "This provision, dating from
our 1838 constitution ... guarantees to every person the right to free access
to the courts on claims of redress of injury free of unreasonable burdens and
restrictions., 3 However, statutes of limitation and statutes of repose can
extinguish a litigant's cause of action before the litigant is even aware that
a problem exists.
* Shareholder in the firm of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A.,
Lakeland, Florida; J.D., 1967, replaced LL.B. conferred, 1954, University of Florida; B.A.,
1952, University of Florida.
** Associate in the firm of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A.,
Lakeland, Florida; J.D., 1990, University of Florida; B.A. 1988, Haverford College.
1. Swain v. Curry, 595 So. 2d 168, 174 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.) (quoting Holland v.
Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709 (1944)), review denied, 601 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1992).
2. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
3. Id.
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It is not difficult to envision situations in which a person's injuries or
damages do not readily show themselves. The example that most often
comes to mind is a disease such as AIDS, which has a long latency period
wherein the person does not know he is afflicted.4 Such situations give rise
to constitutional challenges based on the access to courts provision in the
Florida Constitution.' Where latent injuries or damages are concerned,
however, Florida courts have eroded that principle in their more recent
pronouncements.6 This article examines the trend away from free access
to the courts and argues that these decisions pose an unfair and unprecedent-
ed threat to those whose damages do not manifest themselves in the time
required to bring suit.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE
Recently, the majority of decisions from the Florida Supreme Court in
this area construed the medical malpractice statute.7 That statute states the
following:
An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years
from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within
2 years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been
discovered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event
shall the action be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the
incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued ....
In those actions covered by this paragraph in which it can be shown that
fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented
the discovery of the injury within the 4-year period, the period of
limitations is extended forward 2 years from the time that the injury is
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence, but in no event to exceed 7 years from the date the incident
giving rise to the injury occurred
4. Another example could be a building whose design or construction flaws are not
apparent until after a limitations period has run. In public construction projects, there is often
a one-year statute of limitations for the owner to make a claim on an available bond. See
FLA. STAT. § 255.05 (1991) ("Little Miller Act").
5. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
6. See Whingham v. Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc., 613 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla.
Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993); see also infra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); see also infra notes 9-13 and
accompanying text.
8. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (Supp. 1992).
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The above statute contains a two-year statute of limitations and a four-
year statute of repose.9 The relationship between statutes of limitation and
statutes of repose have often been misunderstood. The Florida Supreme
Court has explained their relationship in the following manner:
A statute of limitation begins to run upon the accrual of a cause of
action except where there are provisions which defer the running of the
statute in cases of fraud or where the cause of action cannot be
reasonably discovered. On the other hand, a statute of repose, which is
usually longer in length, runs from the date of a discrete act on the part
of the defendant without regard to when the cause of action accrued."
In contrast to a statute of limitation, a statute of repose precludes a right
of action after a specified time which is measured from the incident of
malpractice, sale of a product, or completion of improvements, rather
than establishing a time period within which the action must be brought
measured from the point in time when the cause of action accrued.'
When statutes of limitation or repose present a constitutional threat to
one's access to courts, courts look to the test enunciated by the Florida
Supreme Court in Kluger v. White.' 2 In Kluger, the court devised a test
that, in general, prohibits the Legislature from abolishing a person's right
of action unless an overpowering public necessity is shown. 3 The court
initially used the Kluger test liberally to grant relief to those plaintiffs whose
injuries were latent and undiscoverable."4
9. See id.
10. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 418.
11. University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 1991).
12. 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
13. Id The court's test in Kluger reads as follows:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has
been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has
become a part of the common law ... pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the
Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reason-
able alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for
injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for
the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity can be shown.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981); see
also infra notes 23-25, 33 and accompanying text.
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III. DIAMOND'S RULING
In the case of Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 5 the supreme
court was faced squarely with the constitutionality of depriving a plaintiff
of her cause of action when her injuries were undiscoverable.' 6 In
Diamond, the plaintiff alleged that while yet unborn, a drug manufactured
by the defendant was administered to her.'" This drug was later found to
be a cause of cancer in those children whose mothers were treated with the
drug.'" The defendant moved for summary judgment based on the statute
of repose that existed for products liability suits.' 9 That statute, section
95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes, provided that no products liability action
could be brought within twelve years after delivery of the product "regard-
less of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have
been discovered. '2 In this case, the effect of the ingestion of the drug did
not materialize until after the plaintiff reached puberty. 2' As pointed out
in Justice McDonald's concurrence,
[The plaintiff] had an accrued cause of action but it was not recogniz-
able, through no fault of hers, because the injury had not manifested
itself. This is different from a situation where the injury is not inflicted
for more than twelve years from the sale of the product. When an
injury has occurred but a cause of action cannot be pursued because the
results of the injury could not be discovered, a statute of limitation
barring the action does, in my judgment, bar access to the courts and is
constitutionally impermissive.22
The court held that the statute of limitation, as applied in that case,
violated the plaintiffs guarantee of access to courts. 23 Although the court
did not specifically use the Kluger test, it was influenced by an earlier
decision that applied the test wherein the plaintiff was allowed to sue a
building contractor after the statute of repose had run.24
15. 397 So. 2d at 671.
16. Id. at 672.
17. Id. at 671.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Diamond, 397 So. 2d at 672 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1977))..
21. Id.
22. Id. (McDonald, J., concurring).
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)); see
American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West & Conyers, Architects & Eng'rs, 491 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d
[Vol. 18
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IV. DELAYED "INJURY" VS. DELAYED
"DISCOVERY OF INJURY"
A critical distinction must be drawn between factual situations wherein
the plaintiff has, in fact, been injured but her injuries remain undiscovered,
and those situations wherein the plaintiff does not become injured until after
the statute of limitation or repose has run. The Florida Supreme Court
recognized this distinction when it passed on the constitutionality of the
products liability statute of repose in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc.25  In
Pullum, the plaintiff was injured while operating a press brake machine in
1977, and subsequently filed suit against the manufacturer in 1988, which
was past the statute of repose then governed by Florida Statutes section
95.031(2).26 In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the court
found that the Legislature, in enacting the statute of repose, reasonably
decided that perpetual liability places an undue burden on manufacturers.27
However, in an important footnote, the Florida Supreme Court recognized
the critical distinction between the injuries in Pullum, and those suffered in
Diamond. Specifically, the court stated:
In Diamond, we held that the operation of section 95.031(2) operated
to bar a cause of action before it accrued and thereby denied the
aggrieved plaintiff access to the courts. But Diamond presents an
entirely different factual context than existed in either Battilla or the
present case where the product first inflicted injury many years after its
sale. In Diamond, the defective product, a drug known as diethylstil-
bestrol produced by Squibb, was ingested during plaintiff mother's
pregnancy shortly after purchase of the drug between 1955-1956. The
drug's effects, however, did not become manifest until after plaintiff
daughter reached puberty. Under these circumstances, if the statute
applied, plaintiffs' claim would have been barred even though the injury
caused by the product did not become evident until over twelve years
Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Opponents of the Diamond decision would argue that Overlandapplied
the Kluger test to a statute of repose wherein no strong public interest was specifically
expressed. A strong public interest was subsequently expressed in the preamble to the new
section 95.11(3)(c), wherein the Legislature specifically found the people's best interest
would be served by limiting potential liability to an engineer, architect, or contractor.
25. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986), supercededby
statute as provided in Smith v. Sturm. 510 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
26. Id. at 658; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Later cases decided by
the District Courts of Appeal specifically recognized that section 95.031(2) superseded
Pullum. See, e.g., Sturm, 510 So. 2d at 345.
27. Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659.
1993]
615
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
after the product had been ingested. The legislature, no doubt, did not
contemplate the application of this statute to the facts in Diamond.
Were it applicable, there certainly would have been a denial of access
to the courts. 8
Despite the Diamond decision and the Pullum footnote, the court in
recent decisions dealing with the medical malpractice statute of limitation
and repose has apparently ignored, or overlooked, the distinction to be
drawn by these cases.
V. RECENT DECISIONS
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the medical
malpractice statute of repose in Carr v. Broward County.29 In Carr, the
parents of a brain-damaged newborn child brought suit after the statute of
repose had run.3" Plaintiffs alleged that, despite due diligence, they were
unable to discover the circumstances surrounding the prenatal and obstetrical
care rendered during birth.3 The court upheld the defendant's motion to
dismiss based on the statute of repose and specifically ruled that the statute
was constitutional under the Kluger test.32 The court cited the extensive
preamble to the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 wherein the
requisite public necessity was expressed.3
28. Id. at n.*.
29. 541 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1989). Contra Public Health Trust v. Menendez, 584 So. 2d
567 (Fla. 1991).
30. Carr, 541 So. 2d at 93.
31. Id
32. Id. at 94.
33. Id. A portion of the preamble states:
WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance
for doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few
months; and
WHEREAS, the consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens
created by the high cost of insurance; and
WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced to
curtail their practices, retire, or practice defensive medicine at increased cost to
the citizens of Florida; and
WHEREAS, the problem has reached crisis proportion in Florida, NOW
THEREFORE ....
Id. (quoting Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, ch. 75-79, § 7, 1975 Fla. Laws 13,
20 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b))).
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Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court passed on the constitutional-
ity of the statute of repose in Kush v. Lloyd.34 In Kush, the parents of a
deformed child were referred by their physician for genetic testing.3' The
parents were subsequently assured that they possessed no genetic abnormali-
ties and that their first son's impairment was an accident of nature, not a
genetic defect. However, the results of an important study were never
transmitted, and the parents eventually had another deformed child.36 The
parents filed suit after the statute of repose had run. 37 The court held that
the statute of repose begins to run from the date of the negligence, not from
the date of birth.38
More important, neither the Kush decision nor the Carr decision
involved injuries that were latent. In both cases, the injuries were readily
apparent and the issue involved the time of discovering negligence, as
opposed to the time of discovering the injuries.39 Therefore, neither the
Kush nor the Carr decision overruled or even confronted the Diamond
decision.4" Nevertheless, recent decisions in the district courts have relied
on the Kush and Carr decisions in precluding from suit those plaintiffs who
did not realize they were injured during the period of repose.
In Whigham v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.,4 the
plaintiff received AIDS tainted blood during a transfusion administered by
the defendant. After the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose had
run, the plaintiff discovered that he had been infected with the AIDS
virus.42 The plaintiff was completely asymptomatic until that point.43
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
action, based on the statute of repose." The court relied on Carr, Kush,
and other recent Florida Supreme Court decisions upholding the constitu-
tionality of the medical malpractice statute of repose.45 The supreme
court's Diamond decision was specifically not followed, as the court was
34. 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992).
35. Id. at 417.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 418.
39. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
41. 613 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1993).
42. Id. at 111.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 114.
45. Id. at 112-13.
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more inclined to follow the "more recent pronouncements from the Supreme
Court."46
Under a similar fact situation, Doe v. Shands Teaching Hospital &
Clinics, Inc., the First District Court of Appeal again ruled that the plaintiff
was not denied constitutional access to courts. 7 In Doe, the First District
Court of Appeal considered the applicability of Diamond to the case.4
The court reasoned that Diamond was inapplicable as the statute of repose
in that case was not effective at the time the plaintiff ingested the drug.49
The court reasoned that Kush had the opportunity to address Diamond but
did not and, therefore, Diamond might be limited to its facts."
The district court overlooked the more likely reason that Diamond was
not confronted in the latest Florida Supreme Court cases, namely, the fact
that Kush is factually distinguishable from Diamond. As Justice Kogan
observed in his dissent of the Kush decision, prior decisions have failed to
focus adequately on the distinction between delayed discovery and delayed
injury." In Kush, the injury was delayed until after the repose period had
run.52 In Diamond, the injuries were immediate, but discovery of the
injuries was delayed until after the repose period had run. 3 Diamond is
the only Florida Supreme Court decision with facts which are similar to
those presented in Whigham and Doe. 4 The First District Court's reliance
on cases that are factually distinguishable is misplaced, thus resulting in
decisions which are unprecedented. 5 Furthermore, in his dissent in Doe,
Judge Ervin felt that a judicial determination of overpowering public
necessity could not be made under the factual situation wherein a plaintiff
neither knows nor was able to know of the injury until after the repose
period had elapsed. 6
46. Whigham, 613 So. 2d at 113.
47. 614 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,_ So. 2d (Fla. 1993).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1171.
50. Id.
51. Kush, 616 So. 2d at 426 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
52. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
55. Doe, 614 So. 2d at 1172 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1177.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., a statute of repose that barred
a cause of action to a plaintiff who was unaware of his injury prior to the
expiration of the repose period was held to be unconstitutional by the
Florida Supreme Court.57 Despite the fact that no subsequent supreme
court decision has receded from Diamond, recent district court opinions have
mistakenly found that persons with latent injuries, discovered after the
statute of repose has expired, have not been denied their access to the
courts. These decisions rely on supreme court cases that are factually
distinguishable from Diamond. Although the public necessity for a repose
period in the medical malpractice context may be shown, the Legislature has
not expressed an overpowering public necessity as it relates to people with
latent or undiscoverable injuries. As the supreme court has stated, "[t]he
legislature, no doubt, did not contemplate the application of this statute to
the facts in Diamond.01 Until the Florida Supreme Court decides differ-
ently, district courts should follow the ruling in Diamond and allow these
litigants to pursue their claims as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution.
57. Diamond, 397 So. 2d at 672.
58. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475
U.S. 1114 (1986), supercededby statute as provided in Smith v. Sturm, 510 So. 2d 343, 345
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance is purposefully made mysterious to exclude you [the consum-
er]from any role other than to sign a check.'
There are more than 12,000,000 registered owners of automobiles in
the state of Florida.2 As in most states, Florida law requires all registered
automobile owners to purchase a minimum of $10,000 in no-fault personal
injury protection ("PIP") insurance.3 Florida's PIP insurance is cheap. The
cost for PIP insurance can be as little as $36 per year, per registered
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. B.A. Magna Cum
Laude Gonzaga University, 1973. J.D. Cum Laude Gonzaga University, 1977. The author
thanks Steven Bell, J.D., Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center, 1992 for his research
work and assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, WINNING THE INSURANCE GANE xviii (1990).
2. Florida Drivers License Bureau Statistics, August, 1991. This is an estimate based
on the Bureau's January 1, 1991, figure of 11,612,402 registered automobile owners and
drivers. The Bureau estimate takes into account the annual percentage increases in the
number of registered drivers in Florida from the prior year.
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
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automobile owner.4 In addition, most registered automobile owners select
4. The lowest recorded rate is $18 per six months of coverage as offered by USAA in
Jacksonville. The rate a particular driver pays depends on a variety of factors. These factors
include age, sex, marital status, driving record, use of the car, number of miles the car is
driven, the make and model year of the car, and the area where the driver lives. See
FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., 1988 AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SHOPPERS' GUIDE 13 (1988).
Here is a sample of the various rates which the top insurers in Florida, by area, charge
their customers. The rates shown in the following chart are only the PIP portion of the
premium charged to the insured every six months.
Company Name Alachua
1. Allstate $61
2. Allstate Indemnity $68
3. GEICO $48
4. Liberty Mutual Fire $57
5. Nationwide Mutual Fire $69
6. State Farm Mutual $48
7. State Farm Fire & Casualty $59
8. USAA $25
9. FJIUA $75
Company Name
1. Allstate
2. Allstate Indemnity
3. GEICO
4. Liberty Mutual Fire
5. Nationwide Mutual Fire
6. State Farm Mutual
7. State Farm Fire & Casualty
8. USAA
9. FJUA
Company Name
1. Allstate
2. Allstate Indemnity
3. GEICO
4. Liberty Mutual Fire
5. Nationwide Mutual Fire
6. State Farm Mutual
7. State Farm Fire & Casualty
8. USAA
9. FJUA
Company Name
1. Allstate
2. Allstate Indemnity
Ft. Lauderdale Hillsborough
$151 $81
$212 $85
$124 $86
$111 $82
$135 $89
$95 $64
$120 $79
$42 $32
$223 $106
Miami Jacksonville
$145 $63
$174 $76
$129 $59
$128 $58
$152 $69
$84 $51
$104 $63
$44 $18
$188 $86
Lee
$77
$78
$76
$54
$71
$67
$83
$22
$84
Leon
$45
$60
Pensacola
$81
$78
$61
$66
$70
$51
$63
$20
$93
Pinellas
$73
$80
Orange
$65
$80
$63
$64
$72
$52
$65
$25
$95
Volusia
$72
$90
$66
$61
$85
$59
$74
$28
$104
W. Palm Beach
$83
$104
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a $2,000 deductible which further reduces the cost of PIP insurance.' The
deductible obligates the insured to pay the amount of the deductible before
the insurance company's obligation to pay PIP benefits ripens.6 Conse-
quently, for a small price, PIP insurance provides $10,000 worth of peace
of mind in the event of an automobile accident. That is what an insured
expects. That is what Susan Arnone expected, too.
3. GEICO $41 $73 $85
4. Liberty Mutual Fire $49 $63 $85
5. Nationwide Mutual Fire $50 $78 $97
6. State Farm Mutual $37 $60 $77
7. State Farm Fire & Casualty $46 $74 $96
8. USAA $16 $21 $31
9. FJUA $68 $96 $117
Id.
Insurers specifically use a combination of factors to determine the cost of PIP insurance
including the risk potential of insuring a particular driver. For instance, Allstate refers to the
method of determining risk as the "cost-based pricing" system where the factors include the
type of car, the driver, use of the car, and location of the car. See ALLSTATE AUTO
COMMUNICATIONS, How AUTO INSURANCE RATES ARE SET (1991).
5. Telephone Interview with Miriam Meister, Representative of the Professional
Insurance Agents Trade Association (Aug. 26, 1991). According to the trade organization
representing auto insurance agents, the primary concern of the insurance consumer is cost.
While there is no national collection of information from all auto insurers, common sense
indicates that more consumers would choose the highest deductible. By selecting the highest
deductible, the insured is lowering the premium cost. For many insureds, the selection of the
highest deductible is a choice forced by economic considerations. A consumer survey by the
Insurance Information Institute, a media relations group funded by insurers, reveals that
"Americans are frustrated with automobile costs: Roughly three out of four insured vehicle
owners nationwide reject the idea that automobile insurance costs are about right."
INSURANCE INFO. INST., INSURANCE PULSE ch. 3 (1990). Further, most consumers cite low
premiums as the number one reason for choosing a particular insurance company. Id.
6. FLA. STAT. § 627.739(2) (1991). Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
New York require the insurance companies to offer authorized deductible amounts which are
established by either a statute or the state insurance department. Delaware, Kentucky,
Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania allow the insured to choose any amount of
deductible. See IRWIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3.07, at 3-65
(2d ed. 1991).
The glossary in the 1991 version of the Automobile Insurance Shoppers' Guide gives
the definition of a deductible as "[t]he amount which a policyholder must pay, per claim or
accident, before an insurance company pays its share." FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., 1990-1991
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SHOPPERS' GUIDE 22 (1990).
In the 1988 Guide, the deductible is explained by the following paragraph: "By law,
you are allowed to buy a PIP policy with a deductible of up to $2,000. A deductible is the
amount you must pay from your own pocket before your insurance starts paying." FLORIDA
DEP'T OF INS., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SHOPPERS' GUIDE 4 n.4 (1988).
1993]
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Susan Amone purchased a $10,000 PIP insurance policy, which carried
a $2,000 deductible, from International Bankers Insurance Company.
Unfortunately, Ms. Amone was injured in an automobile accident. Susan
Amone's medical bills exceeded her $10,000 PIP policy limit and were
much more than she could afford to pay. Ms. Amone properly paid her
$2,000 deductible and requested her insurance company to pay the $10,000
policy limit of her PIP insurance. Her insurance company refused. Instead,
the insurer advised that it would pay only $8,000 under Susan Amone's
$10,000 PIP insurance policy. The insurance company reasoned that
because Ms. Amone chose a $2,000 deductille, she purchased only $8,000
worth of PIP coverage.7
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the consolidated cases of Internation-
al Bankers Insurance Co. v. Arnone and Great Oaks Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Kelly,8 agreed with the insurance company's calculations. The Florida
Supreme Court ruled that despite the statutory requirement that registered
automobile owners in Florida must obtain $10,000 worth of no-fault PIP
insurance, the insurance company would not be obligated to pay PIP
benefits equal to the required policy limits of $10,000. 9
The Arnone decision released insurance companies, who have issued
over twelve million $10,000 PIP insurance policies in Florida, from the
payment of as much as twenty-four billion dollars in PIP insurance
benefits." Was Florida's PIP statute intended or expected to provide this
windfall for insurance companies?
7. International Bankers Ins. Co. v. Arnone, 552 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 1989).
8. 552 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1989).
9. Id. at 911 (holding that the authorized deductible amounts must be subtracted from
the lesser of 80% of the eligible medical benefits or the statutorily mandated coverage limit
of $10,000).
10. See Florida Drivers License Bureau Statistics, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
The $24 billion windfall discussed in the text does not account for the actual percentage of
drivers who did not purchase PIP insurance, the exact percentage of insureds who select a
$2,000 deductible, and for the exact amount of PIP benefits paid out by insurers during any
calendar year. The $24 billion figure represents the theoretical maximum windfall to
insurers.
The top three auto insurers in Florida are: State Farm with 21.5% of the insureds;
Allstate with 17.8% of the insureds; and GEICO with 3.6% of the insureds. Corrections,
SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 20, 1991, at 3D. The 10 largest auto insurers in the nation are: State
Farm with 20.41% of the insureds; Allstate with 12.14%; Farmers with 5.32%; Nationwide
with 3.82%; USAA with 2.74%; Aetnawith 2.67%; GEICO with 1.99%; Liberty Mutual with
1.77%; Travelers with 1.7%; and California State Automobile Assoc. with 1.66%. Andy
Dorsett, Largest Insurers, SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 18, 1991, graphic at ID.
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The purpose of this article is to examine and evaluate the relationship
between deductibles and Florida's mandatory, no-fault PIP insurance. First,
this article will examine the purpose of no-fault insurance statutes and, in
particular, the typical no-fault insurance system as evidenced by Florida's
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Next, this article will describe how insurance
companies sell and how consumers purchase no-fault automobile insurance.
Then, this article will examine Florida case law interpreting the no-fault law,
and the relationship of deductibles to the payment of required PIP insurance
benefits. Finally, this article will comment on Florida case law and its
impact on consumers, and suggest a revision to the Florida PIP insurance
statute.
II. THE PURPOSE OF NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
Several states have some form of no-fault automobile insurance
statute." The term "no-fault insurance" means that the insured/injured
party receives insurance benefits regardless of who was at fault in causing
the automobile accident. 2 No-fault insurance is the result of public
dissatisfaction with the cost and delay involved before compensation for
automobile accident injuries is received. 3 No-fault insurance operates on
the premise that prompt payment of compensation by the insured's own
insurance carier serves the public interest better than the costs and delays
traditionally encountered in attempting to recover damages from the person
at fault. 4
Florida. is a typical example of a pure, no-fault jurisdiction. Four
elements characterize a pure, no-fault system: (1) no-fault insurance is
required in order to own and operate an automobile; (2) there is a statutory
level of benefits afforded to any person covered by no-fault insurance; (3)
the "at fault" party is immune from suit for any losses covered by a no-fault
insurance policy; and (4) there is a limitation on the availability of non-
11. Twenty-four jurisdictions have some form of no-fault automobile insurance law.
The majority are compulsory but a few are optional. See Josephine Y. King, Survey: State
No-Fault Systems Attorney's Guide to Statutory Provisions; The Statutory Architecture of
State No-Fault Systems, 4 PACE L. REv. 297 (1984); see also SCHERMER, supra note 6, §
1.02, at 1-12.
12. JONATHAN L. ALPERT, FLORIDA MOTOR VEHICLE NO-FAULT LAW 23 (1984).
13. ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW-BAsIC TEXT 246 (1971).
14. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974); see also Robert A.
Henderson & Patrick F. Maroney, Motor Vehicle Insurance Reform: Revisiting the
Uninsured Driver, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 789, 790 (1988).
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economic damages, including pain and suffering. 5  Florida is one of
sixteen jurisdictions utilizing a pure, no-fault system. 6 States which have
not adopted a pure, no-fault insurance law still require a modified version
of no-fault insurance which provides a minimum amount of insurance cover-
age.' 7
Section 627.731 of the Florida Statutes states that the purpose of
Florida's no-fault insurance law is:
[t]o provide for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance
benefits without regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance
securing such benefits, for motor vehicles required to be registered in
[Florida] ... and, with respect to motor vehicle accidents, a limitation
on the right to claim damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish,
and inconvenience. 8
The intended result of a no-fault law is to guarantee that an injured party
receives prompt and definite financial assistance after an automobile
accident. 9 In theory, no-fault insurance reduces the uncertainty of
receiving financial assistance, court congestion and delay, and also reduces
the premium cost for all types of automobile insurance.2" In Lasky v. State
Farm Insurance Co.,2 the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the
legislative purpose of PIP insurance is to provide a mandatory minimum of
insurance benefits to protect an injured party from financial hardship and to
avoid swelling the public relief roles.22
The nucleus of Florida's no-fault insurance law requires that:
15. See King, supra note 11, at 299.
16. Id. The other pure no-fault jurisdictions include Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See generally id. at 301-72.
17. See id at 377-97. Jurisdictions utilizing a no-fault system which is not pure are
designated as quasi no-fault systems. In these systems there is no threshold limitation
imposed on the traditional tort recovery system nor is tort immunity granted, and first party
benefits are expanded. The quasi no-fault states are Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Oregon,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1991).
19. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. (involving a constitutional challenge to the Florida no-fault law in which the
validity of the limitation of tort recovery was upheld).
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Every insurance policy.., shall provide personal injury protection to
the named insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons
operating the insured motor vehicle, passengers in such motor vehicle,
and other persons struck by such motor vehicle, and suffering bodily
injury to a limit of $10,000 for loss sustained by any such person as a
result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle ......
Under Florida law, PIP insurance pays for: 1) eighty percent of all reason-
able expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, and rehabilita-
tive services; 2) sixty percent of loss of gross income and earning capacity;
and 3) a death benefit of $5,000 per individual. 24  The key element of
Florida's PIP insurance statute, which is typical of most no-fault insurance
statutes, 25 is that a PIP insurance policy must provide a minimum benefit
23. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
24. See id. § 627.736(1)(a)-(c).
25. State no-fault insurance laws may differ as to the total amount no-fault benefits
available, but most states by 1982 had placed a cap on no-fault benefits, ranging from $2,000
in Massachusetts to $62,975 in Colorado. See EMMETmr J. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
RISK AND INSURANCE 473 (3d ed. 1982). Three states have no minimum benefit: Michigan,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See id.
The following chart shows the breakdown of the various states employing updated no-
fault insurance statutes:
STATE
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Kansas
Kentucky
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
BENEFITS
$25,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$10,000
$15,000
$25,000
$25,000
$10,000
$20,000
$10,000
$20,000
$25,000
$15,000
$10,000
$25,000
$25,000
$10,000
$15,000
TYPE OF NO-FAULT LAW
Optional First Party
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
Compulsory
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of $10,000.26 Consequently, mandatory PIP insurance differs from the
voluntary purchase of other types of automobile insurance because Florida
law, rather than the insured, dictates the type and amount of insurance
coverage.2" In conjunction with the purchase of PIP insurance, Florida
mandatory no-fault law requires an insurer to offer each potential insured or
policyholder a deductible in the amount of $250, $500, $1,000 or $2,000.28
The purpose of requiring insurance companies to offer a deductible was
noted by the Florida Supreme Court in Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Kwechin.29 In Kwechin, the supreme court explained the election
of a deductible avoids requiring redundant, duplicate, and therefore,
uncollectible insurance benefits.3" The court ruled that by allowing for a
deductible, an insured can purchase the minimum PIP insurance coverage
of $10,000 and avoid, to a certain extent, any overlap with other insurance
coverage.31 The majority of Florida insureds, typical of most jurisdictions,
South Dakota $15,000 Optional First Party
Texas $20,000 Optional First Party
Utah $20,000 Compulsory
Virginia $25,000 Compulsory
Id. (supplying each state's type of no-fault law); see King, supra note 11, at 297 (supplying
updated benefit amounts); see also SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 1-12.
26. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
27. See NADER & SMrrH, supra note 1, at 81. "Most of the terms in a no-fault
insurance policy remain the same as in a fault policy. The major difference is the personal
injury protection coverage, known as PIP. The PIP portion of the insurance policy pays for
the no-fault benefits that are mandated by state laws." Id.
"Liability insurance is designed to protect you against the costs of being sued." Id.
"[M]edical payments coverage.., is designed to pay for some of the medical consequences
that can result [from an] accident." Id. at 89. "The part that protects the value of your
vehicle ... from an impact with another vehicle or object ... is called collision coverage."
Id. at 91-92. "Loss caused by flying objects, fire, theft, windstorm, hail, malicious mischief,
riot, hitting an animal, etc. is ... commonly called comprehensive coverage." NADER &
SMITH, supra note 1, at 92.
In Florida, one may drive without comprehensive auto insurance coverage; however,
one may not drive without PIP insurance coverage. Automobile owners who fail to purchase
PIP coverage may have their vehicle registration revoked. See FLA. STAT. § 627.733(6)
(1991).
28. FLA. STAT. § 627.739(2) (1991).
29. 447 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1983).
30. Id. at 1339.
31. Id. "To require payment for coverage which is redundant, therefore uncollectible,
would be inequitable. Hence, section 627.739 provides for a deductible to prevent
overlapping coverage." Id.
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choose the highest deductible amount of $2,000 to maximize the reduction
in premium cost and justify such deductible in light of collateral insurance
coverage.32 The up-shot of choosing a deductible is that the higher the
deductible, the lower the premium cost for PIP insurance. Furthermore, the
Kwechin court ruled that insurance agents, acting on behalf of an insured,
possess a heightened duty to fully disclose and inform the insured what the
deductible means, how the deductible effects PIP insurance coverage, and
whether the insured's collateral insurance coverage warrants choosing a
deductible .
III. rHE MAKING OF A NO-FAULT INSURANCE CONTRACT
The typical applicant buys [insurance] 'protection' much as
he buys groceries.34
Under Florida's and most states' no-fault insurance law, the consumer
has no choice but to purchase PIP insurance upon buying or leasing an
automobile.3" However, the consumer does have a choice of insurance
32. See supra notes 4, 5 and accompanying text. A recent survey asked insured
automobile owners the following question: "When did you last discuss with your insurance
agent or insurance company the possibility of raising the amount of your deductible?" The
owners answered as follows:
When I last bought a car 25%
When I last changed insurance companies 10%
When my insurance was last renewed 29%
Never--I have always had the same deductible 29%
Don't Know 7%
INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 5, at ch. 3. These answers reveal that most automobile
owners prefer to have a higher deductible, and that some owners have no idea about their
deductible. See id.
33. Kwechin, 447 So. 2d at 1337-40. Prior to a 1982 amendment, the insurer was
required to e)xplain to the insured that a deductible could be obtained only where there was
collateral coverage. See FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (1981).
In writing the dissenting opinion in Kwechin, Justice Boyd remarked that the court's
holding imposes an inequitable duty on "insurance agents ... to inquire into the financial
affairs of all persons selecting one of the optional deductibles available with personal injury
protection coverage and to counsel with such individuals concerning the coverage and
deductible selected." Kwechin, 447 So. 2d at 1340 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
34. 7 WALTER H.E. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at 34 (3d ed. 1963)
[hereinafter JAEGER].
35. See generallyKing, supra note 11. Most states require proof of no-fault insurance
in order to register a car. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-4-702 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
Flynn
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companies. Consumers tend to pick a PIP insurer two ways: Either they
choose the company with whom they already have obtained other types of
insurance or "open the yellow pages to the insurance listings, close their
eyes, and point." In either case, insurance companies know the con-
sumer's primary concern is cost.37 Armed with this knowledge, the
experienced PIP insurance underwriter simply waits for the consumer to
inquire and then pitches the product.
The consumer's inquiry usually begins with a phone call or a visit to
an insurance agent.38 In either case, the insurance companies equip their
ANN. § 14-112 (West 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a) (1992); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-2106(a), (b) (1992); FLA. STAT. § 627.733 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-34-4 (Supp.
1992); HAw. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-117 (Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3104 (Supp.
1975); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-080 (Baldwin 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539
(1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90, § 34A (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.3102(2) (1991); MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (1992); N.J. REV. STAT. § 39:6A-4 (1991); N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-321 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law. Co-op. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-302
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472 (Michie 1992). See SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 1.02 at
1-12.
Arkansas is an optional no-fault state. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-203 (Michie 1992).
Oregon does not require compulsory insurance, but if a liability policy is issued, then no-fault
insurance must be provided. OR. REv. STAT. § 742.520 (1991). South Dakota is an optional
no-fault state in which insurers must offer "supplemental coverage" as an option. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-23-7 (1992). In Texas, an automobile owner must have liability
insurance which includes no-fault coverage unless rejected by the insured. TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 5.06-3(a) (1993).
36. NADER & SMrTH, supra note 1, at 21.
37. Id. at 63. Smith and Nader have noted that:
Now, because of the tremendous increases in the price of auto insurance in many
parts of the country, the topic is one that generates anger, controversy, and
resentment-evenbefore the envelope containing the bill is opened.... For one
thing, auto insurance is mandatory in many states. That means that consumers
can't 'Just Say No,' thereby reducing the incentives of the companies to keep
the prices low.
Id.
38. When it comes to getting information before purchasing auto insurance, the top
source for most consumers is an insurance agent. The next best sources for information
regarding insurance, according to most Americans, is friends or relatives. INSURANCE INFO.
INST., supra note 5, at ch. 1.
When asked about what kinds of information concerning insurance would be most
helpful, consumers responded as follows:
Explanations on the different types of insurance 39%
How to shop for insurance 21%
How to choose a good insurance agent 13%
What to do if you have a complaint 9%
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agents with the tools necessary to close a deal. Most agents give a
prospective consumer a pamphlet which summarizes the coverages and the
premiums. 9 If the consumer inquires over the phone, the agent tells the
How to file a claim 7%
(None of these) 6%
(Don't know) 5%
Id. at ch. 131.
39. In a personal visit by the author to Florida State Discount Insurance and Auto Tags,
Inc., in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, the agent provided a summary of coverages and a premium
statement which can be used to figure the amount of insurance which is being purchased.
See FLORIDA STATE DIscouNT INSURANCE AND AUTO TAGS, INC., SUMMARY OF COVERAGES
AND PREMIUM (1991).
In talking to a representative of Knight Auto Insurance in Davie, Florida, the author
was provided with a packet of standard forms, referred to as the "Mickey Mouse forms"
which are kept on file with the insured's application. The agent is able to help with the
application process through the use of computers. After the applicant is accepted, the insured
pays the first premium payment which is sent to the insurer. The agent has constant contact
with the insurer and thus can answer any questions which the applicant might ask. See
KNIGHT AUTO INSURANCE, ELECTION OF PERSONAL INFURY [sic] PROTECTION WITH A
DEDUCTIBLE (1991). The following is a reproduction of the "Mickey Mouse forms" which
a prospective insured must fill out prior to leaving the agent's office:
ELECTION OF PERSONAL INFURY [sic] PROTECTION WITH A DEDUCTIBLE
I hereby certify that I fully understand that if I or my dependent relatives are injured
in an accident under which Personal Injury Protection benefits would be payable by the
_ Insurance Company, my other medical/disability/loss of use insurance
must pay for the first S __ of the medical/disability/loss of use benefits before my
Personal Injury Protection purchased from ... [Insurance] Agency will start paying
benefits. If I or my dependent relatives have no other medical/disability/loss of use
insurance, I or my dependent relatives must personally be responsible for the first S
of the loss and will hold the . . . [Insurance] Agency and the __ Insurance
Company completely harmless.
I certify that I have read and understood the above paragraph.
Witness Insured
Id. It is interesting to note that the original "Mickey Mouse form" which the insured must
fill out contained a spelling error in its title ("infury" instead of "injury"). This form notifies
the insured of the deductible, and there is a power of attorney on the bottom of the form in
order to insure payment of the premium. See id.
The back of a typical application for auto insurance contains the following explanation
of the PIP deductible:
$10,000 NO-FAULT COVERAGE (EXPLANATION & OPTIONS)
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consumer what the pamphlet says.4 The typical insurance company
pamphlet contains one paragraph describing PIP insurance." This
With reference to my application for auto insurance through the __ Auto Insurance
Agency, I understand that Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits pay for MEDICALAND
REIMBURSEMENT FOR LOSS OF INCOME. Deductibles which reduce the amount of
PIP benefits paid to me and/or my resident dependent relatives, are available in amounts of
$250, $500, $1,000 and $2,000. A WORD OF CAUTION: Most PIP is carried without a
deductible of any amount and DEDUCTIBLES ARE NOT RECOMMENDED. I hereby
select a PIP deductible by marking the appropriate box below with an "X." I agree that the
Auto Insurance Agency has no responsibility to advise me as to the provisions or
conditions of any OTHER INSURANCE that I may have and that I understand that any
OTHER INSURANCE may also exclude coverage for the personal injury deductible. In
consideration of the-_ Auto Insurance Agency offering the PIP deductible elected by me,
I hereby agree to indemnify the - Auto Insurance Agency from all claims, loss, damage,
injury, liability, costs and expenses whatsoever kind or nature (including attorney's fees),
howsoever, the same may be caused resulting directly or indirectly from my election of a
deductible on personal injury protection. I acknowledge the price, indicated to the right of
this explanation of personal injury protection benefits to eliminate any deductible that I have
elected, has been quoted to me.
See id.
40. In the USAA pamphlet a variety of insurance products are available. The range of
products is wide, from life to auto insurance. There are even a few related non-insurance
products such as credit cards and new car price lists. See YOUR GUIDE TO USAA SERVICES
(1990). For each product which may interest a consumer, there is an "800" number to call
in order to obtain assistancewith information. For example, auto insurance is advertised on
page seven of the guide with a corresponding number to call. Id. at 7.
41. Allstate's brochure only has one paragraph which refers to no-fault insurance in
general. Under a section boldly labeled as "NO-FAULT COVERAGE," the brochure
provides, "coverage for injury, death, loss of services, and loss of income suffered by you,
your covered passengers, or covered family members. (No-Fault Coverage is not available
in every state. Ask an Allstate agent for details.)" See ALLSTATE INS. Co., ALLSTATE...
MORE VALUE FOR YOUR AUTO INSURANCE DOLLAR! (1990) [hereinafter INSURANCE DOLLAR].
Allstate does publish a brochure concerning the no-fault insurance system, but the
publication is meant more as a political statement on the position of the insurance company
concerning legislation which could affect no-fault. See ALLSTATE INS. Co., THE No-FAULT
SYSTEM-How DOES IT WORK IN FLORIDA? (1989) [hereinafter No-FAULT SYSTEM]. The
consumer is told that higher rates are the only logical result if the system is not changed.
Yet, this comprehensive explanation of the Florida no-fault system has no information
concerning how the election of a deductible affects the amount of benefits received. See id.
The State Farm brochure also fails to give a person the full details of how the
deductible effects the amount of PIP benefits received. The brochure statesunder the "limits
of liability" section that "[t]he most we pay under No-Fault for each insured for all losses and
expenses from one accident is $10,000 (less any deductible... $250 up to $2,000)." STATE
FARM INS. Co., LIKE A GOOD NEIGHBOR, STATE FARM IS THERE (1989) [hereinafter GOOD
NEIGHBOR]. While the State Farm brochure provides more information than most, this
statement still does not inform the applicant of the "double deductible" effect. See id. For
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paragraph informs the consumer of the mandatory minimum amount of PIP
insurance coverage required by Florida law.42 In addition, insurers supply
their insurance agents with brochures containing the most frequently asked
questions and answers about PIP insurance.43 The insurance agent usually
offers the brochures if the prospective consumer asks the questions.44 The
consumer does not have the opportunity to read or even look at the actual
PIP insurance policy until much later.45
From the foregoing information, the consumer must decide whether to
apply for PIP insurance with that particular insurance company. Although
a prospective consumer may have a choice of insurers, the consumer does
not have a choice of the actual terms of a PIP insurance policy. Florida
statutes and the Florida Department of Insurance prescribe the content of a
PIP insurance policy.46 Consequently, the consumer's choice of PIP
insurance companies primarily involves a comparison of premium rates for
standardized coverage.
To be considered for coverage, the consumer must then fill out an
application for PIP insurance either in person or over the phone. The
a discussion of "double deductible" effect see infra notes 72 & 81 and accompanying text.
42. See INSURANCE DOLLAR, supra note 41; No-FAULT SYSTEM, supra note 41; GOOD
NEIGHBOR, supra note 41.
43. Typical of the question and answer brochures are ones dealing with rates or payment
of the auto insurance premium. The question and answer format is used by both Allstate and
State Farm in their publications. See ALLSTATE AUTO COMMUNICATIONS, How AUTO
INSURANCE RATES ARE SET-A GUIDE TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT AUTO
INSURANCE COSTS (1991) [hereinafter ALLSTATE AUTO COMMUNICATIONS]; STATE FARM
INSURANCE CO., Q. WHAT CAN I EXPECT FROM STATE FARM'S MONTHLY PAY PLAN? A.
LOOK INSIDE FOR DETAILS (1991) [hereinafter STATE FARM INSURANCE].
44. The brochures were obtained by the author on August 15, 1991 only after asking a
series of questions to which the insurance agent did not know the answer. See ALLSTATE
AUTO COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 43; STATE FARM INSURANCE, supra note 43.
45. "The agent in fact prepares the contract when he writes the application, because the
policy, which the applicant does not see until delivered and does not sign, follows an
acceptance as a matter of course." JAEGER, supra note 34, at 39.
46. Section 624.05 defines "Department" as Department of Insurance. FLA. STAT. §
624.05 (1991). For a discussion of the role that the department plays in approving rates and
insurance policy coverage, see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 415 So. 2d 47
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), reviewdenied, 426 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1983). In Chapman, a rule
that the Department had set forth regarding the definition of a motor vehicle was found to
be in violation of the Florida statutes despite the reliance of the insurer on the rule
promulgated by the Department. Id. at 48-49.
47. "In writing the application, the agent does what the company sent him to do. He
negotiates for the company, asks questions for the company, writes down answers for the
company, and makes the return for the company." JAEGER, supra note 34, at 30.
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application requires the prospective consumer to choose a deductible, if any,
and quotes the premium cost for mandatory $10,000 of PIP insurance. The
insurance agent then sends the application along with the first month,
quarter or semi-annual premium to the insurance company.48 Upon receipt
of the application and the required premium, the insurance company must
decide to accept or reject the prospective insured's application. Upon
rejection, the consumer is notified and the premium is refunded.49 Upon
acceptance, the insurance company issues a PIP policy which states the date
coverage begins.5° Only upon issuance of the PIP policy does the insured
have the opportunity to read and review the exact terms of the PIP insurance
policy.51 The typical PIP policy provides as follows:
Regardless of the number of persons insured ... the total aggregate
limit of personal injury protection benefits available under the Florida
Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, as amended, from all sources combined,
including this policy, for all loss and expense incurred by or on behalf
of any one person who sustains bodily injury as the result of any one
accident shall be $10,000 .... Regardless of whether payments are
made under the Florida Motor No-Fault Vehicle Law, as amended, or
under Extended Personal Injury Protection, the $10,000 limit indicated
in the preceding paragraph shall be the maximum payable under this
endorsement. 52
Accordingly, the insured believes that a Florida no-fault PIP insurance
policy obligates payment of the mandatory $10,000 insurance benefits
required by Florida law. Yet the insurance companies believe that a Florida
48. See INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 5, at ch. 1.
49. With the advance in communications and computers, an agent at Florida State
Discount Insurance and Auto Tags, Inc., can obtain the acceptance or rejection right within
minutes; however, receipt of the actual policy is delayed by the mail. See supra note 39.
50. In obtaining insurance from USAA, after the application was filled out by the agent
over the phone at the "800" number, the actual policy detailing the coverage was sent to the
insured after a few weeks. See supra note 40.
51. See NADER & SMITH, supra note 1, at 42. Under a boldly stated section labeled as
a "consumer alert," the authors' note that
[f]requently you will not receive the actual policy until after you have decided
to buy. You will also often have the right to inspect the policy and cancel.
When you receive your policy, read it to make sure the promises about the
terms of the policy made to get you to buy were actually kept in the contract
itself. Few of us do this, but we should.
Id. at 42. (emphasis added).
52. SUSAN J. MILLER & PHLLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES
ANNOTATED 83 (1991). These are standard provisions in a Florida PIP policy.
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no-fault PIP insurance policy only obligates payment of the mandatory
$10,000 of insurance benefits less the amount of any deductibles for
insureds who select a deductible.53 This conflict concerning the payout of
mandatory no-fault insurance benefits has only surfaced in Florida under
Florida's version of a typical no-fault insurance law. Since there is no
legislative history directly on point, both insureds and insurers have had to
look to the Florida courts to resolve the issue of the amount of PIP benefits
payable to insureds with a deductible. 4
IV. COMPUTATION OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE BENEFITS
UNDER FLORIDA LAW
Section 627.739 of the Florida Statutes regarding no-fault PIP insurance
deductibles states that:
Insurers shall offer to each applicant and to each policy holder...
deductibles, in amount, of $250, $500, $1,000 and $2,000, such amount
to be deducted from the benefits otherwise due each person subject to
the deduction.55
The application of this provision to the Florida statutory $10,000 PIP
insurance requirement is crucial in carrying out the purposes of the no-fault
law. For over ten years, Florida courts have struggled with the application
of the deductible in relation to the payment of the required PIP benefits.
This struggle has produced a peculiar series of court opinions unique to
Florida and to this issue.
Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Cowan 6 presented the
Florida Third District Court of Appeals with this issue. In Cowan, the
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and incurred medical
expenses and other losses of approximately $40,000."7 Cowan's PIP policy
provided for the $5,000 of PIP insurance coverage required by Florida law
at the time.58  The insured selected a deductible of $1,000. 59  Cowan
claimed that upon his payment of the deductible, the insurance company was
53. See International Bankers Ins. Co. v. Arnone, 552 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1989).
54. See id.
55. FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (1991).
56. 364 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
57. Id. at 811.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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obligated by law to pay $5,000 in PIP insurance benefits.6" The insurance
company countered that the insured, by choosing a $1,000 deductible,
reduced the coverage limits of the PIP insurance policy by $1,000, the
amount of the deductible.61 Consequently, the insurance company argued
that it was only obligated to pay a maximum of $4,000 in PIP benefits to
Cowan.62 The Third District Court of Appeal sided with the insurance
company."3 Relying on the Florida PIP statute in effect at the time, the
court ruled that the amount of any deductible was "to be deducted from the
amounts otherwise due each person subject to the deduction . "...,64
Based on this statutory language, the court calculated that the "amount
otherwise due" under the Cowan PIP policy equaled the required $5,000 PIP
policy limits and then subtracted the $1,000 deductible to conclude that the
maximum liability of the insurance company was $4,000.65 The court did
refer to the section of the Florida statute that required Cowan to obtain
$5,000 worth of PIP insurance.66 However, the court did not address any
argument regarding the legislative purpose or intent behind this requirement,
and merely inserted the $5,000 PIP policy limits as the "amount 'otherwise
due"' referenced in the PIP statute.67 In sum, the court equated the
"amount otherwise due" with the statutorily required policy limits for
Florida PIP insurance.
Two years after Cowan, the Fifth District Court of Appeal was
presented with the same issue in Thibodeau v. Allstate Insurance Co.6"
Thibodeau incurred over $8,000 in medical expenses from injuries she
sustained as a passenger in an automobile accident. Under the Florida PIP
law in effect at the time, Thibodeau was covered under a $5,000 PIP
60. Id.
61. Cowan, 364 So. 2d at 811.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court decision which held
that the plaintiff was entitled to $5,000, the maximum PIP benefits, because the amount of
the insured's PIP covered expenses was $40,000. Id.
1 64. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 627.739 (Supp. 1976)). The only policy language that the
court considered concerning the deductible stated: "This Policy Contains $1,000 Deductible
on Personal Injury Protection." Id. No policy language was cited by the court indicating the
insured was informed that the selection of a deductible altered the maximum payable PIP
benefits.
65. Cowan, 364 So. 2d at 811.
66. Id. The court referred to section 627.736 of the Florida Statutes, which is the
section requiring PIP insurance coverage. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 627.736 (1975)).
67. Id. The court stated: "The amount 'otherwise due' under the policy is $5,000.00."
The court then cites as its authority section 627.736(l) of the Florida Statutes. Id.
68. 391 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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insurance policy which included a $4,000 deductible. Thibodeau claimed
that after payment of the $4,000 deductible, the insurance company was
obligated to pay $5,000 in PIP insurance benefits. The insurance company,
relying upon Cowan, argued that the insurance company's maximum PIP
liability was $1,000 because of Thibodeau's $4,000 deductible. Thibodeau
argued that Florida's PIP statute was ambiguous and misleading.6 9
Thibodeau further argued that any person reading Florida's PIP insurance
law and Thibodeau's PIP policy would conclude that $5,000 of PIP
insurance would require the insurance company to pay $5,000 in PIP
insurance benefits after payment of any deductible." The court acknowl-
edged that Thibodeau's argument was "appealing."7  The court also
confessed that the insurance company's argument clearly bestows the
deductible with a double effect; a reduction of the PIP insurance policy
limits as well as a threshold to payment of any PIP insurance benefits.7"
However, the court, without legislative history for guidance, passed
Thibodeau's argument to the Legislature and ruled, consistent with Cowan
and the insurance company's argument, that the "amount otherwise due"
language of the Florida PIP statute means the statutorily required PIP
insurance policy limits.
7 3
The question of computing PIP insurance benefits under a PIP
insurance policy with a deductible laid dormant for six years until the
Fourth District Court of Appeal was presented with the issue in Internation-
al Bankers Insurance Co. v. Govan.74 In Govan, the insured purchased
$10,000 in PIP insurance as required by Florida law at the time. Govan
also selected a $2,000 deductible. The insured incurred over $5,000 in
medical expenses from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.7" At
issue was whether the payment of eighty percent of Govan's medical bills,
as required by Florida's PIP insurance statute, should be computed before
69. Id. at 806. "The appellant argues the [insurance] policy statement of '$5,000
coverage' is ambiguous and misleading because under no circumstances is $5,000 ever
payable if it is subject to a deduction." Id.
70. Id. "[T]he general public assumes, upon reading such a statement, that there is
$5,000 coverage after the insured pays the first $4,000." Id.
71. Thibodeau, 391 So. 2d at 806.
72. Id.
73. Id. "If the result is contrary to public policy or understanding and expectation, the
legislature should revise [Florida Statute] section 627.739(1)." Id.
74. 502 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 521 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1988).
75. Id. Govan's total medical bills were $5,887.45 which was below the $10,000
maximum limit of PIP benefits mandated in Florida Statute § 627.736(1)(a). Id.
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or after the deductible is subtracted from the total medical bills.76 In ruling
that the insurance company's obligation to pay 80% of the insured's medical
expenses should be based on the total medical bills before subtraction of any
deductible, the Fourth District Court of Appeal took issue with the Cowan
and Thibodeau decisions." The Govan court held that the "benefits
[amounts] otherwise due" language of the Florida PIP statute meant the total
amount of medical expenses incurred by the insured before application of
the deductible."8 The court noted its conflict with the Cowan and Thibo-
deau decisions and criticized those decisions by stating:
Those cases appear to hold that "benefits otherwise due" refers to the
no-fault benefit limits, such as the $10,000 limit involved herein. If
76. Id. at 913-14. The issue breaks down mathematically as follows:
The insurer claimed that Govan's total medical bills should be multiplied by 80%, the
maximum amount payable under Florida law, and then that sum should be further reduced
by the deductible to arrive at the amount of PIP benefits payable to Govan. The math looks
like this:
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS $5,887.45
80% PAYABLE (x) .80
$4,709.96
DEDUCTIBLE (-) $2,000.00
BENEFITS PAYABLE $2,709.96
Govan claimed that the total of his medical bills should first be reduced by the
deductible and then that sum should be multiplied by 80% to reach the total amount of PIP
benefits payable by the insurer. The math looks like this:
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS $5,887.45
DEDUCTIBLE (-) $2,000.00
$3,887.45
80% PAYABLE (x) .80
BENEFITS PAYABLE $3,109.96
Note that the $400 difference between the insurance company's and Govan's formula
remains constant regardless of the insured's deductible amount. See also Govan v.
International Bankers Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 1988) (breaking down the figures
graphically in its opinion).
77. See Govan, 502 So. 2d at 914.
78. Id.
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that were true, the "deductible" would not be a deductible at all in the
manner that word is normally used, i.e., as an amount to be deducted
from the claim, but rather would simply be a means of providing for
lower policy limits. We do not believe the legislature would have
authorized lower policy limits in such an indirect and unusual fashion,
especially since [Florida Statutes] section 627.736(l)(a) specifically
mandates coverage in the amount of at least $10,000.00. We are not
aware of any statutory provision authorizing lesser limits. 9
The court also noted that the Govan PIP insurance policy language
regarding deductibles paralleled the Cowan and Thibodeau PIP insurance
policy terms."0 The court expressed some concern that the PIP policy
provisions regarding deductibles could be construed to support the use of a
PIP deductible twice; first, to reduce the PIP policy limits and second, as a
threshold to payment of PIP benefits.8 However, the court declined to
comment further on the policy language because that issue was not before
the court and regardless of the policy language, the court based its decision
on the "plain meaning" of the language of the Florida PIP statute.8 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Govan was affirmed
on appeal by the Florida Supreme Court in Govan v. International Bankers
Ins. Co.,83 In sum, the Florida Supreme Court in Govan equated the
"amounts [benefits] otherwise due" language of Florida's PIP insurance law
with 80% of the insured's total medical expenses rather than the PIP
insurance policy limits.8 4 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Govan, insurance companies would be obligated to pay out the statutorily
required PIP insurance policy limits of $10,000 in benefits when 80% of the
insured's medical expenses minus any deductible equals or exceeds $10,000.85
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Govan, 502 So. 2d at 914.
83. 521 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Fla. 1988). The court usedaplain-meaning analysisto rule
that the PIP statute required that 80% of the medical benefits must be computed first, and
then the amount of any deductible should be subtracted to arrive at the total amount of PIP
benefits payable by the insurer. Id. at 1088. The court dismissed Govan's argument that
Florida's PIP statute was vague and ambiguous in an interesting footnote where a failure of
the Legislature to amend section 627.739(2) of the Florida Statutes results in a "plain
reading" of the statute. Id.
84. Id. at 1087-88.
85. See id. For example, if Govan' s medical expenses were $15,000 or more, then the
insurance company would be obligated to pay $10,000 in PIP benefits. The math looks like
this:
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in International Bankers
Insurance Co. v. Arnone 6 was predictably consistent with the same court's
opinion in Govan. The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Arnone
extensively cited the Govan opinion in concluding that Ms. Amone's $2,000
deductible acted as a threshold to the payment of the PIP insurance policy
limits in the event that eighty percent of the covered medical expenses
equaled or exceeded the required $10,000 PIP policy limits.87 Under the
facts of the Arnone case, eighty percent of her covered medical bills minus
the $2,000 deductible did exceed her $10,000 PIP insurance policy limits.
The court rejected the insurance company's argument that a deductible
reduces the face amount of a PIP insurance policy because Florida law
requires $10,000 worth of PIP insurance coverage.88
The appeal of the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Arnone
presented the Florida Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify the
calculation of no-fault PIP insurance benefits subject to a deductible. The
supreme court in Arnone reaffirmed the Govan method of computing PIP
insurance benefits whereby eighty percent of the insured's total medical
expenses must be computed before subtracting the amount of any deduct-
ible.89 In doing so, the supreme court quashed the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's decision,90 and ruled that under the facts of Arnone, the
"benefits [amounts] otherwise due" language of the Florida PIP statute
means the lesser of eighty percent of the insured's medical expenses minus
any deductible, or the statutory PIP insurance policy limits minus any
deductible.9 Consequently, because eighty percent of Susan Amone's
medical expenses minus her $2,000 deductible is greater than her mandated
TOTAL MEDICAL BILLS $15,000.00
80% PAYABLE (x) .80
$12,000.00
DEDUCTIBLE (-) $ 2,000.00
BENEFITS PAYABLE $10,000.00
86. 528 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
87. Id. at 918-19.
88. Id. at 918. "We do not believe the legislature would have authorized lower policy
limits in such an indirect and unusual fashion, especially since [Florida Statute] section
627.736(l)(a) specifically mandates coverage in the amount of a least $10,000.00. We are
not aware of any statutory provision authorizing lesser limits." Govan, 502 So. 2d at 914.
89. International Bankers Ins. Co. v. Arnone, 552 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1989).
90. Id. at 911.
91. Id.
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$10,000 PIP policy limits minus her $2,000 deductible, Ms. Amone's
$10,000 PIP policy with a $2,000 deductible only obligates the insurance
company to pay out $8,000 in PIP benefits. In effect, the supreme court's
ruling in Arnone sanctions the use of a deductible not only as a threshold
to the payment of PIP insurance benefits, but also as a reduction of the
amount of statutorily required PIP insurance. As support for its ruling, the
supreme court mentioned the Florida Department of Insurance's interpreta-
tion of the Department approved standard PIP insurance policy provision
concerning deductibles and the "internal consistency" rule of statutory
construction.92 The supreme court did not expound a further explanation
of these bases for its ruling, nor did it make any reference to legislative
intent or legislative history to support its ruling and did not address any
other issues regarding Florida's no-fault PIP insurance law.93 In sum, the
Florida Supreme Court's decision in Arnone means that an insurance
company will never be obligated to pay PIP insurance benefits to a Florida
insured equal to the statutorily required $10,000 policy limits if the insured
selects a deductible.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN ARNONE
An insurance coverage dispute between an insured and an insurer is not
uncommon.9 4 Courts have traditionally relied on finding an ambiguity in
the insurance contract or on the doctrine of unconscionability to resolve
coverage disputes in favor of an insured.9" Conversely, courts have
92. Id. at 910. "Reading these sections in pari materia, it is plain that the statutorily
defined 'required benefits' are the benefits otherwise due from which the deductible amount
is to subtracted." Id. at 911.
93. See Arnone, 552 So. 2d at 911. The supreme court cited American Nurses Ass 'n v.
Passaic Gen. Hosp., 484 A.2d 670, 673 (N.J. 1984) as authority to define the functional
purpose of a deductible.
94. There have been thousands of cases were the insured is at variance with the insurer.
See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.1(a), at 614 (1988).
95. See id. "The doctrine that ambiguities in contract documents are resolved against
the party responsible for the drafting is a well recognized principle of contract interpretation.
This doctrine was one of the first, and continues to be one of the most widely used
approaches, which courts employ to ameliorate harsh effects that would otherwise result from
insurance policy terms." Id. at 628-29. "In some cases, for example, the unambiguous
language of an insurance policy provision provides so little coverage that it would be
unconscionable to permit the insurer to enforce it." Id. at 638.
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traditionally relied on the plain meaning rule and the sanctity of contract
doctrine to hold in favor of an insurer.96 However, no-fault PIP automo-
bile insurance differs from other types of traditional insurance.97 No-fault
PIP insurance is a creation of statute.98 Consequently, absent specific
legislative history to the contrary, courts must consistently decide PIP
insurance coverage disputes based on statutory language drafted and
designed to accomplish a specific legislative purpose.99 Accordingly, the
Florida courts must forgo decision making that undermines or disregards the
Legislature's intended purpose in enacting a no-fault PIP insurance
statute.1"' The Florida Supreme Court twice failed its task in Arnone.
The supreme court initially failed to provide a consistent interpretation
of the "benefits otherwise due" provision of Florida's PIP insurance statute.
The court, by affirming Govan, ruled that for insureds who chose a
deductible, the "benefits otherwise due" language of the PIP statute means
that payable PIP insurance benefits equal eighty percent of the total medical
expenses minus the deductible.10° The court later ruled in Arnone that for
For other comments and articles concerning unconscionability see generally Robert
Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Pitr. L. REV. 337 (1970); Robert
Dugan, The Application of Substantive Unconscionability to Standardized Contracts-A
Systematic Approach, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 77 (1982); M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977); John A. Spanogle, Jr.,
Analyzing UnconscionabilityProblems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969).
96. "If the language employed is clear and unambiguous, the meaning of the plain
wording must prevail ('plain meaning' rule). Courts must enforce, not write, contracts of
insurance and their language must be given its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning."
WILLIAM F. YOUNG & ERIC M. HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 55 (2d ed.
1985) (citing Tobin v. Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 606, 608 (4th Cir. Ct.
App. 1982)); see also the plain meaning cases cited in CURTIS M. CANTON ET AL., The Rules
ofInsurance Policy Construction and the Myth of the "SophisticatedInsured," in IlSURANCE,
ExCESS, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1990, at 9 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 385, 1990).
97. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
98. See King, supra note 11, at 299; see also SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 1.02 at 1-12.
99. 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes § 114 (1984); see also White v. Pepsico, 568 So. 2d 886,
889 (Fla. 1990) (service of process statute); Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec. Inc., 552
So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla. 1989) (workers' compensation statute); Tampa-Hillsborough County
v. K.E. Morris Alignment Serv., 444 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Fla. 1983) (eminent domain
statute); State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981); Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So. 2d
540, 542-43 (Fla. 1981) (statutory attorney fee statute); Schultz v. State, 361 So. 2d 416 (Fla.
1978); State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 84 So. 61 (Fla. 1920).
100. See infra note 114.
101. Govan, 502 So. 2d at 914.
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insureds who chose a deductible, the "benefits otherwise due" language of
the PIP statute means the mandatory PIP insurance policy limits minus the
deductible." 2 The two formulas for calculating no-fault insurance benefits
are inconsistent. Under the Govan formula, if eighty percent of the
insured's covered medical bills minus the deductible equals or exceeds the
$10,000 statutorily required policy limits, then the insured's PIP insurance
benefits would equal $10,000.1"3 Under the Arnone formula, the insured's
PIP insurance benefits would never be more than the $10,000 statutorily
required policy limits minus the amount of the deductible." 4 The Arnone
opinion belies the court's stated allegiance to its guideline of internal
consistency in statutory interpretation.'
5
The court's failure to be consistent and pick one formula for the
computation of PIP insurance benefits raises other questions. Why did the
court concoct two formulas and two interpretations for the "benefits
otherwise due" statutory language? The only difference between Govan and
Arnone is the amount of medical expenses. In Govan, the insured incurred
over $5,000 in medical expenses;0 6 while in Arnone, the insured had over
$10,000 in medical bills.0 7 However, the common thread in both of these
cases was that the insurance company won. Consequently, the supreme
court's inconsistent interpretations of the Florida PIP insurance law produces
a consistent result: the insurance companies pay out less in PIP insurance
benefits-a potential multi-billion dollar windfall!"0 '
The supreme court also failed to follow its own prior court opinions
and the express legislative purpose of Florida's PIP insurance law. The
court's ruling in Arnone prohibits any insured who chooses a deductible
from receiving the statutory minimum $10,000 of PIP insurance bene-
fits. 9 Regardless of the Florida Department of Insurance's interpretation
of the deductible provisions of the PIP statute, the court must look to the
legislative history (nonexistent for this issue), the Legislature's expressed
purpose for the statute, the actual language used in the statute, and prior
precedent for guidance in statutory interpretation." 0 The court in Kwechin
102. Arnone, 552 So. 2d at 910-11.
103. See Govan, 502 So. 2d at 914.
104. See Arnone, 552 So. 2d at 911.
105. See id.
106. Govan, 502 So. 2d at 913.
107. Arnone, 552 So. 2d at 909.
108. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
109. See Arnone, 552 So. 2d at 911.
110. See id. at 910-11; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992); Heredia v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1354-55 (Fla. 1978) (PIP case); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78
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clearly stated that the legislative purpose of an insurance deductible was to
avoid requiring duplicate and uncollectible insurance benefits; not to reduce
insurance policy limits.' 11 Furthermore, the court in Lasky ruled that the
legislative purpose of Florida's PIP statute was to provide a mandatory
$10,000 of no-fault PIP insurance benefits. 1 ' Finally, the court in
Praetorians v. Fisher"3 stated that the Florida statutes governing insurance
contracts must be liberally construed so as to protect the public." 4 The
court in Arnone disregarded not only the explicit language of the PIP statute
requiring $10,000 of PIP insurance benefits, but also its own precedent to
the detriment of Florida automobile owners, drivers and passengers.
The supreme court's reluctance to provide a single formula for the
computation of PIP insurance benefits for insureds who choose a deductible
requires legislative repair. The primary goal of any legislative remedy must
be to clearly disclose the amount of PIP insurance benefits an insured
purchases when choosing a deductible. There have been several attempts,
spearheaded by The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, to legislatively
correct the Florida Supreme Court's Arnone decision." 5  The 1993
Regular Session of the Florida Legislature yielded House Bill 2139, which
included an amendment to the Florida PIP statute designed to override the
Arnone decision." 6 House Bill 2139 merely adds the following language
to the text of section 627.739(2) of the Florida Statutes after the "benefits
otherwise due" language of this section:
After the deductible is met, an insured shall be eligible to receive up to
the $10,000 in total benefits described in s. 627.736(1). 17
So. 693, 694-95 (Fla. 1918); Curry v. Lehman, 47 So. 18 (Fla. 1908); Suazo v. Delbusto, 587
So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd sub nom., Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Suazo, 614 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1992).
111. Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kwechin, 447 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. 1983).
112. Lasky v. State Farm Ins., 296 So. 2d 9, 16 (Fla. 1974).
113. 89 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1956).
114. Id. at 333.
115. The Academy ofFlorida Trial Lawyers ("AFTL") Proactive Legislation Summaries
from 1989 through 1993 indicate that AFTL has proposed legislation to overrule the Arnone
case. See ACADEMY OF FLORIDA TRIAL LAWYERS, AFTL PROACTIVE LEGISLATION
SUMMARIES (1993).
116. Fla. I-IB 2139, § 12 at 18-19 (1993). Fla. SB 1044 (1993) was the identical bill
considered by the Florida Senate. This article will only reference Fla. HiB 2139, § 12 at 18-
19.
117. Id.
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This proposed amendment explicitly requires insurance companies to pay out
PIP insurance benefits equal to the statutorily mandated PIP policy limits of
$10,000 afer the insured satisfies any deductible. " 8  The proposed
amendment would overrule the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Arnone.
House Bill 2139 was not enacted by the Florida Legislature during the 1993
Regular Session, but will be re-introduced in the 1994 Regular Session of
the Florida Legislature." 9 The proposed amendment is appealing to
consumers and unappealing to insurance companies because the amendment
increases the pay out of PIP benefits. The sponsors and supporters premise
this proposed amendment on the Legislaturo's express statutory language to
provide $10,000 in PIP benefits under Florida's no-fault law 2' and on
common sense. Could the Florida Legislature have been so gripped by
nonsense fhat it would enact a PIP statute requiring $10,000 of PIP
insurance coverage, and then never require insurance companies to pay out
$10,000 in PIP benefits?12 Putting aside the debate over the propriety of
the Govan formula for computing PIP benefits,'22 the proposal to require
the insurance companies to pay out PIP benefits to the extent of the face
value of the required PIP insurance policy limits merits adoption by the
Florida Legislature. By adopting the proposed amendment, the Legislature
would reinstate the mandatory $10,000 of PIP insurance benefits for
insureds who chose a deductible'23 and eliminate the insurance companies'
windfall.' 24 In addition, the Legislature would send a message to the
118. Id.
119. Senate Bill 1044 passed the Florida Senate, but the Florida House of Represen-
tatives failed to act on the bill before the close of the 1993 regular legislative session. House
Bill 2139 was not reported out of the Appropriations Committee of Florida House of
Representatives and therefore, never voted on by the Florida House of Representatives.
Report of Legislation, 1993 regular session of the Florida Legislature.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
121. The answer to this rhetorical questions is "no." However, the answer given by the
Florida Supreme Court in Arnone was "yes." The Florida Supreme Court's answer violates
one of the traditional rules of statutory construction: a statute must be construed so as to
avoid an unreasonable, illogical, ridiculous or abused result. 49 FLA. JuR. 2D Statutes § 121
(1984); see also FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992); Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833
(Fla. 1963); City of St. Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1950); State v. Sullivan,
116 So. 255 (Fla. 1928); McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O'Kelley, 349 So. 2d 717 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1978) (PIP statute); Gracie v.
Deming, 213 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
122. See Govan, 502 So. 2d at 913.
123. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
124. See Florida Drivers License Bureau Statistics, supra note 2.
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Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Department of Insurance that
Florida's PIP insurance law means what it is supposed to mean. The
Legislature would also send a message to insurance companies that if an
insured purchases $10,000 in PIP insurance, then insurance companies better
be prepared to pay out $10,000 in PIP insurance benefits. Finally, the
Legislature would send a message to Florida consumers that the puzzling
words of a no-fault, PIP insurance policy and the clever sales efforts by
insurance agents will not amount to a reduction in the required no-fault PIP
insurance benefits. 25
VI. CONCLUSION
The insurance contract is carefully prepared by the insurance company
with over two centuries of experience. The insured is a neophyte...
S26 Under these circumstances the law . . . must become avowedly
pragmatic. The first step in the administration of justice is the
recognition that man is not made for the law, but that the law is made
for the man. 127
Despite the best of intentions, Florida's no-fault automobile insurance
seems to have sunk into the same interpretive quagmire of most other types
of insurance. 2 Perhaps, it is time for Florida to put aside the favorite "It
is an insurance case!" rationale to explain away court opinions like Ar-
none.'29 Otherwise, it is just a matter of time before all of us reach into
our mailbox only to find a letter from our insurance company that says 'We
regret to inform you .... " 3o
125. See ALLSTATE AUTO COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 43; JAEGER, supra note 34, at
30, 39; see also JAEGAR supra notes 45, 47 and accompanying text; NADER & SMITH, supra
note 1, at 63; STATE FARM INSURANCE, supra note 43;
126. Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 567 P.2d 62, 65 (N.M. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 569 P.2d 414 (N.M. 1977) (Sutin, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
127. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 252 (1936).
128. See KEETON & WIDiss, supra note 94, at 614.
129. Id. at 615 n. 1. The generalization was used to explain these one-time unpredictable
insurance cases where there was a variance between the policy provisions and the insured's
position. Id.
130. NADER & SMTrH, supra note 1, at xvii.
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Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.-Does Florida's Construction
Contracting Statute Create a Private Cause of Action
Against Individual Qualifying Agents?
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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Murthys sought damages for injuries that chapter 489,
Florida's construction contracting statute, was enacted to prevent, the court
had to decide whether the Legislature intended the statute's expressed
penalties and disciplinary enforcement provisions to be exclusive.' Because
implied recovery or denial is attributable to the legislation, not to the court's
independent policy choice,2 the Murthys' claim stands or falls with the
statute under which it was asserted: chapter 489.3 Still in the devastating
aftermath of Hurricane Andrew,4 consumers such as the Murthys do not
1. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
2. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 791 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
3. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
4. See generally Alan T. Dimond, Hurricane Andrew: From Devastation and Chaos to
Rebirth and Renewal, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1003, 1003-07 (1993) (describing the hurricane and
its effect on South Florida).
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care that the Construction Industry Licensing Board5 ("CILB") may
discipline and penalize incompetent and unscrupulous contractors under the
statute.' It may be "cold comfort" to them that the wrongdoer will be
disciplined if the discipline excludes liability for damages to injured
consumers.7 The courts should not presume that legislative silence implies
such a policy choice.'
The series of cases discussed in this comment debate the existence,
within chapter 489, of an implicit private right of action against qualifying
agents.9  Conflicting interpretations of the statute prompted the Third
District Court of Appeal to request resolution from the Florida Supreme
Court."° Accordingly, in Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., the Third District
Court of Appeal noted the conflict of its decision and the Finkle v.
Mayerchak" decision with the decisions from the First and Fifth Districts
and certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Does
chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1991), the licensing and regulatory chapter
governing construction contracting, create a private cause of action against
the individual qualifier for a corporation acting as a general contractor?"' 2
Upon closer examination, however, a conflict exists only between the
First and Third Districts. Specifically, the Third District Court of Appeal's
decisions in Finkle and Murthy, conflict with Gatwood v. McGee, 3 decided
by the First District Court of Appeal. In the other two cases to which the
Murthy court cites, 4 Hunt v. Department of Professional Regulation,5
and Alles v. Department of Professional Regulation,6 the First and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal held that, under chapter 489, a qualifying agent
5. FLA. STAT. § 489.107 (1991). The CILB, created within the Department of
Professional Regulation ("DPR"), enforces the provisions of chapter 489. Id.; see infra note
84.
6. See Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 854 (Or. 1981) (Linde, J.,
concurring).
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309; Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
10. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
11. 578 So. 2d at 397-98.
12. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
13. 475 So. 2d at 723.
14. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
15. 444 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
16. 423 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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has a statutorily-imposed duty to supervise any construction project for
which the qualifying agent is the licensee of record.' 7
Gatwood, Hunt, and Alles served to establish the decisional law
construing the statute's legislative intent to impose a supervisory duty upon
qualifying agents. 8 By 1988, however, before Finkle and Murthy were
decided, the Legislature codified the duty to supervise in section 489.1195
of the Florida Statutes, setting standards and procedures for qualifying
agents.' 9 In other words, the statutory duty exists; the question becomes
whether the qualifying agent's breach of the duty creates a private cause of
action. Both Hunt and Alles involved contractors who appealed disciplinary
actions taken by the Department of Professional Regulation2" and thus, did
not reach the issue of creating a private cause of action against the
qualifying agents.2' While both Finkle and Murthy held the statute creates
no private cause of action against qualifying agents individually, 22 the
Finkle court cites Gatwood, contradicting itself, to support a cause of action
in common-law negligence against an individual qualifying agent.23
Moreover, the Murthy court cites Finkle with no additional explanation, so
too implying the Gatwood court's reasoning.24
Both cases misapply Gatwood, Finkle directly and Murthy indirectly,
because Gatwood implies a cause of action in negligence, under chapter 489,
against individual qualifying agents. 2' The action lies for damages resulting
from a breach of their nondelegable, statutorily-imposed supervisory duty.26
It is likely that the Third District Court construed chapter 489 to mean
it does not create a negligence per se action when a qualifying agent
breaches the supervisory duty in violation of the statute.27 In fact, by
allowing a cause of action in common-law negligence the court begs the
certified question. The more appropriate question may be whether chapter
17. 444 So. 2d at 999; 423 So. 2d at 626.
18. Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J.,
concurring).
19. FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (Supp. 1988).
20. See supra note 5.
21. See Hunt, 444 So. 2d at 997; Alles, 423 So. 2d at 625.
22. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397; Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309.
23. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 398.
24. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
25. See Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
26. Id.
27. See Williams v. Youngblood, 152 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1963)
(stating in dictum that an unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se, that
is, negligence as a matter of law to be ruled by the court).
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489 creates a private right of action in negligence per se, or whether its
violation is merely prima facie evidence of negligence.28
Although the Finkle court refers to the plaintiffs' negligence per se
claim,29 the court does not apply the negligence per se line of cases in its
reasoning.3" In deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, the Florida
Supreme Court set forth rules applying the negligence per se doctrine,
creating binding case law statewide.3' However, the Finkle court uses the
judicial implication doctrine from Fischer v. Metcaly2 that is binding only
in the Third District.33 In order to analyze and evaluate Murthy and the
certified question, one must understand both the Gatwood and Finkle
decisions.
Part two explains the facts and disparate decisions of Gatwood, Finkle,
and Murthy. Part three analyzes chapter 489 and applies the Third District
Court of Appeal's rationale for declining a private right of action under the
statute. The threshold analysis focuses on the judicial implication doctrine
adopted by the Third District and applies the doctrine to Murthy using
intrinsic and extrinsic aids to statutory construction to ascertain legislative
intent.
Thereafter, part three suggests and applies an alternative judicial
implication doctrine, negligence per se, not considered by either the First or
Third Districts. Part three also considers extra-jurisdictional approaches
28. See deJesusv. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973) (holding
that violations of statutes, other than those imposing a form of strict liability, may be either
negligence per se or evidence of negligence).
29. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
30. See id. at 397-98.
31. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201.
32. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc). The court
held that chapter 827, Florida Statutes (1979) does not provide a private right of action for
violation of a statutory duty to report an alleged abuse. Id. at 787.
The court adopted the more restrictive United States Supreme Court doctrine, not
binding on Florida district courts of appeal, id., instead of controlling doctrine from de Jesus.
See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201; see also Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d
182, 184 (Fla. 1983) (holding that an injured party should have an action where a statute
gives a right, even though it has not expressly given a remedy).
The Fischer case involves minor children who brought an action against their father's
psychiatrist, alleging the psychiatrist failed to report that he knew or suspected the father was
physically and emotionally abusing the children, causing their injuries. 543 So. 2d at 786.
33. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397-98. Although Fischer is controlling authority in the
Third District, and therefore binding on the Finkle court, both courts ignored the Florida
Supreme Court cases on judicial implication doctrine and negligence per se. See deJesus,281
So. 2d at 201; Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; see supra notes 28, 32.
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which, when applied to Murthy, support a private remedy under chapter 489.
Finally, part four discusses the likely ramifications of a private right of
action against qualifying agents, then part five concludes that chapter 489
implicitly supports a private remedy.
II. SPLIT AMONG FLORIDA'S DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
A. Gatwood v. McGee
Prior to 1979, Gatwood Enterprises, a home construction business,
entered into an agreement with Glynquest, a third party builder, whereby
Glynquest was employed to manage and supervise Gatwood Enterprises'
home building operation. 4 Gatwood, a building contractor, was Gatwood
Enterprises" president, sole stockholder and qualifying agent." Gatwood,
although involved in various aspects of Gatwood Enterprises' operations,
had nothing to do with the actual construction of the homes.36 He did,
however, obtain the building permit for the home sold to the McGees in
October 1979. 3" Within two months after the McGees bought and occu-
pied the new home, they discovered that it had been constructed on a bed
of muck, ten to twelve feet deep, which had been covered with a layer of
fill sand." The unstable ground caused substantial structural problems to
the home.39
The McGees filed suit in August 1980 against Gatwood individually,
and Gatwood Enterprises, Inc., a dissolved corporation since June 1980.40
The trial court entered judgment for damages against the corporation and
Gatwood individually. 41 Only Gatwood, individually, appealed the judg-
ment.42
The First District Court of Appeal held that Gatwood had a statutorily-
imposed duty, as qualifying agent, to supervise construction pursuant to
chapter 489, Florida Statutes (1979). 4' The court further held that breach-
34. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 721.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 722.
38. Id.
39. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 722.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at '723.
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ing the duty provides a basis for personal liability in a negligence action."
Specifically, the court stated that the "negligent performance of the
qualifying agent's statutorily imposed duty of supervision may support a
cause of action for damages . . . ."" The court added that the qualifying
agent's duty of supervision is nondelegable; 46 the qualifier may not evade
responsibility for negligent supervision by relying upon one who, even
though a competent builder, is not the qualifying agent of record for the
company pursuant to chapter 489.4' The court emphasized that the cause
of action was based upon negligence.4 ' The court further stated that to
recover, the plaintiffs must prove more than Gatwood improperly delegated
his supervisory responsibility.49 The McGees must prove that the construc-
tion defects could reasonably have been avoided if the qualifying agent
executed his statutorily-imposed duty with due care.5 °
B. Finkle v. Mayerchak
In early 1984, the Finkles met with Firestone, the owner of a construc-
tion company, MPF Enterprises, to negotiate a contract for the design and
construction of their home.5' Firestone represented to the Finkles that he
personally held a Florida general contractor's license." Firestone did not
inform the Finkles that Mayerchak was, in fact, the qualifying agent for
MPF. 3
In 1987, the Finkles sued Mayerchak individually, as MPF's qualifying
agent, alleging that the house was not completed timely, economically, or
free from defects. 4 The Finkles filed both common law negligence and
negligence per se actions.5 They claimed that Mayerchak was responsible
for their damages pursuant to chapter 489, because the building permit was
issued to him and because he allowed an unlicensed person to use his
44. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 723.
50. Id.
51. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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license.56 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Mayer-
chak on both the negligence and negligence per se claims."
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision on the negligence per se claim and held that neither section
489.119 nor 489.129 of the Florida Statutes, regulatory and penal statutes,
creates a private cause of action against Mayerchak as the individual
qualifier for a corporation acting as a general contractor.5 However, the
district court reversed the trial court's ruling on the negligence claim.5 9
Citing Gatwood, the court held that the Finkles' claim did state a cause of
action against Mayerchak for common-law negligence.60
C. MurthY v. N. Sinha Corp.
Prior to 1991, the Murthys entered into a contract with N. Sinha
Corporation, a home construction business, for improvements to their
home.6 Sinha was the president, sole stockholder, and qualifying agent
for the corporation.62 According to the terms of the contract, the corpora-
tion could not require payment before the completion of a pre-defined
phase, unless it was mutually agreed by both parties.63 When the corpora-
tion requested payment before completing work on Phase III, the Murthys
refused to pay until the corporation completed the Phase III work and
satisfied the county building code requirements.64 The corporation refused
to correct the defects and abandoned the project.65 The Dade County
Building and Zoning Department later cited and red-tagged the Murthys'
home for building code violations.66 Further, N. Sinha Corporation's
builders prematurely cut the overhang around the house and left it
uncovered for weeks knowing that the Murthys were living there.67 The
56. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id at 398.
60. Id.
61. Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.. 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
62. Id.
63. Initial Brief of Appellants at 2, Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01237).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
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house flooded repeatedly and the ceiling collapsed causing property damage
and personal injuries.6"
In May 1991, the corporation filed a claim of lien against the Murthys'
home.69 When the Murthys contested the lien, the corporation filed an
action for breach of contract and to foreclose on the mechanic's lien.7"
Thereafter, the Murthys filed an amended third party complaint against
Sinha, individually.7' The trial court granted the corporation's motion to
dismiss the third party complaint, and the Murthys appealed.72
Citing Finkle, the court held that neither section 489.119 nor 489.129,
the regulatory and penal statutes, respectively, of chapter 489 creates a
private cause of action against qualifying agents individually.73 Again
citing Finkle, and reversing the trial court, the district court held that the
Murthys did state a cause of action against the qualifying agent, individual-
ly, for common-law negligence.74 The court added that Sinha could not
be held personally liable under the construction contract because he was not
a party to the contract; the contract was between the Murthys and N. Sinha
Corporation.75
III. INTERPRETING FLORIDA STATUTES CHAPTER 489
A. Implying a Private Cause of Action
Chapter 489 makes no express provision for a qualifying agent's civil
liability.76 The threshold inquiry, therefore, concerns whether a cause of
action should be judicially implied. Whether to imply a private cause of
action from a statute is determined by legislative intent.77 Legislative
intent controls construction of statutes in Florida and that intent is deter-
mined primarily from the language of the statute.7" The plain meaning of
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308.
73. Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 308.
75. Id. at 309.
76. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991).
77. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982).
78. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982).
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the statutory language is the first consideration.79 This principle, known
as the "plain meaning rule," requires judicial determination of statutory
ambiguity as a prerequisite for judicial interpretation.8"
Conflicting interpretations of chapter 489 among the First and Third
District Courts of Appeal evidence the statute's ambiguity." In its
inconsistent and unclear interpretation of chapter 489,82 the Third District
Court of Appeal has placed itself in direct conflict with the First District
Court of Appeal.83 Resolution of the controversy depends upon an analysis
of the rationales applied in the Third and First Districts, respectively,
together with the relevant sections of chapter 489,84 and an alternative
79. Id.
80. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879,
882 (Fla. 1983).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 11-24.
82. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 309; Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
83. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see also
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J., concurring)
(failing to exercise "due care" in carrying out qualifying agent's statutorily-imposed
supervisory duty has effect of lifting protection of corporate veil and rendering qualifying
agent personally liable).
84. Florida Statutes, section 489.101 provides:
Purpose.
The Legislature recognizes that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when incompetent
or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or
services. Therefore, it is necessary in the interest of the public health, safety,
and welfare to regulate the construction industry.
FLA. STAT. § .489.101 (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.105(3) defines "contractor" as
follows:
"Contractor" means the person who is qualified for and responsible for the
entire project contracted for and means ... the person who, for compensation,
undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or by others construct, repair,
alter, remodel, add to, subtract from, or improve any building or structure,
including related improvements to real estate, for others or for resale to others
FLA. STAT. § 489.105(3) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.105(4) defines a "qualifying
agent" as follows:
"Primary qualifying agent" means a person who possesses the requisite
skill, knowledge, and experience, and has the responsibility, to supervise, direct,
manage, and control . . . construction activities on a job for which he has
obtained the building permit; and whose technical and personal qualifications
have been determined by investigation and examination as provided in this part,
as attested by the department.
FLA. STAT. § 189.105(4) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.107(l) provides in relevant
part:
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Construction Industry Licensing Board.
"To carry out the provisions of this part, there is created within the
Department of Professional Regulation the Construction Industry Licensing
Board ....
FLA. STAT. § 489.107(l) (1991). Florida Statutes, section § 489.119(2)(a) provides in
relevant part:
Business organizations; qualifying agents.
[A]pplicant[s] propos[ing] to engage in contracting as a... corporation ... or
other legal entity . . . must apply through a qualifying agent . . . . Such
application must also show that the qualifying agent is legally qualified to act
for the business organization in all matters connected with its contracting
business and that he has authority to supervise construction undertaken by such
business organization .... The registration or certification, when issued upon
application of a business organization, must be in the name of the qualifying
agent, and the name of the business organization must be noted thereon ....
FLA. STAT. § 489.11 9(2)(a) (199 1). Florida Statutes, section 489.1195(1) provides in relevant
part:
Responsibilities.
"A qualifying agent is... responsible for supervision of all operations of
the business organization; for all field work at all sites; and for financial matters,
both for the organization in general and for each specific job."
FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(1) (1991). Florida Statutes, section 489.129(1), (2) provides in
relevant part:
Disciplinary proceedings.
(1) The board may revoke, suspend, or deny the issuance or renewal of the
certificate or registration of a contractor, require financial restitution to a
consumer, impose an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000, place a contractor
on probation, require continuing education, asses costs associated with
investigation and prosecution, or reprimand or censure a contractor if the
contractor, or if the business organization for which the contractor is a primary
qualifying agent.., responsible under s. 489.1195, is found guilty of any of the
following acts:
(d) Willfully or deliberately disregarding and violating the applicable
building codes or laws of the state or of any municipalities or counties thereof.
(f) . . . When a certificateholder or registrant allows his certificate or
registration to be used by one or more business organizations without having any
active participation in the operations, such act constitutes prima facie evidence
of an intent to evade the provisions of this part.
(h) Committing mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contract-
ing that causes financial harm to a customer . ...
(in) Committing fraud or deceit or gross negligence, incompetency, or
misconduct in the practice of contracting.
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rationale not applied by any of the district courts in the context of the
certified question."
The Third District Court of Appeal, in Finkle v. Mayerchak, was the
first to hold that neither section 489.119 nor 489.129 of the Florida Statutes,
the regulatory and penal statutes governing construction contracting, creates
a private cause of action against the individual qualifier for a corporation
acting as a general contractor.86 The Finkle court relied on Fischer v.
Metcalf, looking to legislative intent rather than what it termed the "class
benefitted'" factor to determine whether the statute creates a private right of
action.87 The Finkle court found no evidence of legislative intent to create
a private remedy on behalf of individuals. 88 The Murthy court cited Finkle
without explanation to deny the plaintiffs a statutory cause of action against
the qualifying agent, 89 and to permit a common-law negligence action
against the qualifier.9" Neither court revealed its analyses of the statute,
legislative intent, or cases upon which its conclusions were based.
However, the Finkle and Murthy courts' reasoning can be reconstructed
by applying the Fischer court's rationale to Murthy. Prior to Fischer,9 the
Third District Court of Appeal applied the common-law tradition from
Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc.,92 which set forth a relatively simple test.
The test provides that, where a penal statute imposes a duty to benefit a
class of individuals, a right of action accrues to a class member injured
through breach of the duty.93 The cause of action arises by virtue of the
duty created by the statute.94
(2) If a contractor disciplined under subsection (1) is a qualifying agent
for a business organization ... the board may impose an additional administra-
tive fine not to exceed $5,000 against the business organization or any partner,
officer, director, trustee, or member if such person . . . knew or should have
known ... and failed to take reasonable corrective action.
FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1), (2) (1991).
85. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
86. See Finkle, 578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also FLA. STAT.
§§ 489.119, 489.129 (1989).
87. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
88. Id. at 398.
89. Murthy, 618 So. 2d 309.
90. Id. at 308.
91. 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
92. 168 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (adopting test originating federal
implication doctrine from Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
93. Id.; Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
94. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
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The Fischer court found the United States Supreme Court's rationale
in Cori v. Ash " compelling and adopted the Cori test while receding from
the common law tradition in Rosenberg.96 The Fischer court stated that,
in the Third District, "the 'class benefitted' factor would no longer be the
sole determinative" in implying a private right of action for violation of a
penal statute.9 7 The court set forth the United States Supreme Court
doctrine using its test to determine whether a private remedy should be
implied in a statute not expressly providing one.9" The Fischer court's
criteria focused on discerning the legislative intent behind enacting the
statute under review.99
First, the plaintiff must be one of the class for whose "especial" benefit
the statute was enacted.100 Second, a court must consider any explicit or
implicit intent to create or deny a private remedy.' Third, judicial
implication must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.' 02
The first step in applying the Fischer test to Murthy is to decide if the
plaintiff is one of the class for whose "especial" benefit the statute was
enacted.' 3 In other words, a statute that merely makes a provision to
secure the safety or welfare of the public as an entity should not be
construed as establishing civil liability. 4 However, whether the liability is
95. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). The Supreme Court's reluctance to imply civil liability
from federal statutes is partly because damage actions are normally a question of state law.
Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 853 (Or. 1981) (Linde, J., concurring).
Unlike Congress, however, state legislators know that judicial recognition of implicit tort
liability does not involve such jurisdictional questions. Id.
96. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 788.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(violating minimum building code is not negligence per se because purpose of statute is to
protect general public). The Rockercourt ignored section 553.84 of the building construction
standards statute which states: "any person ... damaged as a result of a violation of ... the
State Minimum Building Codes, has a cause of action in any court ... against the person or
party who committed the violation." FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1979); see also Byron G.
Petersen & Steven S. Goodman, Section 553.84: Remedy Without a Cause?, 17 NOVA L.
REV. I I 11, 1121 n.48 (1993) (noting that a violation of the building code translates into
failure to meet the minimum standards of proper construction, which is more like a
formulation of negligence per se than mere evidence of negligence).
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exclusively of a public character depends on the nature of the duty imposed
and the benefits to be derived from its performance. °5
The Legislature enacted chapter 489 to regulate the construction
industry "in the interest of the public health, safety and welfare.' °6  The
Legislature "recogniz[ed] that the construction and home improvement
industries may pose a danger of significant harm to the public when
incompetent or dishonest contractors provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived
products or services."'0 7 Although the stated purpose of chapter 489 uses
the broad term "public," the statute functions to protect consumers of
contractors' services: a specific class of persons.
Furthermore, the nature of the qualifying agent's duty is absolute
responsibility for the project.0 8 The qualifying agent must supervise all
operations of the business organization, the field work at all sites, and
financial matters of the corporation and each specific job."09 The charac-
ter of the qualifying agent's duty is private not public because a specific
consumer derives the primary benefits from its performance.
The statute defines a contractor as one who "undertakes to . . .con-
struct, repair, alter, remodel ... or improve any building or structure for
others or for resale to others . . . .""' The "others" for whom contractors
provide services are a distinct, specific group of consumers. Thus, the
statute was enacted for the "especial" benefit of the consumers of contrac-
tors' services. It follows that Murthy, a consumer who contracted for
services from a business organization acting as a contractor, N. Sinha
Corporation, is a member of the class for whom the statute was enacted."'
105. Frontier Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 101 N.W. 995, 996 (Neb. 1904). If the
duty imposed is clearly intended for the benefit of individuals or their property, the plaintiff
may recover; but where the duty imposed is plainly for the public at large, then an individual
acquires no new rights by virtue of the statute. Id. See generally 49 FLA. JUR. 2D Statutes
§ 223 (1984) (discussing rights of action predicated on violation of statutory duty); cf Lake
v. Ramsay, 566 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that qualifying agents
have a duty to their employers and a further duty of competence and professional
responsibility to the public).
106. FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991); see supra note 84.
107. Id
108. FLA. STAT. §§ 489.105(4), 489.1195 (1991); see supra note 84.
109. FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (1991). But see ch. 93-166, § 14, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015,
1036 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (Supp. 1992) to allow corporation to designate
"financially responsible officer," in addition to qualifying agent, responsible for all its
financial aspects).
110. FLA. STAT. § 489.105(3) (1991); see supra note 84.
111. See Mallock v. Southern Memorial Park, Inc., 561 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (implying right of action from statute based on Fischer test).
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Moreover, the Finkle court based its holding on "no evidence of...
legislative intent . . ." rather than the "class benefitted factor." '112 The
court's statement invites the reasonable inference that the plaintiff satisfied
the class benefitted factor.'" 3  Notwithstanding the court's omission, the
facts of Murthy satisfy the first requirement of the Fischer test."4
The second prong of the Fischer test requires discerning any explicit
or implicit legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy." 5 While
the statute does not expressly create a private remedy on behalf of
individuals, and the courts are under no compulsion to apply the statute, 116
the absence of an express provision for civil liability does not negate a
legislative intent that the statute will affect private rights." 7
The Finkle and Murthy courts held that there was no evidence of a
legislative intent to create a private remedy on behalf of individuals. 18
The courts did not discuss their reasoning or whether the referenced lack of
intent was explicit or implicit. Nor did they address legislative intent to
deny a private remedy on behalf of individuals. The ensuing analysis
applies rules of statutory construction to determine a legislative intent to
either create or deny a private remedy against individual qualifiers.19
First, penal statutes and highly regulatory laws are usually subject to
strict construction in favor of the violator, and should not be extended by
112. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
113. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788. The court did not specify whether the statute must
meet all three criteria to justify judicially implying a private right of action. The inference
assumes the Finkle court applied the criteria conjunctively. Id. at 792 (Baskin, J., dissenting)
(explaining that Cort directs the court to consider all relevant factors).
114. But see id. at 790 (legislating a private right of action to include so many, by
implication only, strained the court's credulity).
115. Id. at 788.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286(d) (1964).
117. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983) (holding
that an injured party should have an action where a statute gives a right, even though it has
not expressly given a remedy); see supra note 32; Girard Trust Co. v. Tampashores Dev. Co.,
117 So. 786, 787 (Fla. 1928); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv.
395, 401-06 (1950) (effecting purpose of statute justifies implementing it beyond its text).
118. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 398; Murthy v. N. Sinha. Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 309 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
119. Fleischman v. Department of Prof. Reg., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (instructing that "[e]very statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed
to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship
between its parts.").
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interpretation. 20  A penal statute commands or prohibits acts imposing
penalties for their violations in order to enforce obedience to the law and
punish its violation.' 2 ' However, the penal character of a statute will not
prevent imposition of civil liability. 22 Moreover, the rule of strict con-
struction does not apply to those portions of a statute that are not penal.'23
Chapter 489 is penal in nature because it imposes penalties such as
fines and license revocation for most violations.124  Section 489.127
classifies a violation of subsection (1) a misdemeanor punishable according
to a cross-referenced criminal statute.1
25
However, the sections of chapter 489 within the scope of the certified
question involve the qualifying agent's positive duty to competently
supervise construction projects. 12 Moreover, section 489.129 subsection
(1) authorizes the licensing board to require the qualifying agent to pay
financial restitution to a consumer for violations under that subsection. 27
The remedial nature of this part of the statute disciplining the qualifying
agent removes it from a strictly penal category. 12  Thus, courts may
liberally interpret the statute because the rule of strict construction does not
apply here. 1
29
120. Federgo Discount Ctr. v. Department of Prof. Reg., 452 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 788; Dotty v. State, 197 So. 2d 315, 318
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
121. Dotty, 197 So. 2d at 318.
122. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975); Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So.
2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club,
Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1369 n.3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
123. Lee v. Walgreen Drugstores Co., 10 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. 1942).
124. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.127, 489.129, 489.132 (1991) (enumerating prohibitions,
penalties, and disciplinary proceedings of licensed and unlicensed principals); see also supra
note 84.
125. FLA. STAT. § 489.127 (1991) (referencing FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082-775.083 (1991),
for criminal penalties and fines).
126. Id. §§ 489.1195,489.129; accordViking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 770 P.2d 732, 735
n.4 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (explaining that Contractors' State Licensing Law is nonpenal in
nature because its purpose is to protect consumers not punish individuals). The court added
that the statute's nonpenal nature allows a broader 'interpretation. Id.
127. FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (1991); Boneski v. Department of Prof. Reg., 562 So. 2d
441, 443 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating the 1988 amendment authorizing DPR to
order financial restitution to a consumer may not be applied retroactively).
128. Collins v. Kidd, 38 F. Supp. 634, 637 (E.D. Tex. 1941) (holding that a statute
containing both penal and remedial parts should be considered penal when it is sought to
enforce the penalty, and remedial when it is sought to enforce the remedy).
129. Maloney, 770 P.2d at 735 n.4; see supra note 126.
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Second, the courts may not supply an omission that to all appearances
was not in the minds of the legislators when the law was enacted. 3 ' To
imply a private remedy here, the court may supply the omission because the
express statutory language reveals the legislators contemplated a civil action
and inserted a provision that justifies implication.' 3' Specifically, section
489.129(1)(m) provides a penalty for "[c]ommitting fraud . . . deceit ...
gross negligence, incompetency, or misconduct in the practice of contract-
ing."' 3 2 Notwithstanding the language in section 489.129 subsection (1),
authorizing financial restitution to a consumer, chapter 489 contains no
language explicitly creating or denying a private remedy.'33 While the
restitution clause may provide a remedy to a consumer, it does not qualify
as a private right of action because it is available only upon the DPR's
prosecution of the contractor or qualifying agent.'34
While the Legislature intended to protect the class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member, it has not manifested an intention to achieve this
protection by imposing a private right of action against qualifying agents.
130. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Motor & Compressor Co., 446 So. 2d 224, 226
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
131. Telephone interview with Wellington H. Meffert, Chief Construction Attorney,
Department of Professional Regulation, (Aug. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Meffert Interview]. Mr.
Meffert, a former contractor, and prosecutor for the DPR, was the primary drafter of the 1993
amendments to chapter 489. He contributed to the 1991 and 1992 revisions as well. Mr.
Meffert said the drafters contemplated a civil suit against qualifying agents and they
envisioned that section 489.129(l)(m) would support judicial implication; however, he will
"wait and see what the Florida Supreme Court decides, to find out [what they really
intended]." Id. See generally Robert M. Rhodes & Susan Seereiter, The Search for Intent:
Aids to Statutory Construction in Florida--- An Update, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 508-09
(1985) (noting that postenactment statements are disfavored as indicia of legislative intent).
But see Ostemdorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 545 (Fla. 1982) (admitting a legislator's
affidavit as an expression of legislative intent).
132. FLA. STAT. § 489.129(l)(m) (1991); see supra note 84. In 1992, the Legislature
subdivided the provision into three parts:
(m) Committiig fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting.
(n) Being found guilty of incompetency or misconduct in the practice of
contracting.
(o) Being found guilty of gross negligence, repeated negligence, or negligence
resulting in a significant danger to life or property.
FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (Supp. 1992). In 1993, the Legislature changed the wording in
subsections (n) and (o) from "[b]eing found guilty of' to "[clommitting." Ch. 93-166, § 18,
1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1043 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.129(1) (Supp. 1992)).
133. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991); see supra note 84.
134. See FLA. STAT. § 489.129(l) (1991). The "board may ... require financial
restitution to a consumer .... Id. (emphasis added).
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The only remedies involving qualifying agents that the statute provides are
disciplinary or penal proceedings.'
Admittedly, the Legislature could have conferred a private right of
action against qualifying agents who breach their statutorily-imposed duties
in the same manner as it has done in other statutes.1 3 6 In 1988, section
768.0425, formerly numbered 489.5331, was transferred from chapter 489
to chapter 768 entitled "Negligence.',3 Section 768.0425 expressly
provides civil treble damages in actions against unlicensed contractors for
injuries sustained from negligence, malfeasance, or misfeasance.
13 8
Subsequent versions of chapter 489 of the Florida Statutes, including the
1993 revisions, do not include a cross reference to the renumbered
statute. 139
Even though the statute was originally enacted as part of chapter 489,
the same legislative act, tending to support the conclusion that it is part of
a single statutory scheme, the lack of a continuing relationship indicates
otherwise. The legislators probably transferred the provision from the
contracting chapter to the negligence chapter because they intended no
private remedy against contractors within chapter 489. Because contractors
135. Id. § 489.129; see supra note 84. The qualifying agent who breaches the duty to
supervise is not subject to criminal penalty, only discipline by the CILB. FLA. STAT. §
489.129 (1991); see supra note 84. The legislators identified one remedy to benefit the
consumer directly, and according to the general statutory construction principle, expressio
unius estexclusioafterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Thayer
v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). However, it is more likely the Legislature avoided
the question because it is controversial. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789. Nevertheless, the
Restatement of Torts states:
The fact that a statute ... provides for ... the payment of a sum of money to
the injured person as a penalty [for its violation], does not in itself prevent the
imposition of tort liability through the adoption by the court of the standard of
conduct required by the legislation or regulation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 287(a) (1964).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1991) (providing private cause of action against anyone
violating minimum building codes); see also supra note 104; FLA. STAT. § 772.11 (1991)
(providing civil remedy for theft); id. § 681.11 (providing consumer remedies for violation
of motor vehicle sales warranty statutes). The preceding statutes exemplify a few, but not
all of those expressly providing private rights of action.
137. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING REGULATORY REFORM, STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT OF 1988, Section 23 at 4 (April 18, 1988)
(transferring language on damage actions by consumers against contractors to chapter 768,
Florida Statutes).
138. FLA. STAT. § 768.0425 (1991).
139. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992); ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla.
Laws 1015, 1055 (amending FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
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must be privy to a contract with a consumer under section 768.0425,14°
and qualifying agents are not usually parties to the construction contract, the
transfer indicates no deliberate legislative intent to preclude a remedy
against qualifying agents.
Third, when scrutinizing the history of legislation to determine
legislative intent, it is appropriate to consider acts passed at subsequent
sessions.'4 In addition, the courts may consider extrinsic aids to statutory
construction.142 Florida courts frequently cite committee reports to assess
legislative intent, especially staff analyses. 43
Review of the statute's history indicates the Legislature has repeatedly
amended chapter 489 since its enactment in 1979. In the most recent
revision, during the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the Legislature
substantially amended chapter 489, effective July 1993. 44 While the
drafters did not add a private right of action against qualifying agents, they
reaffirmed prior legislative intent by maintaining the qualifying agent's
absolute duty to supervise each project.145 The Legislature recognized that
consumers needed more protection from incompetent and unscrupulous
contractors. 46  Legislative intent derived from committee reports, staff
analyses, staff materials and the revised text of the 1993 amended provisions
focused on more consumer protection.141
In the 1993 amendments to chapter 489, the Legislature reformed
various elements of existing provisions and added several elements designed
140. FLA. STAT. § 768.0425 (1991). The statute states: "[flor purposes of this section
only, the term 'contractor' means any person who contracts [with a consumer] to perform
any construction .... (emphasis added).
141. Watson v. Holland, 20 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 839
(1945).
142. Rhodes & Seereiter, supra note 131, at 488.
143. Id. at 495.
144. Ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1055 (amending FLA. STAT. §§
489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
145. Id. § 14 (amending FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(l)(a) (Supp. 1992)).
146. See H.R. COMM. ON BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, FINAL BILL
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTRUCTION AND ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING OF 1993, at 3, Summary (Apr. 8, 1993)
[hereinafter H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM].
147. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 2-12; WELLINGTON H.
MEFFERT, DEP'T OF PROF. REG., SYNOPSIS OF CONSTRUCTION REFORM BILL CH. 93-166 AND
93-154, LAWS OF FLA. (1993); ch. 93-166, §§ 1-23, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1055 (amending
Fla. Stat. §§ 489.101-489.131 (Supp. 1992)).
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to protect the consumer.' The revised statute establishes a recovery fund
for homeowners to recover monies lost in dealing with a licensed contrac-
tor.'49  Although the 1993 amendments do not apply to Murthy, the
Legislature acknowledges the hardships consumers such as Murthy faced
under the 1991 and 1992 versions of the statute. 50  Prior to the 1993
revisions, there was no recourse for consumers who suffered financial
damage fi'om dealing with licensed contractors if those contractors were
insolvent, "judgment proof," or had simply disappeared.' 5' If the contrac-
tors were available, the consumer could have initiated a disciplinary process
which may have penalized the consumer.15 Alternatively, the consumer
could have filed a civil suit against the contractor.153  However, in many
cases, neither the disciplinary action nor the civil suit resulted in reimburse-
ment for the consumer's losses.'54
Concededly, the Legislature has had ample opportunity to broaden the
penalty for a qualifying agent's breach of a statutory duty by adding a
companion civil remedy. However, the unchanged nature of the penalties
148. H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3. Major consumer-oriented
changes included requiring state certification for all municipal or county building personnel,
revising and enhancing disciplinary measures, requiring all contractors to maintain a $10,000
surety bond, and establishing a Construction Industries Recovery Fund. In addition, local
jurisdictions that do not provide discipline must cease to issue local construction contractor
licenses. Id.
149. Ch. 93-166, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1050 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
489.140); H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, § 22, at 7.
150. See H.R. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3.
151. Id.
152. If a consumer allowed the statute of limitations to run on a civil suit while waiting
for the DPR to complete its investigation, and the DPR decided not to prosecute [the
contractor], the consumer loses. Meffert Interview, supra note 131. Consumers encounter
other disadvantages if they file a complaint with the DPR in lieu of a civil suit. First, the
DPR must meet a higher standard of proof (clear and convincing), than the plaintiff in a civil
action (preponderance). Hence, the consumer is more likely to prevail in a civil action.
Second, the consumer is not a party to any action the DPR takes; thus, consumers relinquish
decision-making control that they would maintain in a civil action with their own attorneys.
Id.
153. The civil suit is usually on the contract, not a statutory action. See, e.g., Smith v.
Mark Coleman Constr., Inc., 594 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Moreover,
the qualifying agent is not privy to the contract therefore unreachable via an action on the
contract. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 127 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Finkle v. Mayerchak,
578 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 722
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
154. HR. COMM. ON CONSTR. REFORM, supra note 146, at 3.
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in the face of repeated revisions may imply that, rather than a deliberate
omission, the legislators avoided the question because it was controversial
or they simply did not have a civil suit in mind.15
In summary, chapter 489 reveals no explicit legislative intent, using
intrinsic or extrinsic aids to statutory construction, to create or deny a
private right of action against qualifying agents.'56 However, the statute's
expressed purposes and penalties supply an implicit intent to support a
private remedy which overrides any implicit intent to deny one.' 57
Without question, the Legislature recognizes the need for and intends to
provide consumer protection against the risk of harm from incompetent and
unscrupulous contractors, including qualifying agents.'58 While the
Legislature's expressed intent is to provide that protection through regula-
tion, the court would further the general purpose of the statute by implying
a private right of action.
Finally, the third prong of the Fischer test requires that judicial
implication must be consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme.'59 An implied civil remedy is consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. The thrust of the legislation
indicates intent to protect consumers of contractors' services, of which
qualifying agents are a subset, and to discourage dishonest and incompetent
contractors from harming those who employ their services, whether by
criminal prosecution, CILB discipline or by civil lawsuit.
Chapter 489 satisfies each prong of the Fischer test. Therefore, its
application should not operate to "close the courthouse doors to litigants
seeking private redress" for violations of the qualifying agent's statutory
duty. 6 ° While the legislators may not have forecasted a situation in which
a contractual remedy would not apply,'6 ' they have supplied sufficient
155. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131; see also supra note 117.
156. See FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101-489.132 (1991).
157. See id.; see supra note 84.
158. FLA. STAT. § 489.101 (1991).
159. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 788 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
160. Id. at 789.
161. When a qualifying agent controls the project that results in the plaintiffs' injuries,
a contractual remedy does not apply. See A.R. Moyer, Inc., v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 399
(Fla. 1973). Currently, the qualifying agent is accountable to the contractor, who is bound
by the contract, and to the DPR which can discipline and penalize the qualifying agent. FLA.
STAT. §§ 489.127, 489.129 (1991). However, without judicial implication, the plaintiff is
without a private remedy against the responsible party, the qualifying agent. See id. But cf
Montgomery v. Chamberlain, 543 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
licensed contractor of record liable for implied warranty claims based on principles of agency
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specifications to provide a discernible frame of reference within which to
imply a private right of action against qualifying agents. Without ignoring
the plain purpose and language of the statute, the court should not be
reluctant to provide civil liability for an unlawful breach of a statutory duty
that the Legislature envisioned as necessary to protect unwary homeown-
ers162 and deter unscrupulous and incompetent contractors. 163
B. What Type of Action to Imply
In Florida, violation of a statute is either evidence of negligence or
negligence per se. 164 In a negligence per se action, the measure of the
legal duty is fixed by statute, so that the violation becomes conclusive
evidence of negligence, or negligence per se. 165  In a common-law
negligence action, the duty is determined by common-law principles.
166
In either case, failure to perform the duty, whether imposed by common law
or by statute, constitutes negligence.' 67
The issues of common-law negligence parallel the issues in the
negligence per se claim. Pleading a negligence per se claim differs from a
common-law negligence claim only in that the plaintiff must allege a
statutory violation. 61 More important, the primary difference between
them is how they are proved. Negligence per se results from the violation
of a statute; 169 thus, the jury must determine only whether the actor
law).
162. Simmons v. Owens, 363 So. 2d 142, 143 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The court
stated:
The ordinary purchaser of a home is not qualified to determine when or where
a defect exists. Yet purchaser[s] make[ I the biggest ... investment [of their]
li[vesl . . . on a limited budget . . . . The careless work of contractors,
[formerly] insulated from liability, must cease or they must accept financial
responsibility for their negligence.
Id.
163. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 793 (Baskin, J., dissenting).
164. deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973).
165. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286(d) (1964).
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1964). "[T]he care which the actor is
required to exercise to avoid being negligent . . . is that which a reasonable man in his
position, with his information and competence, would recognize as necessary to prevent the
act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another." Id. § 298.
167. deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1964).
168. 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 729 (1989).
169. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959) (stating the court
rules negligence per se, as a matter of law); Williams v. Youngblood, 152 So. 2d 530, 532
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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committed or omitted the specific act prohibited or required. 7 ° The jury
must find common-law negligence from the evidence. 7'
The Florida Supreme Court, in deJesus, stated that not all violations of
statutes are negligence per se; for some, a violation may be only evidence
of negligence.'72 Violations of statutes, other than those imposing a form
of strict liability, may be either negligence per se or evidence of negli-
gence.' 73 The court divided statutory violations into three categories: (1)
violation of a strict liability statute designed to protect a particular class of
persons who are unable to protect themselves, constituting negligence per
se; (2) violation of a statute establishing a duty to take precautions to protect
a particular class of persons from a particular injury or type of injury, also
constituting negligence per se; and, (3) violation of any other kind of statute,
constituting mere prima facie evidence of negligence.'74
For actionable negligence per se, based on a statute other than the strict
liability type, plaintiffs must first meet the statutory purpose test on the issue
of negligence.'75 Plaintiffs must prove that they are of the class the statute
was intended to protect, that they suffered injury of the type the statute was
designed to prevent, and that the Legislature intended to create a private
liability as distinguished from one of a public character.'76 Plaintiffs also
must prove a causal connection between the statutory violation and the
injury. 177 They must establish that the conduct constituting the violation
was the cause in fact and the legal or proximate cause of the injury. 178
Plaintiffs must satisfy these tests for the defendant's statutory violation to
170. Klein, 116 So. 2d at 423. If the court deems a statutory violation negligence per
se, the plaintiff will have established a conclusive presumption of duty and breach, two of
the four elements necessary for actionable negligence. Id
171. Id. (stating that the jury weighs all four elements of negligence when a statutory
violation is held to be merely evidence of negligence). Here, the plaintiff must prove all four
elements of actionable negligence: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate cause, and (4) damage.
172. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 200-01.
173. Id. at 201.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288(b) (1964); see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
177. deiesus, 281 So. 2d at 201 (holding that in a negligence per se action, plaintiff
must still prove proximate cause).
178. Id.
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amount to negligence per se or even to be considered as evidence of
negligence in a common-law action.' 79
While a qualifying agent's violation of a statutory duty falls outside the
parameters of the strict liability category, violations are within the second
type of negligence per se category 8° because, as has been demon-
strated,' 81 the statute establishes the qualifying agent's duty to take
precautions to protect a particular class of persons (consumers of the
contractor's and qualifying agent's services) from a particular type of harm
(bodily harm, financial harm, or property damage). 2  Alternatively,
violations are at least prima facie evidence of negligence.8 3 Nevertheless,
the plaintiff still must prove proximate cause and the other elements of
actionable negligence.8 4
The Finkle and Murthy courts ignored the line of cases implying a
private cause of action in negligence per se.' 85 The Finkle court referred
to the claims as negligence per se or common-law negligence theories."8 6
However, the court did not cite to any binding case law on negligence per
se. '7 Instead, the court relied on Fischer for judicial implication doctrine
and Gatwood for common-law negligence theory.' While Finkle asserts
that the statute creates no private cause of action against the qualifying
agent, the court relied on Gatwood, the only case holding otherwise.' 89
The Finkle court cites Gatwood to support an action in common-law negli-
179. Id. (holding that contributory negligence is a defense to negligence per se if
violation is not of strict liability statute); Alford v. Meyer, 201 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. Ist Dist.
App. 1967), cert. denied, 209 So. 2d 671, 671 (Fla. 1968) (stating that negligence or
negligence per se rules apply to statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules or regulations);
see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1964) (listing situations in which
a statutory violation may be excused).
180. See supra notes 169-70 and text accompanying note 174.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
182. FLA. STAT. §§ 489.101, 489.129(1)(d), (h), (m) (1991); see supra note 84. The
statute's stated purpose to protect the "public" from "incompetent or dishonest contractors
[who] provide unsafe, unstable, or short-lived products or services," functions effectively to
protect those who employ the contractor's services from personal injury, property damage,
and financial harm. See supra text accompanying notes 103-1I.
183. deJesus, 281 So. 2d at 201.
184. Id.
185. See Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
186. Finkle, 578 So. 2d at 397.
187. See id. at 397-98.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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gence.'9 ° However, Gatwood stands for the propositions that the statute
creates a private right of action against qualifying agents, and that the cause
of action for breach of the qualifying agent's statutory duty is negli-
gence.' According to Gatwood, the plaintiff must prove the construction
defects could reasonably have been avoided if the qualifying agent
performed his statutorily-imposed supervisory duty with "due care." '192
Even though Gatwood does not mention negligence per se or the Florida
Supreme Court's test set forth in deJesus, the facts of the case fit into the
second category of negligence per se.' 93 Applied to Murthy, the plaintiffs
are members of the class the statute is intended to protect (consumers of
contractors' and qualifying agents' services) and they suffered the particular
type of harm the statute was designed to prevent (bodily harm, financial
harm and property damage). 94 Additionally, in order to prevail, the
Murthys must establish that the qualifying agent's violation of the statute
proximately caused their injuries. 95
C. Guidance from Other Jurisdictions
Authority from other jurisdictions supports extending chapter 489 to
allow a private right of action against qualifying agents. For example, in
Brown v. Transcon Lines,'96 the Supreme Court of Oregon recognized a
public policy that supported a civil action for damages for wrongful
discharge by a worker discharged for applying for such benefits.' 97 The
court explained that it was not "creating" a new cause of action based upon
a statutory violation, but was holding only that the employee had an existing
common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge. 98  The court
characterized Brown as an extension of an existing common-law cause of
action, rather than a creation of a new cause of action. 99
190. Id. at 398.
191. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 721-22; see also supra notes 169-70 and text accompanying note 174.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
195. See deJesus, 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973).
196. 588 P.2d 1087 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
197. Id at 1094.
198. Id. at 1092-95.
199. Id. The court also used a violation of a statutory duty as the basis for finding
liability under an existing common-law cause of action for negligence per se. Id. See Davis
v. Billy's Con-Teena, Inc., 587 P.2d 75, 78 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (holding that violation of
statute prohibiting sale of liquor to minors is negligence per se).
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Conversely, in Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff,2°° the Supreme
Court of Oregon analyzed violations of statutory duties and when such
violations give rise to a private right of action."' The Roloff court
declined to create a private cause of action for conduct by attorneys who
violate duties imposed by the Code of Professional Responsibility. °2 The
court denied recovery for damage to the attorneys' reputations or for
attorney's fees incurred in the defense of a civil action.203 However, the
court's rationale turned on the fact that there was no underlying common-
law cause of action.204
Applied to Murthy, the Roloff and Brown analyses support a private
action arising from chapter 489 because an underlying action exists at
common law. Neither Murthy, Finkle nor Gatwood conflict as to whether
a common-law cause of action against qualifying agents exists under chapter
489.205 Each case so holds. Additionally, the circumstances surrounding
Murthy are similar to those in Brown.216 In both cases three other condi-
tions are satisfied. A civil action is: 1) consistent with the legislative
provision; 2) appropriate for promoting the statute's policy; and 3) needed
to assure its effectiveness. 7
Applying the Supreme Court of Oregon's analysis to Murthy, the
Florida Supreme Court would have to recognize a private right of action
under chapter 489. A civil remedy would promote the statute's policy and
it would be consistent with legislative intent to protect consumers from
exploitation by incompetent and unscrupulous contractors. Moreover, in the
wake of Hurricane Andrew, a civil remedy is needed to assure the statute's
effectiveness.
In Colberg v. Rellinger,2°' a case factually similar to Murthy, the
Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the plaintiffs' claim against the
qualifying agent for failing to supervise the construction work on their
residence.20 9 The court rejected the claim on the basis that the statute
200. 630 P.2d 840 (Or. 1981).
201. Id. at 842-51.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 851.
204. Id.
205. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Gatwood v. McGee,
475 So. 2d 720, 723 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
206. See Brown v. Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087, 1096 (Or. 1978).
207. See Roloff, 630 P.2d at 847.
208. 770 P.2d 346 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
209. Id. at 352.
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pertaining to the qualifier's obligations contained no language contemplating
a private cause of action for an injured party against a qualifying agent.21°
Thus, the court concluded that the Legislature intended no private right of
action against qualifying agents."' However, the court noted that the
Arizona contracting statute "may contemplate a private claim against
contractors" because the statute permits consumers to recover from the
contractors' recovery fund when they obtain a judgment against a contractor
who violates the statute.212
The Colberg analysis applied to Murthy supports the notion that a
private right of action against qualifying agents logically flows from chapter
489. The Colberg court rejects the action against qualifiers because it
assumes that statutory silence means it excludes civil recovery. 3 This
view assumes the Legislature fosters a hostile policy toward making whole
the intended beneficiaries of a statutory duty imposed for their protec-
tion.2" 4 Colberg is distinguishable from Murthy because chapter 489 does
contain language that indicates the Legislature contemplated such a private
claim.2t5 Further, the Colberg court weighs consumers' ability to recover
from the contractors' recovery fund in favor of judicially creating a private
remedy.21 6  Section 489.129 of the 1991 Florida Statutes provides a
restitutional remedy to consumers, which comports with the Colberg analysis
that the Legislature contemplated a private right of action; therefore, it
should be allowed. 7 Moreover, Florida Statutes section 489.140 creates
a Construction Industries Recovery Fund analogous to that referenced by the
Colberg court.218 Although section 489.140 was added to chapter 489 in
1993, it provides evidence that the legislators again contemplated a private
remedy. 2 9  Accordingly, applying the Colberg analysis, the Florida
Supreme Court would necessarily recognize a private right of action against
qualifying agents under chapter 489 because the statute contains both
language and remedial provisions indicating the legislators contemplated a
private action.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Colberg, 770 P.2d at 351.
214. See Roloff, 630 P.2d at 854 (Linde, J., concurring).
215. See supra text and accompanying notes 84, 127, 130-31.
216. Colberg, 770 P.2d at 352.
217. See FLA. STAT. § 489.129 (1991); see also supra notes 84, 127.
218. Seech. 93-166, § 21, 1993 Fla. Laws 1015, 1050-52 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 489.140).
219. See id.
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In Donnelly Construction Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland,22 ° the Su-
preme Court of Arizona provided an instructive analysis supporting a
negligence action against a design professional, individually, for purely
economic loss. 22' The Donnelly court held that a negligence action may
be maintained if the plaintiffs prove that the design professional owed them
a duty, that the duty was breached, and that the breach proximately caused
an injury that resulted in damages.222 The Donnelly court stated that
design professionals have a duty to use ordinary skill, care, and diligence in
rendering their professional services.223 The court further concluded that
the duty extends to those with whom the design professional is in privity as
well as to those with whom he is not.
224
The Donnelly analysis applies to qualifying agents such as Sinha,
Mayerchak, and Gatwood who, like design professionals, had a duty to use
ordinary skill, care, and diligence in rendering service to the Murthys,
Finkles, and McGees, respectively. Therefore, the Donnelly decision
supports two propositions applicable to Murthy. First, a negligence action
against individual qualifying agents under chapter 489 is appropriate and
second, the action against those not in privity precludes application of the
economic loss rule.225
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE MURTHY DECISION
If the Florida Supreme Court reverses Murthy, thus agreeing that
chapter 489 supports a private right of action against qualifying agents,
Florida residents will reap five significant benefits: (1) qualifying agents
will be more likely to comply with the statute, affording consumers more
protection; (2) consumers will have a private right of action against the
culpable party; (3) consumers will be required to meet less of a burden to
establish negligence if the court rules the statutory violation is negligence
per se; (4) consumers probably would not be limited to claims of property
damage and personal injury because the economic loss rule should not
220. 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
221. See id. at 1294; accord A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla.
1973); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906(b) (1979) (stating that
compensatory damages may include compensation for harm to property which also includes
physical impairment of anything that is the subject of ownership).
222. Donnelly, 667 P.2d at 1295.
223. Id.
224. Id.; accord Graham, 285 So. 2d at 402.
225. See infra text accompanying notes 232-38.
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apply; and finally, (5) consumers may be allowed to claim exemplary
damages.
First, if qualifying agents are subject to personal liability for violating
chapter 489, they are more likely to comply with their statutorily-imposed
duties. Qualifying agents will receive a clear signal that they will be held
accountable for their negligence. Second, consumers will have a right of
action against the culpable party. A right of action against qualifying agents
comports with the basic function of tort law; that is, to "'shift the burden of
loss from the injured plaintiff to one who is at fault ... or to one who is
better able to ... prevent its occurrence."'226  Where the qualifying agent
is also a corporate officer and stockholder of the corporate entity with whom
the consumer contracts,227 a Murthy reversal would reduce contractors'
ability to evade liability for their negligence. The statute may effectively
pierce the corporate veil that heretofore has insulated them.228
Commonly, in such cases, consumers are without a remedy even when
they prevail in a civil action on the contract. 229 The corporation may be
dissolved or bankrupt. Consequently, the corporation fails to satisfy the
judgment, and the consumer loses.230 Hence, a statutory action against the
qualifying agent, the individual responsible under chapter 489, will avail
consumers of a remedy against the culpable party.
Third, if the court rules that the statutory violation is negligence per se,
consumers will have an added advantage because they will be required to
226. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244,
1246 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for
Construction Defects: A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 935 (1989).
227. See Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 618 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 126 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Gatwood v. McGee,
475 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
228. A statutory remedy would function effectively to pierce the corporate veil when the
qualifying agent is also an officer of the corporation with whom the consumer contracts.
E.g., Mitchell v. Edge, 598 So. 2d 125, 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hall, J.,
concurring) (stating that the statute has the effect of lifting the protection of the corporate
veil, rendering the qualifying agent personally liable). Butcf Roberts' Fish Farm v. Spencer,
153 So. 2d 718, 721 (Fla. 1963) (holding that the corporate entity's purpose is to limit
liability and serve a business convenience). The Spencer court further stated that those who
do business in the corporate form have every right to rely on the rules of law that protect
them against personal liability. Id.
229. Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 127 (holding action against qualifying agent not barred
because prior judgment against contracting corporation not satisfied).
230. See id; see also supra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18
673
: Nova Law Review 18, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Ferguson
prove only two instead of the four elements of actionable negligence.231
Fourth, if the court implies a private right of action under the statute, the
economic loss rule should not apply. 32 A consumer's action on the
contract, against the corporation, may prove fruitless if the consumer's
damage is purely economic loss without an accompanying physical injury
or property damage.233 For example, if the Finkles were not afforded a
cause of action under the statute against the qualifying agent, Mayer-
chak, they would have been remediless because the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment for MPF Enterprises, on their
contract claim.235 The court reasoned that without property damage or
personal injury, the economic loss rule precluded their remedy.236
The rationale of the economic loss rule is that parties who have
bargained for the distribution of risk should not be permitted to circumvent
their bargain after loss occurs to property that was the subject of the
231. See Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. 1959); see also supra
note 169 and accompanying text.
232. Gatwood v. McGee, 475 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming
a statutory action for damages against a qualifying agent where builders constructed the home
on a bed of muck, and "unstable ground . . . caus[ed] substantial problems to [part of] ...
the home."); see also Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 126, 127 (holding that action against qualifying
agent was not barred where homeowners claimed that the builders' workmanship was inferior,
improper, unsound, and untimely completed). Contra Finkle v. MPF Enters., Inc., 618 So.
2d 307, 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming judgment for builders based on
economic loss rule where homeowners claimed their house was not completed timely,
economically, or free from defects).
233. Finkle, 618 So. 2d at 307; see also Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, 620 So. 2d
at 1248 (holding that economic loss rule applies to home purchasing); AFM Corp. v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987) (holding that for services,
there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach without personal injury
or property damage). But see Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 621 (Ind. 1976)
(rejecting the argument that injury in addition to the defective product is necessary). In
Barnes, the court reasoned that when consumers are personally injured from a defect, they
recover mainly for their economic loss. Id. The court further stated:
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs the defect and suffers
an economic loss, should he fail to recover because he did not wait until he or
some member of his family fell down the stairs and broke his neck? Does the
law penalize those who are alert and prevent injury? Should it not put those
who prevent personal injury on the same level as those who fail to anticipate it?
Id.
234. Finkle v. Mayerchak, 578 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
no statutory action allowed, but then allowed one); see supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
235. Finkle, 618 So. 2d at 307.
236. Id. (citing AFMCorp., 515 So. 2d at 181); seesupra note 232-33 and accompany-
ing text.
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bargain.237 Here, the privity requirement triggering the economic loss rule
would not be satisfied,238 because no contract exists between the individual
qualifying agent and the consumer. In fact, the tort action would not flow
from a contractual breach.239 Rather, the plaintiffs would raise a fresh
question when a qualifying agent violates the statute. The economic loss
rule would "work a mischief' here, where the culpable party is not privy to
the contract but injury to third parties is reasonably foreseeable. 240 Indeed,
qualifying agents are at fault for negligence because they are responsible for
the construction work.241 Therefore, when consumers sustain foreseeable
injuries as a result of qualifying agents' statutory violations,242 a negli-
gence action under the statute would preclude application of the economic
loss rule without contravening it.
Finally, because a statutory action against the qualifying agent would
not flow from a contractual breach, exemplary damages may be allowed
over and above actual or compensatory damages. 3 The Florida Supreme
Court noted in Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n, that plaintiffs prefer tort
remedies because they often permit recovery of greater damages.244
However, the court will allow exemplary damages only as a deterrent to
others if the plaintiff proves malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, or
outrageousness of the tort.
2 45
Alternatively, two deleterious effects may result if the court recognizes
a private right of action against qualifying agents under chapter 489. First,
237. Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Shaw, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
238. See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181; A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397,
399 (Fla. 1973) (approving recovery for economic losses without personal injury or property
damage because plaintiff was not beneficiary of underlying contract). The Graham court
explained that "[p]rivity is a theoretical device ... that recognizes limitation of liability
commensurate with compensation for contractual acceptance of risk." Id. Moreover, "[sluch
liability cannot be reasonably anticipated ... when there is no privity between the parties.
... Id. at 403 (Dekle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
239. See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
240. See id.; FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.6, at 404 n.3 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining that the economic harm likely to result from negligence is finite and easily
predictable in some cases).
241. See FLA. STAT. § 489.1195(1) (1991).
242. See Murthy, 618 So. 2d at 308; Mitchell, 598 So. 2d at 127; Finkle, 578 So. 2d at
397; Gatwood, 475 So. 2d at 722.
243. Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So. 2d 678, 680 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
244. 620 So. 2d at 1245.
245. Rosenberg, 168 So. 2d at 680.
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the cost of litigation may propel consumer prices upward. Qualifiers may
be unwilling to risk incurring personal liability and may become scarce. In
turn, corporate contractors who remain in the market may have to purchase
additional insurance coverage to indemnify their qualifying agents, or the
qualifiers themselves may necessarily incur the expense. Consequently, the
pace of development would probably decelerate because construction costs
would accelerate; thus, consumers may bear the cost of higher priced homes.
Second, an implied private remedy under the statute would add to the
Florida courts' "ever-greater burden" of litigation.246 Notably, the Fischer
court adopted the more restrictive federal implication doctrine from Cort v.
Ash, rather than that which was controlling in Florida under deJesus or
Smith, when it confronted the issue of creating a private right of action
under a statute.247 The court adopted the more restrictive doctrine to
manage the burden of discerning legislative intent from increasingly
complex legislation and to contain the growing volume of litigation.248
In striking a balance between the positive and potentially negative
effects of creating a private remedy, the scales tip to ensure the intended
beneficiaries of the legislation, the consumers, the full measure of protection
their needs may warrant.249
V. CONCLUSION
We live in a society which values every person's right to pursue a
grievance in court.2  Our jurisprudence rests on the principle that absent
compelling, countervailing public policies, a remedy exists for every
wrong.25" ' Chapter 489 clearly imposes a duty upon qualifying agents to
perform their statutory obligations with due care. 2  Therefore, the statute
confers by implication every particular power necessary to insure the
performance of that duty; 253 viz. the power to pursue a private right of
246. Fischer v. Metcalf, 543 So. 2d 785, 789 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en banc).
247. Id. at 789 (adopting doctrine from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
248. See id at 788-89.
249. See id. at 789.
250. Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 851 (Or. 1981).
251. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Holland ex. rel. Williams v. Mayes, 19 So. 2d 709, 710
(Fla. 1944); Casa Clara Condominium, 620 So. 2d at 1248 (Barkett, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
252. See FLA. STAT. § 489.1195 (1991); see also supra note 84.
253. Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983).
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action in a court of competent jurisdiction. 254  Although the Legislature
did not explicitly provide for a civil action, that is not determinative.255
Moreover, the Legislature has explicitly recognized consumer hardship at the
hands of incompetent and dishonest contractors. 56 In fact, the Florida
lawmakers have systematically manifested their intent to provide more
consumer protection each time they revised the statute, most notably with
the victims of Hurricane Andrew in mind, in the 1993 amendments. 57 In
the face of legislative faltering or uncertainty, the court should not relinquish
its task of judicial implication.258 To do so the court would sacrifice a
balance.
Mindful of the pitfalls of loose legislative drafting, Justice Frankfurter
once told a story in which one legislator said to his colleagues, "I admit this
new bill is too complicated to understand. We'll just have to pass it to find
out what it means." '259 Similarly, when the Florida Supreme Court decides
Murthy and answers the certified question, so too will the Florida legislators
know what chapter 489 means.
2 60
Gail E. Ferguson
254. See id at 184 n.I. Contra Wilson C. Barnes & Larry R. Leiby, The Role of the
Qualifying Agent in a Corporate Structure, 45 (1993) (available at Florida International
University, Dep't of Constr. Mgmt.) (recommending that Legislature add language stating no
private right of action is created by failure to perform statutory duties under chapter 489).
255. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; accord Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 806 P.2d 59, 62 (N.M.
1991) (determining legislative intent requires looking not only to the language of the statute,
but also to the object sought to be accomplished and the wrong to be remedied).
256. See supra text and accompanying notes 147-54.
257. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131. George Stuart assumed responsibility for
the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, formerly called the Department of
Professional Regulation, in January 1991. According to Mr. Meffert, Secretary Stuart
undertook a mission to reorient the Department from a "peer group regulatory agency" to a
"consumer regulatory agency." The consumer-focused changes to chapter 489 reflect the new
mission. In fact, Hurricane Andrew was a "catalyst" for those changes. Id.
258. See Fischer, 543 So. 2d at 789.
259. Rhodes & Seereiter, supra note 131, at 514 (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 545 (1947)).
260. See Meffert Interview, supra note 131.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, there were 5906 accidents involving motorcycles in Florida,
ninety percent of which involved bodily injury.' During 1992, in Broward
County alone, there were 538 motorcycle accidents, eleven resulting in
fatalities and 485 resulting in injury.2 Comparatively, there was a sixty-five
percent injury rate for private passenger automobile accidents over the same
period in Broward County.' Moreover, injuries in motorcycle accidents are
1. Letter from Skip Hood, Management Review Specialist, State of Florida Department
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, to Denise Tamir, Student Writer, Nova Law Review
(May 26, 1993) (on file with this writer).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see infra Appendix A.
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more severe than those sustained in private passenger automobiles.' A
motorcyclist is not surrounded by the protective structure of an automobile
when a collision occurs.' The motorcycle's first impact with the other
vehicle will send the rider hurling through the air to make a second and
devastating impact with the ground or surrounding structure.' Therefore,
motorcyclists not only die more often,7 but are also injured more often and
more severely than motorists in automobiles.8  This combination has
prompted much litigation to define these vehicles and the insurance coverage
available to their victims.
The Florida District Courts of Appeal, once again, disagree on such a
coverage question. There is now a conflict between the Third and Fourth
District Courts of Appeal9 regarding whether or not a motorcycle is a motor
vehicle under the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion in uninsured motorist
coverage ("UM").' ° This conflict, which has emerged with the recent deci-
sions of Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." and Grant v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2 will soon force the Florida Supreme Court
to re-examine its "polestar"' 3 opinion regarding uninsured motorist cover-
age,'4 and change the way Florida courts define an insured.' 5
The purpose of this comment is to provide a guide for the attorney
faced with the confusing task of defining a motor vehicle under Florida
4. See Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Motorcycle Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1990, at
3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See infra Appendix B.
8. For every motorcyclist killed, there are approximately 90 others injured severely
enough to require medical care. Frederick P. Rivara, M.D., The Public Cost of Motorcycle
Trauma, 260 JAMA 221 (1988) [hereinafter Motorcycle Trauma].
9. The Fifth District has also rendered a decision regarding this issue. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hatcher, 592 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam)
(affirming summary judgment rendered in favor of the insured).
10. Uninsured motorist coverage is "[pirotection afforded an insured by first party
insurance against bodily injury inflicted by an uninsured motorist, after the liability of the
uninsured motorist for the injury has been established." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1532
(6th ed. 1990).
11. 615 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).
12. 620 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
13. See Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So. 2d 408, 411 (Fla. 1990) (coining the
adjective).
14. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
15. On May 13, 1993, State Farm filed a petition for discretionary review based on the
conflict that now exists. Petitioner's Brief, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Peterson, 615
So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (No. 81,740), reviewgranted, 623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993).
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insurance law. The comment will discuss UM and the history of the owned-
uninsured vehicle exclusion in Florida. The comment will then review the
key cases defining motorcycles and "motor vehicles" 6 in other areas of
insurance and will demonstrate that under Florida's insurance law, "motor
vehicle" has no plain meaning. The comment will conclude with an
analysis of the courts' reasoning in Grant and Petersen and will propose a
direction tbr the courts and the Florida Legislature.
II. THE COVERAGE CONFLICT
A. Petersen v. State Farm
On February 22, 1991, Robert Petersen was severely injured when his
uninsured 1986 Yamaha motorcycle collided with an uninsured motorist. 7
When the accident occurred, Petersen also owned a 1988 Ford truck which
was insured by State Farm Fire & Casualty Company ("State Farm").' 8
The policy provided coverage for "damages for bodily injury an insured is
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor
vehicle."' 9 It also contained the following exclusion:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
FOR BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED WHILE OCCUPYING A
MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY
RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE
UNDER THIS POLICY.2 °
The only definition for the term "motor vehicle" was provided in the
No-Fault section of the policy, which, in accordance with Florida's No-Fault
Law,2 ' defined a "motor vehicle" as:
[A] vehicle with four or more wheels that:
16. The survey includes mopeds, minibikes, three-wheeled vehicles, golf carts, and lawn
mowers.
17. Appellant's Initial Brief at 2, Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615 So.
2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01828).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 3. This is commonly called the "owned-uninsured motor vehicle exclusion."
See IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 32.02 (revised ed. 1993).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-627.7405 (1991).
1993]
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1. is self propelled and is of a type;
a. designed for, and
b. required to be licensed for use on Florida highways; or
2. is a trailer or semitrailer designed for use with a
vehicle described in 1 above.22
Petersen asserted that because the State Farm policy defined a motor
vehicle as one with four or more wheels, his motorcycle was not a motor
vehicle under the terms of the policy. 23 The motorcycle, therefore, could
not be excluded from coverage under the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion
and the uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy covered him for
his injuries .2  In the alternative, Petersen argued that the term "motor
vehicle" was ambiguous, 25 and the ambiguity must be construed in favor
of the insured.26
Conversely, State Farm asserted that the definition of the term "motor
vehicle" under the No-Fault provision was not applicable to the uninsured
motorist provision.2 7 Absent any applicable definition for UM, the term
"motor vehicle" must be given its plain meaning which, State Farm asserted,
includes motorcycles.28
On March 2, 1993, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
summary judgment which had been rendered in favor of State Farm.29 The
court held that the term "motor vehicle," as used in the policy, was
ambiguous and the policy was, therefore, construed against the insurer.3 °
22. Appellant's Initial Brief at 4, Petersen (No. 92-01828).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 6. In demonstrating the ambiguity, appellant cited to several Florida Statutes
sections which define "motor vehicle." See FLA. STAT. § 627.041(8) (1991) (insurance rates
and rating); FLA. STAT. § 316.209(1) (1991)(traffic control); FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1991)
(No-Fault law).
26. Appellant's Initial Brief at 6, Petersen(No. 92-01828) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1986)).
27. Appellee's Brief at 10, Petersen v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615 So. 2d 181
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 92-01828).
28. Id.
29. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
30. Id. (citing National Auto. Ass'n v. Brumit, 98 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1957); Ceron v.
Paxton Nat'l Ins. Co., 537 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 545 So. 2d
1368 (Fla. 1989)).
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B. Grant v. State Farm
On April 7, 1993, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided a case
that was factually identical to Petersen,3' but reached the opposite result.32
In Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the Fourth District held that
a motorcycle was a motor vehicle "based upon statutory definition, public
policy, and precedent (by analogy)" and affirmed the summary judgment
rendered in favor of State Farm."
For statutory definition, the Grant court looked to the Financial
Responsibility Law, which specifies the minimum amount of insurance
required by Florida drivers. 34 By defining a motor vehicle as "[e]very self
propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be licensed for use upon
a highway . . . "" the Financial Responsibility Law's general definition
includes motorcycles.36 For public policy, the Grant court cited Standard
Marine Insurance Co. v. Allyn," which held that the Financial Responsibil-
ity Law's definition of motor vehicle was more appropriate for defining an
uninsured motor vehicle, as using the No-Fault definition would impermis-
sibly limit coverage where an insured was struck by an uninsured motorcy-
cle.3" Such limitation on coverage was considered against the public policy
of the UM statute.39
Finally, the precedent cited by the court consists of cases that were
decided when Florida's antistacking" statute included UM coverage.4
31. Both cases involved "U3" non-stacked uninsured motorist coverage issued by State
Farm. Hatcher also involved State Farm's "UY' coverage. Appellant's Initial Brief at 2,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hatcher, 592 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(No. 91-500715); see supra note 9.
32. See Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 620 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993).
33. Id. at 780.
34. Id. at 779 (citing FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991)).
35. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991)).
36. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 8-9, Grant v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 620
So. 2d 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 91-03303).
37. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779 (discussing Standard Marine Ins. Co. v. Allyn, 333 So. 2d
497 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
38. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
39. Id.
40. "Stacking" is the concept of adding or multiplying uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverage available to an injured accident victim from multiple sources. John G.
Douglass & Francis E. Telegadas, Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motor Vehicle
Coverages, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 87 (1989). For example, if an insured owns three
automobiles, each with UM limits of $10,000 per accident, he could add all three together
and recover $30,000, provided his injuries exceeded that amount and he was injured by an
19931
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Uninsured motorist coverage was eliminated from the antistacking statute in
1980.42 With the 1987 amendments43 to the UM statute allowing selec-
tive destacking," the Grant court implied that this precedent may again be
5, 45applicable "by analogy".
Although the Petersen and Grant courts effectively reach opposite
results, with Petersen finding coverage for the insured and Grant finding no
coverage under identical language of the same policy, the rationale applied
by these courts are different. Petersen relies on rules of policy construc-
tion,46 while Grant relies on the supposed public policy of the UM
statute.47 As Petersen deals with a narrow issue of policy construction, this
article will, instead, focus on Grant and demonstrate that the public policy
considered by the court is either no longer valid, or is inapplicable to these
cases. To fully understand the reasoning of the court, one must review the
history of the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion and the different ways in
which it has been handled in Florida courts.
III. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
World War 1I and the proliferation of the mass produced automobile
on America's highways prompted a need to provide compensation when this
dangerous instrumentality 48 was used negligently. 49  Although some
motorists transferred the economic risk of their negligence through the
purchase of liability insurance, many drivers neither purchased insurance nor
uninsured motorist. Florida's antistacking statute was enacted in 1976 to prohibit this
practice with UM and other insurance coverages. See FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977).
41. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779-80 (citing Indomenico v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d
1079 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.
1980)); see also FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977).
42. Ch. 80-364, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1495 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1979)).
43. Ch. 87-213, § 1, 1987 Fla. Laws 1341, 1343 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.727
(1986)).
44. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9) (1991).
45. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 780.
46. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
47. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779-80.
48. A dangerous instrumentality is "[alnything which has the inherent capacity to place
people in peril, either in itself ... or by a careless use of it ...... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 394 (6th ed. 1990).
49. See generally ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE § 1.1, at 3-4 (2d ed. 1985) (historical development of UM coverage).
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had the financial resources to compensate the victims of their careless-
ness.50  Because a significant number of injured motorists were left
uncompensated for injuries by financially irresponsible drivers, pressure
upon legislatures to require liability insurance for all drivers increased.5
This pressure led to two significant developments in motor vehicle tort law:
financial responsibility statutes and UM coverage.52
Uninsured motorist coverage is now required in forty nine states,
53
and was first required in Florida in 1961. 5' Since its enactment, the UM
statute has been the subject of much litigation, interpretation, and amend-
ment.55 The landmark case interpreting UM coverage in Florida is Mullis
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,56 and no discussion of
UM may begin without a review of this Florida Supreme Court opinion.
A. Mullis v. State Farm
Interestingly, the facts of Mullis are similar to those of Grant and
Petersen. On May 25, 1967, Richard Lamar Mullis was severely injured
when he was struck by an uninsured automobile while riding his mother's
uninsured Honda motorcycle.57 His parents owned two other vehicles
which were insured by State Farm. 8 The policies defined an insured as
including "the first person named in the declarations and while residents of
his household, his spouse and the relatives of either . . . ."" The UM
sections included "owned-uninsured" exclusions similar to those in Grant
and Petersen.6° State Farm refused to arbitrate the claim, asserting that
although Richard Mullis was an insured, the motorcycle was excluded.6'
50. Id. Widiss refers to these drivers as the "financially irresponsible". Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. WiDISS, supra note 49, § 1.12, at 14. Only Michigan does not require insurers to
offer UM. Id. at 4.
54. Ch. 61-175, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 291, 292 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.0851
(1961)) (renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 627.727 in 1970).
55. The statute has been amended so many times that one judge equated the relationship
between the Florida Legislature and the UM statute to that between a fragile beach and a
hurricane, "except the annual storm season in the legislature arrives a few months earlier."
Quirk v. Anthony, 563 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
56. 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971).
57. Id. at 231.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 231.
1993l
684
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm, which was
affirmed by the district court of appeal. 62 The Florida Supreme Court re-
versed 63 and set up the foundation for analyzing UM coverage that is still
followed.64
In labeling UM the counterpart of the Financial Responsibility Law,65
the court stated that UM coverage "provides bodily injury family protection
as if, and to the extent, the uninsured motorist had been covered by a
standard automobile liability insurance policy under the Financial Responsi-
bility Law. 66 Because the Financial Responsibility Law is mandated by
statute, it cannot be narrowed by exclusions contrary to the law.67
Similarly, a carrier could not narrow UM coverage in a manner contrary to
the purpose of the UM statute which, as the court stated, was to "provide
uniform and specific insurance benefits to members of the public to cover
damages for bodily injury caused by the negligence of insolvent or
uninsured motorists and such statutorily fixed and prescribed protection is
not reducible by insurers' policy exclusions and exceptions .... ,61
The court then classified insureds into two groups: Class I insureds,
which included the named insured, the named insured's spouse, and relatives
residing in the same household; 69 and, Class II insureds, permissive users
or passengers of the insured vehicle.7° Coverage for Class II insureds was
linked to the vehicle they occupied when injured. Therefore, Class II
insureds were only covered for injury that occurred in or by the insured
vehicle.7' Class I insureds, however, were covered
[w]henever bodily injury is inflicted upon [them] ... by the negligence
of an uninsured motorist, under whatever conditions, locations, or
circumstances, any of such insureds happen to be in at the time ....
They may be pedestrians at the time of such injury, they may be riding
62. Id. at 232.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Florida Farm Bureau v. Hurtado, 587 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1991); see also
Coleman v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1988) (applying the Mullis
doctrine).
65. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233.
66. Id. at 236.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 233-34.
69. Both Peterson and Grant were named insureds on their respective policies and were,
therefore, Class I insureds. See Grant, 620 So. 2d at 778; Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 181.
70. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233.
71. Id.
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in motor vehicles of others or in public conveyances and they may
occupy motor vehicles (including Honda motorcycles) owned by but
which are not "insured automobiles" of named insured.7
Thus, the Mullis court invalidated the owned-uninsured vehicle
exclusion, and any other exclusion that attempted to "whittle away ' 7 at the
coverage mandated by the UM statute. 74 Accordingly, defining the vehicle
which a Class I insured occupied when injured was unnecessary under the
Mullis doctrine. Although similar fact patterns have arisen in the courts
since Mullis was decided, defining a motorcycle was unnecessary as long as
the exclusion was invalid, and the type of vehicle occupied by a Class I
insured did not affect coverage. The antistacking nature of this exclu-
sion, 75 however, has left it alternatively, valid and invalid, depending on
the status of stacking in Florida.
B. The Owned-Uninsured Vehicle Exclusion and Stacking
Statutory Schizophrenia
Stacking permits an automobile owner to provide UM coverage for
himself and members of his family while operating or occupying any owned
vehicle, even if only one of them has UM coverage.76 The owned-
uninsured exclusion was developed to circumvent the effects of stacking by
precluding coverage if the insured is injured in or by a vehicle which he
owned, but was not insured under the particular policy.7 7 Because of its
antistacking effect, the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion has been
considered valid or invalid by Florida's courts depending on whether or not
stacking was prohibited by statute.7"
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1968) (invalidating endorsement which precluded coverage for drivers under twenty-
five years of age)).
74. The only exception recognized by the Mullis court was that under the statute, an
insured could elect to reject the coverage altogether. Id. at 238; see also FLA. STAT. §
627.727(1) (1991).
75. See SCHERMER, supra note 20, § 31.02.
76. Id. § 32.02; see also supra note 40.
77. SCHERMER, supra note 20, § 32.02.
78. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1986). The
supreme court's opinion in Pohlman clarified the relationship between the owned-uninsured
vehicle exclusion and the antistacking statute. In Pohlman, the insured purchased a policy
covering two vehicles on March 1, 1979, when the antistacking statute was in effect. Id. at
419. On February 27, 1981, after UM was removed from the antistacking statute, the insured
Tamir
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Stacking of UM coverage was permitted in Florida until 1976, when
Florida's Legislature enacted the antistacking statute. 79  Because the
Legislature targeted UM in response to case law which allowed stacking,8"
it effectively repealed the statute in 1980 when it removed UM from the
antistacking statute.81 In 1987, the Legislature compromised by giving
insureds the opportunity to select non-stacked policies if they so chose.82
Under the 1987 amendment, insurers may now offer policies with exclusions
preventing stacking of coverage, including the owned-uninsured vehicle
exclusion. 3
added an additional vehicle. Id. After the insured was injured while riding a motorcycle
which he owned but did not insure with Firemen's Fund, the court held that the insured could
recover under the coverage added in 1981, despite an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion.
Id. at 421. The insured could not, however, stack the coverage for the two vehicles insured
in 1979. Id.; see also Hausler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (where policy was purchased one month before the antistacking statute
was signed into law, insured was entitled to coverage under prior case law despite owned-
uninsured vehicle exclusion).
79. Florida Statutes section 627.4132 in its entirety provided:
If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle
insurance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or
any other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured
is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in
the accident. However, if none of the insured's or named insured's vehicles is
involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on
any one of the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other
vehicles shall not be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall
not apply to reduce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies
insuring different named insureds.
FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1977) (emphasis added); see also supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
80. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 829 (1987) Staff Analysis 1 (April 27, 1987)
(on file with this writer).
81. Id. The statute, in pertinent part, currently reads:
This section does not apply:
1. To uninsured motorist coverage which is separately governed by §
627.727.
2. To reduce the coverage available by reasons of insur-
ance policies insuring different named insureds.
FLA. STAT. § 627.4132(1) (1991).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9) (1991). In exchange for the lower exposure, insurers
must roll back premiums to the insured by 20% on all destacked policies. Id.
83. Id. Florida Statutes section 627.727(9) states:
Insurers may offer policies of uninsured motorist coverage containing
policy provisions, in language approved by the department, establishing that if
the insured accepts this offer: ....
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The case law relating to the owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion
likewise alternates between finding the exclusion valid or invalid depending
upon the version of the statute applicable when the case accrued.84
Accordingly, the case law relating to this exclusion and stacking can be
categorized chronologically: cases accruing before 1976, which find the
exclusion invalid and hold that the Class I insured can recover; 5 cases
accruing between 1976 and 1980, which find the exclusion valid under the
antistacking statute and hold that the Class I insured cannot recover;86 cases
accruing between 1980 and 1987, which reinstate Mullis as precedent and,
again, find the exclusion invalid; and cases accruing after 1987, whose
findings and holdings have mixed results.8
The reason for mixed results in cases under the current statute is that
there are now two types of policies in the insurance market, stacked and
nonstacked.8 9 The Grant court asserted that prior case law from the
(d) The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy does not
apply to the named insured or family members residing in his household who
are injured while occupying any vehicle owned by such insureds for which
uninsured motorist coverage was not purchased.
Id.
84. See Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Pohlman 485 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1986); New
Hampshire Ins. Group v. Harbach, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983); Mullis v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Peterson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 615
So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 609 So.
2d 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Beem, 469 So.
2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 437 So.
2d 195 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), reviewdenied, 447 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1984); Progressive
Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 428 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Indomenico v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wimpee, 376 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.
2d 762 (Fla. 1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn, 374 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Hausler v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); McDonald v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Johnson v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
85. See, e.g., Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 238; Hausler, 374 So. 2d at 1038; McDonald, 373
So. 2d at 95; Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 289 So. 2d at 750.
86. See Harbach, 439 So. 2d at 1386; Reynolds, 437 So. 2d at 196 (case accruing in
1979); Indomenico, 388 So. 2d at 30-31; Wimpee, 376 So. 2d at 21; Kuhn, 374 So. 2d at
1081.
87. See Beem, 469 So. 2d at 140; accord Glenn, 428 So. 2d at 368.
88. Compare Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1390-91 with Peterson, 615 So. 2d at 182.
89. A Florida practitioner must therefore be careful in determining which type of policy
his client carries. For example, State Farm currently offers stacked UM coverage called "U"
Tamir
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antistacking era is now applicable to nonstacked policies "by analogy,"9
in the same way the Florida Supreme Court reinstated prior case law in
Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Co. v. Hurtado.91 In Hurtado, the court
held that the amendment eliminating UM from the antistacking statute
operated to revive prior case law that permitted stacking for Class I
insureds.92 Hurtado is distinguishable, however, in that the court cited
legislative history which indicated the Legislature's intent to "revive prior
case law which permitted and determined the extent of the stacking of
uninsured motorist insurance policies."93 There is no similar language in
the legislative history of the 1987 amendment.94 It is unclear, therefore,
if the Legislature intended precedent from the antistacking era to again
control determination of UM coverage. If the supreme court adopts the
Grant court's analogy, there will be two separate bodies of case law that are
mutually exclusive but equally applicable. Stacked policies, following
Mullis, will provide UM benefits wherever the injury occurred and, because
the exclusion is invalid, defining the occupied vehicle remains irrelevant.95
Nonstacked policies, however, containing a valid exclusion in compliance
with Florida's UM statute96 will be construed under Harbach,9 7 and the
nonstacked definition of the occupied vehicle becomes an issue.
IV. MOTOR VEHICLES DEFINED
Because of these changes in the UM statute, the definition of a motor
vehicle has only recently become important again in determining UM
coverage. Although the term "uninsured motor vehicle" is defined in the
UM statute, this definition explains when a vehicle is uninsured and does
in addition to the nonstacked "UY' in dispute in Grant and Peterson.
90. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 780; see also CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMM.,
FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW § 4.38 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter
FLORIDA LAW].
91. 587 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 1991).
92. Id. at 1318.
93. Id. (citing Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 1315 (1980) Staff Analysis (June
16, 1980)).
94. See Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 829 (1987) Staff Analysis (April 27, 1987)
(on file with this writer); Staff of H.R. Comm. on Ins., HB 1029 Staff Analysis (1987) (April
20, 1987) (on file with this writer).
95. See Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1388-89.
96. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(d) (1991).
97. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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not define the vehicle itself.9" Any definition of a "motor vehicle" must,
therefore, be gleaned from cases and other statutes. 99 The two major
statutory sources for defining a motor vehicle have been the Financial
Responsibility Law, and Florida's No-Fault Law.'00 Because application
of either statutory definition will yield opposite results, they will be
discussed separately.
A. No-Fault Insurance
The term "motor vehicle" is defined in several places in Florida's stat-
utes.'' Because Florida's No-Fault law0 2 also deals with automobile
insurance, its definition has often been asserted as the controlling definition
of a motor vehicle.0 3 The No-Fault statute is also the source from which
State Farm derived its definition of "motor vehicle" for the No-Fault
provisions of its automobile policy.0 4
Creating Personal Injury Protection Benefits ("PIP"), Florida's No-Fault
statute was enacted to provide baseline coverage for an injured person's
medical expenses, lost income, death benefits, and funeral expenses without
regard to fault.0 5 Much like workers' compensation, in exchange for
recovery of basic expenses without the burden of proving fault, the injured
98. See FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3) (1991).
99. CJ. Prinzo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App.) (holding that definitions provided under the: No-Fault Act, FLA. STAT. §
627.732(1) (1983); Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT. § 316.003(2)(21) (1983); Motor Vehicle
Licensing Law, FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1) (1983); and Financial Responsibility Law, FLA.
STAT. § 324.021(1) (1983), should be read in pari materia in defining a moped) (citing State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Link, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)), review
denied, 475 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1985).
100. See Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
101. See supra notes 25, 98, 99.
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-627.7405 (1991).
103. See, e.g., Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498 (carrier asserted that the No-Fault definition
contained in the PIP provision of an automobile policy applied to defining the uninsured
motor vehicle, which was a motorcycle).
104. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
105. The purpose of the statute is to:
provide for medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits without
regard to fault, and to require motor vehicle insurance securing such benefits, for
motor vehicles required to be registered in this state and, with respect to motor
vehicle accidents, a limitation on the right to claim damages for pain, suffering,
mental anguish, and inconvenience.
FLA. STAT. § 627.731 (1991).
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loses his right to pursue a bodily injury claim in tort unless his injuries meet
a minimum threshold of severity."°6
The statute defines a "motor vehicle" as "any self-propelled vehicle
with four or more wheels which is of a type both designed and required to
be licensed for use on the highways of this state and any trailer or
semitrailer designed for use with such vehicle . *.". ." ' By definition, the
phrase "four or more wheels" under no-fault clearly excludes any two
wheeled vehicles, including motorcycles. The Legislature deliberately
excluded coverage to motorcycles because of the higher risk of severe
injuries faced by the driver or passenger of a motorcycle.' There is an
underlying belief that anyone who rides a motorcycle has assumed this
higher risk of injury."0 9 Although insurance for medical expenses result-
ing from injury are available to motorcyclists, such coverage is expensive
and not mandated by statute. 110
There are two ways in which a vehicle must be defined under PIP.
The vehicle that struck the claimant must be a motor vehicle, and the
vehicle that the claimant occupied when struck must be either a motor
vehicle or not a self propelled vehicle."' If the claimant is occupying a
motor vehicle, he need not be struck by anything at all as the claimant's
106. Id; see also FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1991).
107. FLA. STAT. § 627.732(1) (1991) (emphasis added); see also supra note 22.
108. See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 393, 394 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
("[Tintent seems to focus on the equipment's propensity for accidental injury during
operation, excluding those types of vehicles with the highest propensity for injury from
coverage such as motorcycles ...."); cf State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nicholson, 337
So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding three-wheeled police vehicle is a
motor vehicle because its physical characteristics, including safety equipment, were more
determinative than the number of wheels); see also supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
109. Unfortunately, this assumption is often shared by juries, making it more difficult
to prove fault in motorcycle accident cases. See Kelner & Kelner, supra note 4, at 3.
110. Accordingly, a motorcyclist does not have to meet the statutory injury threshold
requirement in order to pursue a claim for non-economic damages against the tortfeasor. See
Scherzer v. Beron, 455 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that a motorcyclist is
not required to meet the statutory injury threshold to maintain tort action), cause dismissed,
459 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1984); cf Santiagoherrera v. Stout, 470 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (because a bus was not a motor vehicle under the No-Fault statute, woman
injured while driving the bus did not have to meet the threshold).
1ll. In describing the coverage required, section 627.736(1) of the Florida Statutes states
that every insurance policy complying with the statute must provide PIP to "the named
insured, relatives residing in the same household, persons operating the insured motor vehicle,
passengers in such motor vehicle, and other persons struck by such motor vehicle and
suffering bodily injury while not an occupant of a selfpropelled vehicle .... FLA. STAT.
§ 627.736(l) (1991) (emphasis added).
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injury need only alight from operation, maintenance, or use of the vehi-
cle.112 At the other extreme, however, if the claimant is a pedestrian or
bicyclist, then he must be injured by a collision with a motor vehicle which,
by definition, precludes motorcycles, mopeds, minibikes and any other two
wheeled vehicle." 3  Most of the litigation comes from the gray area
between the automobile and the pedestrian, and classifying the modes of
transportation that fall in between as either motor vehicles or self propelled
vehicles.
In defining the vehicle occupied by the blaimant, the importance of the
"self propelled vehicle" distinction becomes apparent. A motorcycle, with
its high rate of speed and propensity for injury, is excluded because it is a
self propelled vehicle.114 Conversely, mini-bikes and mopeds, with a
much lower brake horsepower, are viewed as less dangerous by Florida
courts, 1 5 and are, therefore, considered bicycles and not self propelled
vehicles." ; Accordingly, under PIP, an automobile, a three wheeled
police vehicle," 7 and a golf cart"' are motor vehicles, but a motorcycle
is not.1 9 A motorcycle and lawn mower' are self propelled vehicles,
112. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1) (1991); see also Hemandez v. Protective Casualty Ins.
Co., 473 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1985) (holding PIP was recoverable for claimant who was injured
when pulled out of his car by police during an arrest for a traffic violation); Government
Employees Iris. Co. v. Novak, 453 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1984) (holding PIP was recoverable by
plaintiff's estate where plaintiff was shot in her vehicle after refusing to give the assailant a
ride).
113. See Prinzo, 465 So. 2d at 1365 (pedestrian struck by a moped could not recover
PIP or UM).
114. Cf Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (finding a golf cart is a motor
vehicle and a dangerous instrumentality).
115. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Link, 416 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. O'Kelly, 349 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1978); see also Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 860
(three wheeled police vehicle which had enclosed cabin, was steered with wheel, and could
stand upright when not ridden, was more like a motor vehicle than a self propelled vehicle
despite the "four or more" wheels requirement of the statute).
116. See Velez v. Criterion Ins. Co., 461 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1984); Prinzo, 465 So. 2d
at 1365; Link, 416 So. 2d at 876.
117. Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 862; see supra note 115.
118. Meister, 462 So. 2d at 1072.
119. Dunlap v. United States Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Scherzer,455 So. 2d at 441; Brandal v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 867
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976); Long Island Ins. Co. v.
Frank, 328 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
120. See Miller, 560 So. 2d at 393 (insured who was struck by a motor vehicle while
riding a lawn mower could not recover PIP benefits). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stone
asserts that a lawn mower is no more a self propelled vehicle than is an electric wheelchair.
1993]
692
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
but a moped is not. 2' Finally, a moped is a bicycle and not a motorcycle
or "self propelled vehicle."' 2
To illustrate, when a car hits a pedestrian, both the pedestrian and
driver recover."2 3 Likewise when a car strikes a moped. If, however, a
motorcycle or moped strikes a pedestrian, neither the pedestrian nor rider
can recover.'24 Finally, when a car strikes a motorcycle, the car driver
can recover, but the motorcyclist cannot.'25 As these examples show,
determining coverage under PIP involves a simultaneous evaluation of both
the vehicle occupied by the claimant and the vehicle that struck the claim-
ant. If a motorcycle was involved in the accident on either side, the
claimant will not recover unless the claimant was in a car.
Cases defining motorcycles in other areas of insurance further illustrate
the bias against motorcycles in Florida. Cases defining the unowned
vehicles under liability coverage,'26 for example, have produced some
results similar to the PIP cases. Although defining the insured vehicle is
easily accomplished by looking at the declarations page of the policy, this
will not define unowned vehicles driven by the named insured.'27 Florida
Id. at 395 (Stone, J., dissenting). His dissent demonstrates how far the courts may go to
preclude recovery.
121. Velez, 461 So. 2d at 1349; Prinzo, 465 So. 2d at 1365; Link, 416 So. 2d at 878.
122. See, e.g., Velez, 461 So. 2d at 1349; see also FLA. STAT. § 316.003(2) (1991).
123. The pedestrian recovers because he is not on a "self propelled vehicle" when struck
by a "motor vehicle"; the driver recovers because his injury alights from the "operation,
maintenance and use" of the motor vehicle.
124. The pedestrian can not recover because, although he is not the occupant of a self
propelled vehicle, he was not struck by a motor vehicle. The moped rider cannot recover,
because, as with the pedestrian, although he was not the occupant of a self propelled vehicle,
he was not struck by a motor vehicle. The motorcyclist cannot recover both because he was
the not the occupant of a motor vehicle, and because he was the occupant of a self propelled
vehicle.
125. The car driver recovers because his injuries alighted from operation, maintenance
and use of a motor vehicle. Although the motorcyclist was struck by a motor vehicle, the
motorcyclist cannot recover because he or she was not the driver of a motor vehicle and was
the occupant of a self propelled vehicle.
126. Automobile liability insurance, usually "provides that the insurer will pay damages
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of personal injury or property
damage to others caused by an accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use
of the ... insured motor vehicle." FLORIDA LAW, supra note 90, § 5.2. Automobile liability
insurance will also typically protect the insured as well as family residents of the insured's
household, when he or she is driving unowned vehicles. Id. § 5.8.
127. See Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pitzer, 330 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.) (where policy defined "motor vehicle" as the motor vehicle, semitrailer, or trailer
described in the policy, court held that this definition does not define automobile not
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courts have held that, absent a definition of the term "automobile" in the
policy, a motorcycle is not an automobile, and coverage for injuries caused
to others while driving an uninsured motorcycle is precluded." 8
Homeowner's insurance also contains liability coverage that indemnifies
the insured for injury caused to others on the premises, as well as medical
payments coverage which provides reimbursement of medical expenses for
injuries caused by the insured when off the insured premises. 29  To
prevent duplication of automobile insurance, homeowner's policies typically
exclude coverage for property damage and bodily injury arising from the use
of any "land motor vehicle."'30  In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Caronia,T'
the insured's minor son injured the plaintiff while driving someone else's
motorcycle. The court held that a motorcycle was a "land vehicle" under
the policy exclusion and, as a result, the injured plaintiff could not
recover.' Likewise, a three-wheeled power driven cycle, called a "Tri-
sport," was considered a land motor vehicle under the same exclusionary
language.'33 As under No-Fault, however, a moped was considered a
bicycle and not a "land motor vehicle."'34
In Loftus v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co.,'3 the insured was
killed while riding a motorcycle. In construing a policy providing coverage
for accidental injury sustained while driving or riding within an automobile,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the insured's motorcycle was
not an automobile and, thus, his spouse could not recover for his death.'36
described in the policy), cert. dismissed, 336 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1976).
128. Heritage Ins. Co. of Am. v. Canter, 342 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Pitzer, 330 So. 2d at 499.
129. 3 WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,
Appendix K at 442 (6th ed. 1990); see also TORT AND INSURANCE SECTION, PROPERTY
INSURANCE LAW COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNOTATIONS TO THE HOMEOWN-
ERS POLICY 18 (2d ed. 1990) (reproduction of Insurance Services Office (ISO) and State
Farm Homeowner's policies with annotations).
130. FREEDMAN, supra note 129, at Appendix K.
131. 395 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
132. Id. at 1223.
133. Johnson v. Unigard Ins. Co., 387 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
134. See Ortiz v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 475 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 482
So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1985).
135. 314 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 33 (Fla.
1976).
136. Id. at 161; cf Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 197.5) (police motorcycle excluded as emergency vehicle under accidental death and
dismemberment provision).
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Generalizations emerge when viewing these cases together. First, if a
motorcycle has anything to do with causing the injury, the claimant will
usually not recover.'37 Second, courts define vehicles based upon their
propensity to cause injury, rather than strictly by statutory or policy
construction. 3 ' Finally, the vehicle the claimant was occupying when
injured is critical in determining coverage. 39
The exception, however, has been the UM statute, under which, as a
matter of public policy, the insured could purchase coverage for himself and
his family regardless of the type of vehicle driven, or its propensity for
injury."4  Because the occupied vehicle distinction typical of No-Fault
was contrary to this public policy, the PIP definition was not applied to UM
coverage. 4'
Although the public policy in determining UM has historically been to
provide coverage for the insured wherever or whenever an accident
occurs, 4 2 the 1987 statutory amendment allowing nonstacked policies'43
has changed this principle.144 In nonstacked policies provided by the amend-
ment, the vehicle occupied by the insured becomes the critical determinant
of coverage much as it does under the No-Fault law.'45 The No-Fault
definition of a motor vehicle may, therefore, be more applicable to UM, at
least to nonstacked policies, than it has in the past. Thus, while the Grant
court asserts that the policy definition, which is patterned after the No-Fault
statute, is inapposite, the underlying rationale for the inapplicability may not
be valid in construing nonstacked policies.'46
137. See, e.g., Dunlap, 470 So. 2d at 99-100 (precluding recovery for plaintiff because
he was originally riding a motorcycle, even though he was thrown off and into the roadway
by a truck collision and was later injured when run over by a taxi).
138. See Nicholson, 337 So. 2d at 862; Miller, 560 So. 2d at 393; see also supra note
108.
139. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 72.
141. See, e.g., Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
142. E.g., Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 233; Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
143. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
145. Section 627.727(9)(b) of the Florida Statutes states, "[i]f at the time of the accident
the injured person is occupying a motor vehicle, the uninsured motorist coverage available
to him is the coverage available as to that motor vehicle." FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(b)
(1991) (emphasis added).
146. Both Petersen and Grant had purchased nonstacked policies.
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B. Grant and the Financial Responsibility Equation
The Grant court held that public policy requires application of the
Financial Responsibility Law definition of motor vehicle.'47 This public
policy is rooted in the reciprocal relationship between the Financial
Responsibility Law and the UM statute, and their intertwined histories.'48
Financial responsibility laws attempt to induce drivers to procure
liability insurance to cover injury their negligence causes to others.'49
Florida's Financial Responsibility Law' 50 was enacted in 1955 to promote
"safety, and provide financial security by such owners and operators whose
responsibility it is to recompense others for injury to person or property
caused by the operation of a motor vehicle . . . ,, "' Both UM insurance
and the Financial Responsibility Law, therefore, were created as solutions
to the same problem: The financially irresponsible driver, with Financial
Responsibility Laws inducing third party coverage, and UM insurance
offering first party coverage for the same risk. 52  This relationship was
recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Mullis, when the court called
UM the "reciprocal or mutual equivalent of automobile liability coverage
prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Law."'
147. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
149. WIDISS, supra note 49, § 1.1, at 2-7. Unfortunately, most such statutes do not
require proof of financial responsibility until the driver has had one accident. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1991).
151. Ch. 29963, § 1, Laws of Fla. (1955) (codified at FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1956)).
Although Personal Injury Protection coverage has been required throughout the
registration period since the No-Fault statute was enacted in 1971, property damage liability
was added to the required coverage in the motor vehicle insurance reform act of 1988.
Robert Henderson & Patrick F. Maroney, Motor Vehicle Insurance Reform: Revisiting the
Uninsured Driver, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 790 (1988). Bodily injury liability coverage,
however, is still only required under the Financial Responsibility Law, and only after the first
accident as Florida Statutes section 324.011 states:
[T]he operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident or convicted of certain
traffic offenses meeting the operative provisions of s. 324.051(2) shall respond
for such damages and show proof of financial ability to respond for damages in
future accidents as a requisite to his future exercise of such privileges.
FLA. STAT. § 324.011 (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, in Florida, only the vehicles are
protected for liability from the time of registration. Injured persons are still only guaranteed
the minimum coverage afforded under PIP.
For an overview of the history and development of Florida's Financial Responsibility
Law see, FLORIDA LAW, supra note 90, §§ 1.5-1.8.
152. WIDNESS, supra note 49, § 1.1, at 4.
153. Mullis, 252 So. 2d at 237-38; see supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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Florida's Financial Responsibility Law defines a motor vehicle as
[e]very self-propelled vehicle which is designed and required to be li-
censed for use upon a highway, including trailers and semitrailers de-
signed for use with such vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers,
farm tractors, power shovels, and well drillers, and every vehicle which
is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires but not
operated upon rails, but not including any bicycle or moped.1 54
The distinction between the PIP statute and Financial Responsibility
statute is readily apparent; PIP treats self-propelled vehicles separately,
whereas the Financial Responsibility Law incorporates self-propelled
vehicles into the definition of a motor vehicle. Thus, absent the four or
more wheels requirement of PIP, the two statutes are mutually exclusive in
their handling of motorcycles. If the PIP definition is used, motorcycles are
excluded. Conversely, when the Financial Responsibility statute is used,
motor vehicles include motorcycles.155
The courts have shown a preference for using the broader Financial
Responsibility Law definition to include motorcycles under UM cover-
age.'56 Relying on Standard Marine Insurance Co. v. Allyn, the Grant
court, likewise, applied the Financial Responsibility Law's definition. 157
In Allyn, the insured was a pedestrian who was severely injured when struck
by an uninsured motorcycle. 158  He filed a claim under his automobile
policy, which provided that the carrier would "pay all sums which the
insured or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile .. .,.
In defining an uninsured motor vehicle, the court stated:
We do not perceive that the legislature, by enacting the Florida
Automobile Reparations Reform Act, intended to exclude those motor
154. FLA. STAT. § 324.021(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
155. The inverse relationship between a policy provision and exclusion should be noted.
When the definition is applied to a coverage provision, the broader the definition, the more
coverage available. Conversely, as in Grant and Petersen, applying the definition to an
exclusion, the broader the definition the less coverage available.
156. See Carguillo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Becraft, 501 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Allyn,
333 So. 2d at 497.
157. Grant, 620 So. 2d at 779.
158. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 497.
159. Id. at 498. The term "uninsured automobile" was later changed to "uninsured
motor vehicle" by amendment. Id.
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vehicles enumerated above from the umbrella of uninsured motorists.
The statutory definition of a "motor vehicle" found in the Financial
Responsibility Act is far more consonant with the public policy of this
state as to uninsured motorist ....
The public policy described by the court was to provide the insured
recovery under his own policy for the same damages he would have been
entitled to recover had the tortfeasor maintained liability insurance. 161 The
court, therefore, held that the tortfeasor's uninsured motorcycle, which
struck the insured pedestrian, was an uninsured motor vehicle and the
insured could recover under his own UM coverage. 162  This logic was
clarified further by the supreme court in Carguillo v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 1
63
As in Allyn, the Carguillo court was defining the tortfeasor's uninsured
vehicle. The insured was injured when struck by a motorcycle designed
mainly for off road use.' 64 The court reasoned that because the definition
of motor vehicle in the Financial Responsibility Law excluded vehicles
designed mainly for off road use, the tortfeasor would not have been
required to maintain liability coverage for his vehicle.'65 Because the
exclusion in the policy did not reduce the insured's coverage to a level
below that which was required by the Financial Responsibility Law, the
court upheld the exclusion and denied recovery to the insured.'66
160. Id. at 499 (emphasis added).
161. Id, (citing Davis v. United Fidelity & Guar. of Baltimore, Md., 172 So. 2d 485
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
162. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498.
163. 529 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988).
164. Id. at 277.
165. Id. at 278 (citing Becraft, 501 So. 2d at 1316).
166. Id. Another doctrine for determining UM coverage bears discussion at this point.
Florida courts have interpreted this portion of the Mullis case to mean that UM coverage for
the injured party is based on whether or not the liability coverage of that particular policy
would cover him if he were the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Valiant Ins. Co. v. Webster, 567 So.
2d 408, 410 (Fla. 1990) (holding that the insured could not recover for the wrongful death
of his son, who was no longer a member of father's household, because son was not an
insured contemplated by Financial Responsibility Law, and because father sustained no bodily
injury as specified under the Financial Responsibility Law's minimum coverage requirement);
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Queen, 468 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (where
liability portion of the policy provided coverage for the daughter, who was a resident relative
of the insured, the UM section containing an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion could not
preclude her recovery); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Bennet, 466 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); France v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
1993]
698
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/1
Nova Law Review
(where definition of relative under liability portion of the policy excluded relatives who
owned their own automobile, daughter, who was injured while driving her own uninsured
auto, was not an insured under the liability provision and could not recover UM).
This "liability analysis" took on an additional wrinkle, however, when the supreme
court restated the Mullis doctrine:
[S]ince our decision in Mullis, the courts have consistently followed the principle
that if the liability portions of an insurance policy would be applicable to a
particular accident, the uninsured motorist provisions would likewise be
applicable; whereas, if the liability provisions did not apply to a given accident,
the uninsured motorist provisions of that policy would also not apply (except
with respect to occupants of the insured automobile).
Webster, 567 So. 2d at 410 (emphasis added).
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Shaw clarified the problem.
[AIII of these cases apply an analysis that focuses exclusively on the injured
individual rather than the accident; they rule simply and clearly that UM cover-
age is unavailable if liability coverage is inapplicable to a particular individual.
The majority, unsupported by case law, broadens the exclusion from the
'individual' to the 'accident' ....
Id. at 412 (Shaw, J., dissenting opinion).
The distinction between "individual" and "accident" has served to broaden the
exclusion, and thus narrow coverage. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 609 So.
2d 1385 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Phillips, the insured's husband was injured while
riding his owned, uninsured motorcycle. Id at 1386. Nationwide asserted that the supreme
court overruled Mullis, sub silentio, by shifting the focus of the analysis from the individual
to the accident. Id. at 1387. The Nationwide policy provided liability coverage for "your
[the insured's] auto." "[Y]our auto" was defined as "the vehicle or vehicles described in the
... declarations." Id. at 1386. Thus, Nationwide asserted that because the motorcycle was
not listed in the declarations page, the accident would not have been covered under liability
if the insured's spouse had been the tortfeasor. Id. Although the husband was the spouse
of the named insured, and was covered under the liability section as an individual,
Nationwide asserted that the accident was not covered, and he was therefore precluded from
recovery under UM. Phillips, 609 So. 2d at 1388.
The Phillips court held that the restatement of the Mullis doctrine in Webster was
confusing and contradicted the repeated holding by Florida courts that UM applied to a Class
I insured "under whatever conditions, locations, or circumstances any of such insureds happen
to be in at the time . I..." ld. at 1388-89 (quoting Coleman v. Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n Inc.,
517 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1988)). Moreover, the statement is contradicted by a later
reference in Webster to the Mullis opinion: "Mullis specifically holds that the statute
requires only that uninsured motorist coverage must be provided to those covered for
liability." Id. at 1389 (quoting Webster, 567 So. 2d at 411). The Phillips court therefore
held that the language in Webster, which defined UM coverage by the availability of liability
coverage for the accident, was non-binding dicta, and that the husband could recover under
UM. Id.
The Florida Supreme Court has granted certiorari and heard the Phillips case on
October 5, 1993, along with a companion case, Welker v. World Wide Underwriters Ins. Co.,
601 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Petitioner's Brief on Jurisdiction at 8, State
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Allyn and Carguillo are distinguishable from Grant and Petersen,
however, in that Allyn and Carguillo define the tortfeasor's vehicle. It is
logical to apply the Financial Responsibility Law when defining the
"offending motorist,"'7 whose fictitious insurance"' under that law UM
coverage is intended to parallel. The Grant and Petersen courts, however,
are not defining the tortfeasor's vehicle. Rather, they define the vehicle
occupied by the insured. Because there is no fictitious liability coverage
pertinent to the analysis in Grant and Petersen, the rationale for preferring
the Financial Responsibility Law definition over the No-Fault definition, the
public policy outlined in Allyn and Carguillo, is not applicable to Grant or
Petersen.
V. PETERSEN, GRANT AND POLICY CONSTRUCTION
In "My Fair Lady", Professor Higgins lamented, "Why Can't the
English Learn How to Speak?" On behalf of the insureds and their
attorneys, this plea may well be paraphrased to "Why Can't the
Companies Learn How to Write?" Why is it that so many of them
insist upon cluttering up their policies with braintesting definitions,
exclusions and conditions? . . .For years they have insisted upon
inserting ambiguity and repugnancy in their policies, to the constern-
ation of laymen and attorneys alike, all in face of the fact that when
they indulge in such practice, the courts invariably construe the policies
liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.'69
Although Grant and Petersen effectively reach opposite results, the
reasoning of the courts are different. While the Grant court focused on the
public policy of UM and the Financial Responsibility Law outlined
above, 7° the Petersen court based its ruling on policy construction.
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Petersen, 615 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (No.
81,740). The court's opinion was not available as of this publication. This issue is raised
now to demonstrate the degree to which carriers have attempted to narrow the broad coverage
afforded under Mullis since it was decided.
167. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
168. Salas v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972) (Dekle, J., dissenting)
(in applying the reasoning that recovery should be as if the uninsured motorist had carried
an automobile liability policy, the court "fictitiously" "issues" a liability policy to the
tortfeasor).
169. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp. v. United Filigree Corp., 298 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1974).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 160-66.
Tamir
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As the quote above indicates, insurance contracts are the penultimate
contracts of adhesion. Because they are steeped in ambiguity and confusion,
Florida courts have adopted the rule of liberal construction in favor of the
insured, and strict construction against the insurer.' 7 ' If a policy is
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the insured.'72 This rule is
tempered, however, by requiring a "genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or
ambiguity in meaning remain[ing] after resort to the ordinary rules of con-
struction" before the policy will be construed in favor of the insured.'73
A genuine ambiguity occurs when the terms of a policy are susceptible to
two reasonable constructions, and the interpretation which sustains coverage
for the insured will then be adopted.7 7 The rationale underlying this
principle is that the carrier, and not the insured, picks the language used.
75
171. Hartnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1965); see also Nixon v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 290 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1973) (where contractor, sued for defect in
wall which collapsed killing a child, could recover under policy despite exclusion precluding
recovery for completed products); Kirsch v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 598 So. 2d 109 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App.) (terms of an exclusion in insurance policy are to be narrowly construed
and uncertainties resolved in favor of coverage), review denied, 613 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992);
Swindal v. Prudential Property & Casualty Co., 599 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (exclusion of liability for intentional acts in homeowner's policy construed narrowly
allowing indemnity to insured who shot the plaintiff); Tire Kingdom Inc. v. First Southern
Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (inconsistencies in policy required
adopting construction that afforded coverage under commercial policy for claim of unfair
trade practices made against insured), review denied, 589 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1991); Tropical
Park Inc. v. United Stated Fidelity & Guar. Co., 357 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (terms of policy susceptible to two reasonable constructions, interpretation which
sustains coverage for the insured will be adopted); Fontainbleau Hotel, 298 So. 2d at 455
(under contractor's liability policy having two interpretations, court adopted interpretation
which sustained claim for building collapse caused by contractor's negligence).
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (interpretation of
contract against the draftsman); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK
ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.01, at 3-8 (5th ed. 1992).
173. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 498 So. 2d 1245, 1248 (Fla. 1986);
see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, § 1.02, at 8-10.
174. See, e.g., Tire Kingdom, 573 So. 2d at 885; accord Tropical Park, 357 So. 2d at
253; Fontainbleau Hotel, 298 So. 2d at 455; Feldman v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha,
279 So. 2d 897, 898 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra
note 172, § 1.03[b], at 12-13.
175. See, e.g., TropicalPark, 357 So. 2d at 256; Nixon, 290 So. 2d at 29; Hartnett, 181
So. 2d at 525. In Hartnett, the supreme court stated:
There is no reason why such policies cannot be phrased so that the average
person can clearly understand what he is buying. And so long as these contracts
are drawn in such a manner that it requires the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer
to comprehend the terms embodied in it, the courts should and will construe
[Vol. 18
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In Petersen, State Farm asserted that because the term "motor vehicle"
was not defined in the definitions section of the policy, and did not appear
in "bold italics" as other defined terms did, it was an undefined term in the
UM section and must be afforded its plain meaning.'76 It proposed that
the definition of the term "motor vehicle," which appeared in the No-Fault
section, did not apply to the UM section.'77 This assertion, however, is
contrary to Florida law which states that "[e]very insurance contract shall
be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth
in the policy and as amplified, extended, or modified by any application
therefore or any rider or endorsement thereto."'78 If an application must
be incorporated into the terms of a policy, so must a definition that appears
on the face of it.'" 9 The only definition for the term "motor vehicle" ap-
them liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer to protect
the buying public who rely upon the companies and agencies in such transac-
tions.
Hartnett, 181 So. 2d at 528; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt.
b, (1981) (rationale for interpretation of a contract against the drafter).
It should also be noted that State Farm could have avoided this problem altogether in
one of two ways: (1) it could have adopted the wording of Florida's Statutes section
627.727(9)(d) which phrases the exclusion:
The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy does not apply to the
named insured or family members residing within his household who are injured
while occupying any vehicle owned by such insureds for which uninsured
motorist coverage was not purchased.
FLA. STAT. § 627.727(9)(d) (1991) (emphasis added); or (2) it could have merely supplied
another definition of "motor vehicle" in the UM section of the policy.
176. Appellee's Brief at 19, Petersen (No. 92-01828).
177. Id.
178. FLA. STAT. § 627.419 (1991) (emphasis added); see also Associated Elec. & Gas
Ins. Servs. v. Houston Oil & Gas Co., 552 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(allowing insured to recover under Completed Operations Hazard clause of commercial policy
for damages caused by explosion occurring off the insured premises); Ellenwood v. Southern
United Life Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to read clause
in life insurance policy separately from the two sentences preceding it, when all read together
provided coverage, and the sentence read separately excluded coverage); Feldman v. Central
Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 279 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (construing health
insurance policy as covering hospitalization after termination of the policy, where policy
language provided for all hospitalizations resulting from an accident, and hospitalization was
caused by injuries sustained in accident which predated termination of the policy).
179. See Dorrel v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 221 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969) (holding that definitions given in the policy must be followed when interpreting
automobile insurance policies); accord Valdes v. Prudence Mut. Casualty Co., 207 So. 2d
312, 314 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (in holding that a motor scooter is not an "automo-
bile" for an owned-uninsured vehicle exclusion, the court stated "this case could and should
1993]
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peared in the PIP section of the policy. 8' Therefore, when construing the
State Farm policy "according to the entirety of its terms,"'' the exclusion
must incorporate the definition provided in the policy, which excludes
motorcycles. Because Petersen was driving a motorcycle, his vehicle was
not excluded, and he was, therefore, covered when the accident oc-
curred.8 2
Even if State Farm can persuade the court that a motorcycle is
excluded by applying the Financial Responsibility Law's definition, State
Farm must still fail. By writing a definition into the policy which contrasted
with the definition applied to the exclusion, State Farm created ambiguity
in the policy. The policy is susceptible to two opposite interpretations; one
affording coverage, and the other precluding coverage. This "genuine
ambiguity '83 must be resolved in favor of the insured.
84
The Petersen court correctly applied Florida's rules of construction in
finding coverage for the insured. The Grant court reached different results,
however, not by applying the plain meaning of the term as urged by State
Farm; rather, by adopting the Financial Responsibility Law's definition and
relying on the precedent of Allyn and Carguillo.'85
Allyn dealt with a similar policy construction issue of whether the court
should look to a statutory definition in favor of one provided by the
policy. 86  As in Grant and Petersen, the Allyn policy had a No-Fault
section which defined a motor vehicle as one with four or more wheels.8 7
Ironically, the insurer made the same argument the plaintiffs now propose.
In recalling the rule that the court must apply the policy definitions when
construing its terms, 8 Standard Marine asserted that the court should
apply the policy definition under the PIP section to the motor vehicle driven
by the uninsured tortfeasor.8 9 Standard Marine asserted that because the
be decided by reference to the words and definitions used by the defendant itself in the
policy." (quoting Westerhausen v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966))); see also
OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, § 1.01, at 3.
180. Petersen, 615 So. 2d at 182.
181. FLA. STAT. § 627.419 (1991).
182. Peterson, 615 So. 2d at 182.
183. See supra text accompanying note 173.
184. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
186. See Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 498-99.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 499 (citing Dorrel, 221 So. 2d at 5).
189. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499. As in Peterson and Grant, the PIP definition in the
Standard Marine policy was based upon the No-Fault law which required the vehicle to have
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tortfeasor was driving a motorcycle, his vehicle was not an uninsured motor
vehicle under the policy definition, and the claimant, who was a Class I
insured, was precluded from recovering UM coverage.' 90
The Allyn court, however, held that the definition in a policy may be
applied where the definition given is applicable to the coverage assumed, if
not contrary to statutory limitations and requirements.' 9' "It is well settled
in this State that where a contract of insurance is entered into on a matter
surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, the parties are
presumed to have entered into such agreement with reference to the statute,
and the statutory provisions become part of the contract. .... In
recalling the public policy of the UM statute,' 93 the Allyn court reasoned
that applying the policy definition in this instance would impermissibly
provide the insured with less coverage than required by the statute., 94
Thus, the policy definition was supplanted with the Financial Responsibility
definition in order to afford the insured the minimum coverage required by
the UM statute.' 9"
Although the public policy of the UM statute overrode the words of the
policy in Allyn, no such public policy exists in Grant and Petersen.
Because Grant and Petersen are not defining the tortfeasor's motor vehicle,
using the State Farm policy definition of "motor vehicle" will not provide
the insured less coverage than intended by the statute. Although a carrier
may not afford less coverage than outlined in the statute, it can provide
more.'96 Because the Grant court had no reason to construe the policy
four or more wheels. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1966), cert. dismissed, 196 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1967)).
192. Gavin, 184 So. 2d at 232 (citation omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 178-79 (1981).
193. The UM statute is intended to provided an insured with the same coverage he
would have been entitled to recover had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance. Allyn, 333
So. 2d at 499; see supra text accompanying note 161.
194. Allyn, 333 So. 2d at 499.
195. Id.
196. This is so because the statutes outline the minimum coverage required, not the
maximum. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 574 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1990)
(policy language allowed recovery even though tortfeasor's liability coverage exceeded
insured's UM limits and under Florida Statutes section 627.727, insured would not have been
able to recover); see also Newton v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 560 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App.) (allowing insured recovery under UM policy even though insured's injuries did not
meet the statutory injury threshold required to pursue a claim for non-economic damages
against the tortfeasor), review denied, 574 So. 2d 139 (Fla.), review denied sub nom.
1993]
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differently from the way it was written, its holding erroneously relied on
precedent and public policy that did not apply to the facts of the case.
Moreover, Florida's courts generally treat coverage clauses differently
from exclusions, such that exclusionary clauses are construed more strictly
than coverage clauses.'97 Yet the Grant court applied the rationale from
cases which construed coverage in order to broaden an exclusion. The
distinction between coverage clauses and exclusions was clarified in Salas
v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,198 when the supreme court stated
"the use of the language utilized in the argument under consideration ...
indicates that the phraseology was intended to create greater liability
coverage, not to create exemptions."' 99 The supreme court rejected the
carrier's attempt to apply case law which broadened coverage to exclusions
which decreased it.2"' The Grant court's reliance on case law which
broadens coverage for the insured, therefore, is misplaced when construing
an exclusion.
Thus, the Grant court's application of the Financial Responsibility
Law's definition is in error for two reasons. First, the public policy the
court relied upon does not apply to the facts of the case. Second, the court
applied case law that construes coverage broadly, in order to broaden an
exclusion, which, according to Florida's rules of construction, are to be
narrowly construed.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Petersen court correctly applied Florida's rules of policy
construction, the Grant court relied on public policy that does not apply, and
precedent that may not be controlling, in order to construe the State Farm
policy as precluding coverage to the insured. The Florida Supreme Court
could resolve the conflict between Petersen and Grant on narrow grounds
by ruling on the policy construction issue only. However, such a narrow
International Bankers Co. v. Newton, 574 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1990).
197. Triano v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1990); accord Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 536 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1988); see also OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 172, §
1.03[b][1], at 12.
198. 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id. at 5 (holding that language of Mullis, which provided that the public policy of
UM is to provide the minimum limits of automobile liability policy, could not be applied to
household member exclusion).
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ruling will not address the position of Mullis as precedent under the current
version of the statute which allows selective nonstacking; would not resolve
the effect of the 1987 amendment to the UM statute on UM's relationship
to the Financial Responsibility Law and PIP Law; and would shed no
further light on the position of a motorcycle under Florida insurance law.
This comment has illustrated that in most insurance cases, the motorcy-
clist does riot recover for his injuries; either because the courts define a
motorcycle as a motor vehicle when such definition precludes recovery by
policy exclusion, or because the Legislature excluded motorcycles from the
definition of motor vehicle under the No-Fault Law. Uninsured motorist
coverage, therefore, has usually been the only recovery available to the
motorcyclist in the wake of catastrophic collisions and devastating injuries.
Uninsured motorist coverage, however, is rapidly disappearing as the safety
net for the motorcyclist.
Although motorcyclists can purchase UM coverage for a motorcycle,
most insureds do not understand the nature of this coverage or its impor-
tance.2' Moreover, many insureds are not fully informed by their carriers
of the availability of UM coverage for motorcycles, or are intentionally mis-
lead.2" 2 The Grant and Petersen cases illustrate the degree to which UM
carriers have tried to narrow the coverage afforded under UM, and to
"whittle away" at the broad holding of Mullis.
Given motorcycles' propensity for injury and damage, Florida's
Legislature should consider providing more coverage for their victims rather
than less. The public funds contribution to care for injured motorcyclists
has been estimated at between 63.4 and 82.3 percent of total expenses.2 3
The Legislature must consider the public cost of treating the injured
201. See Karen E. Roselli, Comment, Florida Statute Section 627.727: Is the Statutory
Right to Reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage Really a "Right" At All?, 8 NOVA L. REV. 145,
145-46 (1983).
202. See, e.g., Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 395 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (insured asserted that his agent told him UM was not available for
motorcycles); cf Wilson v. National Indem. Co., 302 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (insured was told by agent that she did not need UM because it duplicated medical
coverage she already had as member of the armed forces).
203. Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222 (studying the costs of motorcycle trauma
in Seattle, Washington); see also Timothy Bray, M.D. et al. Cost of Orthopedic Injuries
Sustained in Motorcycle Accidents, 254 JAMA 2452 (1985) (studying the costs of motorcycle
trauma at the University of California, Davis, Medical Center in Sacramento, California).
The average cost per patient in the Seattle study group was estimated at $25,764.00 in 1988.
Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222. Factoring in the rising cost of health care, the per
patient cost is much higher today.
1993]
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motorcyclist, caring for his or her family during a long period of convales-
cence, and supporting the family of a motorcyclist permanently if he or she
dies.2" 4 Thus, the underlying argument for failing to require coverage for
motorcyclists, that they assume the inherent risk of riding these vehicles,
falls flat when Florida's citizens assume the cost.
Although the optimum solution, both for motorcyclists and for all
Florida motorists, would be mandated bodily injury liability coverage for all
drivers," 5  Florida's Legislature has been reluctant to do this.20 6 In the
alternative, the Legislature could mandate UM coverage as a prerequisite for
all motorcycle registrations, and thus require drivers who wish to assume the
inherent risk of driving these vehicles to also assume the insurance cost of
their protection. Although this seems a paternalistic solution, it would shift
the financial burden of caring for the injured motorcyclist from the taxpayer.
It would also ensure recompense for motorcyclists who face a much higher
risk of death and severe injury and who, in Florida, will more likely than
not, be struck by an uninsured driver.20 7
DENISE TAMIR
204. See Motorcycle Trauma, supra note 8, at 222-23. A Massachusetts court summed
up the problem:
We cannot agree that the consequences of such (motorcycle) injuries are limited
to the individual who sustains the injury. From the moment of injury, society
picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and
municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment compensation, if after
recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the injury causes permanent
disability, may assume the responsibility for his and his family's subsistence.
Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Mass), affirmed, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
205. This would decrease the number of uninsured drivers on Florida's roads, and
accordingly, reduce the risk of non-compensable injuries.
206. Surprisingly, it is the insurance industry that has lobbied against such required
coverage. See Henderson & Moroney, supra note 151, at 802.
207. See id. at 792.
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Exhibit A
BROWARD ALL CRASHES FATAL CRASHES INJURY CRASHES
COUNTY # 9 # %
PASSENGER
VEHICLES 34,933 195 
.56 22,984 65.79
MOTORCYCLES 538 11 
2.04 485 90.15
PALM BEACH ALL CRASHES 
FATAL CRASHES INJURY 
CRASHES
COUNTY 
PASSENGER
VEHICLES 19,935 
152 .76 13,202 
66.23
MOTORCYCLES 
311 8 2.57 
269 86.50
#= The number of all crashes which resulted in a 
fatality or injury.
%=The percentage of all crashes which resulted 
in a fatality or
Source: Florida Department of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles, crash
records.
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